Part I

Introduction

1 Social psychological debates about identity

Rusi Jaspal

We live in an ever-changing social world, which constantly calls forth changes to our identities and actions. Advances in science, technology and medicine, political upheaval and economic development are just some examples of social change that can impact upon how we live our lives, how we view ourselves and each other and how we communicate. Social change can result in the salience and visibility of particular social categories, changes in the assimilation, accommodation and evaluation of these categories and new patterns of action. Similarly, individual psychological change – getting a new job, being diagnosed with a life-changing illness, growing old – can dramatically affect our sense of self, potentially forcing us to rethink who we are, our relationships with others and how we ought to behave in particular contexts. What social change and psychological change have in common is their power to affect radically our identities and actions.

This volume is about identity, change and action. The contributors to this volume address this tripartite relationship in diverse and complex social psychological contexts. The chapters endeavor to explore the antecedents of changes in identity and action, and their developmental trajectory. It is easy to see why the important task of examining the tripartite relationship between identity, change and action has generally been neglected by social psychologists. Core debates in the field have focused on questions about the "correct" unit of analysis (psychological or sociological); competition between the quantitative and qualitative paradigms; and epistemology. These divides have, to a large extent, impeded theoretical integration. Identity Process Theory (IPT) sits within this matrix of debate because of its integrative focus on the intrapsychic, interpersonal and intergroup levels, its methodological diversity and epistemological eclecticism. The theory constitutes a valuable explanatory tool for addressing pressing social psychological problems of the twenty-first century and aspires to acquire predictive power as it is refined and developed in empirical work. We decided to edit this volume

amid a growing body of diverse empirical research based on the theory since the early 1980s. It has been used by social psychologists in particular but has broader appeal in the social sciences and among practitioners. Thus, Identity Process Theory has an important role to play in shaping the social psychology of identity, change and action.

As evidenced by the chapters in this volume, Identity Process Theory research has addressed a wide range of pressing real-world issues – national identity, post-conflict societies, sexual behavior, risk, place and environment and prejudice. Furthermore, unlike many Western social psychological theories, Identity Process Theory has been used as a heuristic tool in diverse geographical and cultural settings – the UK, Spain, Canada, India, Israel and others. Yet, the diversity that characterizes the theory can also make it difficult to delineate conceptually. This volume provides a summary of the development of Identity Process Theory and contextualizes the theory in the social psychology of identity, change and action.

Identity Process Theory

Identity Process Theory (Breakwell, 1986, 1988, 1992, 1993, 2001; Vignoles *et al.*, 2002a, 2002b) proposes that the structure of self-identity should be conceptualized in terms of its content and value/affect dimensions and that this structure is regulated by two universal processes, namely *assimilation–accommodation* and *evaluation*. The assimilation–accommodation process refers to the absorption of new information in the identity structure (e.g. coming out as gay) and the adjustment which takes place in order for it to become part of the structure (e.g. self-definition as gay and downplaying one's religion). The evaluation process confers meaning and value on the contents of identity (e.g. viewing one's sexual identity as a positive thing but one's religious identity negatively).

Breakwell (1986, 1992, 2001) originally identified four identity principles which guide these universal processes: (1) continuity across time and situation (*continuity*); (2) uniqueness or distinctiveness from others (*distinctiveness*); (3) feeling confident and in control of one's life (*self-efficacy*); and (4) feelings of personal worth (*self-esteem*). There has been some debate about the number of identity principles – some Identity Process Theory researchers have suggested additional principles although they have not met with universal approval (Breakwell, this volume; Vignoles, 2011). For instance, Vignoles *et al.* (2002a) proposed two additional identity "motives," namely *belonging*, which refers to the need to maintain feelings of closeness to and acceptance by other people and *meaning*, which refers to the need to find significance and purpose in one's life.

More recently, Jaspal and Cinnirella (2010) proposed the psychological coherence principle, which refers to the motivation to establish feelings of compatibility between (interconnected) identities.

A core prediction of Identity Process Theory is that if the universal processes cannot comply with the motivational principles of identity, for whatever reason, identity is threatened and the individual will engage in strategies for coping with the threat. A coping strategy is defined as "any activity, in thought or deed, which has as its goal the removal or modification of a threat to identity" (Breakwell, 1986, p. 78). Coping strategies can function at three levels: intrapsychic (e.g. denial, re-conceptualization), interpersonal (e.g. isolation), or intergroup (e.g. social mobilization). Some forms of threat may induce coping at multiple levels in order to optimize identity processes (Jaspal and Sitaridou, 2013).

Identity Process Theory provides a holistic model of (1) the structure of identity, namely its content and value dimensions and the centrality and salience of identity components; (2) the interaction of social and psychological factors in the production of identity content; (3) the interrelations between identity and action. A key assumption of the theory is that, in order to understand the processes that drive identity construction, it is necessary to examine how individuals react when identity is threatened (Breakwell, 2010).

According to the theory, identity is the product of social and psychological processes. Breakwell (1986, 2001, 2004, 2010) has repeatedly acknowledged the role of social representations in determining the content of identity and the value of its components. Social representations determine how individuals assimilate, accommodate and evaluate identity components, what is threatening for identity and how individuals subsequently cope with threat. In formally allying Identity Process Theory with Social Representations Theory, Breakwell (1993, 2001, this volume) sought to provide greater insight into the *social* contexts in which individual identities are constructed and the social resources (images, notions, language) employed by individuals in constructing their identities. Crucially, the theory recognizes that individuals have agency in the construction and management of identity. In interaction with relevant social contexts, individuals construct systems of meaning for making sense of their lives, experiences and identities. To this extent, IPT can be described as a *social constructivist* model of identity processes (see von Glasersfeld, 1982).

Debates in the social psychology of identity

In order to understand the contribution of Identity Process Theory to the social psychology of identity, it is necessary to contextualize the

theory historically. In many respects, the theory was ahead of its time – ambitiously seeking to articulate the intersections between the intrapsychic, interpersonal and societal levels of analysis and to provide a holistic framework within which identity, change and action could be collectively examined. With the exception of Tajfel's (1978, 1982) Social Identity Theory, social psychology seemed to have become more concerned with piecemeal theorizing, than with presenting integrative, holistic theoretical frameworks incorporating multiple layers of analysis. When Breakwell (1983, 1986, 1988) first began to articulate what subsequently became known as Identity Process Theory, there were already a number of social psychological models of identity. Yet, none seemed able to explain the micro- and macro-processes underlying the construction of identity, that is, the total identity of the individual. While it is necessary to be explicitly selective in discussing social psychological approaches to identity, some dominant approaches can be identified. In thinking about how these approaches relate to one another, a number of "divides" surface: US versus European; psychological social psychology versus sociological social psychology; realism versus social constructionism; qualitative versus quantitative.

