9 The politics of liberalism in a realist world

This book has clearly shown the extent to which human rights has become a routine part of international relations. Michael Ignatieff has captured the trend succinctly but brilliantly: “We are scarcely aware of the extent to which our moral imagination has been transformed since 1945 by the growth of a language and practice of moral universalism, expressed above all in a shared human rights culture.”1 The language and practice of universal human rights, and of its first cousin, regional human rights, has been a redeeming feature of a very bloody and harsh twentieth century. But the journalist David Rieff reminds us of a more skeptical inter- pretation of universal human rights. “The universalizing impulse is an old tradition in the West, and, for all the condemnations that it routinely incurs today, particularly in the universities, it has probably done at least as much good as harm. But universalism easily declines into sentimen- talism, into a tortured but useless distance from the particulars of human affairs.”2 Or, to drive the same point home with a more concrete exam- ple, whereas virtually all states formally endorse the abstract principles of human rights in peace and war, “Combatants are as likely to know as

much about the laws of war as they do about quantum mechanics.”3

The international law of human rights is based on liberalism, but the

practice of human rights all too often reflects a realist world. State interests

rather than personal rights often prevail, interpersonal equality often gives

way to disrespect for – if not hatred of – “others,” violent conflict is persistent, and weak international institutions are easily demonstrated.4

1 Michael Ignatieff, *The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience* (New York: Metropolitan, 1997), 8.

2 David Rieff, “The Humanitarian Illusion,” *The New Republic*, March 16, 1998, 28.

3 David Scheffer, “The Clear and Present Danger of War Crimes,” Address, University of

Oklahoma College of Law, February 24, 1998, unpublished.

4 To expand on notions of realism discussed in chapter 1, see further among many sources

Jack Donnelly, *Realism in International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 2000). On the difference between human and national interests in international

relations, see especially Robert C. Johansen, *The National Interest and the Human Interest:*

*An Analysis of US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980).

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It is a type of liberal progress in keeping with Ignatieff ’s view that we now recognize the enslavement and other exploitation of the persons in the Congo river basin between about 1460 and 1960 as a violation of their human rights.5 It is a testament to the continuing explanatory power of David Rieff ’s realism that we note the lack of effective or decisive inter- national response to the massacres and other gross violations of human rights in the Congo river basin after 1960, whether one speaks of Zaire or the Democratic Republic of Congo.

We recognize rights, but often we do not act to protect them. This provides one good answer to the frequently heard lament: “How could the rhetoric of human rights be so globally pervasive while the politics of human rights is so utterly weak?”6

**To review**

Given the ground covered in this work thus far, a brief review of main points is in order. Dichotomies and paradoxes characterize the turbulent international relations of the turn of the century in 2000, as we noted in chapter 1. International human rights are here to stay, but so is state sovereignty. The latter notion is being transformed by the actions, *inter alia*, of intergovernmental and transnational non-governmental organi- zations. But state consent still usually matters legally, and state policy and power still count for much in human affairs. One historian – tongue in cheek – quotes a British diplomat to the effect that we need an addi- tional article in the UN Charter: “Nothing in the present Charter should be allowed to foster the illusion that [state] power is no longer of any consequence.”7 Our moral imagination has been expanded by the lan- guage of universal rights, but we live in a world in which nationalism and the nation-state and national interests are frequently powerful barriers to effective action in the name of international human rights. Trade-offs and compromises between liberal and realist principles are legion, as human rights values are contextualized in a modified nation-state system of inter- national relations.8

As covered in chapter 2, the International Bill of Rights and supple- mental standards give us the modern international law of global human rights. For all of its defects, noted in various critiques covered below, it is

5 Adam Hochschild, *King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial*

*Africa* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998).

6 Kenneth Cmiel, “The Recent History of Human Rights,” *American Historical Review,*

109, 1 (February 2004), 117–135, at 118.

7 Geoffrey Best, Book Review, *Los Angeles Times*, August 16, 1998, 8.

8 See further Rein Mullerson, *Human Rights Diplomacy* (London: Routledge, 1997).

far more developed (meaning specified and structured) than some other parts of international law pertaining to such subject matter as ecology.

Like all law it is the result of a political process, frequently contentious. Surely it comes as no surprise that transnational standards pertaining to the right to life or to the right of freedom of religion or to free- dom from discrimination, *inter alia*, should prove controversial. The exis- tence of international human rights law owes much to the western-style democracies – their liberal values and their hard power (the liberal val- ues themselves can be a type of soft power). Still, internationally recog- nized human rights were also affected by the old communist coalition, and certainly by the newly independent states of the global south after about 1960.

It cannot be stressed too much that whereas certainly the practice of politics on the basis of respect for the notion of human rights was exten- sively developed in certain western states, the idea of human rights is a defense against abuse of power everywhere.9 Wherever the bicycle was invented, its utility is not limited to that historical and geographical situ- ation. So it is also with the idea and practice of human rights.

The human dignity of especially those without great power and wealth normally benefits from the barriers to injurious acts of commission and omission provided by human rights standards. Intentional mass murder and neglectful mass misery are equal affronts to any conception of human dignity. Mass misery no less than mass murder can be changed by human endeavor, and is thus grist for the mill of human rights discourse. As often noted, there is no material or moral reason for world hunger, save for the way we choose to organize ourselves as inhabitants of the planet earth.10

We create territorial states whose governments are sometimes said to have responsibility only to their citizens; foster a type of nationalism that tends to restrict morality to within national borders; and internationally endorse a harsh form of *laissez-faire* economics despite its rejection on moral grounds at home. The idea of universal human rights seeks to change those mind sets.

But human dignity itself, and human rights as a means to that end, are contested constructs whose meaning must be established in a never- ceasing process of moral, political, and legal debate and review. Beyond mass murder and mass misery, the dividing line between fundamental personal rights and myriad optional legal rights is a matter of considerable controversy.

9 See further Thomas M. Franck, “Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?,” *American*

*Journal of International Law*, 91, 4 (October 1997), 593–627.

10 Thomas Pogge, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms*

(Cambridge: Polity, 2002).

