edited by Stephen Worchel, J. Francisco Morales, Darío Páez and Jean-Claude Deschamps

social identity

international perspectives

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Preface

This volume deals with the issue of identity, the concern over which is far from being something new. In fact, it can be traced to classical Antiquity. Identity is present in the famous 'Know Thyself' precept, inscribed on the frontispiece of the Delphi Temple. It is also the target of many of the famous Socratic questions and the stimulus for Plato's well-known reflections. It can be considered, without exaggeration, an issue which has occupied humankind since the beginning of civilization.

It also focuses on categorization or, more explicitly, on the analysis of how we perceive other people (stereotypes) and how we decide to behave towards them (prejudice, discrimination), and, in general, on the understanding of our readiness to come to grips with the social environment. All these problems have a long tradition, but they cannot be taken as old-fashioned or as belonging to the past, since they are pervasive in our current, so-called 'civilized' societies.

Admittedly, it would be illusory to try to find in the Socratic–Platonic analysis of the Delphic formula the point of departure of a current psychosocial analysis of the personal and social self. Only in the last 20 years or so have social psychologists provided such an analysis, framed in the recent, but already well-known theories of social identity, and social and self-categorization. It is the purpose of this volume to offer an updated and balanced view of these fairly new developments, in the expectation that it will foster a better understanding of some of the more urgent and central problems of our time.

The latest elaborations of the theories and the most recent research inspired by them are especially attended to. A detailed summary of them would exceed the length usually allowed to any preface. However, we can, at least, highlight three of their main contributions, closely linked to three salient features of the theories mentioned.

In this respect, it should be stressed that one of the most important assets of the social identity and self-categorization theories is the building of an original theoretical corpus which has provided social psychology with new theoretical insights.

Undoubtedly, before Tajfel's formulation of social identity theory, there were several psychosocial approaches to the study of identity. However, perhaps due to their low theoretical coherence, they did not succeed in making social identity a crucial concept of the discipline of social psychology. The same can be said of self-categorization theory.

This theoretical corpus was not without its appropriate empirical content, since the theoretical concepts and propositions were elaborated through an intense dialogue with certain psychosocial phenomena demanding explanation, such as intergroup discrimination, the effect of stability and legitimacy of status differences, the processes of social comparison and of group competition, among others. In providing such an explanation, both theories became more and more influential and began to play a leading role within social psychology.

Going still a step further, they widened their scope to accommodate other psychosocial phenomena. Let's take the example of the group concept. Tajfel himself had suggested the need for its reformulation. However, this was only done by Turner several years later. The covariation hypothesis, formulated by Deschamps, and linking intra- and intergroup differentiation, is just another example of the success of the theories in their efforts to cover other psychosocial phenomena. Besides the group concept and the covariation hypothesis, the following processes, among others, are worth mentioning: influence, group polarization, collective behaviour, the impact of minorities, prejudice, stereotypes and leadership. This speaks in favour of the fruitfulness of both theories.

These three features correspond approximately to the stages of development of the theories, but, at the same time, all three have been, and still are, open and subject to changes and modifications. The fact that there is a mutual influence between them cannot be forgotten either. Thus, the intensive study of intergroup discrimination has helped to reformulate the early concepts, throwing light on the functions of comparison dimensions. By the same token, the extension of the theory to the group concept has allowed Turner to replace the early interperson–intergroup continuum by a new, more accurate interperson–group one.

In recent years, the sustained vitality of the theories has allowed them to gain new empirical content with the corresponding increase in the amount of explanations of phenomena of interest for social psychology. As a result, they have become both more complex internally and more sophisticated in their theoretical formulation. The contributors to this volume, among them some of the original formulators of both theories, have tried to give them even more impulse. They raise new issues, examine critically some crucial points, and explore new areas of research. Their work will serve to expand the theories and, we hope, to persuade others to join the effort.

The overall aim of this volume is, then, to demonstrate the breadth of scope of issues related to social identity. Indeed, one of the most unique features of the area is that it has found a warm welcome in a variety of camps. As such, we begin the volume with chapters addressing identity and the self. We move from here to contributions that deal with identity in the group and intergroup context. And the final contributions venture into the realm of cultural influences on social identity.

But the breadth of social identity is not only demonstrated by its contribution across the social spectrum. It is also a theory that has captured

the imagination of investigators in diverse lands with different cultural perspectives. In an effort to represent this geographical scope, the chapters in this volume represent a mosaic from five continents (Asia, Europe, North America, South America, Australia) and seven countries (Israel, Australia, Spain, Great Britain, the United States, Poland, Venezuela, Switzerland). Although the specific focus of each chapter represents a combination of the investigator's interest and his or her cultural foundation, the social identity framework provides a common language that eclipses geographical, political and cultural boundaries.

We'd like to extend our appreciation to our colleagues who have commented on specific chapters. Special thanks is given to Dawna Coutant, John Turner and William Webb. Jennifer Ford, Kim Cozzi and Jon Iuzzini provided invaluable editorial assistance in preparing the manuscript for publication. And above all, we extend our appreciation to Ziyad Marar and Lucy Robinson, who were brave enough to accept such an ambitious project and whose expertise and gentle guidance moved it from the idea stage to book form.

PART I

REPRESENTATIONS OF SELF AND GROUP

1

Regarding the Relationship Between Social Identity and Personal Identity

Jean-Claude Deschamps and Thierry Devos

The problems to be discussed in this chapter can be considered the central issue regarding both identity and a general perspective of social psychology; the theme of this chapter describes the relationship between two concepts called social identity and personal identity.

Few concepts are as polysemic as identity. The idea of identity appears in the first texts of Antiquity (the famous 'Know Thyself' of Delphi) and is used in both everyday language and scholarly discourses; it is also the concern of many scientific disciplines. There are many synonyms or near synonyms for identity (one can mention at random: oneself, I, the self, we, self-perception, self-image, self-representation or self-awareness, the ego, and so on). The self can refer to a familiar subject, but also to a social agent's action. It can also refer to active processes and mechanisms that rule behaviour. Therefore, our remarks are limited to specific aspects of identity.

Social identity and personal identity

Identity is a central concept in social psychology, probably because it is one of the main concerns of that field. As Codol wrote (1979, p. 424), that major concern – which has been the subject of very old debates regarding philosophy and religion as well as ideology and the humanities – simply refers to the conflict of affirmation and individual necessity versus affirmation and collective necessity, the search for personal identity versus the search for collective identity, what constitutes individual difference versus what constitutes similarity to others (same things constitute both), social

visibility versus conformity, in short the conflict of the individual versus the group. And that concern, which can take many forms, refers to the relationship between the concept of the individual and the collective, often viewed as conflicting. This relationship is central in social psychology. In other words, it is an opposition between the diverse and the homogeneous, or, as Robert Pagès notes, it is the recurrent theme of the same and the other.

Studies about self-concept and identity also deal with the opposition between the individual and the social; and that opposition is codified according to the distinction made between personal identity and social identity. This distinction was already made – although not explicitly – at the beginning of modern psychological thinking. At the end of the last century, William James (1890) wrote about the distinction between the I and the me and came up with the idea of duality in self-representation. Nowadays, this distinction continues to have a great impact on studies on identity. Mead (1934) goes deeper into the question with his idea that the self consists simultaneously of a sociological component (the me) – which would only be an internalization of the social function – and a more personal component (the I); the developments of that definition of the self have gradually led to the distinction between social identity and personal identity. Of course, everyone agrees that identity is both personal – in the sense that it is 'situated within' a person – and social, inasmuch as its processes of individual formation are social, but the individual is indeed characterized by two poles – one is psychological and the other sociological – that have no connection to each other. At first, the individual/society dichotomy seemed outmoded, particularly with Mead's idea of conversation between the I and the me, according to which the individual is a continuous creation of society, and society an unremitting creation of individuals. But we will see that the two poles, the individual and the social, tend to be considered opposite.

Let us first make clear the concepts of social identity and personal identity. These concepts are based on the idea that every individual is characterized by social features which show his or her membership of a group or a category, on the one hand, and by personal features or individual characteristics which are more specific, more idiosyncratic, on the other.

The former features define the social identity of a person. Belonging to a group or to a given social category is the most important. Social identity is codified as the part of the self which refers to cognitions ensuing from social ecological positions (Sarbin & Allen, 1968). Those who have similar positions and common backgrounds have similar social identities, therefore social identity does indeed refer to the similarity pole. However, the feeling of belonging to a group and the phenomena of identification are only possible in connection with groups or categories one does not belong to. Thus social identity refers to the fact that the individual perceives him- or herself as similar to others of the same background (the we), but social

identity also refers to a difference, to a specificity of that we in connection with members of other groups or categories (the them). We have then a double motion which combines ingroup similarities and intergroup or categorial differentiation. The stronger the identification with a group, the more significant the differentiation of that group from other groups will be.

More personal features or specific character attributes of each individual refer to personal identity and the idea that each individual is a unique combination of features which make him different from others, and which explains his uniqueness and the fact that he is specific. Personal identity is not well defined. However, it indicates how an individual is aware of his difference with respect to others. That feeling can only be experienced in relation to others and personal identity refers to the fact that the individual perceives himself as identical to himself; in other words he is the same in time and in space, but that is also what specifies him and marks him out from others. Personal identity is what makes you similar to yourself and different from others.

Of course, one could debate this postulate regarding self-permanence as a relatively stable and durable concept held by everyone (see, for instance, Goffman [1956] with his descriptions of the individual who plays different roles for different audiences and Gergen [1965, 1982] with his idea of fluidity of the self). It is therefore necessary to speak of identities in the plural, considering that every social agent – whether individual or collective – can actualize, mobilize or produce identities according to the context. This also leads us to the question of the historical universality of this feeling of identity. But that does not change fundamentally the problem that concerns us. The fact that the feeling of identity is socially built into every individual and modulated in every social position and that it is an ideological construction does not mean that it is not real and efficient; it is a guide for individuals' actions and it is essential for the functioning of our society.

Now, we must see how the articulation, the organization, the synthesis of personal and social aspects of identity are conceptualized. Social identity refers to a feeling of similarity to (some) others; personal identity refers to a feeling of difference in relation to the same others. This distinction between personal identity and social identity is indeed only an example of duality between the individual and the collective or difference and similarity. On the basis of generally accepted definitions of what is conventionally called social identity and personal identity, we have to deal with the conflict between the individual and the social. This lack of differentiation on a certain level – in other words social identity – and this differentiation – personal identity – are considered most of the time as two opposite poles between which human behaviour oscillates. This combination of similarities and differences is problematic. It is hard to conceive how one can feel very similar and very different at the same time; it seems as though one has to choose to be one or the other.

Social identity theory

The studies carried out by the 'Bristol School' emphasize the link between social identity and personal identity. In order to understand how the concept of identity is theorized and used in that perspective, first of all a certain number of developments regarding the process of categorization must be addressed.

Categorization and social categorization

Categorization refers to psychological processes which tend to organize the environment into categories or groups of persons, objects, events (or groups of some of their characteristics) according to their similarities, their equivalences concerning their actions, their intentions or behaviour (Tajfel, 1972a, p. 272). Categorization divides the environment into groups of subjects which are or seem to be similar according to certain criteria; these subjects are or seem to be different from other subjects according to the same criteria. Categorization plays a specific part in structuring the environment by systematizing (dividing and organizing) and thus by simplifying it.

One of the major effects of categorization and the simplification it implies is that it emphasizes the differences between categories (contrast or cognitive differentiation effect) and the similarities within the same category (assimilation or cognitive stereotype effect). Each element of the category is characterized by the features shared by all the subjects of that category.

Thus, a category is a group of elements which have in common one or several features. Cognitive apprehension is a simpler apprehension of reality. The emphasis on similarities and differences is one of the aspects of that simplification. Dealing with a psychological process, there is no reason at first sight to think that this process does not also play a role in the perception of the others, who are characterized by the fact that they belong to social categories. The fact that the elements referred to are persons and that we deal with social categories does not matter; the process does not change in that perspective. Actually, a social category is principally a cognitive category, where individuals who are supposed to share one or several features are grouped together. Stereotypes are – on a social level – the expression of the attribution of features shared by different members of a group without taking into account the interindividual differences. The classification used as a basis for the stereotypes minimizes the differences in features among the members of a social group. As Doise noted in 1976, categorization is then a psychological process that simplifies the perception of physical and social worlds and the way the individual organizes the subjective perception of his or her environment.

But apart from the homology between the perception of physical environment and social environment, social categorization – unlike physical stimuli categorization – implies that subjects are themselves inside a system of categories. They are subjects and objects of categorization at the same time.

Social categorization minimizes the in-category differences and exaggerates the differences between categories. In addition, these differences are used for evaluation. When people hold the representation of a dichotomous universe where you can belong only to one category, they end up having a discriminating attitude towards the members of other categories.

Social categorization and identity

How can discrimination between groups be explained? Unlike in Sherif's theory of the objective conflict of interest between groups (see, for instance, 1966), competition is not a sufficient explanation for discrimination between groups. For Tajfel (1972a) the idea of belonging to two different groups leads to discrimination in favour of the group one belongs to. But then, one must refer to concepts other than competition to explain the phenomenon of discrimination. This is when the concept of identity is introduced. It is important to recall the main points of social identity theory (see in particular Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

According to Tajfel (1972a), social identity is conceptualized as being connected to the individual's knowledge of belonging to a certain social group and to the emotional and evaluative signification that results from this group membership. Thus, it is through their belonging to different groups that individuals acquire a social identity defining their specific positions in society. But belonging to a given group contributes to the development of a positive social identity only if the characteristics of that group can be compared favourably to other groups. In comparing the groups, individuals tend to establish a difference which is in favour of their own group.

From 1974 on, Tajfel adds an *a priori* distinction between two opposite poles in social behaviour. At one extreme (which can probably not be found in such a 'pure' form in 'real life'), we find interactions between two or more individuals. These individuals are totally determined by their interpersonal relations and by their individual characteristics and not affected at all by the different groups or social categories they belong to. At the other extreme, there are interactions between at least two individuals (or groups of individuals) which are totally determined by their respective membership of different groups or social categories and not affected at all by inter-individual relationships among the concerned persons. Here again, there are few chances of encountering such 'pure' forms of this extreme in 'real' social situations (Tajfel & Turner, 1979).

The two poles refer to interpersonal attitudes on the one hand, and to intergroup behaviour on the other. As Turner (1981a) noted, personal identity corresponds to interpersonal behaviour – which means differentiation between the self and the others; and social identity corresponds to intergroup behaviour – which means differentiation between groups or between 'we' and 'them'.

When identification with a group is emphasized, one changes from the interpersonal pole to the intergroup pole. The introduction of this distinction between interpersonal and intergroup phenomena is important for things are not going to be as simple as in Tajfel's early theory, according to which this distinction motivates a need for a positive difference in favour of one's own group compared to other groups, the creation of that difference and the emphasis on it. What really matters it the need for self-esteem, the 'desire' for a positive self-evaluation, the need for individual positivity. The basic postulate is that 'individuals tend to maintain or increase their self-esteem; they try to reach a positive self-concept' (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 34). Thus, the individual tries to preserve or reach a positive self-image, and if she cannot evaluate herself according to the interpersonal behaviour pole – which lies in evaluating oneself directly by comparing oneself to the others – she can satisfy her desire for positive self-evaluation through social competition between groups (which must be considered as a groups comparison) with this tendency to introduce a positive difference in favour of one's own group in relation with other groups.

In fact, social identity theory is founded on two bases: one is cognitive and the other is motivational. As mentioned before, it is cognitive insofar as the categorization process leads the subjects to overestimate intergroup differences and to underestimate ingroup differences. It is motivational insofar as what motivates discrimination is the need for self-esteem – or self-respect, according to Emler and Hopkins (1990).

Turner (1975a, 1975b), who belongs to that school of thought, concludes that subjects act in terms of differentiation between groups only when this differentiation is the only means for them to achieve a positive self-evaluation, a positive identity. If they can act in terms of a differentiation between self and others, they do not resort to the intergroup 'bias'. This only occurs when identification with the group provides for a positive identity. In other words, categorization on its own would not be enough to observe a differentiation between groups; the tendency to establish a positive differentiation between self and others underlies the social categorization process. To put it differently, if the individual accedes to a positive identity through his identification with a group, he establishes differentiation between groups but no longer tends to establish differentiation with the other members of his group. If the individual is able to differentiate himself from the others directly – acceding in this way to a positive self-evaluation – he no longer establishes differentiations with other groups which he knows.

The intention here is not to develop the limits of these studies or to question aspects of social identity theory (see Deschamps, 1984, 1991, for more details). However, it must be underlined that on the basis of this asserted dichotomy between interindividual and intergroup behaviour, one can say that the stronger social identity is, the less important is personal identity, and the more prominent a personal identity is, the less the individual needs a social identity, since social identity and personal identity satisfy the same need for a positive self-image. According to the social

identity model, we can predict that when the salience of belonging to a group increases, every subject identifies him- or herself more and more with the in-group and that will reduce differentiation between the self and the ingroup while exacerbating differentiation between groups. In other words, when identification with a group increases, one changes from the inter-personal pole to the intergroup pole, and vice versa. This dichotomy solves the problem of differences and similarities since only one pole is possible, switching from one to the other. This is indeed what Turner refers to when he introduces the concept of 'depersonalization'. For him, the factors which intensify the salience of the ingroup/outgroup categorization tend to increase identification (similarity, equivalence, interchangeability) between the self and the other members of the group (and differentiations with members of another group). Consequently, these factors depersonalize the self according to stereotypes determining the group. Depersonalization refers to the 'auto-stereotypy' process through which individuals come to consider themselves above all as interchangeable models of a category rather than as unique individuals who are distinct from the others (Turner, 1987, p. 50). As we can see, both analyses – the one based on difference and the one based on similarity – depend on each other negatively. The dicho-tomy postulated between interindividual and intergroup behaviour, which actually refers to the duality of self-awareness and the opposition between personal identity and social identity solves – apparently – the problem of similarities and differences while involving two mutually exclusive poles.

Self-definition and its different levels

Turner (1987) tries to explain the opposition between the psychological aspect of identity – which refers to an individual's unity with its constel-lation of specific features – and the sociological aspect of identity – which refers to the idea of group membership and similarities – by distinguishing three levels in self-definition with his self-categorization theory:

(a) a supra-order level where the self is defined as a human being: it refers to a human identity based on comparisons between the species (simi-larity with the human race, differences with other forms of life);
(b) an intermediate level of self-definition where the self is defined as a member of a group (ingroup similarities and intergroup differences): it refers to a social identity based on intergroup comparisons (in-species);
(c) a subordinate level of self-definition where the self is defined as a unique being (differentiation between the self and the others inside a group); it refers to a personal identity based on interpersonal (in-group) comparisons.

However, when individuals situate themselves at a level of categorization, they obviously have to occlude the two other levels. As a matter of fact,

> there is a fundamental antagonism between the salience of one self-categorization level and the other levels: the salience of one of the categorization levels engenders

in-class similarity and interclass differentiation which reduces or inhibits the perception of in-class differences and interclass similarities on which inferior and superior levels of categorization are based. (Turner, 1987, p. 49)

Turner adds that if, for simplification purposes, the supra-orderly categorization level is ignored, the (social) intermediate level and the (personal) subordinate level are linked by a reverse relation. Obviously, the introduction of these levels does not solve the opposition between the collective and the individual problem. Their relations remain negatively dependent (self-definition in terms of categorial membership – both on the supra-orderly and the intermediate levels – versus individual specificity).

In fact, as a whole these studies give the impression that it is difficult to get rid of this opposition between the individual and the collective, and that we are trapped with a dichotomous analysis according to which similarity and difference, social identity and personal identity, are two poles which depend on each other negatively. Having questioned the link between ingroup resemblance and intergroup divergence, we shall now present another series of studies in order to go beyond this opposition between individual and collective forms.

The categorization model, like social identity theory or self-categorization theory, states that the same factors increase differences between groups and similarity or homogeneity inside the groups. However, this especially applies to outgroups and the way they are perceived and treated. The individual's own group would be perceived in a much more heterogeneous way. In fact, a certain number of studies carried out over the last 15 years illustrate the fact that the individual believes that his or her own group is more differentiated than other groups. This means that the group one belongs to can be perceived as heterogeneous by its members. This tendency to consider one's own group as relatively less homogeneous than a group one does not belong to (or the fact that a group tends to be considered more heterogeneous by its own members and not so by individuals who are not part of it) has been called the 'outgroup homogeneity effect'. This phenomenon has been explained in many ways (some explanations are based on motivation, in terms of beliefs, and refer to the self as a special category, recalling the way information about ingroup and outgroup is processed and codified in the memory; see Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). But this is not essential here. What is important is that the concept according to which differentiation between groups necessarily means convergence within groups has been questioned and is no longer the rule.

Covariation between interindividual and intergroup differentiation hypothesis

A number of studies carried out in the 1970s already stated that emphasis on similarities inside a group does not necessarily mean emphasis on

differences between groups (for instance, Deschamps, 1972–1973; Deschamps & Doise, 1978). These observations, which were astonishing at a time when categorization effects were taken for granted, indicated (Deschamps, 1979) that the simple representation of belonging to two different groups could cause discrimination between groups in favour of one's own group but it would also engender differentiation between the self and the rest of one's group. When the representation of a dichotomized world is not prominent or relevant in a situation, there is no discrimination between groups – which is obvious. Moreover, in certain conditions, the differentiation between self and others could be less important than that between the self and the rest of the membership group when belonging to a group and dichotomy in groups are significant criteria in defining a situation.

This has led us to a new perspective on similarities and differences: the intergroup and in-group differences covariation. Instead of considering interindividual and intergroup differences as two extremes of a continuum, and that they are in this way mutually (at least partly) exclusive, we assume that in certain conditions the stronger the identification with the group, the more important is interindividual differentiation within the group. Codol (for instance, 1975) underlines this issue with what he calls the phenomenon of 'superior conformity of the self': the more an individual conforms to the standards of a group (and the more she identifies herself with that group), the more she will tend to consider herself different from the other members of the group, believing that she corresponds to the standards better than the others.

Here is the central concept of the interindividual and intergroup differentiation model, in a few words. A general process of cognitive centrism appears when individuals are induced with the representation of a dichotomized world, divided into two mutually exclusive categories. According to this representation, both ingroup favouritism or intergroup differentiation (which can be called sociocentrism) and autofavouritism or differentiation between self and others (which can be called egocentrism) would increase when categorization is emphasized.

The aim of a certain number of our studies was to test this postulate (see Deschamps, 1982a, 1983–1984, 1984; Deschamps & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1981; Deschamps & Volpato, 1984). The experiments carried out in these studies are similar to the ones used in Tajfel's minimal group paradigm and refer to the changes introduced into that paradigm by Turner in 1975. An outline of the surveys will suffice here (Deschamps, 1984). One of them was carried out in a girls' college. Using a sample of 88 girls, aged between 16 and 20, half of the subjects were divided into two groups (categorization condition), apparently according to their preference for the works of two modern painters (in reality, it was an arbitrary way of splitting them). The other half was not divided into two groups and did not belong to any group in terms of their artistic preferences (non-categorization condition). In accordance with our hypothesis, it was predicted that differentiation

between self and others as well as intergroup differentiation would be more significant in the categorization condition than in the non-categorization condition.

Concerning differentiation between groups, the results confirmed our expectations: discrimination in favour of the ingroup in the categorization condition and of course no discrimination in the non-categorization condition. Concerning differentiation between self and others, in the categorization condition, the differentiation is much more significant than in the non-categorization condition. In other words, when individuals are simply induced to the representation of an environment including their group and another one (which leads of course to differentiation between groups), it increases significantly autofavouritism 'bias' or differentiation between self and others, compared to a non-categorization condition (without categorization induction). Emphasizing intergroup differentiation in an experiment (in this example, by inducing or not the subjects with the representation of a dichotomized world) is sufficient to increase the differentiation subjects set between themselves and others.

But more observations must be addressed. The contrary is also true. If differences between self and others within a group are emphasized in an experiment, differentiation between groups increases simultaneously. Another survey was carried out in a high school with 112 boys and girls aged between 14 and 15 (see Deschamps & Volpato, 1984). As in the categorization condition of the experiment mentioned above, the subjects were placed into two groups, apparently according to their preference for the works of a contemporary music composer. Half of the subjects, the ones in the individualization condition, expected that each individual would be given exactly the same remuneration, according to the minimal group paradigm. The other half, the ones in the fusion condition, expected that all members of a group would receive the same remuneration, corresponding to an average of points which all the subjects would give to the different members of that group. Our expectations proved to be right. In the fusion condition, differentiation between self and others and discrimination in favour of one's own group are less than in the individualization condition. When differentiation between self and others is emphasized – by focusing not on the groups as a whole, but on the fact that individuals are characterized by their group memberships – differentiation between groups increases in the same way.

In addition, the covariation model seems to apply especially to individuals belonging to privileged groups. Not only do differentiation between groups and ingroup homogeneity not necessarily go together, but the simultaneous variation of differentiation inside a group and between groups also depends on the relative status of the groups in question (Deschamps, 1982b; see also Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1988). These are the conclusions of other studies. For instance, it has been shown (Deschamps, 1977) that when boys had to evaluate themselves as well as other boys and girls for different assignments, they discriminated between boys and girls and between

Figure 1.1 *Personal and social dimensions in psychosocial identity*

themselves and the other boys. Girls would discriminate between boys and girls, but unlike the boys they would not tend to discriminate between other members of their own category.

In conclusion, the results of these studies briefly mentioned underline the relevance of the simultaneous variation of differentiation between groups and between self and others. However, it does not mean that under certain circumstances there is an opposition between personal identity and social identity. Obviously, relationships between the individual and the collective can be examined according to situations, cultures and societies. Nevertheless, one must at least consider the possibility of simultaneity between similarity and difference. Therefore, the postulated axis defining the inter-individual relations and behaviour pole versus the intergroup relations and behaviour pole should be reconsidered. In that prospect, similarity and difference, social identity and personal identity must no longer be considered as two poles of the same continuum which are negatively dependent. These different elements must rather be considered as two disconnected dimensions that can be 'orthogonalized' in some way (see Figure 1.1). Consequently, models based on Tajfel's work and the covariation hypothesis can be explained at the same time.

Note

This chapter was translated from the French by Mehr-Afarin Khosrowdad. It takes up and develops arguments which have been put forth in some of the previous texts and quotes several passages from an article published in 1991 by the first author in *Cahiers Internationaux de Psychologie Sociale* called 'Identités, Appartenances Sociales et Différenciations Individuelles'.

2

Social Representations in Personal Identity

Willem Doise

Introduction: Self as social representation?

Social representations can be defined as organizing principles of symbolic relationships. They permit the positioning of the individual in relation with significant social objects. The self certainly is such an object embedded in a network of relationships. Given its central position in communicative systems, personal identity is not just an idiosyncratic entity, it is one of the most important organizing principles of symbolic relationships.