Psychological social psychology

In general, US social psychological approaches to identity have consistently focused upon the individual level of cognition, viewing the individual as the primary unit of analysis. These approaches are positioned in what is often referred to as "psychological social psychology." Within this paradigm, Hazel Markus (1977) developed the concept of the "self-schema," which she described as a cognitive representation of the self used to organize information regarding the self and to guide the cognitive processing of self-relevant information. The concept of self-schema provided a purely cognitive account of selfhood, suggesting that cognitive abilities such as memory drove the construction of identity. Quite unlike Identity Process Theory, the self-schema model did not view selfhood as an agentive process on the part of the individual (as a social being) but rather as a process driven and constrained primarily by cognitive functioning.

The development of Identity Process Theory coincided with the publication of Markus and Nurius' (1986) paper "Possible Selves" in the *American Psychologist*. Prima facie, this concept seemed to begin to address the social dimension of selfhood. However, the primary concern lay in integrating cognitive (i.e. self-schemas) and emotional (i.e. fear) elements of the self by examining individuals' perceptions of (1) what

they might become, (2) what they would like to become and (3) what they were afraid of becoming in the future. Crucially, these "possible selves" were regarded as noteworthy since they could motivate particular patterns of action. In their articulation of the concept of "possible selves," Markus and Nurius were now drawing attention to the agency of the current identity of the individual in shaping future identities. Moreover, the concept of possible selves initiated a debate on the link between identity and action (Oyserman and Markus, 1990; Riff, 1991). Yet, this line of research seemed to underestimate the importance of examining the social dimension of selfhood – that is, how social structure, the ideological milieu and, most importantly, social change could actively shape and constrain cognitive functioning in relation to the self. Moreover, the concept of possible selves did not fully articulate the social circumstances in which particular "selves" might be desired, resisted or adopted. Conversely, these were all concerns that underlay the development of Identity Process Theory and researchers who subsequently integrated the Possible Selves Concept and Identity Process Theory sought to address this very question (Vignoles *et al.*, 2008; see also Breakwell, 1986).

Identity Process Theory was clearly influenced by Bandura's (1977) Self-Efficacy Model. Bandura (1995, p. 2) defined self-efficacy as "the belief in one's capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to manage prospective situations." While dominant social psychological theories tended to view self-efficacy as a component of self-esteem, Bandura argued that they should be considered as two distinct facets of the self. Breakwell (1986) initially drew on Bandura's ideas concerning self-efficacy in describing self-protection at the intrapsychic level; that is, how individuals cope with threats to identity. More specifically, it was argued that "the individual may engage in the exercise of self-efficacy" in order to regain appropriate levels of the identity principles (Breakwell, 1986, p. 102). Although Bandura's Self-Efficacy Model suggested that self-efficacy was central to cognition, affect and behavior, its role in relation to identity construction remained underexplored. On the basis of extensive research into identity among young adults (Breakwell *et al.*, 1989; Fife-Schaw and Breakwell, 1990, 1991), self-efficacy was later incorporated into Identity Process Theory as a fourth principle of identity (Breakwell, 1992). This established greater linkage between identity and action partly by showing how the processes of identity could function to provide the individual with feelings of control and competence.

Identity Process Theory and the Self-Efficacy Model overlap in some of their core assumptions. Bandura was one of the first social psychologists

to stress that one's sense of self-efficacy was dependent on one's *perceived* success in a given situation, rather than on one's actual success. Crucially, self-efficacy beliefs were dependent upon both social *and* psychological factors. Bandura stressed that self-efficacy should by no means be viewed as a personality trait but rather as "a differentiated set of self-beliefs linked to distinct realms of functioning" (Bandura, 2006, p. 307). Therefore, in his writings, Bandura consistently called for context-specific research that examined the specific situations and contexts in which self-efficacy beliefs might acquire salience. This ethos was echoed in Identity Process Theory. Bandura's (1977) Self-Efficacy Theory was concerned primarily with human agency in self-regulation – indeed, he argued that "[a]mong the mechanisms of agency, none is more central or pervasive than people's beliefs about their capabilities to exercise control over their own level of functioning and over events that affect their lives" (Bandura, 1993, p. 118). Similarly, the self-agency of the individual in constructing and regulating identity has always been a core assumption in Identity Process Theory.

Sociological social psychology

The 1980s also marked significant developments in the more sociologically oriented branch of social psychology. Drawing extensively on the Symbolic Interactionist Framework, Sheldon Stryker (1980; Stryker and Serpe, 1982, 1994) developed Identity Theory within this paradigm. The theory essentially argued that identities arose from role positions, that an individual could have many roles/identities, that these were arranged hierarchically in the self-concept and that they differed in salience. Unlike the mainstream approaches in US psychological social psychology, a key tenet of Stryker's Identity Theory was that social structure did indeed play an important role in dictating one's level of commitment to particular roles and, consequently, in rendering salient or latent particular identities in the self-concept. This partly laid the foundations for theory and research on the concept of "multiple identities," which was to become a buzzword in the social psychology of identity (Howard, 2000; Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2010; Roccas and Brewer, 2002). Furthermore, partly as a consequence of this debate, the *structure* of identity, which accommodated these identities, needed to be adequately theorized. In articulating the "black-box" of identity, Identity Process Theory was concerned partly with explaining the structure of identity – the value and content dimensions. Moreover, the model theorized the content of identity – its multiple elements, interactions between these elements and their relative salience and centrality (Breakwell, 1986).

Identity Theory and Identity Process Theory diverged in some of their assumptions regarding the social antecedents of identity development. While Identity Theory referred to "interactional possibilities," viewing symbolic interaction as the primary means of understanding identity development (Stryker and Burke, 2000), Identity Process Theory drew upon Moscovici's (1988, 2000) Social Representations Theory. The synthesis of these theories served to elucidate the *reciprocal* interrelations between the social and the individual – how social representations affected identity processes and how identity processes in turn shaped social representational processes. Indeed, Breakwell (this volume) argues that "individual identities are developed in the context of an abundance of social representations."