In chapter 3 we saw that the UN has moved beyond the setting of human rights standards toward the systematic supervision of state behav- ior. This is a very broad and accelerating development, unfortunately partially undermined not only by a paucity of resources that states allow the overall UN human rights program, but also by the disjointed nature of the beast. The sum total of the diplomacy of shaming, or the politics of embarrassment, certainly has had an educative effect over time, even if the calculated violation continued in the short term.

At least at first glance it was encouraging that the United Nations Secu- rity Council after the Cold War should pay so much attention to human rights issues in the guise of threats to international peace and security. The Council’s deployment of field missions under the idea of second- generation or complex peacekeeping, mostly directed to producing a lib- eral democratic order out of failed states, showed a willingness to deal with many of the root causes of human rights violations – as long as the principal parties gave their consent to the UN presence. Such missions clearly were on the progressive side of history in places like El Salvador, Namibia and Mozambique. The trend continued in places like Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor, and Cambodia.

It was also noteworthy that the Council should authorize enforcement actions on behalf of democratic governance and other humane values in places like Haiti and Somalia, even if the job had to be contracted out to one or more member states, and even if the follow-up left something to be desired. Unfortunately the Council was heavily dependent on the one remaining superpower, the United States, to make its enforcement actions effective. The result was a very spotty record of UN accomplish- ments, especially where the USA saw few traditional national interests to sustain a complicated involvement. In the Kosovo crisis of 1999 the United States tried to enforce human rights protections via NATO, but without Security Council authorization and through a highly controver- sial military strategy.

On balance the UN was paying more attention to human rights, not less. It was being creative in the interpretation of Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, in calling emergency sessions of the Human Rights Commis- sion, in expanding the authority of its monitoring mechanisms, in creating the office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, in utilizing NGO information, and in other ways.

Some of this UN creativity had to do with the establishment of the two *ad hoc* international criminal courts by the Security Council, as we saw in chapter 4. The new standing international criminal court, whose statute was overwhelmingly approved in 1998, and which began to function dur- ing 2002–2003, was to be loosely associated with the UN. This renewed

foray into international criminal justice was a noteworthy development after a hiatus of some fifty years. It triggered a new round of debate about peace v. justice, and about what was central to peace as compared with a moral sideshow. Ignatieff is again brilliantly concise when he writes, “Justice in itself is not a problematic objective, but whether the attain- ment of [criminal] justice always contributes to reconciliation is anything but evident.”11 New efforts at international criminal justice also caused national policy makers to calculate carefully about how vigorously to go after those indicted for war crimes, crimes against humanity, and geno- cide, for fear of undermining larger objectives or incurring human costs difficult to justify according to traditional notions of national interest.

The permanent court particularly was bitterly opposed by conserva- tive circles in the USA, who saw the projected infringements on state sovereignty, if such they were, as completely unacceptable.12 There was nothing more frightening to them than an effective international law that would really circumscribe their freedom of national decision making. That the USA should be actively pushing a new special criminal tribunal for Cambodia at the same time that it was fending off the new permanent court that might (but probably would not) wind up exercising jurisdic- tion over Americans was a double standard too blatant to ignore. That the USA was in favor of criminal justice for those in the former Yugoslavia and the Great Lakes Region of Africa, but not as applied to itself, was – smokescreen arguments aside – a position which undermined US attempts to present itself as a human rights model for others. More- over, when the USA reduced military assistance to about a dozen states in the Western Hemisphere in order to pressure them to sign agreements exempting Americans from the ICC, this action hurt US attempts to work with these same militaries in curtailing the drug trade and other common objectives.13

What started out in 1993 as mostly a public relations ploy, namely to create an *ad hoc* tribunal to appear to be doing something about human rights violations in Bosnia without major risk, by 2005 had become an important global movement for international criminal justice formally accepted by about 100 states. Such were the unexpected outcomes of a series of “accidental” or *ad hoc* decisions, as states muddled their way through complex calculations of media coverage, popular pressure,

11 Ignatieff, *The Warrior’s Honor*, 170.

12 See for example John Bolton (former US Assistant Secretary of State for International

Organizations and later US representative to the UN), “The Global Prosecutors: Hunt-

ing War Criminals in the Name of Utopia,” *Foreign Affairs*, 78, 1 (January/February

1999), 157–164.

13 Juan Forero, “Bush’s Aid Cuts on Court Issue Roil Neighbors,” *New York Times*, August

19, 2005, A1.

traditional national interests, and state power. Private armies might com- mit many of the violations of human rights, and private human rights groups might be players in the legislative process, but ultimately it was states that decided. Even the normally cynical British and French split with the USA over the issue of a permanent court, endorsing its estab- lishment.

This might have been the case in part because, as we saw in chapter 5, the British and the French and most other European states had become accustomed to having supranational courts make judgments on human rights in both the Council of Europe and the European Union. French policy in particular had undergone a considerable change. Like the USA, France long considered its record on human rights beyond the need for the type of international review provided by individual petitions and a supranational regional court. But France – and Turkey – shifted over time, providing at least a glimmer of hope that eventually US nationalism might prove more accommodating to multilateral human rights developments.14

Be that latter point as it may, European protections of civil and politi- cal rights remained a beacon of rationality and effectiveness in a troubled world. The Council of Europe and the European Union proved that liberal principles of human rights could indeed be effectively combined with realist principles of the state system. Of course European develop- ments transformed the regional state system in important ways, as states used their sovereignty to restrict their independence of policy making. Yet states continued to exist in meaningful ways, as did their views of their national interests. But an international view on protecting human rights also mattered in very important ways, mostly through the judgments of the supranational courts existing in Strasburg and Luxemburg.

In less striking, more diplomatic (as compared with legal) ways the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe mattered regarding especially the diplomatic protection of national minorities. That NATO should be used to try to protect Albanian Kosovar rights in 1999 was indicative not only of the importance of regional organizations, but also of the importance of international action for human rights in Europe. It was not hyperbole to say that commitment to human rights was the touchstone of being European. Beyond Europe, the human rights agen- cies associated with the Organization of American States, especially the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights, at least generated some impact sometimes on some issues. While the short-term view regarding African regional developments for human rights was even less encour- aging, it was at least possible that the Banjul Charter and the African

14 In *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage, 2003, 2004), Robert Kagan argues that Europeans are much more committed to international law and organization as essential public goods than is the USA.