In order to validate the basic assumption of personal identity as a social representation, existence of common knowledge about personal identity should be evidenced together with systematic positioning of individuals in the frame of this common knowledge and the anchoring of such positioning in other socio-psychological meaning systems. Indeed, important components of all studies on social representations are the definition of a common field, the systematizing of individual positioning in that field, and the anchoring of these positionings in related fields of representations (Doise, Clémence & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1993).

Several investigators have already examined aspects of personal identity in the frame of social representation theory (see, for instance, Durand Delvigne, 1992; Palmonari, Carugati, Ricci-Bitti & Sarchielli, 1979; Ravaud, Beaufils & Paicheler, 1986; Tap, 1985; Zavalloni & Louis-Guérin, 1984; Zeegers, 1988). Nevertheless, personal identity is more often studied in other theoretical frameworks and this may explain why books containing prototypical social representation studies do not mention investigations of personal identity (see, for instance, Abric, 1994; Doise & Palmonari, 1986; Duveen & Lloyd, 1990; Jodelet, 1989). A remarkable and pioneering exception is the study by Codol (1984a; see Farr & Moscovici, 1984). In this study Codol analysed the system of relationships connecting representations of self, others, group and task.

Another possible reason for the paucity of research on personal identity as social representation is the limited definition of the concept of personal identity. Generally, identity is conceived of as a very peculiar set of opinions, judgements, evaluations, attitudes, manifested by a person towards him- or

herself. Although research from different theoretical traditions bears on the general processes governing identity development and construction (Damon & Hart, 1982; Erikson, 1977; L'Ecuyer, 1981; Marcia, 1966) and on situational regularities enhancing saliency of identity aspects (Codol, 1990; Kuhn & McPartland, 1954; McGuire & McGuire, 1988), the study of individual identity as socially organized still remains marginal.

Nevertheless, identity, as other social representations, can be studied as a cognitive organization, oriented by a meta-system of social regulations. In order to illustrate this thesis I shall successively show (a) that common knowledge on identity exists, (b) that organizing principles rule individual positioning in relation with this common knowledge frame, and (c) that specific social insertions and experiences modulate such positioning. In developing my position, I draw on selected evidence from studies on social representation theory and a reinterpretation of traditional research on social identity. My main objective is to convince the reader that studying identity as a social representation is feasible.

Common knowledge in personal identity

Personal identity is often considered as unique and singular. On the other hand, shared group membership involves common characteristics. Hence, individuals would be considered similar to the extent that they belong to the same or similar categories. In this sense group membership would result in homogeneity and individual differences would correspond to personal characteristics which are not shared by other group members. Such considerations fit with Turner's conception of a functional antagonism between the salience of different levels of self-categorization, the group level and the individual level: 'The salience of one level produces the intra-class similarities and inter-class differences which reduce or inhibit the perception of the intra-class differences and inter-class similarities upon which lower and higher levels respectively are based' (Turner, 1987, p. 49).

Recent research, however, suggests that the problem of similarity and difference is not so simple: commonness could also be studied at the individual level and specificity at the group level. Let us consider some of the research evidence.

Ravaud et al. (1986) investigated school classes attended by physically handicapped pupils as well as classes of non-handicapped students. Students in both types of classes were asked to describe on the same scales members of their class (themselves included), as well as handicapped pupils in general and non-handicapped pupils in general. Factorial correspondence analysis yielded very contrasting descriptions of the general group of handicapped and non-handicapped students. However, self-descriptions of handicapped and non-handicapped pupils were very similar. In addition, when the descriptions targeted specific handicapped or non-handicapped individuals, there was a high degree of similarity. In terms of social representations,

differences are found at the category level, but they do not manifest themselves when individuals are asked to describe individual members of the categories. Commenting on these results, the authors contest the generality and importance of the so-called 'deductive effect' of social categorization. If such an effect were strong, distinctive traits of categories as such should be attributed to single members of each category.

This is not the case:

> It is a rather striking observation that stereotypes are not very important in structuring representations of individuals considered to be bearers of the stereotypes. The abstract individual described by the valid pupils is totally opposed to the descriptions of the concrete individuals and the image that valid pupils construct of real handicapped ones and that appears in their answers seems not to be mediated through stereotypical representations. This is a strong challenge for assumptions that consider stereotypes to be a necessary tool, a measure applied to all members of a stereotyped group. (Ravaud et al., 1986, p. 180)

However, it should be noted that the same research reports results showing that real discrimination can coexist with a blurring of stereotypes. When the students were asked to choose others for a party at their home or as work partners, non-handicapped and handicapped pupils clearly prefer non-handicapped companions. Such discrimination does not reveal itself in the concrete images pupils give of themselves and of each other.

In the same line of thought, research carried out on adolescent identity by Palmonari and colleagues is relevant (Palmonari et al., 1979; Palmonari, Pombeni & Kirchler, 1989). Their results show striking similarities between descriptions of self given by adolescents belonging to different formal and informal groups. These descriptions reflect their openness to the social world, their commitment, disengagement and dissatisfaction.

Similar results were obtained by Doise and Lorenzi-Cioldi (1991) studying Swiss and second-generation immigrant pupils. These adolescents gave highly contrasting descriptions of Swiss in general and foreigners in general. However, when describing themselves and their friends, Swiss and immigrant pupils gave quite similar 'concrete' descriptions. Moreover, variations between subjects of the same category in self-descriptions are not more important than variations between them in the description of group stereotypes. To state it differently, self-images are as stereotypical as group images.

The results of other investigations (Nakbi, 1990; Nakbi & Arnal-Duchemin, 1987) support similar conclusions. These studies gathered not only self-images and other-images of male and female students, but also ideal images and self-images attributed to others. Multidimensional analyses of these data revealed a very similar structure of these representations for males and females.

This research demonstrates a high degree of similarity between self-definitions of members of different groups. General societal norms affect these definitions much more than do specific group memberships. This is

also a conclusion that can be drawn from research by Cowan and Hoffman (1986) and by Inoff, Halverson and Pizzigati (1983). These investigators examined the self-descriptions of children, finding striking similarities in the self-descriptions of boys and girls, despite the fact that conventional gender stereotypes are used in the description of others. It was assumed that these children did not apply gender stereotypes to themselves because they tend to ascribe favourable traits to themselves, independently of the gender connotation these traits may convey. A similar motivation underlies the self-descriptions of Genevan pupils: Swiss and immigrant students assigned positive traits to themselves that are part of the stereotypes of Swiss nationals and foreigners. This tendency also corresponds to the inclination of individuals to ascribe to themselves numerous and contrasted characteristics (Sande, 1990).

The content of self-representations varies from culture to culture and epoch to epoch. Commonality in self-definitions in the Netherlands was studied by Zeegers (1988), who analysed the contents of 'lonely heart advertisements' in Dutch newspapers from 1945 to 1986. Three styles of self-presentation appeared successively in these personal ads. During a first phase starting in 1945, a majority of the ads contained traits such as serious (*degelijk*), tidy (*net*), educated (*beschaafd*), that is, transsituational evaluative characteristics. During a second phase, from 1965 on, personality traits adapted to more specific situations appeared, carrying information about lifestyle considered important for developing commitment to a relationship that should above all result in friendship. After 1975, the advertiser's description of his or her identity became still more specific, including more personal traits and declarations of interest in particular activities.

It would be remiss not to mention that there are individual differences in the presentation of self-images of members in a group. Experimental results also show that it is easy to entice individuals to differentiate themselves from other individuals within as well as between groups using characteristics deemed to underscore one's originality. However, such differentiations often involve an accentuation of conformity to prevailing norms, the so-called 'superior conformity of the self' (Codol, 1975).

Normative regulations strongly intervene in self-presentations. More generally, linguistic systems offer definite dimensions for describing the self. The English language contains numerous terms for individuals to describe their personality. Allport and Odbert (1936) identified more than 4,000 such terms. Various techniques have been used to systematize this set of traits. By asking individuals to use samples of these adjectives to describe themselves or other persons, or to indicate similarities between the traits, investigators consistently demonstrated the existence of a common structure (Goldberg, 1990; Peabody & Goldberg, 1989). This structure shall be described in the next section, but it is important to note here that according to various authors this structure corresponds to a common-sense psychology embedded in daily language, much more than to the results of strict

scientific observation (Leyens, 1983; Semin, 1987). The important point in this discussion is that individuals use common knowledge systems to describe themselves.

Identity as individual positioning

The images that individuals construct of themselves, although highly similar, nonetheless vary from one person to another. In many studies five dimensions are considered necessary and sufficient to describe these interindividual variations. According to Goldberg (1990): 'These "Big-Five" factors have traditionally been numbered and labeled as follows: (I) Surgency (or Extraversion), (II) Agreeableness, (III) Conscientiousness (or Dependability), (IV) Emotional Stability (vs. Neuroticism), and (V) Culture. Alternatively, Factor V has been interpreted as Intellect' (p. 1217).

In fact these organizing principles of between-individual variation deal with the way people behave towards each other. A person is involved daily in multiple social relationships and the way s/he participates in these interactions is being constantly evaluated. If common language, well before psychological expert language, contains an abundant range of terms to qualify individuals, this variety primarily serves the purpose of differentiating between individuals according to their behaviour in all kinds of social interactions.

It is impossible to estimate the number of people who have been asked, at least once, to describe themselves on a personality questionnaire. If these individuals were able to comply with such a request it is because they disposed of common references, of comparison frames allowing them to compare their own way of behaving with the way prototypical persons behave. Apparently, a stable organization of the description of interactional systems can be traced back in ancient historical documents.

Adamopoulos (1982) examined the descriptions of social interactions between figures in epic texts of various historical epochs (Homer's *Iliad*; an Old English poem of a fight with a dragon: *Beowulf*; and a story of a young recruit's adventures during the American Civil War: *The Red Badge of Courage*). In each text, dyadic interactions were retrieved and the type of interaction between each dyad was classified. Finally, a matrix was constructed for each text linking types of interactions and pairs of persons. For each matrix a principal component factor analysis was performed. Three common factors were obtained for the interpersonal structures in the three documents: affiliation, power (status) and formality (versus intimacy), although the latter factor appears less clearly in the most ancient text. Adamopoulos and Bontempo (1986) repeated the procedure for *The Odyssey* and *The Song of Roland*, and were able to retrieve the same three factors in both documents.

These results can be compared to those obtained by Wish (1976; Wish, Deutsch & Kaplan, 1976), who analysed similarity judgements between 25

social relationships (for instance: between husband and wife, between prison guard and inmate, between two enemies, between two political opponents). The main aim of the study was to identify the dimensions underlying the conceptions of these different social relationships.

Four dimensions described the judgements of prototypical relationships. Dimension 1 contrasted competitive versus cooperative relationships: divorced couple, personal enemies, political opponents versus good friends, husband–wife and team mates. Dimension 2 involved unequal versus equal relationships: guard–inmate, interviewer–interviewee, teacher–pupil versus team mates, political opponents, good friends, personal enemies and cousins. Dimension 3 concerned socio-emotional-oriented versus task-completion-oriented relationships: parent–child, brother–sister, husband–wife versus interviewer–job applicant, seller–buyer and political opponents. Dimension 4 included intense versus superficial relationships: parent–child, husband–wife, good friends, psychotherapist–patient versus chance encounters, interviewer–interviewee and employee–employer. Individual differences in the use of these common dimensions were also investigated.

These representations of social relationships offer important coordinates for individuals who have to position themselves in self-descriptions. In this respect McAdams (1985) proposes a theory of self as composed of internal personified and idealized images. This Imago theory postulates that identity 'is a story complete with setting, scenes, characters, plot, and recurrent themes. Identity formation is the process of constructing a self-defining life story. The main characters in the story are imagoes' (McAdams, 1985, p. 127). References are classical authors such as Erikson (1977), James (1892), Jung (1943), Klein (1948), but also Markus's (1984) ideas on 'possible selves'. The symbolic relationships between these prototypical images remind us of Adamopoulos's analyses:

> The two major thematic lines around which the content of identity can be organized are agency (power/mastery/separation) and communion (intimacy, surrender, union; Bakan, 1966). Initial investigations of life stories of college students and men and women at midlife suggest that the power motive (Winter, 1973) and the intimacy motive (McAdams, 1980) are two independent personality dispositions – both assessed via the Thematic Apperception Test or TAT – that serve as significant predictors of salience in life stories of thematic lines of agency and communion, respectively. (McAdams, 1985, p. 128)

Furthermore, McAdams presented a taxonomy of 12 major deities of the Greek pantheon according to their high or low degree of 'agency' and 'communion', a taxonomy that he also applied to the analysis of identities of 50 respondents on the basis of personality tests and of a life story interview.

Individuals define themselves in relation to each other, referring to representations of their participation in social interaction settings. The research tradition in which I locate my own work emphasizes the importance of group and category membership in self-definitions. However, we have already seen that individuals often do not assign for themselves the same

characteristics they ascribe to their groups. Notwithstanding such findings, it remains true that differences exist between individuals and that some people more readily attribute typical group characteristics to themselves. This is especially true for gender characteristics. Each time individuals are invited to express their degree of agreement with the relevance of masculine and feminine traits to their self-descriptions, factors opposing both kind of traits can be found in the data (for research with French-language subjects, see Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1994; Tap, 1985). This effect certainly cannot be explained by mere chance that this organizing male–female principle actualizes the opposition between 'agency' and 'communion' described by McAdams. In his taxonomy of the pantheon, deities with high 'agency' and low 'communion' were masculine (Zeus, Hermes and Ares) whereas deities with opposed characteristics were feminine (Demeter, Hera and Aphrodite).

The organizing principles of identity regulate symbolic relationships between social agents and, therefore, correspond to the definition of social representations (Doise, 1986). But the fact that positioning in relation with each other actualizes dimensions of 'agency' and 'communion' does not preclude the importance of other dimensions.

Verkuyten (1990) has analysed the identity components of a nationwide sample of Dutch and Turkish adolescents living in the Netherlands ($N =$ 2,710 Dutch and 237 Turkish). Some significant differences were found in self-descriptions between the Dutch and Turkish youngsters, but these differences explained no more than 1% of the overall variance. More importantly, in order to analyse relationship between self-esteem and five components of the self-concept (ethnic identity, academic ability, sports, popularity, body image), a standardized multiple regression analysis with global self-esteem as dependent variable was used for respondents of Dutch and Turkish origin separately. The results were highly similar. For the Turkish and the Dutch adolescents, body image had the greatest impact on self-esteem and ethnic identity, while academic ability and sports had the lowest. The similarity of results for both samples suggests that general norms are very important in shaping self-esteem, and that general societal values transcend, in this case, cultural barriers, probably as a consequence of the homogenizing effect of common schooling.

Makris-Botsaris and Robinson (1991) adapted for Greek youngsters scales elaborated by Harter (1985) for measuring different components of self-evaluation and perception in the USA. They compared factorial structures obtained in Greece and in the USA with youth aged 11 to 14. In both countries they found a highly similar five-factor structure of scholastic competence, social acceptance, athletic competence, physical appearance and behavioural conduct. Correlations between subscales corresponding to these factors and global self-worth were comparable in Greece and the USA, the correlation between physical appearance and self-worth always being the highest.

Common knowledge reflects itself in the way individuals define themselves, others, and their relationships. Application to oneself of this knowledge is

highly normative and results in significant interindividual resemblances. Nevertheless, between-individual variations are equally important and they are organized along dimensions which are also consensually defined and which refer to characteristics of the multiple relationships in which individuals take part.

Anchored identities

The anchoring of social representations has mainly been studied in three different ways. First, the relationships with general beliefs and values (such as belief in a just world or egalitarianism) have been investigated. Such values and beliefs are considered general to the extent that they supposedly organize symbolic relationships in various domains. Social representations have also been studied as anchored in the views individuals develop in structuring their social environment, as for instance the representations they hold concerning relationships between social groups and categories, such as gender. Finally, a third way of studying anchoring investigates how group memberships or social positions held by individuals influence their representations, the general hypothesis being that shared social insertions lead to specific interactions and experiences that modulate social representations.

The first way of studying anchoring mainly uses correlational methods in order to determine if links exist between adherence to given beliefs or opinions. Such a method was used in the studies reported at the end of the previous section showing that important aspects of youth's identity, namely self-esteem, were linked to perceptions of their physical appearance and less to evaluation of their popularity, academic or sportive achievement.

Anchoring in the views on the social environment is directly studied in research on psychological androgyny linking personal sexual identity to the actualization of a gender scheme (see, for instance, Bem, 1981, 1985). Indeed, what else is the gender scheme if not a 'naïve' theory on the respective positions of males and females in society?

More generally, representations held by individuals on the nature of social groups intervene in the structuring of personal identity. Lorenzi-Cioldi (1988) studied this intervention experimentally. He distinguished two conceptions of the social group: the collection group and the aggregate group. Members of dominant groups in our society tend more to adhere to a conception of their group as a collection of individuals, each having their specificity. These individuals define themselves through their personal characteristics, apparently not linking themselves to their group. However, members of more dominated groups tend to consider themselves as less differentiated from each other, as more homogeneous, and they attribute more directly to themselves characteristics of the group as a whole.

Lorenzi-Cioldi (1988, 1994) illustrated the complexity of the links between collective and aggregate groups, gender groups, within- and between-group differentiation on common and specific dimensions. His data supported the

general hypothesis of a homology between the representations of groups which are apparently not linked. Groups of men, of original and singular personalities, of competitors, on the one hand, and groups of women, individuals with similar personalities and cooperators, on the other, are respectively associated with respect to identity dynamics of their members.

Social representations of groups, membership groups as well as other groups with which one interacts, intervene in actualizing personal identity. As social interactions often involve groups occupying asymmetrical positions in a representational field, one is easily led to the conclusion that identities of interacting individuals differ. This was not the starting point of my theorizing on personal identity as a social representation. Initially, I insisted on the similarity between the identities of members of different groups, such as autochthonous and immigrants. I will return to this point after discussing the relevance of the third way of studying anchoring in research on identity as a social representation.

This approach to studying anchoring is still more directly concerned with the problem of differences between groups. Results presented by Durand Delvigne (1992) can be used to illustrate this form of anchoring. She analysed self-descriptions of men and women, of different ages and social conditions, and found important similarities for different groups of respondents in factorial structures of answers to a French version of the sexual role inventory. Notwithstanding this similarity, a striking difference also characterized the structures of men and women, the opposition between the feminine and masculine poles being much stronger in the factorial structures of responses obtained from women than in those of men. Durand Delvigne summarized these results in the following way:

> This result is to be considered in relation with a hypothesis prevailing in relevant literature and stating that women more than men are referred to their social identity. Social models would be available for defining them, whereas men would be more easily individuated. For women, gender category would be a necessary marker of identity (Hurtig and Pichevin, 1986; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1988). (Durand Delvigne, 1992, p. 182)

Hence, differences exist in the organizing principles of male and female identities and they result in different self-descriptions. This is particularly true when comparing the self-descriptions of males and females of high and low social status. Masculinity scores are high for individuals of higher social status, independent of their gender, and femininity scores are especially low for men with a higher status. Androgyny scores are high for all groups of higher status independent of gender. Considering these results together with many others that are accumulating in the area of gender studies, one cannot but subscribe to Durand Delvigne's thesis:

> Gender, as identity, is not inherent to a sex group, but refers to social status. Otherwise said, gender orientation of women is related to the opportunities they

do have or do not have to overcome the social definition of themselves. In this case, and related to identity, gender is not a dynamic set of attributes produced by sexual category membership. It is a social marker linked with the asymmetric position of dominant and dominated individuals. (Durand Delvigne, 1992, p. 223)

Gender opposition does not represent sex opposition. It is a social construction of hierarchical relationships linked with sex group reports and modulating personal identity through social differentiation processes.

Nevertheless, the existence of similarities of personal identities across group boundaries is real. This apparent similarity may correspond to within-group differences along lines that were not analysed in the studies reported previously. Another explanation for the repeated findings of between-group similarities in identity research is suggested by some findings of Lorenzi-Cioldi (1988) and Amancio (1989), who report that identity processes are differently actualized as a function of intergroup encounter situations and of available comparison dimensions. In line with such findings, one can expect that a request to describe oneself on scales without explicit gender connotation or without any intergroup comparison will induce descriptions that privilege the individual as abstracted from his or her group memberships. Otherwise stated, it is possible that questionnaire instructions convey social representations of the 'collection' type. Depriving the individual of his or her representations of membership in 'aggregate' groups focuses his or her attention on representations of self as an individual in search of originality and distinction. But such a search itself is highly normative and results in rather similar identity descriptions.

The predominance of such normative self-definitions should not prevent us from studying less dominant ones. Reicher and Emler (1986) investigated such identities in their work on the origin of adolescent delinquency. According to them, behaviours such as vandalism, theft or physical aggressions are more often admitted by early to mid-teens than by any other age-group. There is evidence that such self-report scores are related to the actual level of involvement in delinquent activities (Singh, 1979). More importantly, such self-reports are analysed by Reicher and Emler (1986) as part of a reputation-building strategy. At this age life chances are considered to be settled by one's educational success or failure, and a young person's identity is characterized by its relation to his/her school career. Negative attitudes towards school authority are not infrequent and are generalized to other forms of institutionalized authorities, such as police and legal authorities. This means that important aspects of the social contract, namely that authorities will protect individuals from anarchy and redress violations of rights, are no longer considered valid:

Thus delinquency can be seen in part as a strategy for coping with the lack of institutional protection. In the first place, delinquency acts as redress. It resolves grievances through attacks upon enemies, upon the police force and upon school and public property. Second, it offers its own kind of protection through the kind of reputation it creates. (Reicher & Emler, 1986, pp. 30–31)

A self-presentation and social reputation is actively promoted in order to signify to others that one is the kind of person who stands up for one's rights. Another objective of the social construction of such a representation is to obtain support from others sustaining the same oppositional identity (see also Emler & Reicher, 1995).

Conclusion: A definition of personal identity

Personal identity can be considered to be a social representation, an organizing principle of individual positioning in a field of symbolic relationships between individuals and groups. This positioning is related to pre-existing insertions in a network of social relationships.

Not all social relationships in which we take part are equally present in our minds. Depending on situations, various relationships become salient and give rise to different identity dynamics. Many self-descriptions only actualize general societal norms inducing individuals to define themselves in relation to each other on consensual dimensions, such as physical appearance for youth. Other situations actualize social representations more directly anchored in group and category memberships. Memberships intervene more intensively in conditions that are now well studied (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; McGuire & McGuire, 1988; Pavelchak, 1989). Studying personal identity as a social representation should contribute to a better understanding of identity processes.

3

The Personal–Social Interplay: Social-Cognitive Prospects on Identity and Self–Others Comparison

Carmencita Serino

Introduction: 'Personal' and 'social' in social identity theory

In his analysis of social categorization, Tajfel describes intra-categorical assimilation and inter-categorial differentiation as two directly related and simultaneously occurring processes. The minimal group paradigm (for example, Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971) is intended to show that these effects usually occur even when group membership is an extremely abstract and irrelevant experience for the subjects. In most of these experiments, the assimilation/differentiation processes manifest themselves by means of some form of favouritism: the mere categorization into different groups would elicit subjects' 'behaviours' (that is, giving money, rewards, and so on) which are clearly intended to favour their own group and to enhance the distance between ingroup and outgroup.

Indeed, Tajfel aimed at providing a purely cognitive basis for intergroup differentiation (Hewstone, Hantzi & Johnston, 1991). On the other hand, he also pointed out the existence of a collective level of reality which cannot be reduced to the sum of merely individual phenomena: under certain circumstances, individuals may act essentially as members of a particular group, even independently of their strictly individual tendencies or characteristics.

Social identity theory (SIT) was later developed by Tajfel and Turner along these lines (for example, Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner, 1978). According to Tajfel (1978b), 'at least in our kinds of societies, an individual strives to achieve a satisfactory concept or image of himself'. This individual will show, then, a tendency either to confirm or to change his/her condition of group member, depending on whether a particular group can contribute (or not) to the positive aspects of his/her identity. In other words, when his/her need for self-positive evaluation is not complied with, an individual will tend to leave the group (unless some objective conditions or particular values and norms interfere with this tendency).

We may notice that, despite the original orientation towards a purely cognitive approach, motivational factors are mostly put forward by the SI theorists. A true 'axiom related to the individuals' need for positive self-

evaluation' (Deschamps, Clémence & Roux, 1983) might in fact underlie their assumptions.

Indeed, the idea according to which a fundamental need for self-positivity is at the basis of social identity and group membership could be easily verified in short-lived groups (such as the 'minimal' ones), wherein joining a group is a rather extrinsic and fortuitous (if not totally exploitable) experience. By contrast, when real social groups are involved, individual and social identities appear to be much more intertwined. Indeed, belonging to particular social groups is in general a deep-rooted aspect of persons' identity, a real 'way of being', which also affects the ways in which all social knowledges are filtered and reconstructed.[1] As we will argue below, belonging to some particular social groups may even be the necessary condition allowing subjects to develop a sharper and better defined self-image, to perceive themselves as being quite specific and highly distinctive individuals.

In this vein, Tajfel and Turner's approach to the personal–social interplay is worth further analysis. Their idea of 'continuum' fails adequately to represent the dynamic connection of individual and collective processes. The personal–social continuum seems to imply an essential, unsolved dichotomy between individual and collective processes, personal and social identity, self/others and intergroup comparisons.

Alternative views on the personal–social continuum

The close interdependence of intra-psychic and social psychological processes in identity formation is recognized by Zavalloni (Zavalloni, 1973, 1983; Zavalloni & Louis-Guérin, 1984). Her research suggests: (a) that even negative stereotypes about the ingroup are possible: these do not weaken, however, the individual feeling of being a group member; (b) that, on the other hand, the strong identification with a group does not exclude the self/others differentiation. The intra-categorial differences can be as marked as the inter-categorial ones. Individuals can make a fine-grained distinction between the characteristics of their own group and the degree to which these characteristics refer to themselves (Serino, 1988a; Zavalloni, 1983). Thus, the conditions in which group membership is made salient do not lead, necessarily, to an intra-categorial assimilation process.

On the whole, the idea of a necessary and positive relationship between intra-categorial assimilation and inter-categorial differentiation was not always completely confirmed (cf. Eiser, 1983; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963).

By contrast, some experiments (Deschamps, 1982a) suggest a different hypothesis. In these studies, the greater the social identification, the greater is also the self/others differentiation occurring inside the membership group. On the other hand, when the self/others differentiation is emphasized, the intergroup differentiation is also found to become stronger. In other words, intragroup and intergroup differentiations do not appear as being

necessarily located at the opposite poles of a continuum. Sometimes, they appear as being consistent, simultaneous judgements which can 'vary together'. This is usually referred to as the 'covariation hypothesis'.

The 'covariation' model was developed in the frame of a greater attention to comparison processes occurring in 'natural' sets, where the different groups are often characterized by a different social status. Natural groups and their functioning already represented a matter of central concern in Tajfel's perspective (see for instance, Tajfel, 1982b). Yet, in his research, prominent attention was given to the minimal experimental conditions of social categorization.