Since the mid 1970s, British social psychological theory and research on identity had come to be dominated by the Social Identity Approach, consisting initially of Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1974, 1978, 1981) and subsequently of Self-Categorization Theory (Turner *et al.*, 1987). Both theories have of course been elaborately discussed elsewhere (Brown, 2000; Hornsey, 2008; Reicher *et al.*, 2010). However, it is worth remembering and reiterating that Tajfel's Social Identity Theory was concerned primarily with explaining intergroup relations and therefore focused on that part of "an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership" (Tajfel, 1978, p. 63). Tajfel never attempted to address individual identity in Social Identity Theory (Breakwell, this volume). Conversely, Identity Process Theory was designed to examine the "blackbox" of the total identity of the individual, that is, "the social, cognitive, conative and oretic processes that comprised identity" (Breakwell, 2010, p. 2). Although Identity Process Theory was, to some extent, inspired by the Social Identity Approach which argued that individuals sought self-esteem from their group memberships (Breakwell, 1978, 1979), it set out to explain and predict a distinct set of psychological phenomena.

Following Tajfel's death in 1982, John Turner and his colleagues (1987) developed Self-Categorization Theory, which was intended to complement, rather than replace or merge with, Social Identity Theory. Self-Categorization Theory set out to elaborate on Social Identity Theory, partly by addressing issues pertinent to individual identity, in addition to the intergroup level of human interdependence. The theory explicitly acknowledged the various levels of self-categorization: individual, group and superordinate/human. It proposed that these distinct levels of self-categorization could all shape intergroup behavior – thus, the focus of the theory remained on the intergroup level of analysis. Conversely,

Identity Process Theory deliberately abandoned the distinction between personal and social identity, because "seen across the biography, social identity is seen to become personal identity: the dichotomy is purely a temporal artefact" (Breakwell, 2001, p. 277). In Identity Process Theory, identity elements include traits, experiences and group memberships, all of which comprise the hierarchical structure of identity. This is not to suggest that Identity Process Theory cannot be used to shed light on intergroup issues – in fact, the theory has been used for this very purpose (Breakwell, 2004; Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2012; Jaspal and Yampolsky, 2011; Lyons, 1996; Oren and Bar-Tal, this volume). Despite the duality of both the Social Identity Approach and Identity Process Theory, both seeking to address the individual and social levels of analysis, their assumptions and foci are distinct – the models set out to explain quite different social psychological phenomena (Pehrson and Reicher, this volume).

Epistemological debates in identity research

Coping with Threatened Identities was published in an era of emerging debates around epistemology. Growing dissatisfaction with positivist, empiricist and laboratory-based approaches to social psychology led some social psychologists to advocate an alternative epistemological approach, namely social constructionism. Kenneth Gergen was possibly the most important intellectual leader in this movement. Gergen's ground-breaking article "Social Psychology as History" appeared in the *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* in 1973. The article argued that, like all knowledge, psychological knowledge was culturally and historically specific and that psychological explanations therefore needed to incorporate the social, historical political and economic aspects of everyday life. In short, social constructionism problematized the "taken-for-grantedness" of social psychological knowledge (Gergen, 2001). Gergen was one of a growing number of social psychologists who were concerned about the potential ideological and oppressive uses of social psychology and who believed that the discipline was implicitly promoting the agenda and values of dominant and powerful groups in society to the disadvantage of marginalized groups. In the UK context, Harré and Secord (1972) voiced similar concerns and emphasized the agency of individuals as "conscious social actors" rather than as passive subjects. Like Gergen, they viewed language as a social resource for constructing particular versions of the world, events and other phenomena and, thus, as central to understanding human agency.

With the publication of *Discourse and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and Behaviour* by Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell in 1987, social constructionism re-emerged with a greater impact on British social psychology than ever before. Their critique of mainstream experimental and attitudinal research questioned the fundamental assumptions of "legitimate" psychological research and thereby initiated what is now referred to as the "turn to discourse" in British social psychology (Parker, 1989). Adopting a social constructionist epistemological position, some social psychologists began to refer to identity as a social discourse, itself constructed out of culturally available discourses (or linguistic resources), rather than as a sociocognitive phenomenon (Burr, 2003; Coyle, 2007). Suddenly, politics and ideology, rather than cognition and psychological processes, became driving forces in identity construction, since they governed the production of discourses in any given culture. In short, it became necessary to look at the sociopolitical contexts and ideological milieux of identity, rather than at the minds of individuals. Social constructionists dismissed personality traits as a meaningful way of conceptualizing identity and rejected sociocognitive approaches to examining identity construction. Rather, the new emphasis was on the social constructedness of identities (plural) in talk and text. Crucially, these identities were viewed as being "socially bestowed identities rather than essences of the person" (Burr, 2003, p. 106).

It is noteworthy that the "turn to discourse" engendered a deep suspicion of sociocognitive approaches to identity. It was assumed by some social constructionists that "there is nothing beyond the text" (e.g. Edwards *et al.*, 1995) and thus approaches that appeared to look "beyond the text" were often seen as misguided, fruitless attempts at understanding cognition. Identity Process Theory was itself developed in the era of the cognitive paradigm in social psychology and its partial focus on cognitive functioning, indicated by the theory's discussion of universal identity processes (i.e. assimilation–accommodation and evaluation) seemed to position it unequivocally within the cognitive psychological camp and outside of the social constructionist camp. However, as Coyle and Murtagh (this volume) show, branding Identity Process Theory a cognitive theory of identity constitutes an inaccurate simplification of the theory, which ignores its conceptual, methodological and epistemological breadth. Indeed, the allying of Identity Process Theory with Social Representations Theory meant that Identity Process Theory remained open to forms of social constructionism, albeit within a pluralist epistemological framework (Coyle, 2010; Jaspal and Coyle, 2010).