Commission on Human Rights were laying the foundations for long-term progress. After all, both the European Commission and Court had mostly undistinguished records during their first decade of operation, although both operated in an environment more conducive to real regional pro- tection compared with Africa (and historically the Western Hemisphere). At least for Latin American states (but not so much the English speak- ing states of the Western Hemisphere), there were more states (not less) accepting the jurisdiction of the InterAmerican Court of Human Rights, and that court was handing down more (not less) judgments.

Permeating all these international developments on human rights was state foreign policy, as we saw in chapter 6. It is states that take the most important decisions in most inter-governmental organizations, and it is states that are the primary targets of lobbying activities by traditional advocacy groups. State sovereignty is being transformed by transnational interests and movements, but states and their conceptions of sovereignty remain an important – indeed essential – aspect of world affairs at the turn of the century.

Contrary to some realist principles, rational states do not always adopt similar foreign policies despite their existing in anarchic international rela- tions. Because of history, culture, ideology, and self-image, some states do strongly identify with international human rights. They may take dif- ferent slants and emphases when incorporating human rights into their foreign policies. But increasingly many states wish to stand for some- thing besides independent existence and power. States certainly have not abandoned self-interest and pursuit of advantage, but more so than in the past they often seek to combine these traditional expediential concerns with concern for the human rights of others. The liberal framework of international relations, embedded in international law and organization, pushes them in that direction.

To be sure the result is usually inconsistent foreign policies that fall short of the goals demanded by the human rights advocacy groups. But in empirical and relative terms, there is now more attention to human rights in foreign policy than was the case in the League of Nations era. In a shrinking world, states that profess humane values at home find it difficult to completely ignore questions of human rights and dignity beyond their borders. Their self-image, their political culture, mandates that linkage. States that initially seek to bypass issues of individual human rights, like China and Iran, find themselves drawn into a process in which they at least endorse, perhaps in initially vague ways, human rights standards.

Traditional human rights advocacy groups have been active concerning both legislation and implementation of norms, as we traced in chapter 7. Basing their actions mostly on accurate information, they have followed a self-defined moral imperative to try to “educate” public authorities into

elevating their concerns for internationally recognized human rights. Fre- quently coalescing into movements or networks entailing diverse part- ners, they have engaged in soft lobbying (viz., lobbying that bypasses electoral and financial threat). Mostly relying on the politics of embar- rassment or shaming, they have sought to use reason and publicity to bring about progressive change.

It has usually been difficult to factor out the general but singular influ- ence of this or that human rights NGO, or even this or that movement. Nevertheless, given the flood of information they produce and the per- sistent dynamism the major groups like Amnesty International exhibit, it is difficult to believe that the same evolution concerning international human rights would have occurred over the past thirty years without their efforts. In some cases and situations NGO influence can indeed be doc- umented. It is certainly true that the international system for provision of emergency relief in armed conflict and complex emergencies would not be the same without private groups such as the International Committee of the Red Cross. Likewise, there are numerous groups active for “devel- opment,” or social and economic rights, like Oxfam, Save the Children, etc., and they often provide an important link between the donor agencies and the persons who presumably benefit from “development.”

Increasingly it is necessary to look beyond not only states and their inter-governmental organizations, but also beyond the private groups active for human rights, relief, and development for an understanding of the fate of human rights in the modern world. We especially need to look at transnational corporations, as we did in chapter 8. Given their enormous and growing power in international economics, and given the dynamics of capitalism, it is small wonder that their labor practices have come under closer scrutiny. It may be states that formally make and mostly enforce human rights norms. But it is private corporations, fre- quently acting under pressure from private groups and movements, that can have a great impact on the reality of human rights – especially in the workplace. Sometimes states are rather like mediators or facilitators, channeling concern from private advocacy groups and movements into arrangements that corporations come to accept.15 Such was the case with the US government concerning labor standards in the apparel industry, and with the German government concerning child labor in the interna- tional rug industry.

One of the more interesting developments concerning international human rights at the close of the twentieth century was the linkage between student activism and labor standards at many universities in

15 See further B. Hocking, *Catalytic Diplomacy* (Leicester: Centre for Diplomatic Studies,

1996).

the global north. This merger resulted in growing pressure on partic- ularly the apparel industry to end the use of not only child labor but sweatshops by their foreign sub-contractors. But progressive develop- ments were not limited to that one industry, as corporations selling coffee and other products felt the need to protect their brand name and bottom line by opening their foreign facilities to international inspection under international labor standards. It was not so much muscular international law and established inter-governmental relations that brought about new developments. Rather it was a movement made up of consumer groups, unions, the communications media, student movements, churches, and traditional advocacy groups that brought about codes of conduct with inspections and public reports.16

Still, one should not be Pollyannaish. Many of the corporations deal- ing in extraction of natural resources had compiled a record quite differ- ent from at least some TNCs in the American-based apparel industry. And many companies seemed more interested in public relations than in genuine commitment to either human rights or other means to human dignity.

**Toward the future**

The future of international human rights is not easy to predict with any specificity. One might agree with the statement attributed to the Danish philosopher Kierkegaard: life is lived forward but understood backward. Or one might agree with a statement from Vaclav Havel, first President of the Czech Republic: “That life is unfathomable is part of its dramatic beauty and its charm.”17 Nevertheless, one point is clear about human rights in international relations. We will not lack for controversy.

Human rights has indeed been institutionalized in international rela- tions, but that discourse will remain controversial. This is paradoxical but true. Debate is inherent in the concept of human rights. I do not refer now to the effort by philosophers to find an ultimate metaphysical source of, or justification for, the notion of human rights. Rather I refer to debates by policy makers and others interested in practical action in interpersonal relations. There is debate both by liberals of various sorts who believe in the positive contributions of human rights, and by non-liberals such as realists and Marxists.

16 For example, the Presbyterian Church USA considered divesting from certain corpo- rations providing military equipment to Israel, such was that church’s concern about Isreaeli policies in the occupied territories. See Laurie Goodstein, “Threat to Divest Is Church Tool In Israeli Fight,” *New York Times,* August 6, 2005, A1.