It was mostly Doise's model of the 'categorial differentiation' which led to a systematic employment of natural groups (for example, males/females; high school students/apprentices) in the experiments (Doise, 1976). This yielded a special focus on the asymmetrical functioning of categorial differentiation, due to the place taken by different groups in our society. In this vein, Deschamps (1982b) focused on the relationships between 'dominant' and 'dominated' social groups. According to him, subjects belonging either to a 'dominant' social group or to a 'dominated' one would show important differences in perceiving intergroup similarities and in 'favouring' behaviours, as well as in the ways of representing themselves. Social identity would vary as a function of the 'symbolic and material capital' available to different subjects. In particular, the members of a 'dominant' social group would show a greater tendency to perceive themselves as highly distinctive individuals endowed with unique idiosyncratic traits. The members of a 'dominated' group, instead, would usually show a tendency to perceive themselves as somewhat undifferentiated components of a 'collective object' (Deschamps, 1980; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1988).

In a study already mentioned above, Zavalloni suggested that there may be deeply different identities, depending on the social status of the membership group. In her view, a meaningful example is offered by the asymmetrical development of men's and women's identities. The two genders are seen as the 'most basic identity groups, not only because they were the first to be learned . . . but also because they have traditionally englobed all others' (Zavalloni, 1983, p. 215), thus becoming the basis of a social hierarchy codified in the culture. The dynamic interplay of men's and women's identities implies a power relationship, analysed with reference to its most subtle and elusive aspects. Language itself, for instance, reveals that only 'male categories' are usually associated with the positive cultural connotations of the concept of humanity (Zavalloni, 1983, p. 217).

There is an essential convergence in these different studies. Although adopting different methods and starting points, they emphasize the close interdependence between comparison processes, self-representations and individuals' concrete positions in a hierarchical social context. They suggest that the different levels of self/others comparison (namely intraindividual, interindividual, intergroup levels) are closely articulated with each other (Doise, 1988).

In this view, Deschamps's studies on 'covariation' and those on the comparison between 'dominant' and 'dominated' social groups should be considered as a whole. The covariation hypothesis suggests that, instead of being opposed along a continuum, the personal 'pole' and the social one can be seen as 'similar' (Doise, 1988, p. 105). Yet, in our opinion, this 'similarity' is not to be understood merely as a form of isomorphism, that is, as a 'structural homology' between interpersonal and intergroup comparisons. A deeper and more concrete connection between different levels and aspects of self/others comparison can be underlined. This rests on the fact that social conditions may affect not only intergroup comparisons but also the forms of individuals' membership, as well as the structure and contents of personal identity. The links between interpersonal and intergroup comparisons can be further analysed along these lines.

We will briefly consider now two main questions singled out in this section. These refer, respectively, (a) to the relationships between similarity and difference and (b) to the interplay of cognitive and social processes in social comparison.

Similarity relationships and self/others comparison

Some of the studies mentioned above suggest that there may be several ways of connecting similarity and difference with each other in social comparison. This point can be further highlighted by referring to Codol's experiments on the 'superior conformity of self' behaviour (Codol, 1975). This is also described as the *primus inter pares* (PIP) effect: the subjects of Codol's experiments, set in a highly normative situation, tended to present themselves as conforming, better than the others, to the shard norms. Actually, they based their own self-distinctiveness on the claim for a 'similarity', deemed to be a value in this case. Considering these effects, we may notice that an entangled co-occurrence of similarity and difference appears at the intra-categorial level. This being similar and different at one and the same time (Codol, 1982) sheds light on the dynamic interplay (if not, on the very 'genetic' relationship: see, for instance, Luria, 1976) between personal and social identity. It is only by starting from some adhesion to a group, to its norms and values (that is, by starting from a certain conformity) that it becomes possible to develop the very idea of one's own uniqueness, and to set out an image of oneself as a highly distinctive individual.

Further insights into the complex structure of the self/others comparison can be derived from a particular theoretical approach: that singled out by Tversky (1977) in his analysis of similarity. Tversky goes beyond the traditional 'metrical' approach, wherein similarity and difference are usually described just as proximity/distance between points along a linear dimension. He opposes this view with a 'non-metrical' approach: in this case, similarity is understood as a global judgement (that is, a *feature-matching* process), taking into account both common and distinctive

features of the objects to be compared. This author demonstrated that similarity judgements usually take a specific direction. In general, one of the two objects is in fact 'prominent' (that is, more 'salient' or 'proto-typical' than the other). It then becomes the reference point (the 'model') which the other term (that is, the 'variant') is usually referred and compared to. By systematical variations of the comparison reference point, Tversky showed that perceived similarity is higher in this standard form of comparison than in the inverse condition (that is, when the model is judged in reference to the variant).

Following these studies on the 'asymmetry phenomena', several authors attempted to verify whether (and in what conditions) the self is a major reference point in interpersonal comparison (Holyoak & Gordon, 1983; Srull & Gaelik, 1983). Codol (1984b, 1987)[2] suggested that interpersonal comparison too is characterized by a cognitive asymmetry, depending on the different 'salience' of the terms (self, other) under consideration. Codol's findings show that, in general, perceived similarity is higher when the others are compared to the self than in the inverse condition. In practice, it is not the same to state: 'I am similar to the others' as to state: 'the others are similar to me'. A person would tend to claim others' similarity ('the others are similar to me more than I am similar to the others') as well as his/her own difference ('I am different from the others more than the others are different from me').

Starting from these results, several meanings of similarity and difference can be pointed out (Serino, 1988b): similarity may mean 'conformity', but also 'representativeness'; difference may mean 'specificity' but it may refer to 'deviance' as well. These different meanings are the result of a social construction and can be 'recoded' depending on the comparison direction (Serino, 1989).

A 'non-metrical approach' to similarity may yield important conse-quences for the analysis of social categorization. One of these consequences could be the greater attention to the 'productive' aspect of categorization. In fact, a feature-matching process involves a number of questions concerning the ways in which similarity judgement is performed whenever a few simple (and generally *a priori* provided) dimensions are not available as yardsticks for comparison. The multidimensional character of comparison is then emphasized: in this light, similarity and difference may even appear as compatible and co-occurring judgements, rather than inversely related and opposed along a continuum.

A 'metrical approach' to similarity?

The way in which concepts are operationalized may affect the way in which particular questions are focused on. Thus, when considering social identity theory, we may observe that (a) by focusing, mainly, on 'favouritism', it appears as shifting to a motivational analysis of group membership, and

that (b) by considering personal and social identity as inversely related levels, the true meaning and the subjective relevance of an identity group for the individuals risk being somewhat neglected.

Starting from Tversky's analysis, we might even observe that Tajfel's approach to similarity seems to lie on some 'metrical' assumptions. Right from his earliest studies in this field (Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963), some similarity/difference judgements were *inferred*, being based on the perception of some 'proximity' or 'distance' between points along dimensions (such as weight or length) already provided by the experimenter. The authors were quite aware that this procedure needed to be further controlled. Wilkes and Tajfel (1966) could in fact demonstrate that there exists a connection between the 'distance of an actor from the series of stimuli and its categorization as the "same" or "different from" the series' (Tajfel, 1981, p. 92). Yet, these experiments cannot explain how similarity judgements are performed whenever comparison is not based on a few simple units or dimensions which are already available and/or directly provided to perceivers.

Some general issues of research on social categorization might be traced back to this 'metrical' view on similarity. For instance:

(a) special attention is paid to the 'deductive' face of categorization, that is, to its consequences: categories are understood as a *condition*, at the origin of the categorizing activity, more than as a *product* of this activity;
(b) judgement is split up into as many similarity relationships as there are comparison dimensions;
(c) similarity and difference appear as being two opposite and mutually excluding forms of relationship between the terms to be compared.

The same characteristics are also shared by social identity theory, as is highlighted by the following SIT assumptions:

1 As a consequence of the outstanding categorization (whether 'interpersonal' or 'intergroup'), subjects will act either as mere individuals or as group members.
2 A more direct or explicit involvement of the self in the comparison would change the whole situation: the previous categorization would be cancelled and a different one would be introduced. Thus, the existing opposition between two groups is replaced by a more general (oneself/another) opposition, wherein membership of either category ends up becoming somehow irrelevant.
3 When an intergroup categorization is activated, the typical accentuation of intra-categorial (that is, self/others) similarity will be observed. Conversely, an accentuation of oneself/another difference is likely to occur only when intergroup categorization is not salient.

As a result, two main issues arise in the frame of social identity theory. First of all the close interdependence between personal and social aspects of identity is often overlooked. Second, self/ingroup and self/outgroup conditions are not sufficiently differentiated from each other. These are just described as two, more or less similar, examples of 'interpersonal' comparison.

To summarize, the continuum model, based on a necessary co-occurrence of intra-categorial *assimilation* and inter-categorial *differentiation*, is not the only way of describing the relationships between personal and social identity. In our view, even the analysis of 'covariation' could be further developed. Not only can intra- and intergroup comparisons appear to be 'similar' rather than 'opposite' poles (as in Deschamps's experiments showing that intra- and intergroup similarities can 'go together'). As a matter of fact, a special form of 'covariation' also occurs when the self takes a prominent (prototypical) role, thus appearing, simultaneously, as being both *similar to* and *different from* the other ingroup members. Here, too, similarity and difference are linked to each other: yet, in this case, they 'co-vary' in a quite unexpected way.

The relationships between similarity and difference are not totally explained by an 'all or none' approach (Deschamps & Serino, 1996), and this may yield some consequences for identity research.

Self-categorization theory

More recent developments of Turner's analysis were aimed at dealing with some of the problems pointed out above. Although an essential continuity is affirmed between social identity theory and Turner's self-categorization theory, nonetheless some important novelties are also introduced. In particular: (a) the attention given to motivational factors is reduced; (b) the 'productive' face of categorization is emphasized; (c) similarity and difference are more closely connected with each other.

Of course, an exhaustive description of this theory exceeds the scope of our chapter. Thus, we will just illustrate, briefly, the three points stated above.

Focus on cognitive processes

Turner integrates the prototypicality theory with the analysis of social categorization.

The prototype concept was singled out by Rosch (1973, 1975, 1978) in the frame of her analysis of categories as 'fuzzy' sets. According to Rosch, class-inclusion can hardly be conceived as a rigid all-or-none process. In most cases, in fact, classification appears as a probabilistic process. More or less typical examples are gathered together in the same category; therefore,

categories take a hierarchical structure, being organized around a central (prototypical) element. Categories are organized, in turn, into taxonomies (that is, hierarchical categorial systems), with different levels of abstraction and inclusiveness (Rosch, 1978).

Turner draws on these ideas when developing his self-categorization theory. According to him, the self is (also) a cognitive structure, and self-categorizations can be described as 'a part of a hierarchical system of classification' (Turner, 1987, pp. 44–45). In this view, 'all social comparisons with others depend upon the categorization of the others as part of a self-category at some level of abstraction' (Turner, 1987, p. 48).

Conforming to Rosch, the self-categorization process gives way to a number of superordinate and subordinate self-categories, with increasing levels of abstraction and inclusiveness. Turner explains this point by singling out three different levels, describing 'one's *human*, *social* and *personal* identity respectively'. A very abstract and inclusive level of self-categorization is the one opposing 'human beings' to other forms of life (inter-species comparison). At an intermediate level (intergroup comparison), the self-concept describes the individual as a member of particular social groups. The most concrete and least inclusive level of categorization would be based on interpersonal comparisons, wherein a person is distinguished from the others by means of his/her particular personality, of his/her unique and strictly individual characteristics.

The productive face of categorization

The 'productive' character of social categorization is put forward by focusing on those processes directed to select, among different levels of abstraction/inclusiveness, the more pertinent ones in the given comparison conditions. For this reason, the question of salience is particularly emphasized (Oakes, 1987; Oakes & Turner, 1986). According to Turner and his co-workers, the salience of a given categorization can hardly be described as the effect of an automatic perceptual prominence of certain stimuli. Instead, it depends on the interaction between *accessibility* and *fit* (see Bruner, 1957). *Accessibility* deals with the degree of readiness with which certain pieces of information are activated, while *fit* 'ties categorization firmly to reality' (Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991) in that it refers to an adequate and veridical representation of social situation. In this view, the salience of a given categorization is highly dependent on context, as well as on perceivers' purposes and goals.

Unlike Rosch, Turner suggests that the basic categorization level (that is, the level at which the best 'compromise' between information generality and concreteness is achieved) is a 'highly contextual variable rather than fixed' (Turner, 1987).

Cantor and Mischel (1979) already emphasized that the relationships between different levels of abstraction is flexible rather than rigid in

categorial systems concerning social reality. These authors too applied prototypicality theory to the analysis of persons' perception, focusing on context and perceivers' purposes as crucial aspects of classification. They pointed out a number of analogies, but also some important differences in the ways categorial judgements are performed in the social versus non-social domain (see also Holyoak & Gordon, 1984; Wyer & Podeschi, 1978). For instance, the different levels of abstraction seem to be 'interchangeable' (Cantor & Mischel, 1979) in the social domain. Moreover, class-inclusion is mostly based on a bipolar opposition, that is, on the incompatibility between different categories, rather than on merely descriptive typologies (Cantor & Mischel, 1979, p. 33). These differences between social and non-social categorial systems emphasize the evaluative character of classification in the social domain. Elsewhere (Serino, 1990) we addressed this question by referring to Billig's (1985) analysis of 'particularization'. In a well-known example, Billig describes the process by which one general category (for example, Christianity) is split up into two distinct sub-categories (black and white Christians). Notice that the new distinction does not describe only the shift from a wide, superordinate category to less abstract and inclusive ones. The difference between black and white christians, in fact, may also entail a basic opposition between a lay and primitive religiousness and a deep and mature one. From this viewpoint, particularization yields an evaluative discrimination allowing the new ingroup to take its place at the top of an extremely general hierarchy (that opposing 'true' religiousness to superstition). The reference to a value system entails both particularization and generalization, as two interrelated aspects of categorizing. The reference to a value system also explains why, although the level of abstraction is not immutable, the 'inclusiveness of the category remains stable' (Cantor & Mischel, 1979, p. 16). In fact, even the introduction of a very abstract level of classification can be aimed at enhancing interpersonal or intergroup differentiation!

Our discussion converges on Turner's position. According to him, categorization and particularization are two interdependent aspects of the same process (Turner, 1988). Turner's description of 'normative fit' as an important component of salience also emphasizes, as we do, the social meaning of categorization. He argues, for instance, that categorizing someone as 'Catholic' is not only the result of a comparison with other categories (cf. Oakes et al., 1991); it also deals with behavioural and normative contents of that person's identity.

Indeed, social categories are highly meaningful and personally relevant for individuals. This might account for 'people's tendencies to perceive themselves and others in terms of psychologically opposing forces' (Cantor & Mischel, 1979) which seem to affect the judgements of prototypicality in the social domain. In this light, prototypicality itself might carry a particular meaning: when social categories are involved, most 'prototypical' features would be in fact those endowed with a strong (positive or negative) value.

Similarity and difference as interdependent judgements

In self-categorization theory, similarity and difference are linked to each other in a more complex fashion. Difference always implies a 'higher level identity', so that no comparative relation in terms of difference could be assessed between two stimuli if they were not suitable to be included in the 'same category' at a higher level of abstraction (Turner, 1987). According to Turner, categorization follows the meta-contrast principle. This entails an inverse relationship between intra- and inter-categorial comparisons.[3] Therefore, it is consistent with the idea that the perception of intra-categorial similarities and inter-categorial differences is at the basis of categories formation and functioning. In this view, the salience of a given category and even the prototypicality of its prominent examples can be understood as a function of the

> meta-contrast perceived between intergroup and intragroup differences. As the differences perceived between individuals belonging to different (implicit) groups increases, *compared* to the differences between individuals belonging to the same (implicit) groups, then the more salient will the social categorization become . . . i.e. members will tend to be perceived less as individually different persons and more as unitary social groups. (Oakes et al., 1991, pp. 126–127)

Turner (1987, p. 49) claims there is a 'functional antagonism between the salience of one level of self-categorization and other levels', assuming that 'there tends to be an inverse relationship between the salience of the personal and of the social levels'. In this sense, Turner clearly draws on Tajfel's idea of 'continuum'.

Prototypes: similar *and* different

The meta-contrast ratio also provides a simple operational description of the prototype concept. As Turner suggests, a given stimulus will tend to be perceived as more exemplary or representative of the category as a whole the higher the meta-contrast ratio: the higher the mean perceived difference between the target stimulus and the out-group members over the mean perceived difference between the stimulus and other ingroup members, the more prototypical the target stimulus.

Yet, by referring to the meta-contrast, only the comparative aspect (the 'horizontal' dimension) of prototypicality is emphasized. Being aware of this, Turner himself recently focused on some aspects of the prototype which cannot be described in this way.

In our view, the prototype concept also contains the idea that similarity and difference 'go together'. A prototype in fact differs from the other items because it better represents an abstract image or an ideal of the common category; an ideal which allows that category to be

defined and distinguished in turn from the other categories. Similarity and difference, conformity and uniqueness, are tightly intertwined in the prototype concept.

This close connection of seemingly opposite judgements can be observed also when referring to the self-concept. On the whole, Codol's studies mentioned above seem to suggest that the self may act as a sort of prototype (Hardoin & Codol, 1984) in interpersonal perception. By varying the order of two different description tasks (self-description, description of another stimulus-person), Codol (1987) also shows that common and distinctive traits carry a different weight across different conditions. Subjects starting with the self-description task used the same self-descriptive traits for describing the others. By contrast, when the other-description came first, subjects tended to use quite different traits in the subsequent description of themselves. (Different results were obtained when the other person was the subject's 'best friend'.) According to Codol, these results would suggest that, in general, 'the others' are assumed to belong to the same category as the self, whilst the reverse is not true.

More generally, there would be a dynamic interplay between similarity and classification. As Tversky (1977) argued, similarity can determine the way in which objects are classified, but it also depends on the adopted classification.

While developing his analysis of salience, Tversky suggests that each pertinent feature is weighted according to both its 'intensity' and its 'diagnostic value' (this refers to the 'kind of classification' introduced by that feature). Of course, these two different components are assumed to be both present and tightly intertwined in any matching process. Nonetheless, we may easily imagine some conditions where either intensity or diagnosticity is, in turn, particularly emphasized.

In some cases, when two objects are to be compared, they are already assumed to belong to the same category. Comparison is just aimed at singling out the reasons for an overall accepted similarity. When a common category is involved (even implicitly), comparison might give rise, mainly, to the (differential) intensity of the shared (categorial) features.

In other conditions, similarity is the final result of a more inductive process. Here, judges are searching for an appropriate category including both objects (thus making the comparison possible): greater attention would be paid, then, to the simple presence/absence of several (either common or distinctive) features, whose 'diagnostic value' is foregrounded.

When considering in this light Turner's analysis of the different self-categorization levels, it seems that similarities and differences are judged mainly by referring to the diagnostic value of particular traits. Thus, at the interpersonal level, individuals are deemed to make comparisons only on the basis of their unique, exclusive personality traits. These are obviously opposed to other traits (which are not recognized as pertaining to themselves) in a kind of judgement giving rise, mainly, to the simple presence/absence of the critical features.

However, we are dealing here with an abstract idea of the individual. Indeed, when self and others are perceived in terms of 'psychological opposing forces', little attention will be paid to common characteristics. Nonetheless, interpersonal comparisons are often performed in a frame of already accepted common categories, relevant to each member and to his/her sense of personal identity. In these conditions, greater attention would be paid to some characteristics which are present, to a different degree, in the different (more or less representative) ingroup members.

In this way, we can also point out an important difference between self/ingroup and self/outgroup comparisons: these are conditions where a different focus on either intensity or diagnostic value of the relevant features might be observed.

Research on intergroup relations already demonstrated that the ingroup members are perceived as varying along specific dimensions more than the members of an outgroup are (Park & Rothbart, 1982); actually, it seems that 'ingroupers' are compared in terms of different intensity of the same features, while 'outgroupers' are not.

At the intragroup level, the self/others comparison might be based on the different intensity of common characteristics, more than on the different salience of features unique to each individual. Again, some aspects of the personal–social interplay seem to escape an explanation in terms of 'continuum', and we can imagine an interpersonal level of self-categorization where some shared social characteristics do not stop being salient and important.

In most cases, a special form of particularization is likely to occur at the intragroup level: it would be based on dimensional discrimination about some crucial categorial characteristics which are shared, to a different extent, by oneself and by the other ingroup members. This process seems to have been described, for instance, in a study by Monteil (1992): this shows a particular form of 'individualization', based on the individual appropriation of the positive characteristics of the group.

On the other hand, a *generalization* process is required when self and other are (perceived as being) quite different. 'Similarity' can be assessed, in this case, only by shifting to a very inclusive category (see also Turner, 1987). At this level, people may share, at least, the fact of being 'individuals', endowed with their own personality. Thus, personal traits, which are usually considered as being the most genuine and concrete identity issues, would be typically elicited in some very general and abstract interpersonal conditions.

Starting from the prototype concept, personal identity and intragroup relations appear as an amazing, intertwined connection of similarity and difference, unicity and conformity, assimilation and distinctiveness (Codol, 1982). It would be hard to reduce this complex interplay to the frame of a personal–social bipolar opposition. In this light, what about the 'functional antagonism' defended by Turner? Is it possible to reconsider the same idea in a different perspective?

'Functional antagonism': different levels of categorization or different modes of processing information?

According to Turner, different contents become salient at different (intragroup, intergroup) levels of categorization. His idea of the functional antagonism between personal and social levels of self-categorization also entails the opposition of personal versus social features. This dichotomy can hardly be overcome just be postulating, as Turner does, a 'midpoint' of the personal–social continuum 'where the self-perception is likely to be located much of the time' (Turner, 1987).

We would refer to a different form of functional antagonism, where different modes of processing information are applied to a substantially unitary social reality. Cognitive research on person perception has pointed out a fundamental opposition between categorial and personalized information, top-down and bottom-up ('stimulus-related') processes (for example, Asch & Zuckier, 1984; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986; Pratto & Bargh, 1991).

Brewer (1988), for instance, proposed a 'dual model', wherein which route is chosen depends, mainly, on the perceiver's purposes and goals. Similarly to Turner, Brewer suggests that 'the level of abstraction at which new information is initially encoded is expected to be different for category-based and person-based processing'. It is worth emphasizing, however, that exactly the same information 'can be processed in a top-down (de-personalized) manner (resulting in category-based cognitions), or in a bottom-up (personalized) fashion, that results in person-based representations'. Thus, 'personalization refers to a different kind of cognitive structure in which the individual becomes the basis for organization of all relevant information'.

When the personalized view is activated, perceivers are dealing with salient information which can hardly be reduced to strictly individual properties. Personalization does not lead, necessarily, to focusing on particular contents or on isolated individuals. Self-involvement may also be linked to the increasing awareness of a number of complex interactions.

In other words, personalization could give way to an extremely sensitive appraisal of all pertinent variables and of their concomitant variations. This was suggested by a recent study (Serino & Mazzara, 1995), bearing on persons' perception in particular social contexts. Subjects (high school students) were presented with a slide showing either a class-room (C) or a fast-food restaurant (F) and an ambiguous figure entering the situation. This figure was described either as 'a person' (N) or as a 'handicapped person' (H). Among other tasks, subjects had to describe themselves and the stimulus-person by means of a list of 15 bipolar dimensions. The order of these descriptions was systematically varied: half the subjects started by the self-description, later describing the other person; the other half described the stimulus-person first, while the self-description was performed later. On the whole, three independent variables were then introduced: *stimulus-person* (N/H); *situation* (C/F) and *reference point* (either 'oneself' or 'the

other person', assuming that the term described first also serves as a 'model' in the subsequent description).

According to our results, the description of the other person was mostly based on categorial information (that is, whether that person was presented as being 'normal' or 'handicapped': $F(15, 120) = 4.87$; $P = .001$). The self-description was performed in a quite different way. Different effects of the three independent variables are observed in reference to each particular self-descriptive trait, so that, for instance, some aspects of the self-description seem to be affected by the *situation*, other aspects depend mainly on the *reference point*, while, in other cases, the interaction of all three independent variables yields significant effects.[4]

In short, the self-description seemed to be more mutable, supple and 'personalized'. The special nature of this 'personalization' is worth empha-sizing, however. It does not lie only on the reference to personal traits independent of the context. Personalization might also spring from an extremely fine-grained analysis of all variables involved in a given social context.

Asymmetries and prototypes in intergroup relations

In the previous paragraphs we challenged the idea that personal identity refers, necessarily, to an isolated individual and to his/her unique person-ality traits. However, the close interdependence of personal and social identity can also be met from a different perspective.

As we have already suggested, being a member of particular groups may deeply affect the individuals' experience, their ideas about social reality, others and themselves. In an intergroup context, usually characterized by several status differences, even self-concept, self/others comparison and personal identity could be defined in different ways, depending on indi-viduals' and groups' position in the social hierarchy. Thus, a number of new questions arise: What structure does the self/other comparison take when the 'others' are ingroup or outgroup members, respectively? Do the nature and the social status of these different 'others' affect comparison modes and direction? What are prototypes in an intergroup frame?

By referring to the asymmetry phenomena described above, we may even wonder whether there is any link or overlapping between the objective, social asymmetry of intergroup relations and the cognitive asymmetry of perceived similarity. By linking the cognitive asymmetry of similarity judgement to the structure of concrete intergroup relations, the close inter-dependence between mental and social processes could be better highlighted (see also Boltanski, 1982).

In a study by Hurtig, Pichevin and Piolat (1992) this connection is highlighted. These authors focused on sex and age as factors affecting asymmetry phenomena. Their study centred on similarity judgements between pictures presenting two people of different sex and age. Indeed

these two variables were considered as defining different social categories, hierarchically related to each other (younger/older; male/female). Conforming to the hypothesis, a strong asymmetry effect was found, due to the sex of the reference point person. When the male photo was the reference point, the similarity perceived between the two stimulus-persons was higher. The authors argued that the male figure showed a great 'salience' (or 'prototypicality' degree) than the female figure. Moreover, when same-sex pairs were compared, similarity was perceived as being lower in male pairs than in female pairs: that is, the more salient (prototypical) stimulus also appeared as fitting a highly articulated and best differentiated social category.

In the same vein, I focused on the self/other asymmetry occurring when different (advantaged/disadvantaged) social groups are involved. After a pilot-study, the powerful asymmetry between Northern and Southern Italians was taken as an example of relationships between 'dominant' and 'dominated' social groups. The Northerners were considered as the upper, dominant group.

In the first of these studies (Serino, 1988b), 358 subjects belonging to the two groups (Northern and Southern Italians) had to perform a comparison between themselves and the Northerners or between themselves and the Southerners, later providing, by free explanation, the reasons for their previous judgement. The comparison reference point (oneself or others) was systematically varied, as in other experiments on the asymmetry effect.[5] A $2 \times 2 \times 2$ design was set up, taking as independent (between subjects) variables the *kind of judgement* (in terms of similarity or difference), its *content* (comparison with the ingroup or with the outgroup) and the comparison *reference point* (oneself or the others, respectively).