Methodological diversity in identity research

Contemporary social psychology is characterized by a methodological divide, which arose largely as a result of the growing acceptance of qualitative research methods in the 1980s (Harré and Moghaddam, 2012). As Coyle (2007) reflects, social psychologists viewed quantitative research methods as the only legitimate means of deriving social psychological knowledge, whereas qualitative methods were not viewed as sufficiently "rigorous" or "scientific" and were frequently regarded as the domain of sociologists. This methodological divide has had widespread implications for the social psychological research community – with some quantitative researchers refusing to take qualitative work seriously and some qualitative researchers defensively safeguarding a "pure" variant of their preferred methodological approach. This has been referred to as "methodolatry," that is "a slavish attachment and devotion to method" (Coyle, 2007, p. 26). This can have an analytically immobilizing effect for the research product since the analyst is discouraged from engaging in any methodological innovation and creativity. In these cases, there is little attention to what should in fact be a priority for the analyst, namely the research question.

Conversely, Identity Process Theory research has defied this methodological divide. Breakwell (1983, 1986, 1993, 2001) repeatedly asserted that a multi-methodological research program, comprising both quantitative and qualitative approaches, was necessary for understanding the complex processes that drive identity construction and development. Accordingly, Identity Process Theory researchers have employed a diverse range of quantitative methods, such as multi-level modeling (Vignoles *et al.*, 2002a, 2002b), multiple regression (Jaspal, 2011; Murtagh *et al.*, this volume) and path analysis (Breakwell *et al.*, 1991), as well as qualitative methods, such as interpretative phenomenological analysis (Timotijevic and Breakwell, 2000; Turner and Coyle, 2000; Vignoles *et al.*, 2004), thematic analysis (Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2010, 2012) and even discourse analysis (Coyle, this volume). More recently, Identity Process Theory research has cut across epistemological boundaries in pluralist research (Jaspal and Coyle, 2010). The contributions to this volume explicitly reiterate the need for methodologically and epistemologically pluralist approaches to the complex social psychological problems of today.

This concise overview of some of the dominant social psychological approaches to identity over the last three decades suggests that social psychology has become a somewhat fragmented discipline, fraught with disagreement and division. Yet, it is clear that, although many of

the theoretical approaches described above have clearly made important contributions to understanding the social psychology of identity, both group and individual, they have said relatively little about the *processes* underlying the formation, development and maintenance of identity. In formulating the theoretical framework that subsequently became known as Identity Process Theory, Breakwell was attempting to understand these very processes – the “black box” of identity. Breakwell (2010) believed that one means of exploring the processes that drive identity construction, development and maintenance was to examine how individuals responded when identity was threatened. Moreover, in order to tap into complex social psychological processes concerning identity construction, threat and coping, it was always acknowledged that a diverse range of methodological approaches would be necessary. This volume provides a summary of the diverse research that has been conducted in this tradition over the last three decades.

Identity, social action and social change

There is a diverse range of theoretical approaches on either side of the “divides” in social psychology. In addition to summarizing the development of Identity Process Theory research, this volume focuses on two debates that have dominated contemporary social psychological approaches to identity. The chapters in this volume suggest that these debates feed back into our understanding of the interrelations between identity, social action and social change.

First of all, this volume acknowledges the distinction between individual and group-level theories of identity, which are associated with the US and European traditions of social psychology, respectively. Given that Identity Process Theory explicitly seeks to integrate these levels of analysis, contributors to this volume ask whether such integration is at all necessary and, if so, discuss the heuristic, theoretical and empirical advantages of a multi-level analysis.

Secondly, social psychology has typically concerned itself with the treatment of pressing societal issues, such as the following three examples: understanding the social and psychological circumstances that led to unthinkable atrocities, such as the Holocaust; explaining why people lay down their lives in the name of a nation or a religion; and predicting behavior change in the contexts of environmental and health issues. In many cases, social psychologists have developed convincing theories to account for these problems. Accordingly, the contributors to this volume ask how Identity Process Theory can provide unique and distinctive explanations and, in some cases, predictions for social psychological

problems that have commonly been examined from other theoretical perspectives. As a holistic, integrative theory, Identity Process Theory can open novel avenues that allow researchers to explain and potentially predict relevant beliefs, attitudes and behaviors, shedding new light on key social psychological concerns.

Overview of the book

Over the last three decades, Identity Process Theory has been passionately debated by social psychologists. In Part I of the volume, Glynis M. Breakwell reflects on some of the major debates in Identity Process Theory research and clarifies and elaborates aspects of the theory.

Part II provides a detailed account of the various methodological approaches to Identity Process Theory research. Both chapters acknowledge the merits and limitations of quantitative and qualitative research methods. In Chapter 3, Adrian Coyle and Niamh Murtagh discuss qualitative methods in relation to Identity Process Theory and argue for a pluralist methodological and epistemological approach. In Chapter 4, Vivian L. Vignoles reviews the plethora of quantitative approaches employed in identity research and reflects upon the implications for Identity Process Theory. His chapter discusses the utility of particular quantitative methods at distinct levels of Identity Process Theory, with a particular focus on the value of multi-level modeling.

Part III of the volume is entitled "Integrating Theoretical Frameworks." Contributors to this section of the volume examine linkage between Identity Process Theory and their own theoretical frameworks. In Chapter 5, Samuel Pehrson and Stephen Reicher provide a Social Identity Approach perspective on Identity Process Theory, arguing in favor of a distinction between personal and social identity. In Chapter 6, Glynis M. Breakwell elaborates the interrelations between Identity Process Theory and Social Representations Theory. In her chapter on identity processes in culturally diverse societies, Xenia Chryssochoou bridges Identity Process Theory and models of acculturation, focusing upon how acculturation can be "customized" at a micro-individual level. In Chapter 8, Catherine E. Amiot and Rusi Jaspal compare and contrast their respective theoretical approaches to identity integration and use Identity Process Theory to explain how the self-concept may be potentially affected at various stages of identity integration. In the final chapter of this section, Anat Bardi, Rusi Jaspal, Ela Polek and Shalom Schwartz provide an individual differences perspective on Identity Process Theory in their theoretical and empirical integration of Identity Process Theory and the Schwartz Value Theory.