17 Vaclav Havel, *Summer Meditations* (New York: Vintage, 1993), 102.

**Controversies in liberalism**

*Enduring questions*

Even for those who believe that international human rights constitute on balance a good thing, there are no clear and fixed, much less scientific, answers to a series of questions. What defines universal human dignity? What are the proper moral human rights, as means, to that dignity? Which are truly fundamental, and which are optional? Which are so fundamental as to be absolutely non-violable, even in war and other situations threat- ening national security or the life of the nation, and thus constituting part of *jus cogens* in international law (legal rules from which no conflict- ing rules or derogation is permitted)? What crimes are so heinous that the notion of universal jurisdiction attaches to them? When moral rights are translated into legal rights, and when there is conflict among legal rights, who resolves the conflicts, and on what principle?

*Traditional principles*

If we focus on particular principles that are said to be human rights prin- ciples in contemporary international law, derived from liberalism, we still cannot avoid debate. Revisit, if you will, the principle discussed in chap- ter 2 and codified in Article 1 of the two International Covenants in the International Bill of Rights: the collective right of the self-determination of peoples. How do we define a people with such a right – the Kosovars, the Quebecois, the Basques, the Ibos, the Kurds, the Slovaks, the Chechens, the Ossetians? Who is authorized to pronounce on such def- initional issues? If we could define such a people, what form or forms can self-determination take? And why have states in contemporary inter- national relations been unable to specify authoritative rules under this general principle that would prove relevant and helpful to conflicts over self-determination? Why is the evidence so overwhelming that most of these disputes are settled by politics, and frequently on the basis of supe- rior coercive power, rather than on the basis of legal rules about collective rights?

Even if we take the widely shared principle of freedom from torture, we cannot avoid controversy. The classic counter-example involves the hypothetical prisoner who has knowledge of an impending nuclear attack. Is it moral to observe the no-torture principle if it results in death or serious injury and sickness to millions? As we noted especially in chap- ter six, the USA from 2002 employed some coercive interrogation in its

military detention centers, ran a secret detention system in which abu- sive interrogation was probably the norm (why else keep it secret), and “rendered” persons to other states where mistreatment and even torture were widely regarded as prevalent. Was all of this truly necessary for US homeland security? Could the same information have been extracted by more humane methods? If one did obtain some “actionable intelligence,” but in the process engaged in a widely known abusive process that pro- duced even more “terrorists” because of their outrage, how should one evaluate the overall security situation? How should one evaluate the expe- rience of other countries that had employed mistreatment or torture, like France in the Algerian war, Britain in Nothern Ireland, and Israel between

1967 and 1999?18

Even if we take the widely shared principle about a right to religious freedom, we cannot escape controversy.19 This is so even in countries

that recognize the principle (and thus I exclude for the moment various controversies about Saudi Arabia and other states that reject the basic principle). What is a religion? The US government says that scientology is a religion, whereas the German government says it is a dangerous, perhaps neo-fascist cult. Do certain Native Americans in prison have a right to use marijuana as part of their arguably religious practices? Is religious belief a valid basis for refusal to serve in the military? Should religious freedom be elevated to those basic rights of the first order, as demanded at one point by the Republican-controlled Congress in the

1990s, and be made the object of special US concern? Or should reli- gious freedom be considered one of many rights, and deserving of no automatic priority over other rights – for example, freedom from torture – in state foreign policy? The latter was the position of the Clinton Admin- istration, although as noted it did respond to congressional pressures by creating a special office in the State Department to deal with religious freedom.

*New claims*

Certainly if we observe the demands for acknowledgment of a new, third generation of human rights in international relations, we cannot escape

18 See further especially Joseph Lelyveld, “Interrogating Ourselves,” *New York Times Mag- azine,* June 12, 2005, starting at p. 36. See also Michael Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terror* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005); and Richard Ashby Wilson, ed., *Human Rights in the “War on Terror”* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

19 See further Kevin Boyle and Juliet Sheen, eds., *Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World*

*Report* (London: Routledge, 1997).

the reality of continuing controversy. Should the principle be recognized of a human right to a safe environment? If so, would the enumeration of specific rules under this principle provide anything new, as compared with a repetition of already recognized civil rights about freedom of infor- mation, speech, association, and non-discrimination? On the other hand, is it not wise to draw further attention to ecological dangers by recast- ing norms as human rights norms, even at the price of some redundancy? Then again, given that many states of the global north already have exten- sive legal regulations to protect the environment, why is it necessary to apply the concept of human rights to environmental law?20 Do we not have a proliferation of human rights claims already?21 Do we not need a moratorium on new claims about human rights, perhaps until those rights already recognized can be better enforced?22

*Process priorities*

As should be clear by now, classical and pragmatic liberals do not always agree on how to direct attention to human rights, how much emphasis to give, and what priorities to establish when desired goals do not mesh easily. The classical liberal places great faith in persistent emphasis on law, criminal justice, and other punishments for violation of the law. The neo- liberal argues for many avenues to the advancement of personal dignity and social justice, of which attention to legal rights, adjudication and sanctions is only one.

As a pragmatic liberal, I see no alternative to a case-by-case evaluation of when to stress human rights law and adjudication, hard law, that is, and when to opt for the priority of other liberal values through diplo- macy. I believe, for example, that it was correct to pursue the Dayton accord in 1995 for increased peace in Bosnia, even if it meant at that time not indicting and arresting Slobodan Milosevic for his support for and encouragement of heinous acts. The persons of that area benefited

20 See further Alan Boyle and Michael Anderson, eds., *Human Rights Approaches to Envi- ronmental Protection* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996); Barbara Rose Johnston, ed., *Life and Death Matters: Human Rights and the Environment at the End of the Millennium* (Walnut Creek, CA: AltaMira Press, 1997).

21 See further Carl Wellman, *The Proliferation of Rights: Moral Progress or Empty Rhetoric?*

(Boulder: Westview, 1999).

22 See further W. Paul Gormley, *Human Rights and The Environment: the Need for Interna-*

*tional Co-operation* (Leiden: W.W. Sijthoff, 1976); and Human Rights Watch, *Defending*

*the Earth: Abuses of Human Rights and the Environment* (New York: Human Rights Watch,

1992). But see Philip Alston, who opposes the development of most new categories of

human rights when the older categories are not well enforced, in “Conjuring Up New

Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Control,” *American Journal of International Law*,

78, 3 (July 1984), 607–621.

from increased peace, decline of atrocities, and the attempt to establish liberal democracies in the region. I believe it was correct to go slow in the arrest of indicted persons in the Balkans, lest the United States and other western states incur casualties, as in Somalia in 1993, that would have undermined other needed international involvement, as in Rwanda in 1994.