According to our results:

1 A certain asymmetry (that is, an independent effect of the reference point variable) was observed.
2 This effect was found mainly in comparisons involving the group of higher status (that is, the Northerners).
3 Self/ingroup and self/outgroup comparisons tended to take an opposite 'direction'. In the self/ingroup comparison, the reference point was the group rather than the self (for example, 'I am similar to the Northerners more than the Northerners are similar to me'). An opposite (although non-significant) tendency appeared in comparisons with the outgroupers.

On the whole, the different contents elicited in self/ingroup and self/outgroup comparisons show that, at the intragroup level, subjects are compared not only to other individuals, but also to a general norm. Similarity with the 'ingroupers' is based on a large amount of references to 'membership'. Figure 3.1 suggests that group-belongingness is dramatically emphasized in the self/ingroup condition. Thus, on the one hand, we can stress the difference between self/ingroup and self/outgroup conditions; on the other hand we can observe that it is not a simple comparison between individuals

Key:
TR = personality traits; CU = culture and habits; HIS = history;
BHV = behaviours; SEC = social and economic conditions;
MBSH = group membership; D/ND = difference and/or non-difference;
OTH = other categories; NC = non-classified

Figure 3.1 *Mean scores (× 100) of each content category elicited in self/ingroup versus self/outgroup similarity judgements (N = 121)*

(just focusing on strictly idiosyncratic personal traits) that we observe at the intra-categorial level.

The above-mentioned study did not provide decisive results. It suggested, however, that subjects belonging to the dominant group (that is, Northerners) were more sensitive to the *structure* of the comparison: perceived similarity and difference varied as a function of the reference point (either self or group) even at the intragroup level. By contrast, Southern subjects appeared mostly concerned with the comparison *content*: in this case, significant effects were due, mainly, to the 'type of comparison' variable (that is, whether the Northerners or the Southerners were involved).

On the other hand, the free answers pointed out two different ways of referring to a common category. The Northerners employed 'we' mostly in relation to their own group (we, the Northern Italians). By contrast, the Southerners referred to a more inclusive category, describing the set formed by both groups (we all, Italians from the North and the South). Thus, it seems that the 'dominant' subjects focused mainly on *their own category*, while the 'dominated' subjects centred, mostly, *on the relationships between the two categories* (Northerners/Southerners). In a sense, our Northern subjects (that is, the 'dominant' ones) would given an example of comparison conditions wherein similarity and difference are activated simultaneously at the *intra-categorial* level. Conversely our Southern ('dominated') subjects would set out a kind of comparison where similarity and difference are

activated simultaneously at the *inter-categorial* level. A strong tendency to overcome the Northerners–Southerners opposition goes hand in hand with the clear awareness of the difference between the two categories (a difference recoded as unjustified discrimination, and then rejected).

Some of the above results were worth further investigation. To this end new research on the same topic (Serino, 1996) was carried out. A group of 111 subjects, equally divided into Northerners and Southerners,[6] had to assess the perceived similarity between themselves and the Northerners or between themselves and the Southerners. The $2 \times 2 \times 2$ design considered as (between subjects) independent variables:

(a)   the subjects' *origin* (either from the North or from the South);
(b)   the comparison *content* (comparison with the Northerners or with the Southerners);
(c)   the comparison *reference point* (either 'oneself' or 'the others').

Let us examine some results:

1   The comparison *content* yields significant effects: greater similarity is assessed in comparisons with the Northerners than with the Southerners $[F(1, 101) = 7.76; p = .01]$. This happens for all subjects, irrespective of their origin. All subjects underline that the Northerners (that is, the group of higher status) are 'more similar' to themselves.

2   On the whole, asymmetry phenomena are more marked in comparisons with the Northerners ($t_{54} = 2.80; p = .05$) than with the Southerners ($t_{51} = -1.65; n.s.$). This tendency may suggest that a group of high status also entail a more prominent, highly differentiated cognitive category.

3   Again, the subjects from the North and those from the South seem to construct their self/others comparisons in different ways. It is mainly the subjects belonging to the group of high status (Northerners) who grant a prominent role to the self, which is taken as the comparison reference point. By contrast, the Southern subjects show a greater tendency to judge their own similarity in reference with 'the others'.

4   The self/ingroup comparisons appear to be more 'asymmetrical', which might suggest that ingroup refers, in any case, to a more differentiated and complex category than that describing the outgroup. This is true for all subjects, but, once again, the comparison direction is not the same for Northern and Southern respondents. For the Northerners, the self/ingroup similarity is higher when it is judged in reference to themselves ($t_{24} = 3.182; p = .004$). They appear, then, as particularly centred on their own 'self' inside the membership group. By contrast, the Southern subjects tend to focus on their own similarity, by taking the 'Southerners' (rather than 'themselves') as the comparison reference point ($t_{26} = -3.38; p = .01$).

On the whole, the different direction of these comparisons may suggest that different meanings of similarity are entailed by Northern and Southern subjects. In fact, the former seem to emphasize their own *representativeness*,

while the latter appear as mostly concerned with their own *conformity* to an external model. Cognitive asymmetry, which is more marked in those comparisons involving the group of higher status (that is, the Northerners), may shed light on the close connection between mental and social aspects of comparison.

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have focused on personal and social identity by referring to the directional character of similarity (Tversky, 1977), to the role of prototypes in person perception (Cantor & Mischel, 1979; Rosch, 1978), and to the different ways of processing social information (Brewer, 1988).

We argued that the close relationship between individual and collective processes, personal and social dimensions, is not always suitably represented by the continuum model described in social identity theory. A dichotomic view of intra- and inter-categorial relations, of personal and social identity, still appear as the basis of Tajfel and Turner's research. More recent developments of the same perspective (such as Turner's self-categorization theory) integrate the theory under several important aspects. Yet that 'dualistic conceptualization of macro/microsocial relations' (Condor, 1990) which is typically expressed by the notion of 'continuum' does not appear to be completely overcome.

When considering self/others comparisons performed in a concrete social context, it seems that (a) even personal identity is socially defined, depending on individuals' and groups' place in a given social hierarchy, and that (b) even categorial information can be processed in a 'personalized' manner. From this viewpoint, personal and social processes, individual and group identities, show their close connections.

In short, the personal–social interplay is worth deeper analysis. Concerning the self/others comparison, several strategies can be observed, where similarity and difference are linked to each other in unexpected ways which are beyond the classical connection of intra-categorial assimilation and inter-categorial differentiation. We explained this point by referring to the prototype concept. Prototypes are – at one and the same time – highly 'conforming' (to the category standards) and clearly 'distinctive' (in reference to more peripheral categorial elements). A special interdependence of similarity and difference is then required. We have suggested that, in the social comparison, a similar close intricacy of similarity and difference often occurs at the intragroup level. Here, personal identity could be based not only on one's unique personality traits, but also on the different intensity of common characteristics, expressed to a different extent by oneself and by the other ingroup members. Thus, in some cases, different levels of self-categorization could be characterized by different modes of judging (for example, intensity versus diagnostic value), more than by the emphasis on different contents.

The prototype concept implies a probabilistic view on class-inclusion and a non-metrical approach to similarity. We suggested that this non-metrical approach may yield some consequences for the analysis of social comparison, and we reconsidered some aspects of Tajfel's theory in this light.

In the same vein, we referred to some studies on the asymmetry phenomena in similarity judgement, showing that these effects may also occur in the social domain. We must admit that it is not yet so clear what asymmetry really means when comparison involves such meaningful social 'objects' as the self or an identity group. Nonetheless, these phenomena often reveal that some sophisticated strategies are activated in interpersonal perception and that respondents are sensitive to the context and to the (social, cultural) consequences of their judgement. From this viewpoint, asymmetry may even serve as an indirect measure of a certain stereotype, which operates independently of respondents' intention (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Serino, 1996).

The typical procedure of asymmetry research (based on systematic variations of the comparison reference point) would point out the different meanings of similarity and difference, which are often at the core of the interactions and 'negotiations' between different social groups. To illustrate this point, we referred to a few studies where asymmetry effects have been observed in similarity judgements performed by subjects belonging to groups of different status. Social status seems to affect the meaning of comparison, the ways in which self/others similarity is assessed and the role of the self.

From this point of view, asymmetry research may contribute to developing a typical social-cognitive level of analysis, wherein individual, interpersonal and intergroup processes are closely interrelated. Social categorization and similarity judgements are typical 'social-cognitive' processes: cognitive research can provide fruitful suggestions in order to understand their functioning. Yet the close articulation between mental and social processes still ought to be further highlighted.

Notes

1. In this light, we may consider the extremely rich literature on social representations (for a review, see Jodelet, 1989). Intergroup differences in the ways of representing some particular aspects of social life (such as mental illness) were highlighted in a series of studies carried out simultaneously in Italy and Spain (see Ayestarán, 1985; Bellelli, 1987, 1994).

2. The substantial continuity of Codol's research (from the discovery of the PIP effect to the analysis of its asymmetry phenomena in interpersonal comparison) is discussed in Serino (1992).

3. Hogg and McGarty (1990) suggested that the meta-contrast ratio is more appropriate in simple unidimensional contexts than in more complex and cross-cutting social frames.

4. For this reason, the self-description would hardly be explained by means of just one variable. Thus, we observe a slightly significant interaction of the three independent variables ($F(15, 125) = 1.69$; $p = .06$) when considering all traits together. However, a number of

significant effects are observed when considering each particular bipolar dimension. Thus, for instance, some self-descriptive traits (for example, *calm/agitated*) vary according to the *situation* ($F(1, 141) = 16.46$; $p = .01$); the *reference point* affects the description of oneself as being *serious* rather than *frivolous* ($F(1, 141) = 6.01$; $p < .01$); the judgement of oneself as being *gloomy* or *cheerful* depends on the interaction of all three independent variables ($F(1, 141) = 10.47$; $p = .01$); and so forth.

5. For instance, some subjects had to assess 'their own similarity to the Northerners (Southerners)' rather than the 'Northerners' (Southerners') similarity to themselves'. According to the experimental conditions, all kinds of comparisons were performed, by different subjects.

6. The data in the Northern region were collected by N. Cavazza, University of Bologna.

4

Self–We–Others Schemata and Social Identifications

Maria Jarymowicz

Searching for the social self: the self and prosocial attachment

In order to examine the social self from a social psychological perspective, we must refer to traditions in other areas of psychology (Jarymowicz & Greenwald, 1993), and distinguish between the ego and the self (Allport, 1961; James, 1890). In social psychology, this distinction is revealed in the view of the self *as a subject* (or self as a knower) and the self *as an object of knowledge* (Epstein, 1980; Greenwald & Pratkanis, 1984). In other words, we can describe the self as an active agent or as an object to be understood.

Different conceptualizations of the social self define how the individual is connected to other people in the social environment. There are two particularly important approaches that deserve attention. On the one hand, the social self can be described by the individual's social identifications: different forms of syntony with other people and states of prosocial ego involvement. These states are accompanied by feelings of attachment, sympathy, affiliation, devotion, respect for others' expectations, common goals, understanding and acceptance. On the other hand, the social self can be associated with people's ability to perceive and recognize themselves, in other words, the ability to create cognitive representations of one's person and self schemata. The content of the self-description combined with the representation of other(s) constitutes the social self and we schemata.

The relationship between the ego and the self, or between the ego-identity and self-identity (Erikson, 1956), has not been carefully examined in psychology. The aim of this chapter is to elaborate on the relation between the self and the other(s) schemata, on the one side, and the states of social identification, on the other. We are particularly interested in the relationship between the distinctness of self–we–other(s) schemata and attitudes towards others, ingroup versus outgroup members.

In order to understand the process of social identifications, we can begin by questioning the generality of the popular thesis that states that the self–others similarity leads to prosocial ego involvement and that the perceived

Table 4.1 *The social self as a structural basis of different forms of social identifications*

The self structure: internal basis of social identifications	Ego-involvement: states of social identifications
1 *'The experiential social self'* affect and drives mechanisms: emotional empathy, security, affiliation, and other hedonistic motives	syntonic feelings, seeking for contact, affiliation, sensual comfort
2 *'The public self'* dependence on group's reinforcements, the we-as-a-group concept (e.g. 'We – a family')	conformity: respect for particular ingroup norms and goals
3 *'The collective self'* cognitive representations of real social divisions and memberships, the we-as-a-category concept ('We – workers, women, etc.)	feeling of ingroup (categorial) homogeneity, internalization of social norms, ingroup favouritism
4 *'The conceptual social self'* cognitive categorization based on abstract criteria, the attributive-we concept ('We – honest, tolerant, etc.)	feeling of we-ness across (and independent from) social groups and categories
5 *'The autonomous social self'* differentiation of two self subsystems: 'me as an individual' and 'me as a member of social groups and categories'	recognition of different *and* common values/ goals, enjoying communality with autonomous others, groups and categories

similarity to others is the main determinant of attachment to them. This thesis has support in theoretical and empirical work (Byrne, 1969; Reykowski, 1979). However, relationships between self–other(s) schemata and ego involvement are far more complex than this work suggests (Brewer, 1991; Jarymowicz, 1987, 1994c; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). In order to understand this relationship, it is necessary to analyse different forms of prosocial ego involvement, ranging from the simple drives to affiliate or conform (when prosocial behaviour leads to affect comfort) to exocentric ego involvement (when prosocial behaviour is focused on other's states and needs, regardless of one's own needs: Jarymowicz, 1992a; Karyłowski, 1982).

Social identifications, expressed by syntony with others and prosocial ego involvement, are sometimes considered to be defining characteristics of the social self. This view, however, creates more problems than benefits because there are many different forms of social identifications based on different social structures (Jarymowicz, 1992b, 1994a; see Table 4.1).

On the primary level (1) drives and affective mechanisms lead to non-specific affiliation and seeking syntony with others. The social self cannot be explicitly articulated by the individual, it is more like 'I have experienced it' or 'I feel it'. Identifications are automatic and strong, their objects are

persons who can gratify primary needs. The feelings last as long as the relationship with particular others endures.

Thanks to a number of social reinforcers that can be offered by groups, the process of socialization determines the respect and conformity with group expectations (level 2). The social self may be a family, partnerships or classmates: *we as a group is formed* (Jarymowicz, 1993a, 1994b). Identifications refer to the concrete group, and terminate when the person no longer belongs to the group.

The ability to focus on broader social categories gradually develops, and the social self moves beyond face-to-face contacts (level 3): *we as a category is created* (Jarymowicz, 1994b) based on intra-categorial differentiations. It gives rise to syntonical identifications with category members and results in group favouritism. Referents of these identifications are stable only so long as the cognitive map of the world reflects social reality.

The human mind can create different types of categorizations as well (Brown & Turner, 1981), for example those based on abstract criteria. Therefore, the *attributive we* appears ('We, optimists, art lovers'). This 'we' is formed independently of, and sometimes cross-cuts, social groups and categories (level 4). The identifications may refer to other people, regardless of their social membership. They are modified as new, cognitive, abstract categories of understanding the world (for example, acquiring the concept of 'loyalty' enables one to discern between loyal and disloyal people).

Social categorization and social comparison processes are not the only ways the social self is identified. Individuals may define themselves beyond comparisons with others or membership to particular categories. Thanks to intrapersonal differentiation and formation of personal evaluative standards, one's self can be recognized as someone realizing the pursuit of certain superior values. Thus social identifications do not refer to a category of people but to common goals (level 5). When values are perceived as common, identifications are likely to last a long time. When goals are common, identifications last as long as they are relevant.

The distinction, we suggest, reflects the sequence of developmental stages in which people can use new cognitive categories and evaluative standards (Gołab & Reykowski, 1985; Hoffman, 1989; Kohlberg, 1976; Piaget, 1975; Reykowski, 1989; Ziller, 1964). The stages also determine new areas and objects of people's identifications (Tap, 1979): from social groups or categories of own membership (levels 1–3), to categories going beyond social divisions (level 4) or categorization as such (level 5).

How can we define the relationship between the social self, social identity and social identifications? In our approach the social self is considered not as a subjective state of identification with other people, but as a subsystem of self-knowledge. Prototypical elements of the social self constitute individuals' social identity (and, consequently, determine its content). On the other hand, social syntony and prosocial ego involvement are considered as states of social identifications, states of ego which depend on self–we–others schemata and thus on social identity.

Self–we–others schemata distinctness as a basis of identity

Self-specific traits as personal identity attributes

Our definition of identity is based on two groups of premises. The first reflects the traditional way of identity conceptualization: identity is considered as a result of recognition of the self (including language-mediated effects of 'talks with the self'; see Mead, 1934). Identity components are only these elements of the self which are explicitly indicated by a subject answering the question 'Who am I?'

The other group of identity-definitional criteria refer to empirical data.

1 According to the well-known studies by Markus (Markus, 1977; Markus & Smith, 1981), traits described by participants as (a) very important and (b) highly characteristic of the self are processed differently (for example, they are processed quicker). Markus labelled them *schematic traits*.

2 Our own studies on social comparison processes (Jarymowicz, 1991a) showed that traits of the self perceived as most clearly distinguishing the self from the others were processed differently (for example, egotism was found only for these traits of the self which were the most highly distinct). Our definition of identity refers to self-descriptive traits, traits which are not only characteristic of the self (and can be also characteristic of the other), but also specific – distinguishing the self from the other. Such traits of the self, which are characteristic and distinguishing at the same time, we have labelled *identity traits*.

In our definition (Jarymowicz, 1991a, p. 693), personal identity is a subsystem of self-knowledge, which is constituted by the traits perceived as the most characteristic of and the most specific (distinct) to the self.

Self–we–others schemata distinctness as a basis of personal versus social identity

According to Byrne's studies (Byrne, 1969), interpersonal similarity leads to attraction. On the other hand, studies on identity have shown that, in some conditions, self/we–others similarity may be aversive and distinctness attractive (Brewer, 1991; Codol, 1979; Jarymowicz, 1982, 1987; Snyder & Fromkin, 1980). Seeking for explanations of the incoherent data concerning self/we–others similarity/distinctness and attractiveness, we found that the perceived dissimilarity was not a good measure of self/we distinctness from the other. People's estimation of the degree of similarity or dissimilarity is determined not only by the ability to differentiate between own person or own group and other people, but also by motivation to perceive self or we as similar or not similar to others (Suls & Miller, 1977). In order to create a better measure, we focused on the real cognitive distinctness of self/we–others schemata, instead of the perceived similarity (depending often on subjects' wishful thinking).

The new operationalization was based on three procedural requirements.

1 Individuals' attention on the self, the we or the other has to be focused without inducing social comparison processes (which are likely to activate social norms and evaluation).
2 As was shown by Holyoak and Gordon (1983), the self is the usual reference point in social perception, and usually has stronger impact on perception of the other than does other on the self (see Hardoin & Codol, 1984) – to focus attention on the self, the we and the others, a reverse order has to be applied.
3 To focus the subject's attention on descriptive and not evaluative dimensions of a particular object, nouns instead of adjectives have to be used (as the latter may help induce affective or evaluative associations).

The so-called *Questionnaire of Social Perception* consists of a list of 70 nouns, enumerating dimensions such as elegance, intelligence, tolerance (all presented in a positive manner). It contains three parts, presented to participants subsequently. The first part of the Questionnaire concerns the category of others. Participants read the list of dimensions and mark those which 'are on their mind when they think about other people'. Afterwards, out of the already indicated nouns, they mark 10 'which are considered the most frequent'. The second part examines the 'we' category. This category is first activated by an additional operation: participants are requested 'Try to think about those people who are on your mind when you use the word WE' and describe the chosen 'we' in an informal way. Then they read the same list of 70 nouns, and choose 10 dimensions 'most frequently used when thinking about people considered We'. The third part examines the self category: subjects choose 10 dimensions 'most frequently considered when thinking about oneself'.

The three tasks refer to *schematic dimensions* (labelled analogous to Markus, 1977) of three objects. The distinctness of schemata is defined, however, by prototype, specific, *distinctive dimensions*, that is, only those dimensions which subjects ascribed to one and only one object. Measurements built upon such material are likely to reflect the distinctness of self–others, we–others and self–we schemata.

Assuming that social identity may be derived from intergroup (or rather we–others) differentiation, in our approach the content of social identity is determined by distinctive dimensions of the we related to the others, that is, those dimensions which are marked by a subject as referring to the we and not marked as referring to others in general.

Further on, assuming that personal identity may be derived from intra-group (self–other members) differentiation (or distinguishing the self from similar ones; see Festinger, 1954), the content of personal identity is determined by distinctive dimensions of the self related to the we, that is, those dimensions which refer to the self and not to the we).

We assume that the level of the distinctness of the self (from the we) and the we (from the others) is related to the stage of the identities' development

and their status, that is, their role in the regulation of individuals' func-
tioning: the higher the level of the distinctness, the greater the impact on the
individual's functioning.

Finally we posit (and present relevant data; Jarymowicz, 1991b, 1993b):

(a) social identity is likely to prevail in persons with a high level of we–
other schemata distinctness and a low level of self–we schemata
distinctness;
(b) personal identity is likely to prevail in persons with a high level of self–
we schemata distinctness and a low level of we–others schemata
distinctness.

By 'prevail' we mean both the higher level of development of a particular
scheme and its relatively greater impact on information processing, evalu-
ation processes or behaviour. It is particularly clear when the social self and
personal self do not overlap. This prediction was empirically verified and is
presented elsewhere (Jarymowicz, 1993b, 1994a).

Self–we schemata distinctness as a basis of social identifications

*The distinctness of the self as a precondition of understanding and
acceptance of outgroups and dissimilar others: a theoretical model*

A number of theoretical arguments and empirical results contribute to the
well-known thesis: similarity of an other to the self and the membership of
the same social category facilitate identifications, and result in ingroup
favouritism. In contrast, we focus on identifications with dissimilar others
who do not belong to the same social group or category and study empirical
findings concerning the relationships between self–we–others schemata
distinctness and intergroup attitudes.

The following predictions are proposed (Jarymowicz, 1992a, 1994c);

1   The strong syntonic identification with one's own group leads to ingroup
favouritism and, in certain conditions, to outgroup discrimination.
2   The lower the level of self–we schemata distinctness, the stronger the
identification with one's own group and ingroup favouritism, and
consequently the lower the ability to decentrate and to recognize the
outgroup's perspective, and the lower the possibility of accepting others'
goals and values.
3   The higher the level of self–we schemata distinctness, the weaker the
influence of a reference group on individuals' functioning (including the
tendency to ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination).

We propose a theoretical model of the relationship between self–we
schemata distinctness and possible identifications with dissimilar others.
Two groups of premises are considered.

Figure 4.1 *Self–we schemata distinctness and the degree of individuals'*
involvement with outgroups and dissimilar others: a theoretical model

(a) instrumental (cognitive) premises – an ability to decentration and to
     recognize others' perspectives;
(b) motivational premises – a readiness to focus on others' perspectives, to
     think what is beneficial to them, and to be involved.

The model is presented in Figure 4.1.
   According to the model:

1 The low level of self–we schemata distinctness relates to lack of ability
   to distinguish perspectives of one's own group from those of other
   groups, and to recognize others' states, needs, goals – which is a
   necessary precondition of others-oriented involvement.
2 The high level of self–we schemata distinctness relates:
   (a) to an ability to distinguish perspectives of one's own group from
        those of other groups, and to recognize others' states, needs, goals
        – which is a necessary but not sufficient precondition of others-
        oriented involvement; and
   (b) to different levels of presocial motivation (which depends on factors
        other than self–we distinctness) – thus, degree of others-oriented
        involvement varies in different situations.

   This model has been confronted with empirical data. Below some results
are presented.

Figure 4.2   *Recall of children's problems (Szuster-Zbrojewicz, 1990)*

Figure 4.3   *Motivation to solve children's problems (Szuster-Zbrojewicz, 1990)*

Figure 4.4   *Readiness to host different nationalities (Cylwik, 1992)*

Figure 4.5   *Tolerance of German minority activity (Pawluczuk, 1992)*

The model and empirical data

Participants of experiments were focused on others – presented either as anonymous 'others' or as 'they' (people of different social or national membership). In all groups self–we–others schemata distinctness was measured, as well as one of the following manifestations of others-oriented involvement:

(a)   recall of children's problems, mentioned prior to the experiment (Figure 4.2);
(b)   motivation to solve children's problems (Figure 4.3);
(c)   readiness to host at home students of different nationalities (Figure 4.4);
(d)   tolerance of the activity of the German minority in Poland (to preserve their national tradition) (Figure 4.5);
(e)   positivity of evaluation of a painting, the artist being presented as a foreigner (Slovak, Irish or Japanese) (Figures 4.6–4.7).

As can be seen, presented data are consistent with the model.

Figure 4.6 *Positivity of evaluation of Slovak and Irish paintings (Sobczyk, 1992)*

Figure 4.7 *Positivity of evaluation of Japanese painting (Sokołowska, 1992)*

1   The follow-up study established that participants with a low level of self–we schemata distinctness were least likely to favour outgroups (similar results were obtained by Jarymowicz, 1994c; Kobuszewska, 1989; Szuster-Zbrojewicz, 1988). The only inconsistency found was the motivational pattern presented in Figure 4.3 (Szuster-Zbrojewicz, 1990). When subjects had to declare more than just good will, persons with a low level of the schemata distinctness were least likely to favour strangers.
2   The results of participants with a high level of the schemata distinctness are less homogeneous: in some studies a rectilinear rather than a curvilinear relationship is found.

Conclusion

There are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from this discussion. Let us outline them briefly.

1   Egocentrism or ingroup orientation is related to universal human properties.
2   The differentiation of cognitive schemata is a necessary precondition to go beyond own egocentrism: to recognize different social perspectives and understand others.
3   Social self and social identity (if related to social groups or categories – see Table 4.1) induce syntony and ingroup involvement.
4   The necessary precondition of coexistence with outgroup members is an ability to distinguish the self from the we schemata: a formation of social and personal identity is necessary to enable the individual to switch focus and shift attention from one perspective to another.

In summary, then, and coming back to the opening sentences of the chapter, we conclude by stating that we have tried to reconcile different traditions in the study of self in psychology. We think that from now on they should not be considered as separate.

PART II
ESTABLISHING GROUP IDENTITY

5

A Developmental View of the Search for Group Identity

Stephen Worchel

I spent several years of my life on the East Coast of the United States. Coming from Texas, which had only two types of weather, hot or rainy, I was awed by the changing seasons on the East coast. Each year, fall followed summer and signalled the coming of winter. I could consult my calendar to find the exact time of the metamorphosis, but nature was a better, but less predictable, source of information. Some years the change of season would be abrupt, easily noticeable and sudden when a winter storm would arrive and take control of my world for months. Other years, the changes of season were gradual, silent, almost secret; a few leaves might drop from a tree to whisper the advent of fall, but the full message took weeks. This four-act play would be performed every year.

The drama of changing seasons has a message that carries far beyond the woodlands. The Navaho Indians believe that human behaviour is a mirror that reflects the forces of nature. If we wish to understand the behaviour of humans, we should look first to understand the natural environment. Indeed, there may be many messages about group and intergroup behaviour in the winds of seasonal change.