Part IV of the volume uses Identity Process Theory as a heuristic lens for examining identity processes and their relationship to social change in a variety of empirical, cultural and geographical contexts. The contributors to Part IV apply tenets of Identity Process Theory to pressing contemporary social psychological phenomena. In Chapter 10, Roxane de la Sablonnière and Esther Usborne highlight the important role of Identity Process Theory in developing a systematic social psychology of social change. Next, in their chapter on intractable conflict and collective identity, Neta Oren and Bar-Tal examine how the coping dimension of Identity Process Theory can provide important insights into our understanding of the eruption, persistence and potential changes in intractable conflicts. In Chapter 12, Marco Cinnirella discusses the social psychological antecedents of Islamophobia and thereby highlights the utility of Identity Process Theory in understanding and predicting prejudice toward outgroups. In Chapter 13, John Dixon, Kevin Durrheim and Andrés Di Masso examine prejudice in a distinct context. They explore the strengths and limitations of Identity Process Theory in addressing place identity, geopolitical change and "white" resistance to desegregation in South Africa. The next chapter by Dario Spini and Daniela S. Jopp examines the challenges to identity in old age and the contribution of Identity Process Theory to understanding these developmental challenges. In Chapter 15, Kate Loewenthal explores religion, identity and mental health from the perspective of Identity Process Theory. More specifically, it is argued that identity and identity-related processes may mediate and explain the relationship between religion and mental health outcomes. In their chapter on transport-related behavior, Niamh Murtagh, Birgitta Gatersleben and David Uzzell argue that identity threat can induce resistance to change in travel behavior and reflect upon the practical implications of an Identity Process Theory approach. In the final chapter of this section, Julie Barnett and Konstantina Vasileiou explore the applicability of Identity Process Theory and Social Representations Theory to understanding publics' appreciations of risk and reflect upon the implications of this for risk communication in a changing social world.

Our goal in producing this volume has been to summarize the development of Identity Process Theory over the last three decades and to demonstrate how the theory can provide unique explanations and predictions regarding beliefs, attitudes and behaviors that are crucially relevant to social psychological problems. The chapters in this volume provide resounding evidence that Identity Process Theory research is concerned primarily with the application of social psychology to real-world problems. This volume provides insightful responses to some of the core questions in the social psychology of identity, but there remain

some unanswered questions. In editing this volume, we hope to initiate a debate about how Identity Process Theory can continue to shed light on some of these unanswered questions and thereby contribute to our understanding of important contemporary social and psychological issues.

REFERENCES

Bandura, A. (1977). Self efficacy: toward a unifying theory of behavioral change. *Psychological Review*, 84, 191–215.

Bandura A. (1993). Perceived self-efficacy in cognitive development and functioning. *Educational Psychologist*, 28, 117–148.

Bandura, A. (1995). *Self-efficacy in changing societies*. Cambridge University Press.

Bandura, A. (2006). Guide for constructing self-efficacy scales. In F. Pajares and T. Urdan (eds.), *Self-efficacy beliefs of adolescents* (pp. 307–337). Greenwich, CT: Information Age.

Breakwell, G. M. (1978). Some effects of marginal social identity. In H. Tajfel (ed.), *Differentiation between social groups* (pp. 301–336). London: Academic Press.

Breakwell, G. M. (1979). Illegitimate group membership and inter-group differentiation. *British Journal of Social and Clinical Psychology*, 18, 141–149.

Breakwell, G. M. (1983). Identities and conflicts. In G. M. Breakwell (ed.), *Threatened identities* (pp. 189–214). Chichester, UK: Wiley.

Breakwell, G. M. (1986). *Coping with threatened identities*. London: Methuen.

Breakwell, G. M. (1988). Strategies adopted when identity is threatened. *Revue Internationale de Psychologie Sociale*, 1, 189–204.

Breakwell, G. M. (1992). Processes of self-evaluation: efficacy and estrangement. In G. M. Breakwell (ed.), *Social psychology of identity and the self concept* (pp. 33–55). London: Academic Press/Surrey University Press.

Breakwell, G. M. (1993). Social representations and social identity. *Papers on Social Representations*, 2(3), 1–20.

Breakwell, G. M. (2001). Social representational constraints upon identity processes. In K. Deaux and G. Philogene (eds.), *Representations of the social: bridging theoretical traditions* (pp. 271–84). Oxford: Blackwell.

Breakwell, G. M. (2004). Identity change in the context of the growing influence of European Union institutions. In R. Hermann, T. Risse and M. B. Brewer (eds.), *Transnational identities: becoming European in the EU* (pp. 25–39). New York: Rowman & Littlefield.

Breakwell, G. M. (2010). Resisting representations and identity processes. *Papers on Social Representations*, 19, 6.1–6.11.

Breakwell, G. M., Fife-Schaw, C. R., and Devereux, J. (1989). Political activity and political attitudes in teenagers: is there any correspondence? *Political Psychology*, 10, 745–755.

Breakwell, G. M., Fife-Schaw, C. R., and Clayden, K. (1991). Risk-taking, control over partner choice and intended use of condoms by virgins. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, 1, 173–187.

Brown, R. (2000). Social identity theory: past achievements, current problems and future challenges. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 30, 745–778.
Burr, V. (2003). *An introduction to social constructionism*. London: Routledge.
Coyle, A. (2007). Introduction to qualitative psychological research. In E. Lyons and A. Coyle (eds.), *Analysing qualitative data in psychology* (pp. 9–30). London: Sage.
Coyle, A. (2010). Qualitative research and anomalous experience: a call for interpretative pluralism [Commentary]. *Qualitative Research in Psychology*, 7, 79–83.
Edwards, D., Ashmore, M., and Potter, J. (1995). Death and furniture: the rhetoric, politics and theology of bottom line arguments against relativism. *History of the Human Sciences*, 8, 25–49.
Fife-Schaw, C. R., and Breakwell, G. M. (1990) Predicting the intention not to vote in late teenage: a U.K. study of 17- and 18-year olds. *Political Psychology*, 11, 739–755.
Fife-Schaw, C. R., and Breakwell, G. M. (1991). The class basis of late teenage voting preferences. *European Sociological Review*, 7, 135–147.
Gergen, K. J. (1973). Social psychology as history. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 26(2), 309–320.
Gergen, K. J. (2001). *Social construction in context*. London: Sage.
Harré, R., and Moghaddam, F. M. (2012). *Psychology for the third millennium: integrating cultural and neuroscience perspectives*. London: Sage.
Harré, R., and Secord, P. F. (1972). *The explanation of social behaviour*. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
Hornsey, M. J. (2008). Social identity theory and self-categorization theory: a historical review. *Social and Personality Psychology Compass*, 2(1), 204–222.
Howard, J. A. (2000). Social psychology of identities. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 26, 367–393.
Jaspal, R. (2011). *The construction and management of national and ethnic identities among British South Asians: an identity process theory approach*. Ph.D. dissertation, Royal Holloway, University of London, UK.
Jaspal, R., and Cinnirella, M. (2010). Coping with potentially incompatible identities: accounts of religious, ethnic and sexual identities from British Pakistani men who identify as Muslim and gay. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 49(4), 849–870.
Jaspal, R., and Cinnirella, M. (2012). The construction of ethnic identity: insights from identity process theory. *Ethnicities*, 12(5), 503–530.
Jaspal, R., and Coyle, A. (2010). 'My language, my people': language and ethnic identity among British-born South Asians. *South Asian Diaspora*, 2, 201–218.
Jaspal, R., and Sitaridou, I. (2013). Coping with stigmatised linguistic identities: identity threat and ethnolinguistic vitality among Andalusians. *Identity: an International Journal of Theory and Research*, 13(2), 157–175.
Jaspal, R., and Yampolsky, M. (2011). Social representations of the Holocaust and Jewish Israeli identity construction: insights from identity process theory. *Social Identities: Journal for the Study of Race, Nation and Culture*, 17(2), 201–224.