I believe it was correct to emphasize truth commissions rather than criminal proceedings in places like El Salvador and South Africa, despite the gross violations of human rights under military rule in San Salvador and under apartheid in Pretoria. Long-term national reconciliation and stable liberal democracy are advancing in those two countries, whereas pursuit of criminal justice may have hardened animosities between the principal communities On the other hand, I think it a good idea to try to hold Augusto Pinochet legally accountable for crimes against humanity, including torture and disappearances, when he ruled Chile. His extra- dition from Britain and prosecution in Spain would make other tyrants more cautious about violating human rights.

Given the Chinese elite’s preoccupation with national stability, in the light of their turbulent national history and the closely watched disin- tegration of the Soviet Union during Gorbachev’s political reforms, I believe it is correct to take a long-term, diplomatic approach to the mat- ter of improvement of human rights in China. I believe we should use the international law of human rights as a guide for diplomacy and a goal for China’s evolution. But in the absence of another massacre as in Tiananmen Square in 1989, or some comparable gross violation of human rights, I believe that constructive engagement is the right general orientation.

None of these policy positions is offered as doctrinal truth. Many of them depend on the evolution of future events which are unknowable. All are offered as examples of policy choices that the typical pragmatic liberal might make, that are based on liberal commitment to the welfare of individuals over time regardless of nationality or gender or other dis- tinguishing feature, and that sometimes avoid an emphasis on criminal justice and other forms of punishment in the immediate future.

The pragmatic liberal approach allows for a great deal of flexibility and guarantees a certain amount of inconsistency. The pragmatic-liberal may support criminal justice for human rights violations in one situation, e.g., Spain regarding Chile, but not in another, e.g., Cambodia regarding the Khmer Rouge. The pragmatic liberal might well regard major sanctions as mostly inadvisable for Chinese violations of human rights, but find them useful in dealing with Iraq, or Afghanistan, or Burma, or Yugoslavia – or maybe not.

What we are certainly going to continue to see, even among liberals, is considerable debate about policy choice.

*Feminist perspectives*

Even the most radical feminists do not reject the international law of human rights, in the last analysis,23 and thus I list feminist perspectives as part of liberalism despite great variety among feminist publicists. Much of the feminist critique of extant human rights actually turns out to be gendered liberalism or pragmatic liberalism.24

The traditional feminist critique of human rights centers on the argu- ment that those norms, being produced in a male-dominated legislative process, focus on the public rather than private domain.25 The public arena is the man’s world, while women have been confined to the home as sexual object, mother, unpaid domestic worker, etc. Thus it is said that international human rights fail to deal adequately with domestic abuse and oppression of women. International human rights have supposedly been gendered to the detriment of women, despite an active role for some women in the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (as noted in chapter 3).

One feminist critique attacks one half of the International Bill of Rights as it exists today, preferring to emphasize supposedly feminist values like caring and responsibility.26 Here the argument is that a rights-based approach can only lead to negative rights of the civil and political variety. If one wishes to move beyond them to adequate food, clothing, shelter,

23 Eva Brems, “Enemies or Allies? Feminism and Cultural Relativism as Dissident Voices in the Human Rights Discourse,” *Human Rights Quarterly*, 19, 1 (February 1997), 140–

141.

24 It can be noted in passing that one strand of feminism reflects a “post-modern” or

“critical” or “essentialist” approach in that it argues that unless one is female, one can-

not understand female human dignity and the rights (and perhaps other institutions)

needed to protect it. Male observers and scholars, as well as policy makers, are sim-

ply incapable of comprehending either the problem or its solution. I myself would not

consider this approach part of the liberal tradition, for liberalism stresses a common

rationality and scientific method available to all without regard to gender. See further

Christine Sylvester, “The Contributions of Feminist Theory to International Relations,”

in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds., *International Theory: Positivism*

*and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 254–278.

25 See further, from a growing literature, Rebecca J. Cook, ed., *Human Rights of Women:*

*National and International Perspectives* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press,

1994). See the extensive literature cited regarding women’s rights on the Internet at

[www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/diana.](http://www.law-lib.utoronto.ca/diana) See further the extensive citations to women’s issues in

international relations at [www.umn.edu/humanrts/links/women/html.](http://www.umn.edu/humanrts/links/women/html)

26 Fiona Robinson, “The Limits of a Rights Based Approach to International Ethics,” in

Tony Evans, ed., *Human Rights Fifty Years On: A Reappraisal* (Manchester: Manchester

University Press, 1998), 58–76.

and health care, one needs a feminist ethics of care that stresses not rights but the morality of attentiveness, trust, and respect.

Parts of international human rights law are being revised to respond to the first critique. International and more specifically comparative refugee law now stipulates that private abuse can constitute persecution and that women can constitute a social group subject to persecution. Thus a woman, crossing an international border to flee such behavior as female genital mutilation, or a well-founded fear of such behavior, particularly when the home government does not exercise proper protection, is to be provided asylum and is not to be returned to such a situation. Canada and the United States have led the way in reading this new interpreta- tion into refugee law, acting under advisory guidelines established by the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees.27

As for the second critique, it should be repeated that the discourse on human rights does not capture the totality of ethics pertaining to interpersonal relations. No doubt an ethics of care and responsibility has its place. Whether such an ethics in international relations is particularly feminine, and whether it can be specified and encouraged to better effect than the human rights discourse, are interesting questions. It is by no means certain that a rights approach must be limited to negative rights, and cannot adequately lead to minimal floors for nutrition, clothing, shelter, and health care.28

The second feminist critique overlaps with parts of the pragmatic lib- eral argument in arguing the merits of at least supplementing legal rights with action not based on rights but still oriented to the welfare of indi- viduals. Once again we find that much of the feminist critique of human rights reflects some form of liberalism, mostly gendered pragmatic liber- alism. One needs the concept of human rights, if perhaps revised to take further account of special problems of dignity and justice that pertain to women, but one may also need to go beyond rights to extra-legal or a-legal programs that do not center on adjudication.