I begin with this retreat into nature because it so sharply contrasts with the approach that characterizes much of the study of group and intergroup behaviour. Typically, social psychology searches for *effects* and the causes of these effects. Our methodological microscopes focus on a single behaviour, at a single point of time. The context in which that behaviour occurs (the person's previous actions, expectations about the present situation, or anticipations of the future) is seen as a pesky problem and given the ignominious title of 'error variance'. We speak of effects such as conformity,

group polarization, social loafing, cooperation, social categorization and intergroup competition as if they were stones in a behavioural river that exist in isolation.

I want to offer a somewhat different perspective in this chapter. To begin, I want to question the concept of *effect*. Our 'effects' are not effects in the sense that we characterize them. Rather they are *processes* that can only be understood in the context of the preceding events and behaviours, the present interpretations of the setting, and the individual's anticipation of future activities. These processes are intertwined with the flow of behaviour over time and can best be understood and predicted in this context. They are the stream itself, not concrete forms that divert, interrupt and stand alone in the behavioural stream. This is not a new view. Lewin found that the effectiveness of leadership styles could be described only when one style was examined in light of the leadership style that had preceded it (Lewin, Lippitt & White, 1939). Schachter (1951) found that reactions to a deviate not only changed over time, they were influenced by changes in the deviate's behaviour. If the deviate accepted the group position, he was quickly embraced by other group members. Continued disagreement with the group resulted in a cessation of communication directed towards him and rejection. Sherif and his colleagues (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961) found that hostility between groups could be reduced only after a series of cooperative encounters. And McGrath and his colleagues (Kelly, 1988; McGrath, 1988) have lamented the neglect of *time* in the study of social psychology.

I want to build on the foundation laid by these early studies and present group and intergroup behaviour as a procession of events, each related to the other, and each taking on meaning from the context in which it occurs. Groups, I believe, develop through rather predictable stages (or seasons). The process of group development is not one with a distinct beginning, and often there is no clear end. In fact, many groups 'live on' long after all the original members have departed. Rather, the development is a cycle that repeats itself. Each stage has a predictable impact on the behaviour of group members and on the relationship between groups. Actions that are accepted or encouraged at one point in the process will be censored and rejected at other points. Understanding and predicting group and inter-group behaviour requires that we understand the developmental process.

Independence versus group membership: a life-long dilemma

Before jumping directly into issues of group and intergroup behaviour, let me be true to my psychology heritage and focus on the individual for a moment. Humanistic psychology argues that nearly from the moment of birth we embark on a life-long journey to 'find' our identity (Maslow, 1954; Rogers, 1951). The journey is a strenuous one, but at the heart of it is determining our relationship with the groups to which we belong. Defining

this relationship throws us into two raging and competing cross-currents. On one hand is our desire to be accepted and valued by others. Groups offer us support, safety, protection and a reason for existence. While groups are a safe harbour in many ways, they also exact their price. They demand obedience and conformity, they require us to place group needs above personal needs, they coerce us to give up some of our personal identity.

It is in this latter demand where the counter-currents meet with such fury, because paralleling the desire for group membership is the desire to be recognized as an independent, unique individual. In order to achieve this goal, we must differentiate ourselves from the groups to which we belong. We must resist their seductive lure to abandon our independent self and accept the group identity. Our lives are characterized by the constant struggle of deciding how much of our personal identity we will sacrifice for the substitute group identity.

Tajfel and his colleagues (Tajfel, 1972b, 1978d; Tajfel & Turner, 1986) anticipated this discussion in their development of *social identity theory*. They implied that we actually hold two identities (more correctly, one identity with two opposite poles), a personal identity that includes our personal characteristics and a social identity derived from our membership in groups. Turner (1982) argued that the identity (personal or social) which we stress at any moment is a function of the context in which a particular interaction takes place. Intimate interactions, for example, enhance the salience of our personal identity, while interacting with people from other identifiable groups may make our social identity salient (Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978). For example, being the only woman in a group of men makes salient the social identity, especially of the minority person, and influences the nature of the interaction that will take place. Social identity theory further suggests that we wish to maintain a positive image of ourselves, and in order to enhance our social identity we will advantage our ingroup in relation to outgroups.

Social identity theory offers unique insight into a host of social and individual behaviours. I would like to push the social identity approach a step further and suggest that the desire to emphasize one identity or the other is influenced by more than the social context in which people find themselves. I want to argue that the individual's own context (history, interpretation of the present situation, and anticipation of the future events) plays at least as important a role as does the social situations in determining the salience of personal/social identity. Further, an individual's life can be characterized as alternating between placing an emphasis on group identity and emphasizing personal differentiation. I accept the social identity position that the social situation influences which identity is salient. However, I suggest that it is the individual's own context that motivates him or her to seek social situations that emphasize one identity or the other. For example, descriptions of close relationships suggest that individuals often alternate between periods of close intimacy with a partner followed by efforts to 'touch base' with larger groups of people (Argyle, 1992; Oldenquist, 1992;

Reis, Nezlek & Wheeler, 1980). Partners in intimate relationships are often threatened when they perceive the other 'pulling away' and becoming interested in the activities of social groups. However, the natural tide of relationships is a cycle of emphasizing the intimate relationship and emphasizing the membership in other groups. A threat to one aspect of the identity can lead a person to focus on and attempt to repair that identity. Individuals who have suffered threats to their social being, such as being fired from a job or going through a divorce, seek social support networks to reaffirm their social identity (Rook, 1987). On the other hand, when the threat is to the personal identity, such as the case of experiencing an embarrassing event, the desire to be alone and repair the personal self is dominant (Morris et al., 1976). Alternating between one identity and the other occurs not only in brief episodes during life. It also characterizes the larger pattern of human existence; greatest emphasis on establishing personal identity occurs during early childhood and middle age, while social identity themes are often most evident in adolescence and in the elderly.

Finally, none of our behaviour escapes the embrace of culture, so it is not surprising that something so central as identity is a product of culture. Numerous investigators (for example, Hofstede, 1980; Triandis, 1988) have observed that cultures place varying emphasis on personal and social identities. In collective cultures such as those found in Asia, Greece and the Middle East, the emphasis is on the group and the individual's social identity is stressed. On the other hand, more individualistic cultures such as the United States and some countries of Western Europe force the individual into centre-stage, and personal identity plays a critical role. It is no accident that humanistic psychology with its emphasis on differentiating the self from the social context is a Western phenomenon.

The development of groups

This has been a rather long preamble to a discussion of groups and intergroup behaviour. However, I wanted to make the point that even at the level of personal and interpersonal behaviour there is an ongoing process of identification that involves emphasizing themes of inclusion and differentiation at different points of time. The theme that is emphasized is a function of dynamics occurring within the individual and between individuals, as well as events that occur within the person's physical and social environment. My aim is now to demonstrate that similar processes characterize groups and the relationship between groups. My interest in group development was initially sparked because so much of the research and theory in group and intergroup behaviour was not dynamic in approach, focusing only on specific behaviours at a single period, and ignoring the history of the members and the groups. I was concerned that most research on group dynamics began with the group already established, either in the sense of a laboratory group of strangers who arrived for an experiment or in an

established group in a natural setting. This approach overlooks the process of group formation, how individuals decide to join groups, and how these variables affect group behaviour. These are important issues that may have dramatic impact on all group and intergroup behaviours. Unfortunately, these issues are beyond the scope of this chapter. However, although I will not address them, I want to raise them for future consideration.

My second concern with traditional group research is that group development and change is rarely addressed. Specifically, after reviewing the literature I was left with many questions about the dynamics of groups: for example, how do groups develop and change over time, and how does this development affect intermember and intergroup behaviour? In order to examine these questions, I turned to empirical accounts in social science literature on group dynamics and popular archival accounts of groups. My search of the archival literature included descriptions of small groups (families, athletic teams, splinter church groups, gangs), large groups (business organizations, political parties, nations) and social movements (women's rights movements, the civil rights movement, ethnic identity movements). I included a wide variety of groups because I wanted to identify both similarities and differences in the process involved in these groups. I was also guided by a personal interest in the processes involved in groups gaining independence from larger groups. This interest moved me to consider the area of group formation, as well as development, and carried me into the fascinating literature on revolution, protests and terrorism. I have discussed group formation and revolution in earlier papers (Worchel, Coutant-Sassic & Grossman, 1992), and space does not allow me to deal with this topic here. For the present, then, I will focus more directly on group behaviour from the time a group is initially formed.

Actually, there has been a long history of efforts to examine group development. The t-group movement beginning in the early 1950s offered a marvellous opportunity to observe groups over time and chart their development and change. Based on data from these and similar groups, investigators suggested that groups do move through rather predictable stages. For example, Tuckman (1965; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977) identified the stages of forming, storming, norming, performing and adjourning. While this earlier work focused on the group, Moreland and Levine (1982, 1988) examined the stages that individual members go through as they enter and move through the group. These studies of group and member development are rich and interesting, but it is difficult to determine where they have impacted group research. Rather than representing a coordinated effort, the studies and observations have been undertaken in isolation from each other so that it is not possible to identify a unified theory of group development. In addition, these fragmented observations of groups do not readily lend themselves to developing specific hypotheses. This is not necessarily an indictment of the approach, because much of the work was designed to describe group development, not generate research, but it does help explain why this approach has not been incorporated into mainstream research

Figure 5.1   *Stages of group development in existing groups*

efforts. Finally, many of these observations dealt with rather specific groups (t-groups, therapy groups), and the applications were rather group-specific. Most of the groups involved had specific beginning and end points, and they were formed for specific purposes. Therefore, the work rarely dealt with issues of group formation or examined cycles in development. Even the important work of Moreland and Levine follows the individual member through one group; there is no discussion of how the experience of membership in one group impacts the member's choice of additional groups or behaviour in these additional groups. In this sense, most earlier models are linear. As we will see, my observations suggested that group development is cyclical and repetitive. This cyclical nature of groups has important implications for explaining intragroup behaviour and the continuing relations between groups.

My work on group development used this earlier work as a starting point, and it was designed to deal with the limitations I perceived in these earlier approaches. As a beginning, I was able to identify four stages or periods that occur in intact groups (assuming group formation as the beginning point). The stages represented themes that dominated group activity during specific time periods. The stages are reciprocal in that they affect the behaviour of group members and the relation between groups, and they are, in turn, affected by member behaviour and intergroup relations. Beginning with the formation of the groups, the stages are: identification, group productivity, individuation and decay (see Figure 5.1).

Identification

Once a group is formed, its initial focus is on establishing its identity. Efforts are directed at defining the boundaries of the group, its 'place' in

relation to other groups (and history), and the relationship between members. This focus has profound effects on member behaviour and intergroup relations. The group establishes a central dogma or theme for the group. Attitudes on these issues are often extreme, clear and uncompromising. Minority positions are not tolerated and minorities are quickly excluded from the group. There are strong pressures on members to conform. Groups often adopt a dress code or uniform, a special language and other symbols that identify the group and mark people as being members. In many cases, efforts are made to 'reach back' in history to establish the legitimacy of the group, recognize patrons and previous founders, and locate the marks that will distinguish the group and identify its 'rightful' members. For example, the 1980s were a time of rebirth of Maori people in New Zealand. The Maori became especially interested in their rightful place in New Zealand history, their language, their customs and dress. There was a renewed push for recognition of the Maori within New Zealand society, a return of lands to the tribes, and greater powers for self-governance.

Leadership during identification is often centralized. Members may be asked to demonstrate their loyalty to the group by making sacrifices or undergoing difficult initiation rites. The boundaries of the group are closed to new members. Recall that the initial stages of the doomsday cult studied by Festinger, Riecken and Schachter (1956) was characterized by withdrawing from public focus and closing the group to new members. In many cases, groups in a period of identification will physically withdraw, demanding that members break contact with other groups to which they have belonged.

Relations with outgroups become especially strained at this point. Group boundaries are defined by the relation of one group to other groups. As a result the group either seeks to isolate itself from other groups or it invites conflict and competition with outgroups. Either of these actions defines boundaries and has a bonding effect within a group. Outgroups are presented as dangerous, aggressive and sinister, thereby forcing members together to deal with this outside menace. Similarities within the group membership and differences between groups are emphasized. In some cases, demands are made on outgroups which cannot be met, precisely to 'prove' that the outgroups are evil and unfair. For example, in many cases where ethnic groups attempt to 're-establish' themselves and incite member awareness, demands are made for the return of land or other resources that were taken from the group at an earlier period of history. Even when it is deemed that the resources were illegally seized, the wholesale return of these properties would create havoc in the larger society, so that the wholesale return is either impossible or will involve a slow, complicated process. The reluctance to return this property or the slow process is then used to 'prove' the lack of good will in the outgroup.

From the group's perspective, the aim of the identification stage is to focus group members on their social identity, as opposed to their personal identity. Interactions within the group and between ingroup and outgroup

members emphasize social identity. At the same time that the group seeks to strip away the individuating characteristics of its members, it attempts to differentiate its own characteristics as a group, separate and different from other groups.

Group productivity

While efforts during the identification stage increase the cohesion within the group, they often interfere with group productivity. Therefore, as identity becomes established, group members begin to examine the goals of the group, especially ones involving group productivity. Although the orientation is still on the ingroup, the topic of concern is productivity rather than identification. This focus creates numerous changes in the group and inter-group behaviour. Overall, the emotional climate cools from the passionate state that characterized the identification process. Members now take a more analytical approach. During identification, group members were most concerned with the similarities of the group members. As the concern turns to productivity, members begin to examine the differences between them-selves, but only those differences that may affect the group's task-related activities. The search is for the specific skills that members may possess that will help the group towards its productivity goals. Although still empha-sizing social identity, the door is now opened for members to focus on their personal identity as it relates to group productivity. The boundaries of the group become more permeable and new members may be recruited to perform specific tasks. In some cases, the group may search for highly skilled members to fulfil high esteemed roles, but in many cases the new members will have a lower status and be expected to perform less attractive jobs, until they have 'proven themselves' worthy of group membership. This is often the fate of new immigrants to a country.

The group becomes less antagonistic towards the outgroups, but its relationship with them remains cautious. In some cases, comparison with outgroups is sought in order to determine how 'productive' the ingroup is. Leadership becomes more task-oriented and the emotional pitch of the group is reduced. Minorities can influence the group on task-related issues, but these minorities will still meet quick rejection and censure if they threaten group identity. Group failures are attributed to external sources, while group success is attributed to internal group factors.

Individuation

During the productivity stage, members began to differentiate between themselves based on their task skills. The self-focus expands and accelerates during individuation. Members begin to assess their contributions to and rewards from group membership. They demand equity based on their contributions to the group rather than equality based on simple group membership. Subgroups appear during this stage, based first on skills and

roles developed in the drive for productivity, but later expanding to include subgroups based on attitudes, interests and skills that may be unrelated to group activity. Individuals become more focused on personal needs and characteristics. Interactions within the group become more selective, but more intimate. Minority voice is not only tolerated, but encouraged. Social loafing (Latané, Williams & Harkins, 1979), in the sense of working less hard for group goals than personal goals, becomes common. Leadership may be questioned and failures blamed on poor leadership.

Relations with the outgroup take on a very different flavour compared to the earlier two stages. Individuals begin a process of social comparison with outgroup members, as well as with ingroup members. They seek information about outgroups to use as standards for comparing their own group, and their treatment within the group. There is a tendency to overestimate the quality of life in the outgroup and the success of the outgroup. But this view is not necessarily used as a threat to the ingroup identity. Rather, it is presented as evidence that the ingroup is not meeting individual needs, and that changes are needed within the group. Rules, roles and norms of the ingroup are questioned, and there is a demand for greater personal freedom. Individual members begin negotiating with the ingroup to improve their personal standing.

Decay

From a group identity standpoint, the shift in focus to personal identity among group members poses a threat to group identity. There may be efforts to suppress this move towards individuality, but the group has become fragmented and the threat of rejection is less feared by members. The group becomes less important in the individual's self-concept. Individual members actively explore defecting to other groups, or subgroups seek to break away from the group and form their new group. Marginal members who are not central to the group's identity are the first to leave. Later in this stage, more central members who have 'saleable' skills leave the group. These losses are viewed with alarm by the remaining members, who use these losses to demand change within the group. Although the call for change may result from a recognizable problem, members are often unclear about the specific change they desire. The result is that initial attempts to respond to these demands are often unorganized and ineffective. The easiest change is to replace the leader(s). There may be rapid succession of leaders as much is demanded from them, but members are unwilling to invest much power in leadership positions. Bitterness is expressed as members feel that they were lured into the group on the basis of false promises and expectations. Anticonformity as a way of demonstrating personal independence and displeasure will be common.

Outgroups perceive the vulnerability of the group and efforts may be launched to encourage defection. Alarm over these incursions may be expressed, but the group is unable to mount a concerted defence. On a broad

scale, the decay of one group often creates conflict and hostility between outgroups as each attempts to profit from the condition.

The cycle

The stage of decay has a dramatic impact on the group. Many members leave the group and a negative emotional state predominates the group. But as the most disaffected members leave, the remaining members begin turning their attention back to the group. In the chaos, a strong leader often emerges, offering the remaining members the hope of re-establishing their group. The defections are seen as a group cleansing. Anger and hostility is expressed towards the defectors, and the group takes some solace in stories of disasters that befell these defectors. Attention is turned to rebuilding and redefining the group. The phoenix rises from the ashes. The group begins the identification stage once again. Often there is a surge of energy that comes from rebirth. The cleansing process may reach new heights as the group looks internally to define traitors or marginal members who have remained. These people are expelled, often with public ceremony. The fundamentalism that characterizes identification process grips the group. The reborn group begins differentiating itself from other outgroups, especially those that have defectors or profited form the demise of the group. Members' social identity is emphasized over personal identity. The cycle begins anew.

The issue of inevitability

This brief summary of the process of development raises as many questions as it answers. One of the first questions is whether this progression of stages is inevitable and must proceed uninterrupted in this order. The answer to this question is 'no'. Although this cycle may be the 'natural' flow of events, it is very clear that the process can be interrupted or short-circuited by numerous intended and unintended events.

At any point during the process, events may occur that force the group to focus on specific issues and drive it to a particular stage. The most common situation is a return to group identification concerns. A clear or perceived threat from an outgroup, regardless of when it occurs in the development process, often makes group identity issues salient. An outgroup may make a bold effort to capture resources (land, material, status) held by a group. For example, it is not uncommon for employees of a company to rally to the aid of that company in the face of a rival's bid to buy that company. This can occur even when the employees are expressing dissatisfaction with their organization.

A wily leader, feeling that his or her power is slipping or that the group is disintegrating, may seek out or manufacture a conflict with an outgroup. The result of this conflict is that the group will be thrown back into a stage

of identification. For example, President George Bush was accused of accelerating the confrontation between the United States and Iraq in an effort to consolidate his power base and turn Americans' attention away from a deteriorating economy and onto the issue of national identity and pride.

A sudden windfall or a dramatic increase in resources may push groups into a stage of individuation. Such a windfall requires that the group grapple with the problem of how to divide these resources among the members. Individual members may then begin to make their claim to these resources based on their skills, contributions to the group, personal needs or other personal characteristics. It is interesting to notice that the windfall, in this case, may hasten the decay of the group, in its present form.

Finally, a scandal that arises from within the group may lead to disillusionment and decay. Scapegoating and dissatisfaction with leadership can result in members feeling that the group cannot meet their needs, and result in their defection to other groups.

While the progression through stages in order is not inevitable, I would like to offer two observations based on the reviews of group behaviour. First, it will take some unusual or unexpected event to derail the orderly progression. Second, when a group is pushed either back to an earlier stage or forward into a new stage, further group development will progress from that new stage. For example, if a group undergoing individuation is forced suddenly into the identification stage, the next step of that group will be into group productivity. The hands of the group clock move from the stage at hand, they don't 'catch up' or revert back to assume an earlier cycle of development.

Transition and the nature of development stages

A second major issue concerns the nature of the various stages and what forces the group from one stage into the next. These questions captured my interest as I read hundreds of accounts of groups. Was one stage necessarily longer than another? How did a group 'decide' that one stage was completed and it was time to move to the next stage? Were there clear distinctions between stages?

I continually attempted to fit the literature into a concrete structure, but the fit was always an uncomfortable one. Like the variety found in the transitions between seasons, the changes in group stages followed a variety of patterns. In some cases, the transition was abrupt and clear, while in other cases it was more gradual, with the group dealing with two issues (for example, identification and productivity) simultaneously. Slowly it became clear that the stages were not necessarily distinct, bounded entities, but rather they were periods in which certain issues predominated the group's concern. Although central issues could be defined with considerable inter-rater reliability, the fact that one issue was dominant did not mean that the

group avoided issues characteristic of other stages. Again, going back to the analogy of seasons, winter in most parts of the world is characterized by a preponderance of cold days. But even in the harshest winters, sunny warm days may appear for brief periods of time. Such was the nature of the group stages. The group discussion during a period would be ruled by concerns with a specific issue, but other concerns would also be addressed. However, introduction of these 'other' issues usually generated briefer discussions that often involved comparatively few members. Thus, a particular stage could be identified by the topic of discussion and behaviour that *dominated* the group and by the *length of time spent on discussion and the number of group members* involved with that issue.

Similarly with the transition from one stage to another. It was often a matter of degree, but the change could be empirically identified by charting the topics of group discussion. Such, too, was the case with identifying the 'trigger' for the transitions. There seemed to be no single event that moved the group from one stage to another. In some cases, a group member or members would declare that it was time the group moved on to another issue. This occurred both in small groups and in larger groups including social movements. What was interesting was that this 'trigger' propelled the group into another stage only when the group was ready to move. There were numerous examples in all sizes of groups of when a member, often the leader, requested that the group move on, only to be ignored by the group, which clung steadfastly to its present issue. In some groups, the trigger was a deadline or an imposed demand from the outside. Often members would indicate that a certain issue, generally productivity, must be addressed in order to meet a deadline; this moved the group out of identification concerns. Boredom was a frequent trigger. Several members might complain that the group was going nowhere or that it had already addressed certain issues and that they were ready for something new. Another sign of malaise and desire to move on was a lack of participation by members.

Failure and success were some of the most interesting events in the groups I examined. Failure, regardless of the stage, tended to fixate members in that stage for a lengthy period of time. Like the classic Zeigarnik effect (Zeigarnik, 1927), groups stayed with or quickly returned to issues that they failed to resolve. However, if these new efforts were not successful, groups tended to move into decay.

Success was often as difficult to cope with as failure. Success spelled the end of a particular stage and moved the group, sometimes prematurely, into the next stage. For example, when workers at a computer company in Texas began organizing to protest decisions by management, they expected to meet stiff opposition. But when management quickly recognized and encouraged the worker organization, the group moved from concerns with identification to expressing their demands and seeking concessions (productivity). In this case, the identification phase of development was cut short and the workers failed to establish a clear organization. The result was that

the union was disorganized and it soon disbanded, leaving many important worker/management issues unaddressed. Success and the lack of outgroup conflict resulted in the failure of the group to develop.

From a research standpoint, these observations have serious implications. Determining the precise stage of development must be based on careful observations of group discussion and behaviour; in this sense, the determinations must be *post hoc*. Groups will differ in the amount of time spent in each stage of development. Therefore, direct comparisons across groups using only time of existence as the independent variable will be difficult and must represent approximations. It is tempting to try to force a more concrete calendar onto the group development process. However, this would not adequately represent the process and such efforts would not help in understanding group development. While the fuzziness of the process is a limitation from an empirical sense, it is not fatal to research efforts, as we shall see. Predictions about the types of behaviour that should dominate a group or time period can be based on the model and these predictions can be tested. Analysis of group discussions and behaviours can identify stages and allow empirical tests of specific hypotheses. And the model can be used to explicate a wide range of intragroup and intergroup behaviours that cannot be easily explained by existing, more static approaches to group behaviour.

Group identity: some empirical evidence

Enough of this talk of 'fuzzy stages' and observation! Let's examine some empirical data. But before undertaking this adventure, one point should be made. The theory of social identity and its close cousin, self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), deal with the individual. They argue that individuals are driven to develop an identity, and, as a result of this desire, their behaviour influences group and intergroup actions. Individuals are the driving forces and groups are their vehicles. There is a great deal of support for this position, and I have no desire to attack it. However, my observations of groups suggest that the theories may be incomplete as they stand. For lurking in the background of the research on group development is the suggestion that groups, like individuals, strive to develop their identity, separate from that of other groups and apart from the unique identities of the individual members.

Indeed, I would suggest that groups are engaged in a struggle with other groups and with individual members to establish and maintain a group identity. The group identity often outlives the members. It is displayed in symbols such as flags, anthems, laws, group structure and costumes that are enduring and not subject to the whims of individual members in search of their own identities. Groups strive for their independence from other groups, and they struggle with group members to keep the identity of the group equal to, if not more important than, individual identity. The striking

motto of the Three Musketeers drives home this point: 'All for one, one for all [the group].'

Indeed, the model of group development may be viewed as a model of group identity. The stages represent the group's struggle to establish its character, which is threatened by demands from individual members and from outside groups. In fact, it is this conflict that ultimately gives the developmental process its energy, its dynamic. Where social identity theory would suggest that groups change and evolve to meet the demands and desires of their members, the group developmental approach argues that there is a more reciprocal relationship between the group and its member; the needs of individuals affect the development of the group, but the group, too, is often the puppeteer, guiding the actions of the members to meet the needs of the group.

This approach argues that the behaviour of individual members is affected by the stage in which the group happens to be. Most pointedly, when developmental patterns or external events challenge the group to establish a clear identity, individual members will respond to support this goal. Specifically, this position predicts that in the early stages of group development, when the focus is on group identity, group members will direct both their intragroup and intergroup behaviours towards group identity. These forces stand apart from the need of the individuals to develop their personal or social identities. In essence, when the group is bent on crafting its identity, individual members are forced to focus on the social (group) side of their identities.

During the early stages of group development, behaviours within the group and between groups should be directed towards securing the group's identity. On the intergroup side, there should be a rise in intergroup competition and conflict designed to create clear group boundaries. Within the group, individuals will be 'encouraged' to sacrifice their independence for the sake of creating a unified, clearly distinguishable group identity. Such actions as high conformity, swift rejection of deviants and perceptions of ingroup will foster this goal. Once the identity of the group is achieved, the group environment can become one that supports the goals of individual members to establish their own unique identities (social and/or personal). As a result, latter periods of group development should be characterized by fewer demands for personal sacrifice. Three studies, focusing on very different aspects of group behaviour, can be offered as evidence of this position.

Preferred intergroup interaction

Relations between the ingroup and outgroups are important and different at each stage of development, but these relations are most vital during the stage of identification. Nearly every aspect of group identity is defined in terms of the outgroups. As individuals, we may have difficulty defining our

place in the universe, but at least we have our skin that defines our physical being. Groups, however, have no predetermined boundaries. Hence, not only are they faced with establishing their physical boundaries, but they must, in a sense, create their own skin. Indeed, this is often the first step in establishing the identity of the group.