Lyons, E. (1996). Coping with social change: processes of social memory in the reconstruction of identities. In G. M. Breakwell and E. Lyons (eds.), *Changing European identities: socio-psychological analyses of social change* (pp. 31–40). Oxford: Butterworth-Heinemann.

Markus, H. (1977). Self-schemata and processing information about the self. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 35, 63–78.

Markus, H., and Nurius, P. (1986). Possible selves. *American Psychologist*, 41, 954–969.

Moscovici, S. (1988). Notes towards a description of social representations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 18, 211–250.

Moscovici, S. (2000). *Social representations: explorations in social psychology*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Oyserman, D., and Markus, H. R. (1990). Possible selves and delinquency. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, 59(1), 112–125.

Parker, I. (1989). *The crisis in modern social psychology, and how to end it*. London and New York: Routledge.

Potter, J., and Wetherell, M. (1987). *Discourse and social psychology: beyond attitudes and behaviour*. London: Sage.

Reicher, S. D., Spears, R., and Haslam, S. A. (2010). The social identity approach in social psychology. In M. S. Wetherell and C. T. Mohanty (eds.), *Sage identities handbook* (pp. 45–62). London: Sage.

Riff, C. D. (1991). Possible selves in adulthood and old age: a tale of shifting horizons. *Psychology and Aging*, 6(2), 286–295.

Roccas, S., and Brewer, M. B. (2002). Social identity complexity. *Personality and Social Psychology Review*, 6, 88–106.

Stryker, S. (1980). *Symbolic interactionism: a social structural version*. Menlo Park, CA: Benjamin Cummings.

Stryker, S., and Burke P. J. (2000). The past, present and future of identity theory. *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 63, 284–297.

Stryker, S., and Serpe, R. T. (1982). Commitment, identity salience and role behavior: a theory and research example. In W. Ickes and Eric S. Knowles (eds.), *Personality, roles and social behavior* (pp. 199–218). New York: Springer-Verlag.

Stryker, S., and Serpe, R. T. (1994). Identity salience and psychological centrality: equivalent, overlapping, or complementary concepts? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, 57, 16–35.

Tajfel, H. (1974). Social identity and intergroup behaviour. *Social Science Information*, 13, 65–93.

Tajfel, H. (ed.) (1978). *Differentiation between social groups: studies in the social psychology of intergroup relations*. London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human groups and social categories*. Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H. (1982). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, 1–39.

Timotijevic, L., and Breakwell, G. M. (2000). Migration and threats to identity. *Journal of Community and Applied Social Psychology*, 10, 355–372.

Turner, A. J., and Coyle, A. (2000). What does it mean to be a donor offspring? The identity experiences of adults conceived by donor insemination and

the implications for counselling and therapy. *Human Reproduction*, 15, 2,041–2,051.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M. A., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D., and Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the social group: a self-categorization theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.

von Glasersfeld, E. (1982). An interpretation of Piaget's constructivism. *Revue Internationale de Philosophie*, 36(4), 612–635.

Vignoles, V. L. (2011). Identity motives. In S. J. Schwartz, K. Luyckx and V. L. Vignoles (eds.), *Handbook of identity theory and research* (pp. 403–432). New York: Springer.

Vignoles, V. L., Chryssochoou, X., and Breakwell, G. M. (2002a). Evaluating models of identity motivation: self-esteem is not the whole story. *Self and Identity*, 1(3), 201–218.

Vignoles, V. L., Chryssochoou, X., and Breakwell, G. M. (2002b). Sources of distinctiveness: position, difference and separateness in the identities of Anglican parish priests. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 32(6), 761–780.

Vignoles, V. L., Chryssochoou, X., and Breakwell, G. M. (2004). Combining individuality and relatedness: representations of the person among the Anglican clergy. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 43(1), 113–132.

Vignoles, V. L., Manzi, C., Regalia, C., Jemmolo, S., and Scabini, E. (2008). Identity motives underlying desired and feared possible future selves. *Journal of Personality*, 76(5), 1,165–1,200.

2 Identity Process Theory: clarifications and elaborations

Glynis M. Breakwell

IPT and the information age

It is 26 years (at the time of writing) since the first publication of *Coping with Threatened Identities* (Breakwell, 1986). Many changes have impacted upon psychology since then. These include:

- The channels of communicating – the digital revolution has freed research communities to speak to each other with an immediacy and on a scale (e.g. in numbers, geographical spread, or volume of transmission) inconceivable to most – even 20 or more years ago. It may be hard now to remember what it was like before Berners-Lee and Cailliau invented the World Wide Web in 1989, with the Internet being implemented in 1991. With the Internet we truly entered the Information Age. All academic disciplines have been changed as a consequence but perhaps none more so than psychology. Not only has its ways of working been changed but the very subject matter that it can research has been irrevocably altered. The quintessential concern of social psychology – interaction between people – has been transformed.
- Since the 1980s there has been a vast increase in the number of graduate psychologists – the massive expansion of the psychology-literate community has changed the everyday discourse about psychological questions and has accelerated the demand by policy-makers and practitioners for responsiveness in psychology to immediate societal problems.
- Agencies that fund research in psychology have increasingly demanded policy-relevance and, in many cases, an interdisciplinary approach (because societal problems are multifaceted and need analyses that span the social, political, economic and technological elements besides their psychological components).
- The tools available for capturing and recording information have radically changed – ranging from the complex and expensive (such as nuclear magnetic resonance imaging – NMRI) to the merely omnipresent (such as closed circuit television CCTV). These tools make the

data accessible to psychology possibly overwhelming in complexity and scale – unless carefully controlled and structured.