Still, a reason for legal rights is the reliability and efficacy of think- ing in terms of entitlements that public authority must respect. That is why Henry Dunant and then the ICRC started with the notion of char- ity toward those wounded in war, but quickly moved to trying to make medical assistance to the wounded a legal obligation in international law.

27 In general see Stephen H. Legomsky, *Immigration and Refugee Law and Policy*, 2nd edn (New York: The Foundation Press, 1997). See also Connie M. Ericson, “In Re Kasinga: An Expansion of the Grounds for Asylum for Women,” *Houston Journal of International Law*, 20, 3 (1998), 671–694.

28 Paul Hunt, *Reclaiming Social Rights: International and Comparative Perspectives* (Aldershot:

Dartmouth, 1996).

*Controversies beyond liberalism*

When considering the future of human rights, I have tried to indicate the tip of the iceberg of controversy even when one accepts the concept of human rights as a beneficial part of international relations. But there is controversy of a different order, based on a more profound critique of human rights as that notion has evolved in international relations. This second type of controversy, which takes different forms or schools of thought, is based on the shared view that individual human rights based on liberal philosophy is misguided as a means to human dignity. The dominant critique, at least for western liberals, has been by realists. But we should also note, at least in passing, the views of Marxists.29

*Realism*

Realism in its various versions has historically captured some prevalent features of traditional international relations. Its strong point has been its emphasis on collective egoism, as numerous political leaders, claiming to speak for a nation, have indeed acted frequently on the basis of their view of narrow self-interest. It has also been accurate in emphasizing calcula- tions of power and balance – or more precisely distribution – of power, however elusive the objective perception of power and its distribution might prove. Such calculations have indeed been a prevalent feature of international relations. In being state-centric, realism captures much of the real strength of nationalism and national identity.

The central weakness of realism has always been its inability to specify what comprises the objective national interest, and therefore its inability to say what is the rational pursuit of that interest based on power calcula- tions. Realism assumes the permanence of a certain nineteenth-century view of international relations in which the dominant principles are state sovereignty understood to mean independence, non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states, and the inevitability of interstate power strug- gles cumulating in war.

29 It should be stressed that there are numerous approaches to understanding international relations, and the place of human rights therein. A short introductory overview such as this one cannot be expected to be comprehensive. See further Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, eds., *Theories of International Relations* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996). As noted in chapter 1, Michael Doyle has shown that one can gain many insights by concentrating on liberalism, realism, and Marxism/socialism. The present book follows that approach. Some authors stress not liberalism versus realism but liberalism versus communitarianism – the idea that the community, not the individual, is the proper dom- inant concern. All liberal orders have to deal with individual rights and autonomy versus the rights and needs of the larger community. We have covered part of this controversy when discussing “Asian values.”

Realism discounts the possibility that states would see their real secu- rity and other national interests advanced by *losing* considerable indepen- dence – e.g., by joining supranational organizations. Realism discounts the possibility of the rise of important transnational interests so that the distinction between domestic structure and issues and international rela- tions loses much of its meaning. Realism discounts the possibility of a decline if not elimination of hegemonic global war among the great pow- ers, and thus does not contemplate the irrationality of saving one’s major preoccupations for a war that will not occur – perhaps at all and certainly without great frequency.

Realism discounts the emergence of values such as real commitment to universal human rights and instead posits, in the face of considerable contradictory evidence, that states will always prefer separateness and independent policy making over advancement of human rights (or for that matter over quest for greater wealth through regulated trade or better environmental protection). Realists are prepared to look away when gross violations of human rights are committed inside states; morality and state obligation tend to stop at national frontiers – and anyway the game of correction is not worth the candle. To realists, international liberalism, and the international human rights to which it gives rise, is a utopian snare left over from the European enlightenment with its excessive belief in human rationality, common standards, and capacity for progress.

In situations *not* characterized by intense fear, suspicion, and the classic security dilemma, however, realism misses much of the real stuff of inter- national politics. Where states and governments do not perceive threats to the life of the nation as they have known it, they behave in ways that real- ism cannot anticipate or explain. Realism is largely irrelevant to interna- tional integration in Europe through the Council of Europe and European Union. Realism has no explanation for NATO’s unified commitment to a democratic Europe, and hence to its intervention in Federal Yugoslavia to protect Kosovars, save for the argument that the entire policy of inter- vention is irrational. Realism cannot explain international human rights developments over the past fifty years, except to suggest that most of the states of the world have been either hypocritical or sentimental in approv- ing human rights norms and creating extensive diplomatic machinery for their supervision. Realists like Kissinger were out of touch with impor- tant developments in international relations when he opposed the human rights and humanitarian aspects of the 1975 Helsinki Accord, and when he came to accept those principles only as a useful bargaining tool with, and weapon against, the European communists. Even then, he was more comfortable with traditional security matters as Metternich and other nineteenth century diplomats would have understood them.

In some types of international politics realists are relevant, but in other types they are anachronistic.30 Realists well understand the prevalent negative correlation between war and protection of most human rights. Insecurity does indeed breed human rights violations. On the other hand, much of international relations cannot be properly understood by sim- ple reference to “prisoner’s dilemma,” in which fear of insecurity is the only attitude, explaining all policies. Some states will pursue human rights abroad only when such action can be made to fit with traditional national interests. But some states in some situations will pursue human rights through international action even at the expense of certain tradi- tional interests, such as independence in policy making, hence the Coun- cil of Europe and European Union. At least sometimes they will incur some costs for the rights of others, as NATO did over Kosovo, as the British did in Sierra Leone, etc. Realists do not understand that some states, like some natural persons, wish to stand for something besides independent power, obtained and used in other than a machiavellian process.

*Marxists*

The Marxist critique of international human rights merits a separate book. But it is accurate to say here, albeit briefly, that Marxists con- sider individual legal rights a sham in the context of economic forces and structures that prevent the effective exercise of human rights. Legal human rights on paper are supposedly negated by exploitative capital- ism that leads to the accumulation of profit rather than the betterment of human beings. When large parts of the world manifest persons earn- ing less than one dollar per day, extensive human rights in legal form are meaningless. In this view international human rights have been used more since 1945 to legitimate international capitalism than to protect human beings from predatory capitalistic states and corporations.31

For a classical Marxist, “the contradictions that characterize human rights reflect the conflicts inherent in capitalist society, lead to pervasive violations of those rights, and make respect for them impossible, particu- larly in this era of global capitalism.”32 Thus, material conditions control, exercising rights depends on having wealth, corporate for-profit rights trump individual fundamental rights, and the Universal Declaration of

30 See further Robert O. Keohane and Joseph H. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). In their view, realism is not very relevant to that type of international relations called complex interdependence.