Establishing group boundaries not only involves determining who is in the group, but it also requires describing who is not a group member. One convenient means for making a clear designation of group boundaries is through intergroup conflict and competition. Such conflict plays multiple roles in the identification process: it forces individuals to declare their membership in one group or another; it marks the boundaries of the groups; it creates a common bond and purpose between members of the ingroup; and it forces the group to clarify what it stands for and what it stands against. Therefore, it can be predicted that group members will help their groups establish boundaries by seeking conflict and competition with outgroups during the early identification stage of group development.

On the other hand, the model of development predicts that intergroup conflict will be increasingly distasteful as the group continues its development. During the group productivity phase, such conflict will distract members from task-oriented activities, although it may still serve the purpose of enhancing cohesion within the group. During individuation, members are concerned with making social comparisons with members of their own group and with members of the outgroup. In attempting to establish their worth to their ingroup and negotiating rewards, they must often demonstrate their potential value to other groups. Therefore, they need information from and acceptance by outgroups. Intergroup conflict would be disruptive to this purpose. And during decay, members are actively seeking alternative groups. Conflict between their present group and the alternative groups would clearly work against their individual goals.

In an effort to examine these predictions from the model, groups of five students assembled to work together for three one-hour sessions. They were informed that other groups would also be working in similar settings during this period. The groups were allowed to choose from a variety of tasks on which to work and they could spend as long as they desired on each task. Their behaviour was video-taped during all the sessions and they responded to periodic questionnaires throughout.

An initial analysis of the sessions indicated that the groups were quite similar in their pattern of development. During the early periods, time was spent getting acquainted, exploring similarities in backgrounds and interests, establishing norms and roles, discussing the uniqueness of their own groups, and agreeing to best the actions of other groups. As expected, the next order of business was on tasks: members examined and discussed the options, chose tasks and began talking about their past experience with similar tasks, their contributions to the group work, and their expectations for the next task. In several of the groups, members jokingly threatening to 'send' productive members to the outgroups, and also in the form of jest,

Figure 5.2   *Nature of desired interaction with outgroup as a function of group life (Worchel, Coutant-Sassic & Wong, 1993, p. 84)*

some members threatened to defect to the outgroups if their present group did not treat them well. During the last session, many of the groups engaged in a review of the group efforts, members talked about what they were going to do after the experiment, and closure was the topic of the period.

Most interesting from the perspective of intergroup relations were responses on the written questionnaires. Several of these questions queried subjects about their feelings about their own group and desired relations with the other groups. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, subjects expressed a desire to engage in intergroup competition during the early periods of the group. As the group aged, their desires changed markedly, and by the time of group closing the desire was for cooperation with outgroups. Feelings about *internal* conflict showed the opposite pattern: extreme discomfort during the early stages and greater comfort by the final period (Figure 5.2).

This is the pattern that would be predicted by the model on the assumption that intergroup competition helps differentiate the ingroup from the outgroup, and such differentiation is most critical during early stages devoted to group formation. The topics of group discussion also fit the predicted pattern, focusing first on group identification and productivity and later on more individual concerns. It should be pointed out that the cyclical pattern of the stages was not observed, but this may have been due to the fact that these groups had a defined end point.

These results are not only interesting from a theoretical standpoint, but they may also carry a message for applied group dynamics. If groups actively seek out competition and conflict with outgroups at certain periods, it follows that efforts to reduce intergroup hostility during these periods will not be well received. Reducing intergroup hostility may only be possible after groups have been able to establish their identity, and do not feel that interaction with the outgroup will threaten that identity. Sherif et al. (1961)

found that intergroup hostility was reduced only after several events involving intergroup cooperation towards a superordinate goal. One explanation for these results is that several cooperative encounters are necessary before hostility is reduced. Another explanation argues that the timing of the cooperative endeavours is the critical factor in ameliorating this hostility. Sherif's groups may have been most accepting of those final cooperative situations which occurred towards the end of the session.

Ingroup and outgroup perceptions

A number of studies have found that groups see greater homogeneity in the characteristics of the outgroup than within their own group (Jones, Wood & Quattrone, 1981; Linville & Jones, 1980; Park & Rothbart, 1982). Explanations for the effect include the fact that people have more and varied contact with ingroup members than with outgroup members. Therefore, they can readily see the variability of behaviour of ingroup members, but do not experience this variability in the limited contact with outgroup members. Further, the contact with ingroup members generally occurs in a variety of situations, while contact with the outgroup is often in a single type of situation (Quattrone, 1986).

This interesting effect poses potential problems for the present model of group development. The model suggests that during periods of identification ingroup members are most interested in finding commonalities between their own group so as to create a group identity. However, later in the developmental cycle, especially during individuation and decay, the model suggests that members will be searching for differences between ingroup members, thereby enhancing their own individuality and giving them reason to search for other groups. The basic prediction, then, is that perceptions of homogeneity within groups will be dependent on the period of group development in which these perceptions are measured. Perceptions of ingroup homogeneity should be greatest during the identification stage and least intense during individuation and decay stages.

In order to examine this prediction, groups of eight subjects worked on a series of tasks (Worchel, Coutant-Sassic & Grossman, 1992). They were then divided into two groups of four, and the two groups competed on other tasks. Subjects were asked to rate ingroup and outgroup members on a number of dimensions at different times during the competition (immediately at the start of competition, after one competitive encounter and after two competitive events). A final condition involved assigning subjects to two groups on arrival, never allowing them to work as a single group, and then measuring their perceptions after one competitive event. Based on the model of group development, it was predicted that members would perceive ingroups as more homogeneous than outgroups during the early phases of competition. This was the situation where groups should be most concerned

Table 5.1 *Perceived differences in ingroup and outgroup similarity*

Condition	Traits			
	Intelligence[a]	Friendliness	Appearance	Talkativeness
Combined-questioned immediately	3.78[b,c]	3.84	1.24	2.47
Combined-questioned after one task	2.97	4.03	0.97	1.33
Combined-questioned after two tasks	−3.11	−1.66	−0.67	−0.12
Never combined	−2.69	−2.07	−2.00	−1.25

[a] Subjects were asked: How similar were the members of your group (outgroup) on the following dimensions: intelligence, friendliness, personal appearance and talkativeness. 1 = very dissimilar, 10 = very similar.

[b] Scores were determined by ingroup–outgroup. Positive score indicates ingroup more similar; negative score indicates outgroup perceived as being more similar.

[c] $N = 6$ groups in each condition.

Source: Worchel, Coutant-Sassic & Grossman, 1992, p. 198.

with identity, especially if the group had just been formed from a larger group. Later in the competition, there would be pressures to perceive the differences within the group as the members focused on task and member skills and contributions.

As can be seen in Table 5.1, the results supported these predictions and they illustrate the need to consider group development when examining group perceptions. Ingroups were perceived as more homogeneous than outgroups during the early stages of competition, but the ingroups were seen as more heterogeneous than outgroups during the latter stages of competition or when the groups had existed as separate units from the beginning of the experiment. It is also interesting that groups perceived greater absolute differences between the ingroup and outgroup during the early stages of competition than during later stages.

Responses to minorities

There is voluminous literature demonstrating that minorities can exercise considerable influence over group decisions (Moscovici, 1976; Moscovici & Mugny, 1983; Moscovici & Nemeth, 1974; Nemeth & Staw, 1989). The focus of much of the research is on the most effective tactic for minorities to follow (Maass & Clark, 1984) and on explaining the cognitive impact of the minority (Nemeth, 1986). Surprisingly, the research has not examined many group factors in demonstrating the impact of the minority. In fact, minority influence work has been conducted outside of group settings altogether. The typical experiment examines how subjects respond to learning of a statistically rare or unexpected position. While the minority influence paradigm

had generated exciting data, it is important to bring the research into group settings. Indeed, minorities are defined by their relation to groups.

The present model of group development suggests that the minority plays an important role in the group process, but that the impact of the minority is influenced by the stage of group development. On one hand, the voice of dissent represents a clear threat to group cohesion and identity. Minorities differentiate members within the group, and may present an image of a vulnerable or disorganized unit. On the other hand, minorities can offer valuable information and new perspectives to the group. Their unmolested existence signals that dissent, disagreement and dissatisfaction with the group are acceptable. Given these functions, it can be predicted that minorities will be more influential and accepted in the group during the stages of productivity, individuation and decay. On the other hand, minorities will be quickly rejected during the identification stage when the group is concerned with developing cohesion and uniformity. Furthermore, the influence of the minority will be dependent on the group's previous experience with minorities. If the experience has been that minorities are not disruptive and help move the group towards its goals, minorities will be more readily accepted than when the group's previous experience with minorities has been negative.

My students and I have completed several studies examining minority influence. In one (Worchel, Grossman & Coutant-Sassic, 1993) we found that minorities were most influential in groups if they had previously demonstrated that their positions were correct and the issue of influence dealt with productivity, not group identity. Minorities who were perceived as a threat to group identity were excluded from the group; indeed, they were viewed as forming another outgroup. It was clear in this study that minorities could exercise greater influence on some issues than others and that the group focus or activity determined which issues were subject to influence. Previous work by Crano (1989) also found that minorities were more influential on some issues (objective) than others (subjective). This research extends these findings by suggesting that when examined in a group context the group will determine the issues on which minority opinion will be accepted.

In a second study (Coutant, Worchel & Grossman, in preparation), groups of five subjects met together weekly over a period of six weeks. In each session, they were given tasks on which to work. At different points during the life of the group, various manipulations were executed; the main independent variable was the time at which the manipulation took place (during the first session, during middle sessions or during the last session). In the case of minority influence, the groups were given problems to discuss and required to arrive at a group decision about the solution. A confederate in the group played the role of the minority, and after ascertaining the modal opinion he proposed an extremely different position. The major dependent measure was the influence of the minority on the group decision at different periods of the group's life.

Table 5.2   *Minority influences in groups over time*

Time	
Early	4.24
Middle	4.67
Late	4.85

Note: Responses represent the group decision on how to deal with a case at hand. Minority took a position of 10 on a scale of 1–10, therefore higher numbers indicate closer agreement with the minority position.

As can be seen from Table 5.2, the minority had little influence in the initial meeting of the group; in fact, the group moved away from his stated position. The minority was most influential when the influence attempt came during the closing group session. Experience with these ongoing groups indicated that the initial sessions were devoted to issues of group identity, while in the closing session individual members focused more on personal issues and the ending of the group. Hence, these results are in line with predictions based on the model of development: minorities will have little influence during identification stages and greatest influence during periods of individuation and decay. In addition to supporting the specific predictions taken from the model, this study and one finding similar results (Coutant-Sassic, 1991) illustrate the need to consider the factor of group development when discussing a group 'effect' such as minority influence. We cannot speak of minority influence as a general effect; rather the influence is closely tied to the issue and to the development of the group. In fact, it might be interesting to speculate that the process of influence differs under the different conditions. The present view of minority influence (Nemeth, 1986) is that it involves a single process: creating divergent thinking in the majority. I would suggest that during the stage of identification when the minority is viewed as a threat to group identity convergent thinking on the *majority* position results from the presence of a minority point of view.

The task ahead

It is time to take stock of where we now stand. In a general sense, the present model can be viewed as a model of group social identity. Groups, like individuals, must establish their own identity. This identity has two dimensions: the identity of the group (similar to the personal identity of the individual in social identity theory) and the identity of the group as it relates to other groups in its universe (similar to the social identity of individuals). The search for identity influences both ingroup and intergroup

behaviour as one identity or the other predominates. By way of summary, I have attempted to establish a number of points concerning group and intergroup behaviour. First, individuals are engaged in a constant struggle of balancing their desire to belong to groups and the concern of establishing their personal independence and uniqueness. Events or situations that threaten their social identity will lead individuals to emphasize their relationship with their groups. Likewise, threats to their personal identity will motivate individuals to seek more intimate interactions, making their personal characteristics more salient. This struggle is felt at the group level by members alternating between being active participants in group activities and withdrawing themselves, physically and/or psychologically, from the group.

Second, groups are dynamic units that develop through a predictable series of stages. The development process is cyclical in that it can repeat itself many times during the life of the group. The repetition occurs as the group loses old members and gains new ones. The amount of time the group spends in any single stage is dependent on numerous intragroup and intergroup factors. The transition between stages can be abrupt and clear or slow and gradual. Numerous events can trigger the movement from one stage to another, including success, failure, leader behaviour, time pressures and deadlines, and intergroup events.

Third, stages can be identified by the issue that dominates group behaviour and discussion and involves the most group members. Stages not only influence the focus of group activity, they also impact the interpersonal behaviours that will characterize the group. For example, minority influence will be most evident during individuation and decay stages, while conformity will be most common during the identification stage. Relating developmental stages to individual and interpersonal behaviour offers fertile grounds for developing specific predictions.

Fourth, the development of the group is keenly affected by intergroup relations, and these intergroup relations are also influenced by the group's development. For example, the group will be most concerned with differentiating itself from outgroups during the identification period. This differentiation process will be seen in efforts by the group to instigate conflict and competition with the outgroup. On the other hand, perceived threats to the group's identity from the outgroup may throw the group into the identification stage, regardless of when these threats occur.

Finally, the developmental approach to group behaviour offers insights that may be used in intervention strategies. Those strategies that are congruent with the group's stage of development will be most effective. For example, it was suggested that prejudice and discrimination could be most effectively reduced by interventions during the individuation or decay stages of development.

These are just a few of the advantages that result from expanding the scope of social identity theory. The theory has a solid base, and it is time to explore pushing its boundaries.

Note

6

The Role of Prototypicality in Group Influence and Cohesion: Contextual Variation in the Graded Structure of Social Categories

Penelope Oakes, S. Alexander Haslam and John C. Turner

The concept of prototypicality

The concept of prototypicality was one product of the 'Roschian revolution' (Neisser, 1987, p. vii) of the 1970s, which introduced some key new ideas to the analysis of category structure and representation. As is now well known, Rosch challenged the philosophically based, classical view of category representation with her ideas about, and evidence of, extensive *variation* in category structure. She and her colleagues (for example, Rosch, 1978; Rosch, Mervis, Gray, Johnson & Boyes-Braem, 1976) found that comparisons *between* categories reveal that they vary in their relative inclusiveness, for example 'dalmation', 'dog', 'animal', 'living thing', are categories of increasing inclusiveness. Those at a higher level are called superordinate, compared to lower level categories known as subordinate. Around the middle of the hierarchy of inclusiveness is the basic level (for example, 'dog', 'chair', 'tree') at which, it is argued, most perceptual activity takes place (Mervis & Rosch, 1981; see also Lassaline, Wisniewski & Medin, 1992). More importantly for our present purposes, Rosch also found that *within* categories, members vary in their typicality, for example robins are seen (by American subjects) as more typical of the category 'bird' than are ostriches, but both robins and ostriches are recognized as sharing membership in the one 'bird' category. In other words, it appears that categories have an internally *graded structure*, rather than members possessing an even level of shared defining attributes, as in the classical view. It was this finding that led to the idea of a category *prototype* (a best example of the category), and the argument that category membership requires a certain level of similarity to the prototype. Rather than being tightly bounded, categories seem to take the form of 'fuzzy sets', much looser groupings which depend upon what Rosch called 'family resemblance', that is, members do not all share a given set of defining features, but are related through their similarity to a prototype.

In her most widely cited paper Rosch (1978) tried to counter some possible misunderstandings of her ideas. In particular, she emphasized that, although her work indicated that prototypes served important functions in categorization, the concept did not 'constitute any particular model of processes, representations, or learning' (p. 40). Indeed, she commented:

> To speak of a prototype at all is simply a convenient grammatical fiction; what is really referred to are judgements of degree of prototypicality. . . . to speak of a single entity that is the prototype is either a gross misunderstanding of the empirical data or a covert theory of mental representation. . . . In short, prototypes only constrain but do not specify representation and process models. (pp. 40–41)

Prototypicality in self-categorization theory

Self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987) is often introduced as a theory of processes underlying psychological group formation, and indeed its original mission was to explain the psychological basis of the group. In effect, however, it attempts more than this, and one of its most important contributions has been the development of a new perspective on the functioning of categorization processes in social perception and interaction (cf. Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). We shall not attempt to provide a comprehensive overview of the theory here, but it is worth setting down some of the main points concerning categorization in order to place our discussion of prototypicality in its proper context (for more detailed discussion of categorization, see Oakes, 1996).

In discussing the role of categorization in social perception, the theory applies and develops Rosch's ideas about variation in both relative inclusiveness across categories and relative prototypicality within categories. The theory begins with the assumption that self-conception reflects self-categorization, the cognitive grouping of the self as identical to some class of stimuli in contrast to some other class of stimuli. Following Rosch (1978), self-categories are assumed to exist at different levels of abstraction related by class inclusion. That is, a given self-category (for example, 'scientist') is seen as more abstract than another (for example, 'biologist') to the extent that it can contain the other, but the other cannot contain it: all biologists are scientists, but not all scientists are biologists. Going beyond the simple distinction between personal identity (self as a unique individual) and social identity (self as a member of a social group) presented in earlier work (for example, see Turner & Giles, 1981), self-categories both more and less abstract than personal and social identity are envisaged, but for purposes of theoretical exposition three levels of abstraction of self-categories are distinguished: the interpersonal (subordinate level of abstraction, personal identity, self as an individual person), intergroup (intermediate level of

abstraction, social identity, self as a group member) and interspecies (super-ordinate level of abstraction, self as a human being). These are defined not by specific attributes but by the level at which people are being compared and categorized. For instance, 'altruism' could function as a cue to individual identity, to a particular social category, or to being human, depending on the context.

In terms of the processes underlying group formation, the central explanatory idea in the theory is that group behaviour is made possible by and reflects self-concept functioning at the level of ingroup–outgroup (rather than interpersonal or interspecies) categorizations. Developing Tajfel's (1978d) idea of an interpersonal–intergroup continuum, self-categorization theory contrasts the social and personal (ingroup–outgroup and inter-personal) levels of self-categorization, and hypothesizes that shifts between these levels are a varying outcome of a continual conflict between personal and social identity as they vary in relative salience. Shifts towards social identity produce *depersonalization* of self-perception and behaviour, that is, self-stereotyping, perception of increased identity between the self and ingroup members and increased difference from outgroup members (on relevant dimensions). The theory proposes that it is this process of depersonalization that makes group behaviour possible and produces its emergent, irreducible properties.

In retaining (from social identity theory) this emphasis on the two levels of personal and social identity, the theory appears to be suggesting that there are, in Rosch's terms, two 'basic' levels in the cognitive representation of the self and others, the social and the personal. In truth, however, this distinction is maintained only for purposes of theoretical clarity in explaining the hypothesized basis of psychological group membership. One of the essential points of the self-categorization analysis is that *the appro-priate level of categorization varies with the context*, and that to speak of any level as more 'basic' than another is misconceived.

To develop this point further, the theory portrays categorization as a dynamic, context-dependent process, determined (in part) by comparative relations within a given context (for example, see Haslam, Oakes, Turner & McGarty, 1996). This approach is formalized in the principle of *meta-contrast*, which is so called because it involves a contrast between contrasts, a judgement of difference between differences. The meta-contrast principle predicts that a given set of items is more likely to be categorized as a single entity *to the degree that differences within that set of items are less than differences between that set and others within the comparative context* (cf. Campbell, 1958; Rosch, 1978; Tajfel, 1969a; Tversky, 1977). This principle encapsulates but subtly transforms the classic idea that categories form on the basis of intraclass similarities and interclass differences. It goes further than earlier work in making clear that such similarities and differences are not independent and additive, but aspects of the same meta-contrast (cf. Medin, 1989; see below). The meta-contrast principle is explicit that categorization is relative to the frame of reference and hence to the contrasts

Figure 6.1   *A categorial hierarchy of vegetation*

available within the salient stimulus field. It depends not just on similarities between stimuli (as is so often assumed), but on *relative similarities*, more similarity between certain stimuli than between others. Meta-contrast contextualizes categorization by tying it to an on-the-spot judgement of these relative similarities and differences.

For example, consider the system of natural categories in Figure 6.1. Meta-contrast predicts that we would categorize and perceive a given piece of vegetation as, say, a 'tree' (rather than as 'vegetation') to the extent that, in the current comparative context, the differences between trees (oaks, birches, and so on) are perceived to be *less than* the differences between 'trees' and 'shrubs' – the distinction between trees and shrubs is more marked, and more relevant, than are the features that trees and shrubs share as 'vegetation'. Alternatively, the tree might be categorized and perceived simply as 'vegetation' to the extent that differences between types of vegetation (trees, shrubs, and so on) are seen to be *less than* the differences between vegetation and, say, animals. The salient categorization will be 'oak' when perceived differences between individual oak trees are *less than* the differences between oaks and birches (or some other comparison species).

The meta-contrast principle applies similarly in person perception. Consider the hierarchy in Figure 6.2. Here, we might categorize an individual as 'Spanish' to the extent that, in the current comparative context, perceived differences between individual Spaniards (Carmen, Isabella, and so on) are *less than* those between Spaniards and Germans. Alternatively, the salient category might be 'European' in a context where perceived differences between various European groups (such as Spaniards and Germans) are *less than* those between Europeans and non-Europeans.

These ideas can be expressed in terms of a meta-contrast *ratio*, that is, the average perceived intercategory difference divided by the average perceived intra-category difference. For example, this might be:

Figure 6.2   *A categorial hierarchy of Europeans*

$$\frac{\text{average perceived difference between Spaniards and Germans}}{\text{average perceived difference between individual Spaniards}}$$

The higher this ratio, the more likely it is that Spaniards will be perceived in terms of their shared national identity. Turner and Oakes (1989, p. 242) provide specific examples of how meta-contrast can be calculated, as do Haslam and Turner (1992) and some of the papers exploring prototypicality in more detail that we shall discuss below (e.g. McGarty, Turner, Hogg, David & Wetherell, 1992).

Note, however, that meta-contrast provides only a partial account of categorization. It describes the *comparative relations* between stimuli which lead them to be represented by a category, but it is also important to take into account the *social meaning* of differences between people in terms of the normative and behavioural *content* of their actions, and the relative accessibility of particular categorizations (Oakes, 1987; Oakes, Turner & Haslam, 1991). In general terms, the theory explains the salience of any given category as a function of an interaction between its relative accessibility (the 'readiness' of a perceiver to use a particular categorization) and the 'fit' between the category and reality. Meta-contrast is the theory's principle of 'comparative fit' (the match between category and the comparative properties of stimuli), but 'normative fit' (the match between category and the content properties of stimuli) is also always inseparably at work (Oakes et al., 1991).

This emphasis on categorization as highly variable and context-dependent produces a concomitant emphasis on the context-dependence of perceived similarity and difference, the major outcome of categorization. People who are categorized and perceived as different in one context (for example, 'biologists' and 'physicists' within a science faculty) can be recategorized and perceived as similar in another context (for example, as 'scientists' rather than 'social scientists' within a university) without any actual change

in their own positions (Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio, 1989). This is the essence of categorization: it is a cognitive grouping process that transforms differences into similarities and vice versa. We need some psychologically neutral term such as perhaps 'distances' to indicate precognized stimulus relations: there are distances between people, but are they similarities or differences? Are physicists and biologists similar or different? Arising from the comparisons specified in the meta-contrast principle, categorization subjectively transforms 'distances' into similarities and differences, and from perceived similarities and differences flow, amongst other things, perceptions of attraction and dislike, agreement and disagreement, cooperation and conflict. In sum, categorization provides the fundamental basis of our social orientation towards others. Within the science faculty, physicists might reject and deride biologists, claiming they aren't 'real scientists', but in comparison with social scientists the two groups may present as inseparable allies.

As changes in the comparative context produce changes in the ingroup–outgroup relationships, they also affect *intra*-category structure, and this is where the concept of prototypicality becomes important. The meta-contrast principle can also be used to define the relative prototypicality of members within a group (see Turner & Oakes, 1989, pp. 259–265). In general terms, the more a group member differs from outgroup members and the less he or she differs from other ingroup members (that is, the more this person exemplifies what ingroup members share and what they do not share with the outgroup), the more that individual will be perceived as prototypical of the group. So, for example, in a communist party, members wishing to be perceived as prototypical communists must differ in politics from members of more conservative, capitalist parties, but they must not be so ultra-left that they begin to differ significantly from other communists – prototypicality depends upon both inter- and intragroup comparisons. One important point is that, because relative prototypicality depends on (amongst other things) intergroup comparisons, *it will vary along with variation in the intergroup context in which judgements are made*. For example, the prototypical communist in a comparative context including fascists will be *different* from the prototypical communist as compared with liberal democrats, or Trotskyists. Self-categorization theory thus agrees with Rosch (1978) that fixed prototypes are 'fictions', and emphasizes context-dependent *judgements of prototypicality* rather than fixed prototypical images which represent groups as constants across changing contexts (cf. Brewer, 1988; Brewer, Dull & Lui, 1981; see below).

There are further aspects of the analysis of categorization presented within the theory (for example, the issue of the relationship between the different levels of abstraction, the dependence of comparison and categorization upon identity at a higher level of abstraction), but these issues are not central to our current discussion and are covered elsewhere (for example, Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994; Turner & Oakes, 1989). The major point to emphasize here is the context-dependence and fundamentally comparative

nature of the categorization process, and the consequent variability of both the level and the content (including the prototypical position) of social categories.

Prototypicality and group polarization

Group polarization refers to the tendency for group interaction (for example, discussion or some related activity) to move the average of group members' responses closer to the extreme of an already favoured position. For example, after discussing feminism a group of moderately pro-feminist individuals would tend to become, on average, *more pro-feminist* than they had been initially. There is a large and complex literature related to group polarization (Turner, 1991), and our aim here is not to review that literature, nor to enter into any debate about the relative merits of different explanations of the phenomenon, but simply to show how the concept of prototypicality as conceptualized in self-categorization theory has enabled resolution of the apparent contradiction between polarization and other social influence phenomena (for more detail see Turner, 1991; Turner & Oakes, 1989; Wetherell, 1987).

Group polarization has been seen as inconsistent with a central tenet of the traditional informational influence model of conformity derived from the findings of Allport, Sherif and Asch – the idea that social norms form through a process of interpersonal averaging or convergence. Norms are thought of as reflecting what the group shares, and this has been conceptualized in terms of a simple conglomeration of what each separate individual brings to the group, specifically the average of individual members' separate views. Given this view of norms, specialized theories have had to be developed to explain polarization as something more than or different from conformity to group norms (Burnstein, 1982; Sanders & Baron, 1977; Wetherell, 1987), because in polarization group members do not converge on the average of their individual positions. Something occurring within the group moves them towards a position more extreme than the average.