The methods for analyzing information – the computational power that is now available permits large data sets to be manipulated more effectively. The statistical techniques that have been developed and are now easily assimilated into psychological research designs allow much more complex multi-variate, multi-level relational models to be explored and tested. As a result of these changes, some areas within psychology have evolved rapidly in recent decades (notably neurocognitive psychology). Social psychology has changed, partly because it is affected by movements in other areas within the discipline (not least neurocognitive developments) but more because it has so many points of interface with other disciplines in the way in which it specifies its research questions. These contacts push social psychologists to absorb different methods and to understand additional theoretical frameworks.

In many ways, these changes of analytical capacity and research focus serve the interests of the development of IPT. The theory presented first in the 1986 book was an attempt to provide an integrative framework within which identity, threat to identity and strategies for coping with threat might be understood. The prime object was to achieve a better understanding of how people seek to cope with experiences that they find threatening to their identity. What has come to be labeled subsequently "Identity Process Theory" was essentially the central tenets of the model of identity, threat and coping proposed in that book. From the outset, the model recognized the complexities of the processes that it addressed. It sought to examine the dynamic between individual identity, interpersonal relationships and social structure. It attempted to describe, at a number of levels of analysis (the intrapsychic, interpersonal and intergroup), the processes whereby identity changes. IPT as a result is an enormously complex model, seeking to be comprehensive. Consequently, IPT should benefit from the developments that have been occurring in psychology: a move toward interdisciplinary approaches, from the availability of a variety of constellations of data over time, from the ability to explore multivariate and multi-level relationships in those data and from a research focus upon societal changes that could be expected to create identity threats. The complexity and relevance of the empirical work informed by IPT that can be done now is much greater than anything possible at the time of IPT's inception.

However, it is not simply changes in empirical work that are driven by the macro-changes in the context of psychology. The digital tools now available permit the interaction, visualization and representation of

the theoretical model itself. In 1986, to visually represent the dynamic relationship between the biological organism, the intrapsychic cognitive and conative processes, the social structure (including interpersonal networks, group memberships and intergroup relationships) and the social influence processes (establishing the ideological milieu) over time, I produced three two-dimensional figures. The third incorporated the other two in an attempt to indicate subtle interactions and changes over time. Those static figures could not capture the dynamism and multi-layered conceptualization that lay at the heart of IPT. In fact, they probably undermined an appreciation of the dynamism that is integral to the theory. Now, in stark contrast, it would be possible to generate a virtual reality, interactive representation of the theory. This would allow us to look at the knock-on effects within the theory when a specific proposition is modified or when new propositions are introduced (e.g. the introduction of additional identity principles).

Yet, in order to do this, it would require a detailed analysis of each component of the initial theory. Clear definitions of each element of the theory and the relationships between elements would be needed. These may be said to already exist in previous publications but fudges and omissions would soon become evident. Where clarifications and elaborations were necessary, it would become obvious. The point here is that the era in which we now work offers incredibly valuable tools for psychologists in their process of theoretical conceptualization but deploying those tools will make us much more rigorous in our theory formulation. The Information Age will promote theoretical development but it will be at the cost of theoretical ambiguity. Even fuzzy logic is couched in anything but fuzzy terms. It is evident that there are certainly clarifications and elaborations that are needed in IPT as a consequence of the challenges that have emerged from the empirical work that has been done since the original formulation. Some other changes are facilitated or potentiated by the new tools of the Information Age. This chapter examines some of the clarifications and elaborations that now seem necessary.

The anathema of orthodoxy

In talking about the evolution of IPT, I would like to reiterate something I have written elsewhere (Breakwell, 2010, 2011). I think that over the last three decades much of the activity and progress in Social Representations Theory (SRT) has been engendered because Serge Moscovici had the wisdom, foresight and courage needed to resist the temptation to impose an orthodoxy on the theory of social representations – despite suggestions from some that a definitive doctrine should

be established (Breakwell and Lyons, 1996). In fact, Moscovici's stance has been quintessentially anti-orthodoxy. He has never drawn tight boundaries around the theory. He has never sought to eradicate divergent views. He has never silenced criticism. In fact, he has encouraged innovation in, and renovation of, the theory. This ensures that the theory continues to develop.

This willingness to encompass the novel also extends to methodological diversity. There is no "approved" method in social representations research (Duveen and Lloyd, 1993; Breakwell and Canter, 1993). Quantitative and qualitative approaches co-exist amicably within SRT's domain. This is enormously liberating for the researcher and theorist. It means that everyone has the scope to make a serious contribution to the evolution of the theory.

Of course, in any evolutionary process, not all new variants prove fit. Some will fail to reproduce – in the context of a theory, they will prove unproductive (false) and/or prove unattractive to the research community (dormant). They are false starts and dead ends. However, my point is that the inculcation of orthodoxy is not advantageous to the competitive process of theoretical evolution. I want to emulate Moscovici and, consequently, nothing that I say subsequently in this chapter should be taken to imply that I want to constrain the challenges to, or elaborations of, IPT. Of course, while orthodoxy may be anathema, it does not preclude me from having my own stance on a variety of issues where IPT has been challenged.

It may be worthwhile also to say something about methodological heterodoxy. I have never suggested that I favor particular methodological approaches when using IPT. My approach to research methods, as evidenced in many methods texts that I have written (e.g. Breakwell *et al.*, 2012), is omnivorous. Personally, I use whatever method is available to get the data that I need and to analyze it. I understand and acknowledge, the important epistemological debates that result in other researchers choosing not to do this. The import of those debates has allowed me to treat research information and conclusions derived from it with the utmost caution. Nevertheless, I believe that IPT benefits from being willing to implement a wide array of methodological tools.