31 See, for example, Norman Lewis, “Human Rights, Law, and Democracy in an Unfree

World,” in Evans, ed., *Human Rights Fifty Years On*, 77–104.

32 Gary Teeple, *The Riddle of Human Rights* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005).

Rights cannot be realized as long as international relations reflects global capitalism.

There is some overlap between Marxists and pragmatic liberals. Both would agree that the international financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund need to consider further the human hardship caused by their structural adjustment programs. Both argue the futility of seeing and dealing with human rights apart from their socio-economic context. Pragmatic liberals differ from Marxists in believ- ing that regulated capitalism, and its primary global agent the transna- tional corporation, can be a force for progress and is not irredeemably exploitative. Pragmatic liberals also differ from Marxists in seeing in west- ern history an effort to combine political freedom, economic freedom, and checks on gross abuses of human dignity, and not a record of unre- lenting exploitation.

In summary of these two illiberal critiques, one can say that realism has been the most important historically. Realism has been the domi- nant prism in the powerful western world for understanding international relations. It has argued that national liberals, if rational, would not be liberal in anarchical international relations, or if they understood the evil “nature of man.” Nowhere has the *practice* of Marxism led to an attractive model of human development entailing an acceptable degree of personal freedom.33 Marxism, perhaps in the form of democratic socialism, how- ever, would seem to have continuing relevance by reminding us of the exploitative tendencies of unregulated capitalism, and of the weakness of legal rights when divorced from certain social and economic facts – e.g., minimal achievements in education and income.

In the final analysis even most of the critics of what I have termed classical political liberalism at the close of the twentieth century do not reject entirely the concept of universal human rights. They argue for its validity, but stress various cautions, reforms, and refinements. Even Kissinger and most other realists tolerate international human rights, although they do not give them high priority and they are unwilling to greatly complicate traditional diplomacy with much attention to them.

Fukuyama may yet be proved correct, however, in that no theory save some type of liberalism offers much prospect of a better world in the twenty-first century. A caution bears repeating. If Fukuyama is read to mean support for libertarianism and minimal governance, instability is the likely result. Libertarian liberalism wants to emphasize private prop- erty as a civil right, and to elevate it to a central and absolute position in its

33 See further Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Scribner, 1989).

view of the good life. But the result of this view is Dickens’ England, or the USA in the era of Henry Ford. There are definitely liberal interpretations that are injurious to human dignity, as recalled particularly in chapter 8 where the misdeeds of certain private corporations were reviewed. It is no small task to combine property rights featuring “economic freedom” with other rights and freedoms so as to produce a widely shared view of social justice or human dignity.

**The Big Picture**

Are there important and enduring patterns and correlations on the subject of human rights in international relations? The answer is yes, with aware- ness of limitations and constant modification through new research.34

If we focus on rights of personal integrity such as freedom from tor- ture, forced disappearances, summary execution, and the like, we find that the protection of these rights is positively correlated with: democ- racy, economic development, peace, former status as British colony, and small population size. In other words, individuals are most at risk for tor- ture and other violations of personal integrity in populous, authoritarian, poor states, facing international or internal armed conflict, and without the restraining traditions of British heritage.

If we inquire more carefully into why democracy seems to generally reduce violations of personal integrity, research by Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and others suggests that: full democracy through the form of multiparty competitive elections is necessary to get this effect; more lim- ited forms of democracy short of multi-party elections do not produce the same effect; and the notion of real accountability to the electorate seems to be the key to the process.35

Such general trends are then cross cut by others. For example, eco- nomic development in Arab-Islamic states does not have a positive correlation with protection of women’s rights. Particular cultural fac- tors intervene to block the normally beneficial impact of economic development.

Can we say for sure what produces democracy, with its civil and political rights? No, but there are some correlations between economic wealth and sustaining democracy. According to Adam Przeworski and Fernando Limongi, democracy does not last very long in the face of economic

34 For an overview see David P. Forsythe and Patrice C. McMahon, eds., *Human Rights and Diversity: Area Studies Revisited* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003), especially chapters 1 and 2, and the conclusion.

35 “Thinking Inside the Box: A Closer Look at Democracy and Human Rights,” *Interna-*

*tional Studies Quarterly,* 49, 3 (September 2005), from 439.

adversity.36 During the Cold War more or less, a democratic state with a per-capita income of $1,500 lasted eight years or less; a per-capita income up to $3,000 increased the longevity of a democratic state to an average of

18 years; above a per-capita income of $6,000, democratic sustainability was largely assured. Against this background, it made complete sense that in 2004 citizens in relatively poor states like Russia or several states in the Western Hemisphere expressed considerable sympathy for a return to authoritarian government, given that existing democratic (or partially democratic) governments had compiled a poor record on increasing per- capita income.37

One could group states in different ways, and inquire into correla- tions about different rights and types of rights, but it was clear that some insights into the fate of rights could be obtained through careful research.38 One of the most persistent conclusions out of this type of research was that it was futile to focus on civil and political rights with- out regard to their socio-economic and cultural context. From the time of Weimar Germany in the 1920s and 1930s to Afghanistan after the Taliban, holding elections would only mean so much over time. With- out attention to economic development and equitable distribution of the fruits of that development, and without attention to cultural fac- tors impeding equity if not equality, elections would not contribute to sustained human dignity.

One might recall at this point that the UN General Assembly has repeatedly endorsed the notion that civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights are interdependent and equally important.

**Final thoughts**

In the early 1980s the conclusion to one overview of human rights in international relations started with a discussion of Stalinism in the Soviet Union and finished with a discussion of apartheid in South Africa.39 In the late 1990s neither the Soviet Union nor legally segregated South Africa existed. Things do change, and sometimes in progressive fashion.40 That is one reason for a guarded optimism about the future of human rights. Both European Stalinism and white racism in southern Africa are spent forces. Each yielded to persistent criticism over many decades. Along the

36 “Modernization: Theories and Facts,” *World Politics*, 49, 2 (January 1997), 155–183.