It has long been evident that polarization *could* be explained as conformity if it could be shown how ingroup norms could sometimes be more extreme than the mean (for example, Singleton, 1979). To do this, one needs to rethink the interpersonal averaging approach to the development of group norms, and there are additional reasons for doing this. The interpersonal averaging approach is individualistic (Turner & Oakes, 1986), implying that social influence is simply a 'change in individuals induced by individuals' (Kiesler & Kiesler, 1969, p. 26). In contrast, self-categorization theory argues that group behaviour (including social influence) reflects and is made possible by a change in the level of abstraction of self-categorization, a *qualitative shift* in both self-conception and the nature of relations with others. In this sense, group interaction does not involve individuals whose idiosyncratic opinions can be averaged, but group members whose behaviour

will be guided by the distinctive, emergent, irreducible properties of their group. The group norm embodies those group properties, and reflects both what group members have in common (on dimensions relevant to the group) *and* the way in which the group can be distinguished from relevant outgroups. Group norms (and other distinctive group properties such as stereotypes) reflect the comparative relations within which the group defines itself as well as, and as much as, they reflect attributes of group members.

More specifically, the position perceived as normative for a group in a given context will be the position that is most *prototypical* in that context, as defined by the principle of meta-contrast (see above). It will be the position which is, on average, *most different* from that of relevant outgroup members and *least different* from that of other ingroup members (obtained by dividing the individual's average difference from outgroup members by his or her average difference from ingroup members). Of course, the position least different from that of other ingroup members is the mean, but the mean may *not* be the position most different from the outgroup. Thus, under certain intergroup conditions (see below) the prototypical position will be skewed away from the mean.

The extent to which the mean does not represent the position most different from the outgroup, and hence the degree of discrepancy between the most prototypical position and the mean, depends on the comparative context within which the ingroup defines itself. In general, the ingroup prototype will tend to coincide with the mean where the mean is at the midpoint of the comparative context, that is, the ingroup is occupying the 'middle ground' on some issue relative to relevant outgroups. When ingroup responses occupy a more extreme position in the comparative context (as a function of either ingroup responses shifting towards an extreme, or a change in intergroup comparison making moderate responses appear more extreme), it becomes more likely that the most prototypical position will tend to be more extreme than the mean. For example, insofar as a group of moderately left-wing students is seen to occupy the middle ground in student politics within their institution (that is, there are other salient groups to both the left and the right of the moderates), the average view in the group will be more prototypical. However, if either individual opinions in the group shift to the left, or the comparative context comes to be dominated by, say, fascists and other extreme conservatives, a more extremely left-wing position within the moderate group will become prototypical. The average position would no longer adequately represent the difference of the moderates from the right-wingers. Examples specifying this process of calculating the prototypical position (and its variation from the mean position) through the principle of meta-contrast can be found in McGarty et al. (1992), and a number of other sources (for example, Turner et al., 1987).

Several studies provide evidence consistent with the self-categorization analysis of group polarization (for example, Abrams & Hogg, 1990; Abrams, Wetherell, Cochrane, Hogg & Turner, 1990; Hogg, Turner & Davidson, 1990; Mackie & Cooper, 1984; McGarty et al., 1992; Spears, Lea & Lee,

1990; Turner, Wetherell & Hogg, 1989; van Knippenberg & Wilke, 1988). For example, McGarty et al. (1992) present correlational evidence (from a computer simulation and two semi-naturalistic group discussion studies) that ingroup prototypes do become more polarized as the group becomes more extreme in the social context. They also show that the magnitude of group polarization is a function of the degree to which groups actually shift towards their prototypes together with the degree to which those prototypes are polarized.

One novel prediction from the self-categorization analysis is that the direction of polarization can be reversed by changing the comparative context, for example moderate left-wingers should move to the left in a context dominated by the right wing, but to the right when comparing themselves with ultra-leftists. Consistent with this prediction, Hogg et al. (1990) report findings from a decision-making study in which subjects perceived the ingroup norm as riskier than the pretest mean when confronted by a more cautious outgroup, but as more cautious than the pretest mean when confronted by a riskier outgroup.

In summary, self-categorization theory explains group polarization as conformity to an extremitized group norm, and explains the extremitization of the group norm through an account of the way in which comparative context influences norm formation. The concept of prototypicality has been important here in specifying the position that will be most normative for a given group in a given comparative context: the position with the highest meta-contrast (maximal similarity to ingroup positions and maximal difference from outgroup positions) is the most prototypical of the group and hence the most consensual and normative.

Prototypicality and social attraction

Prior to the 'cognitive redefinition' (Turner, 1982) of the social group represented by social identity theory and self-categorization theory, the sense of group belongingness and attraction within groups was understood to rest simply on *interpersonal* attraction between individual group members. This was the essence of the traditional concept of group cohesiveness (Lott & Lott, 1965), the affective and motivational 'glue' that held groups together. However, in the same way that the interpersonal averaging conception of group norms has been reconsidered in self-categorization theory, the interpersonal attraction account of group cohesiveness has also been challenged (Hogg, 1987, 1992, 1993). It has long been evident that *interpersonal* attraction is neither necessary nor sufficient for group behaviour (for example, Hogg & Turner, 1985a; Turner, Hogg, Oakes & Smith, 1984; Turner, Sachdev & Hogg, 1983), but that, at the same time, there are strong bonds of attraction within groups (for example, Sherif, 1967), including 'minimal' groups (for example, Brewer & Silver, 1978; Brown & Turner, 1979; Doise, Csepeli, Dann, Gouge, Larsen & Ostell,

1972). Self-categorization theory has introduced the idea of *depersonalized social attraction* to distinguish between interpersonal liking (which seems to be unrelated to group processes) and the intragroup liking that accompanies salient group membership and group interaction.

Hogg (1992) summarizes the self-categorization analysis of intragroup attraction thus:

> the core idea [is] that self-categorization depersonalizes the basis of interindividual attraction, such that ingroup individuals (and self) are liked in proportion to their perceived group prototypicality. (p. 125)

Again, we have an emphasis on the qualitative distinction between group and individual behaviour. Group cohesiveness and intragroup attraction are based on group members' liking of each other *as group members*, not as unique individuals, and it is prototypicality that defines the extent to which individuals are or are not group members. Recall that prototypicality depends upon both similarity to other ingroup members and difference from the outgroup. The closer any individual group member comes to this ideal, maximally normative ingroup position, the more he or she will be liked by other ingroup members, and it is this qualitatively distinctive depersonalized social attraction that holds groups together, rather than the individual personal attraction discussed in earlier models (Hogg, 1992, 1993).

Hogg and his colleagues have tested a number of predictions from this self-categorization model of depersonalized attraction (for example, Hogg, Cooper-Shaw & Holzworth, in press; Hogg & Hardie, 1991, 1992). Hogg et al. (in press, Study 1) tested the basic hypothesis that, where group memberships rather than interpersonal relationships are salient, liking among group members is depersonalized in terms of the group prototype. They studied six small, mixed-sex interactive work groups within a large tertiary educational institution, who were asked to report patterns of intragroup liking under conditions that either heightened or reduced the salience of their work group. They also rated the cohesiveness of the group, described the group prototype, ranked the prototypicality of fellow members, rated their own prototypicality, and rated the subjective clarity of the group prototype. As predicted, it was found that group liking and interpersonal liking were independent, and that group liking was positively associated with the prototypicality of both the self and others, perceptions of strong group cohesiveness and a clear group prototype. Interpersonal liking, on the other hand, was either unrelated or negatively related to these variables, but it was associated with perceptions of interpersonal similarity. Overall, then, the study produced clear evidence of depersonalized, category-based intragroup attraction as distinct from interpersonal liking based on interpersonal similarity. A second study involving 15 mixed-sex groups of between 6 and 10 introductory psychology students produced similar findings.

Hogg and Hardie (1991) report a field study of depersonalized attraction. Members of an Australian football team completed a questionnaire at a practice session which assessed subjective perceptions of prototypical

features of the team, and a rating of self-prototypicality. Team members then ranked each other in terms of prototypicality, social attraction (elicited under conditions of high team membership salience) and personal attraction (elicited where interpersonal friendships were emphasized).

Team members' responses indicated significant agreement about the team's prototypical features. The most important were a sense of camaraderie ('mateship', and unqualified mutual support), task-oriented mutual encouragement ('revving-up') and participation in good-natured 'horsing-around' and socializing. As predicted, in the team-salient condition there was a more significant relationship between subjects' liking for others (social attraction) and perceived prototypicality than between interpersonal liking and perceived prototypicality, and this effect was most marked for members who identified most strongly with the team and saw themselves as highly prototypical. Social popularity (that is, being consensually liked as a team member) was also strongly related to consensual prototypicality, but the relationship between personal popularity (that is, being consensually liked as a personal friend) and prototypicality was weaker.

In summary, Hogg and his colleagues present a strong case for distinction between social attraction and personal attraction, with the former uniquely related to group processes and involving the perception of self and others in terms of group prototypicality rather than individual characteristics. The mechanisms underlying the relationship between perceived prototypicality and attraction are being investigated further (see Hogg, 1992, 1993): for example, does mutual self-categorization produce attraction simply through the accentuation of prototypical similarity, or is group prototypicality in some way inherently attractive, and might this be because intergroup processes work to produce *ethnocentric* prototypes which portray the ingroup as more attractive than comparison groups (for example, see Dunning, Perie & Story, 1991, for evidence of the self-serving nature of prototypes)? Clearly, the precise nature of depersonalized attraction is not yet fully understood, but the fact that there is a distinction between group-prototypical and interpersonal liking has been established, and further emphasizes the irreducible nature of group processes.

The contextual variability of prototypicality

As we noted above, Rosch (1978) emphasized that her analysis of the graded nature of within-category structure focused on *judgements of prototypicality* rather than any notion of fixed prototypes, and she insisted that prototypes were not to be taken as a model of category representation or processing. Similarly, self-categorization theory emphasizes the context-dependence of prototypicality, seeing it as a variable *outcome* of the categorization process. Indeed, contextual variability is *built in* to the self-categorization definition of prototypicality, in that it depends upon both within-category similarity and between-category difference. Thus, at the very least, prototypicality for a

given category will vary as the nature of relevant comparison groups varies, and as the wider context in which those groups are perceived varies. For example, we have already cited evidence from Hogg et al. (1990) that a group can perceive itself as prototypically risky or prototypically cautious depending upon whether it compares itself with a more cautious or more risky outgroup respectively.

More recently, two experiments conducted by Haslam, McGarty, Oakes, Turner and Onorato (1995) directly tested self-categorization theory's assertion that the relative prototypicality of extreme *out*group members would increase to the extent that an intergroup definition of the judgemental context was made salient. This prediction follows from the principle of meta-contrast discussed above: in intragroup contexts individuals embodying the mean group position should be more representative of the group as a whole (since they maximize intragroup similarity), but in intergroup contexts polarized members of *both* ingroup and outgroup should be more representative (as they also maximize intergroup difference).

In Experiment 1 all subjects watched the same video-taped message from a woman who discussed the causes of road accident-induced brain damage and the means by which it could be reduced. They were then asked to make judgements about the degree to which she was representative of the group to which she was said to belong. In one of eight independent conditions she was described as either an extreme or a moderate member of either an ingroup (a group that wanted to improve road safety) or an outgroup (a group that wanted to ban the sale and consumption of alcohol in order to, amongst other things, reduce the road toll). The salience of subjects' own social identity was also manipulated so that half the subjects were simply given information about the target's position (that is, low salience) but half also had to state whether or not they themselves were in favour of banning alcohol/improving road safety (high salience).

As anticipated, the perceived prototypicality of the target varied with her alleged position within her own group (moderate or extreme) *and* with the extent to which an intergroup relationship between subjects and target was salient. More specifically, when the target was described as an outgroup member she was seen as most representative of her group in the condition where subjects' own group membership was salient and she was described as an extremist. In other words, in the context of a salient intergroup division, an extremist was more representative of the outgroup than a moderate.

A similar pattern also emerged from a second study in which all subjects watched a video of a discussion in which a group of four people debated issues about crime and punishment and came to a *pro-authority* conclusion. For example, the group disagreed with the statement 'criminals should be helped rather than punished' and agreed with the statement 'the best way to solve the drug problem is for the present laws to be made much stricter'. In one (low salience) condition subjects then simply made judgements about how representative of the group as a whole were (a) the group member who was most pro-authority and (b) the group member who was least pro-

authority. In two further conditions the intergroup nature of the judge-mental context was made more salient. In the medium salience condition subjects were asked to stage their own (generally anti-authority) views before they saw the video. In the high salience condition they were given a lecture about the psychological basis and negative social consequences of authoritarianism before stating their own views, and the views of all subjects were then collated on a blackboard. As predicted, to the extent that the experimental manipulations served to make intergroup differences between the subjects and the stimulus group salient, the relative prototypicality of the extremely pro-authority target increased so that this individual was seen as more representative of the group as a whole than the individual who was only moderately pro-authority. In higher salience conditions subjects were also less likely to agree with the extremist and more likely to characterize the group as a whole in negative terms.

Taken together, these studies confirm the point central to self-categorization theory that the degree to which a person is perceived to be representative of a group is not simply a function of properties of that person considered in isolation. Instead, *the very same individual* will be perceived as more or less prototypical of a social category depending on the social context within which he or she is defined. More specifically, both studies show that extreme members of outgroups will be seen as more representative of the groups to which they belong to the extent that differences between ingroup and outgroup are made salient and perceivers therefore conceptualize the judgemental context in intergroup rather than interpersonal terms.

To what extent does other social psychological work on prototypicality take into account this context-dependence, and the idea of prototypicality as a variable outcome of categorization? In general, prototypes have been discussed as the basis for category *representation*, with a concomitant emphasis on identifying *the* prototype of a given category and the effects of similarity to this prototype on information processing, rather than issues of prototype variability. For example, Brewer and her colleagues were amongst the first to apply Rosch's ideas in social psychology in a series of studies examining prototypes of elderly people (Brewer et al., 1981; Brewer & Lui, 1984). This work offers the following view of prototypes:

> Categories are represented cognitively by prototypes – actual or imaginary instances of the category that contain attributes most representative of items inside the category and least representative of items outside the category. Once a prototype of a category has been formed, membership in the category is assessed in terms of 'prototypicality' or perceived similarity to the prototypic instance. (Brewer et al., 1981, p. 656)

The assumption is that category representation is in terms of prototypes (cf. Rosch, 1978), and that, once formed, prototypes are the fundamental basis of categorization decisions, that is, it is similarity to the represented prototype that determines whether or not an item is perceived as a member of a category. In later work, Brewer (1988) has developed this analysis of

prototypes further to argue that categories are represented in terms of pictoliteral prototypes, picture-like images of the ideal category member. Thus, the idea of contextual variation in prototypicality within categories is not raised in Brewer's work, and the suggestion seems to be that categories are represented by fixed visual images.

Lord and his colleagues discuss prototypes in their leadership categorization theory (for example, Fraser & Lord, 1988; Lord, Foti & De Vader, 1984; cf. Hogg, 1996). They describe leadership prototypes as cognitive structures (for example, Fraser & Lord, 1988, p. 292), and argue that perception of an individual as a leader depends upon the extent to which he or she is similar to a leadership prototype. Lord et al. (1984) discuss the idea of basic-level leadership prototypes, and suggest that these could be used as 'a standard for appropriate behaviour' (p. 359). Clearly, then, the emphasis here is on the identification of relatively context-independent prototypical standards against which behaviour is evaluated. Similarly, in their treatment of leadership Rush and Russell (1988) refer to prototypes as 'easily accessed schemata which serve as abstract representations of the most representative (stereotypic) member of a particular category' (p. 89). Again, the emphasis is on prototypes as stable, abstract representations of categories rather than variable outcomes of the categorization process.

In contrast, cognitive researchers have identified a number of problems with the view that categories are organized around fixed prototypes. Barsalou (1987, 1989) has reported extensive evidence of the contextual variability of prototypicality. For example, Barsalou, Sewell and Ballato (1986) found a low level of agreement between subjects' typicality judgements given twice in the same context but at two different times separated by a few weeks. Barsalou and Sewell (1984) asked American undergraduate subjects to judge typicality from both the American and the Chinese point of view. They generated graded structures that were, on average, uncorrelated across categories. For example, from the American perspective the most typical birds were robin and eagle, but from the Chinese perspective they were swan and peacock. Barsalou and Sewell also correlated the average graded structure provided by Emory University undergraduates with that provided by Emory University faculty for the same categories and found a low overall correlation ($r = .2$). However, when asked to provide typicality judgements from faculty's point of view, the undergraduates produced a perfect replication of the faculty's own responses, and graduate students were able to reproduce exactly both undergraduate and faculty typicality judgements. Barsalou (1987) concludes from this work:

> The graded structure within categories does not remain stable. Instead a category's graded structure can shift substantially with changes in context. This suggests that graded structures do not reflect invariant properties of categories but instead are highly dependent on constraints inherent in specific situations. (p. 107)

Similarly, Medin (1989) identifies the treatment of categories as context-independent as a major problem for theories which assume prototype-based

representation. He cites the work of Roth and Shoben (1983) which again shows the contextual variability of judgements of prototypicality. For example, Roth and Shoben found that tea is judged to be more typical of the category 'beverage' than milk in the context of secretaries taking a break, but the reverse ordering obtained when the context was truck drivers taking a break.

An intriguing series of experiments by Medin, Wattenmaker and Hampson (1987) demonstrates how difficult it is for subjects to work with categorizations based simply on relative similarity to a prototype, or family resemblance. For the first four experiments, stimuli were constructed to form two categories within which items were linked by resemblance to a prototype. This was done in terms of the degree to which individual items had properties which matched or mismatched the identified prototype. For example, the categories might be two groups of cartoon-like animals, and the varying properties might be the shape of the head, length of the tail, body markings and number of legs (see Medin et al., 1987, for details). Overall, these experiments provided virtually no support for the idea of family resemblance-based categorization. Asked to sort the full set of stimuli into two equal-sized groups, most subjects simply sorted them on the basis of one feature and ignored the identified prototypes completely.

In light of these negative findings, Medin et al. re-evaluated their assumption that the simple matching and mismatching of isolated properties was sufficient to capture what goes on when people make categorization decisions. In the remaining three experiments reported in the paper, they gave subjects information about interproperty relationships which could serve to explain why integration across separate components of the stimuli was appropriate. For example, in Experiment 7 cartoon-like drawings were again used, with variation in body size, foot type (paws or webbed feet), body covering (feathers or hairs), ear size and mouth type (beak or mouth). Again, two prototypes were identified, associated with a pattern of correlated attributes which suggested that one category might be related to birds and flying. Subjects, given the task of sorting 10 figures into two equal-sized groups, were told that half the animals were flyers and half were non-flyers. This instruction was designed to give the subjects a basis on which to relate the separate attributes to each other. It was found that although the majority of the sortings were still unidimensional, a significant minority (9 out of 24 subjects) now did sort by family resemblance, that is, into categories structured around the identified prototypes. Further, subjects' sortings were supported by explanations which drew on the information about flying, even when they did not follow the predicted family resemblance pattern. Medin et al. attribute their increased success in these latter experiments to the fact that the further information provided (for example, about flying) both made interproperty linkages salient and allowed subjects to associate individual items through their relationship to a higher order theme.

These findings are consistent with Medin's cogent argument (for example, Medin, 1989; Medin & Wattenmaker, 1987; Murphy & Medin, 1985) that

categorization cannot be based on judgements of similarity through match-
ing of isolated attributes. Indeed, he asserts that similarity 'is more like a
dependent variable than an independent variable' (Medin, 1989, p. 1474) in
the categorization process (cf. McGarty & Turner, 1992). He has suggested
that perceivers have wide-ranging 'background theories' about their world
and how it works, and that these theories play a crucial role in 'category
cohesiveness', that is, in defining the way in which categories 'hang together'
as coherent wholes, and therefore in determining why we have the
categories we do rather than others. For example, Murphy and Medin
(1985) point out that on the basis of simple attribute matching we could
identify several similarities between a plum and a lawnmower (both cannot
hear, both have a smell, both can be dropped . . .) which might suggest they
should share a category membership, but this is not consistent with our
general theories about the world, so we understand that the 'similarities'
identified are not sufficient to determine categorization. On the other hand,
we can construct meaningful categories which bring together items with
very little apparent similarity. Barsalou (1983) provides the example of a
category comprising children, money, photo albums and pets, which
becomes sensible when one considers it in the context of a knowledge base
which includes the fact that the category represents 'things to take out of
one's house in a fire' (see also Rips, 1989, for further discussion of the idea
that similarity is neither necessary nor sufficient to determine category
membership).

These arguments about the insufficiency of similarity have been used to
challenge the classical view of categorization, but Medin (1989) points out
that the more recent prototype theories (and exemplar-based theories) are in
fact just as dependent upon similarity as a determinant of categorization. It
is similarity to the prototype (or a specific exemplar) that is assumed to
determine categorization (for example, Brewer et al., 1981; Lord et al.,
1984). Medin argues for knowledge-based rather than similarity-based
categorization, although he sees a role for similarity in contributing to what
he calls 'psychological essentialism', which functions to constrain the
'deeper substance' (Medin, 1989, p. 1479) of the knowledge-rich theories
which drive the categorization process (see Medin, 1989; Medin & Ortony,
1989, for further discussion of psychological essentialism).

In summary, cognitive psychologists have argued that theories which
assume that categories are represented by fixed prototypes, and that
categorization is a matter of attribute matching to a prototype, cannot deal
with evidence of contextual variability in category content and structure.
They also fall foul of evidence that attribute matching (simple similarity
judgement) is insufficient to account for category cohesiveness and cat-
egorization decisions. Medin (1989) comments:

> Prototype theories . . . fail to reflect the context sensitivity that is evident in
> human categorization. Rather than getting at the character of human conceptual
> representation prototypes appear to be more of a caricature of it. (p. 1472)

In this context, it is important to emphasize that self-categorization theory is not a 'prototype theory' in the sense referred to in Medin's work. As noted above, the theory sees prototypicality as a wholly context-dependent outcome of the categorization process, not the basis for category representation, and agrees with Medin that this categorization is a product of perceivers' background knowledge in interaction with current stimuli (see Oakes et al., 1994; Turner, Oakes, Haslam & McGarty, 1994). The similarity and difference judgements involved in the meta-contrast principle are made in the context of background theories about the ways in which category members tend, in general, to be similar and different – this is embodied in the 'normative fit' principle discussed briefly above (Oakes et al., 1991). One of the major contributions of the theory has been its analysis of perceived similarity and difference as outcomes (rather than simple determinants) of categorization, and we see perceived prototypicality as one aspect of the way in which categorization *contextualizes* simple attribute judgements, gives them meaning in relation to other stimuli being judged (Turner & Oakes, 1989; Turner et al., 1995).

Conclusion

This chapter has considered the concept of prototypicality from the perspective of self-categorization theory. We have reviewed ideas and evidence from two main areas of self-categorization research in which prototypicality has played an important role. In polarization research, it has been shown that polarization can be explained as conformity to the prototypical position within the group, a position extremitized through the influence of comparative context on ingroup definition. Research on intragroup attraction has established a distinction between social and personal attraction, the former reflecting attraction within groups based on depersonalization and prototypicality. In both these research areas, prototypicality is seen as a context-dependent outcome of the categorization process, as determined by both comparative (meta-contrast) and normative (fit with the content of background theories) factors. Because the principle of meta-contrast allows accurate specification of the most prototypical attributes within a given comparative context, precise predictions about conformity and attraction within groups have been made possible.

Recognition of the internally graded, variable structure of categories was one of the revolutionary contributions of Rosch's work. However, many subsequent developments of that work have transformed the dynamic idea of prototypicality judgements into a concept of idealized 'caricatures' functioning as relatively fixed representations of categories, and determining the categorization process through judgements of item–prototype similarity. Self-categorization theory maintains a more Roschian perspective in this regard, with its emphasis on prototypicality rather than prototypes, and its rejection of the view of categorization as a matter of judging similarity to a

prototype. In predicting categorization through the interaction of comparative and normative factors, the theory shares with the work of Medin and others an emphasis on the intellectual (Neisser, 1987) basis of categorization.

Whilst the theory's conceptualization of prototypicality has proved very fruitful in the research areas reviewed here, it is nonetheless true that more work remains to be done in order to demonstrate the inherently variable nature of category representation (cf. Barsalou, 1987, 1989). This represents one significant direction in which our current work is advancing (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty & Hayes, 1992; Oakes et al., 1994; Oakes, Haslam & Reynolds, in press).

7

Group Beliefs as an Expression of Social Identity

Daniel Bar-Tal

Social identity

One of the seminal theories of social psychology which contributes to the understanding of intragroup and intergroup processes is social identity theory (Tajfel, 1978d, 1981, 1982b). The theory posits that individuals not only adopt a personal identity as unique persons, but also form a social identity which reflects their membership in various groups to which they belong. Specifically, social identity is defined as 'that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership' (Tajfel, 1978b, p. 63). Social identities, in the form of such social categories as nationality, religion, gender, profession, ethnicity or political orientation, are internalized and constitute a potentially important part of the individual's self-concept. They provide meaningful and significant self-references through which individuals perceive themselves and the world around.

Of special importance is the assumption stating that individuals have a need to achieve positive social identity. Specifically, it is assumed that individuals strive for positive self-image and that in the course of identifying with a group this need translates into a tendency to view one's own group favourably. This view is achieved not necessarily through positive perception, but rather through comparison on appropriate dimensions. The comparison allows one to perceive the ingroup as 'better' than relevant outgroups.

The process of social identification is further elaborated in self-categorization theory (Turner, 1987), an extension of social identity theory. The theory suggests that individuals categorize themselves as members of social categories, and then define, describe and evaluate themselves in terms of these categories. In the process of self-categorization, a set of cognitive representations of self is formed. Part of the cognitive representations reflect the perceived membership of individuals in groups. Since individuals belong to various groups, they possess multiple representations of self. The categorization of the self results in a perceptual

accentuation of intra-category similarities and inter-category differences on dimensions believed to be associated with the categorization.

Theories of social identity and social categorization focus on the definition of 'we-ness' by group members in terms of 'We belong to a group'. Group members in this process perceive themselves as group members, identify themselves as such, and differentiate between their own group and other groups. This primary process of cognitive-emotional nature shapes the social identity of individuals. Nevertheless, on the basis of social identity and social categorization theories, a question should be asked: What are the other cognitive representations, in addition to social categorization of the self, which underlie a person's social identity? The answer to this question is provided in an analysis of group beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1990). The purpose of the present chapter is to present group beliefs as a framework for analysing a group member's social identity. Specifically, first the chapter will delineate the conception of group beliefs; second, it will outline their characteristics; third, it will describe group beliefs' formation; and, finally, implications will be presented.

The conception of group beliefs

'Group beliefs are defined as convictions that group members (a) are aware that they share, and (b) consider as defining their "groupness"' (Bar-Tal, 1990, p. 36). The first part of the definition suggests that two beliefs have to be shared by group members. One belief pertains to any content that is the subject of the group belief and the other pertains to specific knowledge saying that the former is shared by group members. The second part of the definition suggests that group beliefs are those beliefs that group members perceive as defining the essence of their group. It is assumed that they provide the cognitive basis that group members view as uniting them as one entity. In fact, group beliefs serve as a foundation for group formation and, later, as a bond for group existence. 'We are exploited', 'Communism is the best system for human beings', 'Jesus is God's son', 'Iraq is our enemy', are examples of possible group beliefs.