Instead of debating whether qualitative or quantitative methods are optimal for IPT research, I would be keen now to focus upon trying to agree the meta-perspective that might be needed in identity research. The main targets for exploration in IPT work (such as the structure of identity, coping strategies or the manifestation of identity threat) seem to beg for longitudinal data collection strategies. The issues that concern us about the cultural or historical specificity of identity principles beg for

cohort-sequential research designs. The concerns that we have about the value (i.e. the meaning) of self-report data when dealing with a dynamic response to identity threat call for the use of other types of information (e.g. archival or observational or physiological). These considerations point to the need for a diverse toolkit of data collection methods but more importantly suggest that the emphasis should be upon careful research study design. Design encompasses not just determining how and what data are collected and from whom but also how they are then analyzed and the findings represented. Before embarking on IPT research, it seems useful to apply a checklist of questions, such as the following: do I actually need longitudinal data to make the argument I need to make at the end of the study?; do I need greater diversity (age, culture, etc.) of participants to make my case?; am I over-reliant on self-report data?; and do I know how to analyze the relationships in the data collected comprehensively and can I adequately describe those relationships? I think that IPT will benefit from diversity in methodological approach as we go forward but I also think it will require methodological rigor.

Identity – personal, social, or just identity?

IPT is designed to be a comprehensive theory (rather than the sort of mid-range models that are so common in the history of social psychology, which are little more than single hypotheses). Its comprehensiveness is both a weakness and a strength. It is a weakness because it makes it complex, difficult to summarize, difficult to understand in its entirety, difficult to codify in a manner that makes it comprehensively falsifiable and so on. It is a strength because it offers a reasonably coherent explanation for a range of phenomena. Given its structure, IPT cries out for researchers to take parts of it and expand, reformulate or excise them through empirical and logical analysis. Hence there is a need for caution where the introduction of orthodoxies is concerned.

Indeed, there are a number of key components of IPT that cause controversy and have generated challenges and new ideas. In this chapter, I will offer my reflections on what has been argued about four of these challenges.

The first is fundamental to the theory. It concerns the basic conceptualization of identity that is used in IPT. IPT is a theory of identity – it is concerned with the holistic analysis of the *total identity* of the person. It proposes that this identity will encompass elements that are dynamically derived from every aspect of the person's experience – social category memberships, interpersonal relationships, social representational exposure, individual activity and observation and so on. IPT struggles to find a

way of articulating the complex dynamic process of personhood that incorporates the personal and the social – the active, subjective conscious self and the objectified, known self. At the core of IPT is the assertion that the person seeks to construct and maintain an identity – and that this process is orderly (in the sense that there appear to be relatively predictable states of identity that are sought). It is clearly argued that this identity comprises many elements (some derived from social category membership; some derived from other aspects of experience within the social world). Identity is a multifaceted, complex phenomenon. It is both a dynamic process and a dynamic state of being. I will return to this subsequently.

The concern in IPT with the agentic role of the person has sometimes been taken to suggest that the theory is ignoring social identity. This is simply a misunderstanding of the theory. Social identities (derived from category memberships and representational processes) from an IPT perspective are elements in the total identity. To this extent, IPT complements and even incorporates, Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1978) – at least in SIT's original formulation. It was always meant to do so (I was, after all, Tajfel's Ph.D. student). I believe a comprehensive theory of identity should support models of intergroup relations and intra-group dynamics. Indeed, I am heartened to see how many theorists are now employing IPT and evolving it, in the context of the analysis of group conflict and societal change (many represented in this volume).

I think the personal identity–social identity dichotomy that has dominated discourse in social psychology is actually counterproductive when trying to understand the dynamism of identity development over the lifespan. In the original formulation of IPT the structure of identity is said to be described along two planes: the content dimension and the value dimension. The content dimension consists of the characteristics that define identity: the properties that, taken as a constellation, mark the individual as unique. It encompasses both those characteristics previously considered the domain of social identity (group memberships, roles, social category labels, etc.) and of personal identity (values, attitudes, cognitive style, etc.). The distinction between social and personal identity is not used in IPT because, seen across the biography, social identities are seen to become core components of personal identity: the dichotomy is purely a temporal artifact. In fact, the same logic can be used to argue that all identity is social since at some point in its development it will have relied upon social inputs. Whichever way you choose to look down the telescope, the end result is the same: there is an integrative identity – a dynamic entity that is continually responsive to the social context but not determined solely by the current social constraints.

Yet, I also believe that it is vital to be clear when the concept of identity is used whether one is talking about the integrative identity or some specific element therein. All too frequently we are imprecise in usage. I particularly dislike the idea that we should talk about individuals having "multiple identities." I realize that this is common parlance but I think this confuses matters. As soon as you talk about multiple identities it begs the question: how do they relate to each other? They cannot be realistically supposed to exist in a series of hermetically sealed units. Then you have the problem of theorizing the superordinate structure that accommodates these multiple identities. Faced with this conundrum, I prefer to think holistically about the identity and the elements that comprise it.

This does not avoid the need to talk about the structure of identity. In fact, it requires you do talk about the structure of identity. IPT originally offered a framework for thinking about the development of the structure of identity. It proposed that the development of identity structures has to be seen as a process occupying the person's whole lifespan. It suggested that the characteristics of the human biological organism (capacity for memory, sensory features, rate of growth, etc.) interact with the social context to provide the material for identity construction. It is argued that the neurocognitive capacities of the individual provide the ongoing core to identity processes. Essentially, the individual interprets experience and assimilates its implications into his or her identity. The relatively simple model offered by IPT originally for the identity structure was that this core would operate through the lifespan and the content and evaluation dimensions of identity would develop as the individual aged. The implication was that both content and evaluation would accumulate and be organized (largely in keeping with the principles of identity – of which, more later).

However, IPT does not say enough about the structure of identity. The theory was more focused on the processes of identity than upon structure. I want to offer a few thoughts that go some way to rectifying, or at least explaining, that omission in the original work. The early representation of the structure (the attempt at a three-dimensional movement through time, in a two-dimensional drawing that looked like a pyramid on its side with a rod through the middle) created an impression of static, if cumulative, development of the structure. It seemed to be a really simple structure – just two-dimensions plus time. Now – in a digital age – I would want a much more dynamic representation of structure. This would represent the universe of probabilistic possibilities as the individual moves through the lifespan. The analogy of the digital image – that can change in area of focus, can modify its pixel definition, can morph at