37 Warren Hoge, “Latin Americans are Nostalgic for Strongman Rule,” *International Herald*

*Tribune,* April 21, 2004.

38 See Forsythe and McMahon, op.cit., especially the chapter by David L. Richards.

39 David P. Forsythe, *Human Rights and World Politics* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska

Press, 1983), ch. 6.

40 See further especially Paul Gordon Lauren, *The Evolution of International Human Rights:*

*Visions Seen* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1998).

way elites in Moscow and Pretoria were staunchly committed to gross violations of human rights, albeit rationalized in the name of some “higher good.” In the case of communism it was the quest for a classless utopia. In the case of apartheid it was betterment through separate development. Prospects for radical change often seemed bleak. And yet a historical perspective shows a certain progress.

But in areas of both former European communism and former white racism in southern Africa, violations of human rights remain. Far too many in both areas lack adequate food, clothing, shelter, and health care mandated by internationally recognized human rights. Corrupt judges and police officers make a mockery of many civil rights, as does rampant crime – much of it organized transnationally. In some areas the right to political participation is not secure. Nor are minorities.

And so the quest for better protection of individual and collective human rights continues. All human rights victories are partial, since the perfectly rights-protective society has yet to appear. The end of Stalinism in the Czech Republic seems to have done little to change discrimina- tion against the Roma in that country. Some human rights victories are pyrrhic, since the *ancien re´gime* can look relatively good in historical per- spective. Tito’s Yugoslavia did not implement anything close to the full range of internationally recognized civil and political rights. But it did not engage in mass murder, mass misery, ethnic cleansing, and system- atic rape as a weapon of war. These things did appear, however, in both Bosnia and Kosovo in the 1990s.

The various levels of action for human rights – whether global, regional, national, or sub-national – were not likely to wither away because of lack of human rights violations with which to deal. Pursuing liberalism in a realist world is no simple task.

**Discussion questions**

– Do the past fifty years show that serious concern for personal rights can indeed improve the human condition in the state system of inter- national relations?

– If one compares the Congo during King Leopold’s time with the Democratic Congo (formerly Zaire) today, has anything changed about the human condition?

– When is it appropriate, if ever, to grant immunity for past violations of human rights, and otherwise to avoid legal proceedings about human rights violations, for the sake of improving the human condition?

– Are the demands for a third-generation of human rights to peace, devel- opment, and a healthy environment well considered?

– Do internationally recognized human rights require radical change so as to properly protect women’s dignity?

– Even after the political demise of European Marxism, are Marxists correct that capitalism and the transnational corporation are inher- ently exploitative of labor? What social values can markets advance (e.g., efficiency?), and what social values can they not advance (e.g., equity?)?

– Should one be optimistic or pessimistic about the future of human rights in international relations?

**Suggestions for further reading**

Alston, Philip, “Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal for Quality Con- trol,” *American Journal of International Law*, 78, 3 (July 1984), 607–621. A plea for a moratorium on more human rights until protection improves for those already recognized.

Boyle, Kevin, and Juliet Sheen, eds., *Freedom of Religion and Belief: A World Report*

(London: Routledge, 1997). An encyclopedia on the subject.

Brzezinski, Zbigniew, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in*

*the Twentieth Century* (New York: Scribner, 1989). An overview of what went

wrong particularly with European communism, written in engaging style by

the National Security Advisor to President Carter.

Cook, Rebecca J., ed., *Human Rights of Women: National and International Per-*

*spectives* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1994). A good and

broad coverage of feminist perspectives on human rights.

Forsythe, David P. and Patrice C. McMahon, *Human Rights and Diversity: Area*

*Studies Revisited* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2003). A collection

of essays studying the interplay of universal rights and global trends with

factors particular to certain areas and regions.

Franck, Thomas M., “Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?,” *American Journal*

*of International Law*, 91, 4 (October 1997), 593–627. Suggests that the West

has no monopoly on the desire for personal freedom.

Gormley, W. Paul, *Human Rights and the Environment: The Need for International*

*Co-operation* (Leiden: W.W. Sijthoff, 1976). An early study based on the

premise that we need a third-generation human right to a healthy environ-

ment.

Hochschild, Adam, *King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism*

*in Colonial Africa* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1998). A gripping history of

the lack of human rights in Central Africa when the Congo was the personal

fiefdom of the King of Belgium.

Hocking, B., *Catalytic Diplomacy* (Leicester: Centre for Diplomatic Studies,

1996). Argues that in the modern world what governments frequently do

is organize others for agreement and action, rather than establish a foreign

policy completely independent from other actors.

Ignatieff, Michael, *The Warrior’s Honor: Ethnic War and the Modern Conscience*

(New York: Metropolitan, 1997). A cosmopolitan and Renaissance man

reflects on whether humane limits can be applied to ethnic war, arguing for the importance of traditional conceptions such as military honor.

Ignatieff, *The Lesser Evil: Political Ethics in an Age of Terrorism* (Princeton: Prince- ton University Press, 2005). A leading thinker on human rights contemplates the effects of confronting Al Qaida after September 11, 2001.

Johansen, Robert C., *The National Interest and the Human Interest: An Analysis of US Foreign Policy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980). Shows clearly that if one starts with realist principles of state interest, one winds up with different policies than if one starts with liberal principles of human interest.

Kagan, Robert, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Vintage, 2004). Supposedly the Europeans are interested in human rights and international law and organization, while the USA is interested in the use of power to protect national security in a hostile world.

Keohane, Robert O., and Joseph H. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977). A major study arguing that there are different types of international relations. Realism may be appropriate to some, liberalism or pragmatic-liberalism to others. Argues that realism is less and less appropriate to contemporary international relations.

Pogge, Thomas, *World Poverty and Human Rights: Cosmopolitan Responsibilities and Reforms* (Cambridge: Polity, 2002). A leading philosopher reflects on, and provides data about, poverty, hunger, and human rights.

Slaughter, Anne-Marie, *A New World Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). The Dean of the Princeton Woodrow Wilson School argues that national authorities are cooperating with international courts in a way that is already producing considerable transnational protection of certain human rights.

Teeple, Gary, *The Riddle of Human Rights* (Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2005).

A clearly argued Marxist analysis.