In this framework, the belief 'We are a group', expressing social identity of group members, is called *the fundamental group belief*. However, in addition to the fundamental group beliefs, group members share group beliefs of various contents pertaining to a variety of other subjects. These beliefs are part of cognitive representations which together with self–social categorization (that is, the fundamental group belief) define social identity of group members and thus underlie their we-ness and uniqueness.

Individuals regard group beliefs as characterizing them as group members and as defining the boundary of the group. On their basis individuals may categorize themselves and may be categorized by others as group members. Acceptance of group beliefs is one of the important indicators of group membership. Sharing group beliefs implies, most frequently, that a person is

a group member. Moreover, being a group member signals to people that a person shares group beliefs. A person joining a group must, at least externally, express acceptance of group beliefs. Thus, on the one hand, group beliefs unify group members and, on the other hand, differentiate them from outgroups. The unification is reflected in the recognition of similarity (Bar-Tal, 1993). Group members are aware that they share the same unique beliefs that define their 'groupness' and thus become aware of the similarity. Group members who may differ with regard to many characteristics are aware that they share the same unique beliefs that define their 'groupness' and thus become aware of the similarity.

Also, since in many cases groups try to be differentiated, group beliefs often provide a criterion for differentiation. Group beliefs draw the line between the ingroup and outgroups. As Sherif (1951) pointed out: 'From the point view of inter-group relations, the most important consequence of group structuring is the delineation of *in-group* from *out-groups*. The development of in-group and "we-experience" is accompanied by the demarcation and setting of boundaries from out-groups' (p. 395).

An experiment by Allen and Wilder (1975) demonstrated that group formation (including the formation of a group belief) is a more potent factor in discrimination against outgroup than the awareness that the outgroup members have some similar beliefs. Also, belief similarity about the basis for group classification (that is, formation of a group belief) had a significant effect on discriminative behaviour. Special ingroup favouritism was displayed when the ingroup had similar beliefs.

Contents of group beliefs

Group beliefs, as implied by the definition, are held by group members, who share these beliefs and consider them as defining their group. Thus, group beliefs should be considered as a category of beliefs and should be characterized by the same features as other beliefs. First of all, the contents of group beliefs will be discussed.

Beliefs in the present conceptual framework, viewed as propositions to which individuals attribute at least some truth, constitute units of knowledge. This is a wide-scope definition which considers any ideas, thoughts or opinions about any topic as beliefs. They can thus cover various contents which can be classified to such categories as 'values', 'ideologies', 'intentions', 'goals', and so on. Group beliefs may also refer to different topics or ideas that a human mind can think. They may concern such subjects as religious doctrines, political ideologies, philanthropic goals, human rights, identity characteristics, prescriptions of behaviour (that is, norms), and others. As examples, four categories of group beliefs will be presented – those which refer to group norms, values, goals and ideology.

Group norms

Group norms, defined as 'an idea in the minds of the members of a group, an idea that can be put in the form of a statement specifying what the members or other men should do, ought to do, are expected to do, under given circumstances' (Homans, 1950, p. 123), regulate group members' behaviour and provide criteria for judging it. Norms, as defined, do not necessarily have to be group beliefs. Norms may regulate group members' behaviour without being considered as characteristic of the specific group. In such groups, group beliefs may pertain to contents other than norms. In other groups, at least part of the norms may define their characteristics and be group beliefs. Nevertheless, when norms function as group beliefs, group members believe that their patterns of behaviour are unique to them and characterize their membership.

In an extensive description of the Amish society,[1] Hostetler (1968) points out several norms that can be considered as group beliefs. That is, Amish people believe that particular prescriptions of behaviours define their 'groupness' and contribute to their social identity. For example, Amish beliefs prescribe the necessity of separation from the world. Therefore, an Amish man does not marry a non-Amish woman, does not do business with an outsider, and even does not enter into intimate relationships with a person outside the Amish community. In addition to norms of separation, the Amish group also perpetuates norms of non-resistance. Group members are forbidden to take part in violence or war, and they withdraw from conflicts or resistance. They refuse to swear any oath, to bear arms, or to hold public offices.

In another example, Ardener (1983) described the group beliefs of Canadian Doukhobors who emigrated from Russia at the beginning of the twentieth century. They believe that the Perfect Life is attainable on earth through the rejection of materialism. They have not recognized human authority structure and therefore are opposed to state legislation or oath taking. Their uniqueness has been reflected in deprivation, suffering and poverty, which became, according to Ardener, part of their self-definition, corresponding to their identification with Christ himself. In this vein, to form their own identity, Doukhobors resorted to nudity as a social artefact for identifying their group and to the use of arson against institutions and then against their own property. Ardener suggested that both practices helped to maintain the boundary of the group and to enhance solidarity in the face of outgroups.

Group values

An analysis similar to the one presented about norms applies to group values. Groups may hold values, but they do not necessarily have to function as group beliefs. A value is defined as 'an enduring belief that a specific mode of conduct or end-state of existence' (Rokeach, 1973, p. 5). The former is called an instrumental value, while the latter is called a

terminal value. Values guide the selection of the means and ends of specific actions, and serve as criteria by which objects, actions or events are evaluated. Examples of values are freedom, truth, individualism or equality. They reflect the ideals to which individuals and groups aspire.

It is possible to characterize groups by the values that their group members share (Kluckhohn, 1951; Parsons, 1968). Sociologists have focused on shared values, referring to them as value systems in a given society. Nevertheless, a given shared value is not necessarily held by every person in the group. When a sufficient number of group members subscribe to the value, it may not only characterize the group, but may also become an important determinant of the group members' behaviour.

In some groups the values, like norms, may be formally formulated (that is, in writing) and maintained as group beliefs, while in other groups they are never formally defined, but may be considered as group beliefs and carried latently through the social processes of socialization and influence. However, in both types of groups, when values are shared by group members and viewed by them as characterizing the group, they are group beliefs. In this case, the value or values define the uniqueness of the group and differentiate it from outgroups.

To specify values that characterize a nation is a complex task. Nevertheless, social scientists commonly have suggested, on the basis of either collected data or their own observations, that self-sufficient individualism is one of the salient characteristics of American society (for example, Diamond, 1976; Gillin, 1955; Williams, 1970). This value emphasizes the responsibility and the right of each individual to pursue personal goals with as much freedom from restraints as possible. Americans are socialized to internalize this value and to believe that it characterizes their society.

Many groups present values as part of their credo. In fact, many of the group norms and goals functioning as group beliefs are based on values. This stress on values can be observed in religious groups, as well as in many political groups. An example of a political group that was founded on the basis of a value is Amnesty International. In its statute, the value of human rights underlies more specific goals. The beginning reads:

1. Considering that every person has the right freely to hold and to express his or her convictions and the obligation to extend a like freedom to others, the objects of Amnesty International shall be to secure throughout the world the observance of the provisions of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, by:

   a) irrespective of political considerations working towards the release of and providing assistance to persons who in violation of the aforesaid provisions are imprisoned, detained or otherwise physically restricted by reason of their political, religious or other conscientiously held beliefs or by reason of their ethnic origin, sex, color, or language, provided that they had not used or advocated violence (hereinafter referred to as 'Prisoners of Conscience');

   b) opposing by all appropriate means the detention of any Prisoners of Conscience or any political prisoners without trial within a reasonable time or

> any trial procedures relating to such prisoners that do not conform to
> internationally recognized norms;
>
> c) Opposing by all appropriate means the imposition and infliction of death
> penalties and torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
> punishment of prisoners or other detained or restricted persons whether or
> not they have used or advocated violence. (Amnesty International pamphlet,
> London, 1978)

Although the Ku Klux Klan is vastly different from Amnesty International,
its group beliefs are also based on values. The principal beliefs of the Ku
Klux Klan are presented in the following way:

> We invite all men who can qualify to become citizens of the Invisible Empire, to
> approach the portal of our beneficent domain, join us in our noble work of
> extending its boundaries, and in disseminating the gospel of Klankraft, thereby
> encouraging, conserving, protecting and making vital the fraternal relationships in
> the practice of an honorable clannishness; to share with us the sacred duty of
> protecting womanhood; to maintain forever the God-given supremacy of the
> White Race; to commemorate the hold and chivalric achievement of our fathers,
> to safeguard the sacred rights, privileges and institutions of our civil government;
> to bless mankind and to keep eternally ablaze the sacred fire of a fervent devotion
> to a pure Americanism. (Cited in Vander Zanden, 1960, p. 459)

Thus, the values of womanhood, white supremacy, mankind and American-
ism are the values that the group intends to protect.

Group goals

Group goals are defined as beliefs of valued or desired future specific states
for the group (Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Etzioni, 1975). On the basis of
this definition, we can assume that with few exceptions almost all groups
have goals. In most of these cases, goals may serve as group beliefs in
addition to other beliefs. Individuals form groups to achieve certain goals.
Subsequently, goals are often considered as a raison d'être for group
formation, frequently keep group members together, provide a basis for
solidarity, and give direction for activity. These functions are particularly
explicit in certain voluntary groups that are formed to advance specific
goals (Sills, 1958). Thus it is not surprising that group goals frequently serve
as basic group beliefs. They increase the identification of the group
members with their group and define the boundary for group membership.
In this vein, March and Simon (1958) noted that:

> The greater the extent to which goals are perceived as shared among members of
> a group, the stronger the propensity of the individual to identify with the group
> and vice versa. (p. 66)

Two examples of group goals may provide illustrations of how they
function as group beliefs. Trans-Species Unlimited (TSU) is a national
animal rights group 'dedicated to the total elimination of animal abuse and
exploitation'. This group belief leads TSU to direct actions and legislative

campaigns to end such practices as the use of leghold trap and live bird shoots and commercial exploitation of rabbits for meat, fur and research

The Richard III Society was founded in England in 1924 with the following aims:

1. To promote in every possible way historical research into the life and times of King Richard III.
2. To secure a reassessment of the historical material relating to this period and of the role in English history of this monarch.
3. To circulate all relevant historical information to members of the Society and to educational authorities. (copied form the pamphlet of The Richard III Society, New Orleans, undated)

The principal goal of this group is to present the truthful history of King Richard III in view of past distortions and biases.

Groups differ with regard to the goals that they try to achieve. There are a variety of goals that can be classified into different categories. One type of category has received special attention by political scientists – namely, goals to influence governmental decisions. Groups that have these goals are called *interest groups* (Salisbury, 1975), and then the term *interest* denotes a 'shared attitude toward what is needed or wanted in a given situation, observable as demands, or claims upon other groups in the society' (Truman, 1951, p. 33). These shared demands or claims, which reflect goals, serve as a basis for group formation and function as group beliefs. The interests can pertain to various contents involving either tangible or intangible claims, and concerns of either a particular policy objective or wide societal goals (Salisbury, 1975).

Interest groups can be based on either a few or many group beliefs. In some groups, the group beliefs refer to one broad topic that is relevant to several issues. For example, the Consumer Federation of America reflects a viewpoint that favours the protection of the rights of individual consumers through the regulation of corporate activities, and the US Chamber of Commerce reflects a strong belief in the character of the American free enterprise system, opposing excessive government regulation of business. Other groups' interests are formed on the basis of narrow group beliefs reflecting single issues. For example, the National Rifle Association has a strong belief in the American citizen's unrestricted right to bear arms; the National Right to Life Committee believes in the sanctity of the foetus.

Group ideology

One of the most discussed concepts for describing a group's uniqueness is ideology. Ideology is often referred to as the mental characteristic of a group. Indeed, various definitions of ideology refer to its commonality – a state indicating that ideological beliefs are shared by group members. It reflects their common experience and serves as a basis for group members' cooperation, morale, order and as a rationale for their behaviour. Ideology refers to an integrated set of beliefs constituting a programme, a theory of causes and effects, and premises on the nature of humanity and societal

order (Apter, 1964; Lane, 1962; Shils, 1968). For example, Toch (1965) defined ideology as:

> a set of related beliefs held by a group of persons. The ideology of a social movement is a statement of what the members of the movement are trying to achieve together, and what they wish to affirm jointly . . . the ideology of a social movement defines the movement, and contrasts it with other movements and institutions. (p. 21)

When group members hold an ideology, it frequently serves as a group belief. By definition, it consists of a set of ideas that characterize the way in which a group posits, explains and justifies the ends and means of its organized social actions. It usually provides an identity to group members, defines the group cohesion, and describes its exclusivity; in most cases, an identification with a specific ideology indicates a membership in a particular group (Lane, 1962).

The contents of an ideology can be political, social or even religious. An ideology usually refers to images of the desired society and the means and conditions needed to achieve it. For example, the ideology of the Fasci Italiani di Combattimento (the Italian Fascist Party) placed a special emphasis on a nation or a state – the fascist state. The individuals and groups are secondary to the state, which embodies the culture and spirit of the people and is considered to be the highest and noblest value. The state provides an orientation for the individuals – it is only there that they can fulfil their identity. According to the fascist ideology, life is a continuing struggle for national supremacy. In order to achieve the nation's goals, the state has to exercise complete authority over all areas of public and private life, from the education of children to control of the economy. The state has the right to control and restructure the society. Accordingly, the state requires total loyalty. There is no place for groups or individuals to object, since the state is the source of political, economic and moral action (Mussolini, 1935). These principles served as group beliefs of the Italian Fascist Party, and, with its ascendance to power in 1922, the party tried to turn them into group beliefs for the entire nation.

For seven decades, the principles of communist ideology served as group beliefs for the members of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. This ideology was the official creed and the most accessible characteristic in every domain of life in Russia. The basic principles of communism were inculcated in Soviet citizens from the early years of education and maintained through all the state communication channels. The ideology advocates a classless social system of equality for all members of society, which provides everyone with material and cultural benefits according to their growing needs (Triska, 1962).

In sum, this limited review of the contents did not exhaust all possible categories of group beliefs. As indicated, group beliefs can have any contents, and the above categories serve only as relevant examples of the ones that are frequently used by social scientists. Group members share

group beliefs that characterize them and differentiate them from other groups. As illustrations of possible contents, this review was not based on group members' reports identifying their group beliefs, though it is possible that they actually serve as group beliefs. Future research should treat the formal statements as hypotheses that need to be validated through empirical evidence.

Characteristics of group beliefs

Group beliefs can be characterized by the same features as other beliefs. Degree of confidence and level of centrality are among the most important characteristics of beliefs (Bar-Tal, 1990; Bem, 1970; Kruglanski, 1989). These characteristics are of special relevance for group beliefs and therefore discussed at some length.

Confidence

Group beliefs are usually held with great confidence because they are considered to be facts and verities. This occurs because group beliefs define the essence of the group and thus the reality of the individuals who view themselves as group members. In fact, in most cases, individuals voluntarily join groups, such as religious denominations, political organizations or professional associations, on the basis of group beliefs. The act of joining a group indicates that group members accept, at least formally, group beliefs and hold them as valid.

A reduced confidence in group beliefs may shatter group members' reality, especially in cases when group membership is very important for individuals or when the change is sudden. The questioning of group beliefs, especially central ones, may have significant implications for group life. Moving group beliefs from the status of verities to the status of hypotheses by the majority of group members may change the essence of the group or its raison d'être, or even cause its division or disintegration. It is, therefore, not surprising that groups often use various mechanisms to maintain high confidence in group beliefs.

It is recognized, though, that groups differ with regard to their insistence on confidence. While orthodox groups insist on high confidence in group beliefs (Deconchy, 1984), other groups may be less strict on this matter. The former groups do not allow any doubts or sanction their expression. The other groups are more tolerant of changes and therefore their group beliefs may be gradually altered.

Centrality

The centrality of group beliefs implies that they are often accessible in group members' repertoire and that they are relevant for consideration

in making various evaluations, judgements or decisions, including behaviours (Bar-Tal, 1986). The centrality characteristics of group beliefs has at least two different aspects. First, the characteristic may refer to the importance of the set of beliefs for the group members, and, second, it may refer to the importance of the specific belief within the set of group beliefs.

The former aspect is based on an assumption that some groups are more important for their members than others. Individuals are usually members in a number of groups and not all of them are of equal importance to them. The importance of the group for group members is reflected in the centrality of group beliefs. That is, when the group is important for group members, in most cases the group beliefs are central. For example, it can be assumed that group beliefs are very central in groups such as the Amish (Hostetler, 1968) and Lubovitcher Hassidim (Levy, 1975). Group membership in these groups is the most important characteristic for the members and the group beliefs are frequently accessible and often taken into consideration. In other groups, group beliefs may be unimportant for most of the group members.

The other aspect of characterizing group beliefs as central refers to the assumption that not all beliefs are of equal centrality for group members. Some group beliefs may be of greater importance than others and thus may be more central. It means that when a group has a set of elaborated group beliefs, some of them contribute more to the group characterization and its definition than others. *The more central group beliefs are considered as prototypic in group characterization and therefore are called basic group beliefs*. Their weight in defining the essence of the group is crucial. Beyond the simple self-definition 'We are a group', these beliefs provide the group's credo. For instance, in certain groups, group beliefs that refer to group goals or identity may be more central than group beliefs that refer to values or group history. In a specific example, it may be assumed that while the Mormons have numerous group beliefs, one of the basic ones is the conviction that the Book of Mormon is another Testament of Jesus Christ, a religious and secular record of ancient American civilization (O'Dea, 1957).

The centrality characteristic is not a given, but often is maintained by external factors. Availability and saliency of group beliefs in the group members' environment may influence their centrality. The first element refers to the frequency with which the content of group beliefs is exposed to group members. The other element expresses the prominence and vividness of the group belief when it is presented to group members. When group beliefs are repeatedly presented to group members in a prominent and vivid manner, they are often accessible in group members' repertoires (Higgins & King, 1981). Groups often keep group beliefs accessible in the minds of the group members by constantly repeating the contents of group beliefs. Moreover, they even sometimes develop cultural and educational mechanisms to maintain group beliefs as central in group members' minds.

Formation of group beliefs

Formation of the fundamental group belief

The crucial phase in the formation of group beliefs is the emergence of the fundamental group belief indicating group existence (that is, 'We are a group'). *This phase is preceded by various social perceptual and cognitive processes.* According to the present view, numerous reasons can cause individuals to start believing that they constitute a group. *Individuals usually have to formulate at least one belief which provides the antecedent for the fundamental group belief stating that a group exists (that is, 'We are a group').* *Such an antecedent belief may later become a group belief.*

Any belief can serve as an antecedent for individuals to begin considering themselves members of a group. The belief 'We are a group' may be instigated by any of the following beliefs: 'We act interdependently', 'We have the same fate', 'We have the same characteristic', 'We live in the same place', 'We have the same goal', 'We believe in the same religious doctrine', 'We have the same ancestors', 'We accept the same ideology', 'We are treated in the same way', and others. *The antecedent belief(s) may be formed on the basis of actual experience and perception or on the basis of reliance on information which comes from sources that propagate these beliefs.* In the first case, individuals may actually become aware of the similarity in what may be called natural evolvement, whereas in the other case, an epistemic source may indicate to the individuals that they are similar and point out that similarity.

For example, Epstein's (1978) work indicates that ethnic identity is based on shared beliefs in common attitudes or property, which differentiate the group from the outgroups. The shared beliefs are products of common perceptions of a group's past and interaction between forces operating within a group and those coming from outgroups. Tajfel (1981) hypothesized that minority groups tend to emerge as a result of common attitudes or treatment by the outside groups which, on the one hand, facilitates the perception of a common fate and, on the other hand, indicates the boundaries operating between the ingroup and the outgroups. Several other conceptions stress individuals' shared needs (for example, Killian, 1964; Toch, 1965), such as common feelings of frustration, alienation, deprivation, exploitation and injustice, any of which may serve as a basis for group formation.

An experiment by Zander, Stotland and Wolfe (1960) may be seen as a demonstration of how the basic group belief is formed. In this experiment, the investigators created a group composed of female college students. To foster a group entity, the experimenter provided several antecedent beliefs regarding similarity, proximity, common goals and identity. Specifically, the experimenter systematically manipulated the perception of 'groupness' by varying seating arrangements (creating proximity), by pointing to similarities among group members (creating commonality), and by assigning a goal for the group (creating competition against another group). Group members

were then asked to choose a name for their group. These antecedent beliefs, together with the name of the group, produced the fundamental group belief 'We are a group'. The study also showed that these individuals behaved as group members. Thus, the investigators concluded that when a group is formed, large proportions of the self 'become involved in the group and are affected by identification with the group' (p. 475).

The effects of group experiences on the formulation of the fundamental group belief are underlaid by the process of perception. It has been suggested that principles of perceptual organization contribute greatly to the self-perception of individuals as a group (Asch, 1952; Campbell, 1958). Specifically, Campbell (1958) proposed the use of four Gestalt principles (proximity, similarity, common fate and pregnance) to explain why individuals begin to see themselves as one entity. These principles, which lead discrete elements to be perceived as parts of a whole, can be viewed as characteristics of individuals, and therefore allowing definition of the group and differentiation between the ingroup and the outgroups. Indeed, Brewer's (1979) review of group formation under limited conditions indicates that factors such as interdependence, intragroup similarity or shared fate affect the feeling of 'groupness'. Moreover, these factors not only determined group formation, but also influenced group members' behaviour in the direction of ingroup bias.

A somewhat similar approach to group formation was recently suggested by cognitive social psychologists. They placed their focus on the knowledge that individuals possess (for example, Pryor & Ostrom, 1987). Thus, information about the collective of individuals (that is, their attributes) serves as a basis for their self-classification as group members. This information denotes the similarity of group members and their uniqueness in comparison to outgroup members.

Moreland (1987) extended the perceptual-cognitive perspective to four different bases for self-classification of individuals as group members, and, therefore, for the formation of the fundamental group belief 'We are a group'. One basis derives from the conditions and resources in the environment. Factors such as money, time, propinquity or social networks may affect group formation. For example, people who live or work in close proximity may form a group which can be based on common goals or common interests. Also, a social network of relationships may facilitate group formation, as happens among friends or members of professional organizations.

Behavioural basis is evident when people become dependent on one another for the satisfaction of their needs. Various theoretical approaches, such as evolutionary perspective, social exchange theory, social evaluation perspective or psychodynamic theories, suggest that individuals form groups in order to satisfy their various needs. Needs of survival, defence, social support, predictability, world understanding, uncertainty reduction, anxiety avoidance or personal adjustment are only a few examples of needs which can be satisfied through group membership.

Groups may also be formed on the basis of affection as reflected in shared feelings. The positive feelings can be expressed in interpersonal attraction of group members, attraction towards group goals or activities, and love and respect of the group's leader.

Finally, the cognitive basis indicates that groups are formed when people realize that they share important personal characteristics such as attitudes, values, interest or goals. Summarizing this basis, Moreland (1987) pointed out that:

> Research on personal factors suggests that small groups will form when people (a) have acknowledged their shared characteristics before, or (b) have done so recently, or (c) have found it useful to think of themselves in that way. Research on situational factors suggests that small groups will form when (d) people are reminded of shared characteristics, or (e) their outcomes seem to depend on those characteristics, or (f) the characteristics that they share are unusual in some way. (p. 103)

On the basis of the present analysis, it becomes obvious that *social categorization is the psychological process which underlies group formation in the minds of the individuals who are group members.* As noted earlier, Tajfel's theory of social identity and Turner's theory of self-categorization elaborate on this process (Tajfel, 1978d, 1981; Turner, 1987).

In this vein, several studies demonstrate that individuals form a psychological group solely on the basis of shared social category, in the process of comparing themselves to others. In these experiments, performed within the framework of Tajfel's social identity theory and Turner's self-categorization theory, individuals were categorized as group members and they acted accordingly (for example, Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Hogg & Turner, 1985b; Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971; Turner, Sachdev & Hogg, 1983).

In a study by Tajfel et al. (1971), individuals were divided into groups on the basis of a fairly trivial task (expressing a preference for abstract paintings of Klee and Kandinsky or guessing the number of dots in rapidly projected clusters). Later, they were put in individual cubicles and asked to divide points worth money between two persons who were identified as either belonging to their group or not. This minimal group situation was enough to produce ingroup favouritism. Individuals tended to award more points to members of their group. These results were replicated, even in the experiment by Billig and Tajfel (1973), when the division into groups was done on the basis of the toss of a coin.

The important contribution of these studies to the understanding of group formation is the demonstration showing that the perception of the group as an entity does not have to be based on actual experiences, but a mere piece of information may be a sufficient condition for self-labelling as a group. Individuals may be told that they are given the same label (or category), and this information may cause them to form the belief 'We are a group' (for example, Billig & Tajfel, 1973).

In this respect it was analysed how groups form the fundamental belief which underlies the formation of a group. Common experience and

perceived information may influence individuals to form a new shared reality. The appearance of the fundamental belief 'We are a group', which was the centre of the work of Tajfel and Turner, reflects the emergence of new social identity and new self-categorization. This is a psychological beginning of group existence.

But the present conception suggests that social identity is not based solely on the fundamental group belief which reflects self categorizations of individuals as group members. As was presented, additional beliefs called group beliefs play a determinative role in the formation and maintenance of social identity. These group beliefs establish the raison d'être for group existence and provide the rationale for individuals to be group members.

Formation of additional group beliefs

Once the fundamental group belief 'We are a group' is formed, other group beliefs are usually added, though the contents of some additional group beliefs may be formed as antecedent beliefs prior to the formation of the fundamental group belief. As already indicated, the contents of group beliefs can be of various categories and of unlimited scope. Groups differ with regard to the repertoire of group beliefs that they form. They differ in the contents and in the quantity of group beliefs that they have. Each group has its own set of group beliefs. Although groups may have similar group beliefs, two separate groups must have at least one group belief which makes them different from each other. With regard to quantity, groups may have few group beliefs or a very long list of group beliefs. The selection of group beliefs depends very much on a group's goal(s), common experiences, ideas regarding symbols, emerging norms and values, constructed rationalizations for group formation, perceived similarities, perceived uniting forces, and so on.

One of the few studies of small groups from which the emergence of group beliefs can be inferred is the study of norm formation by Sherif (1936). He found that a group of strangers facing an ambiguous stimulus tended to converge their judgements into a uniform norm. That is, common experience in a group situation served as a basis for establishing a common social reality. Sherif concluded from these results that individuals who are in contact, in a defined place, form common values or norms as a basis for group formation. It may be further assumed that some of these norms and values may serve as group beliefs, since they may characterize the group and underlie its uniqueness. In this vein are findings obtained by Festinger and Thibaut (1951), who observed that 'belonging to the same group tends to produce changes in opinions and attitudes in the direction of establishing uniformity with the group' (p. 92).

Another line of research by Sherif and his colleagues that contributes to the understanding of group belief formation was the Robbers' Cave experiments, which investigated intergroup conflict and cooperation (Sherif,

Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961). The experiments also studied the formation of a group. In one of them, 22 fifth graders were randomly divided into two groups and brought to separate camps so that group formation would be the consequence of the bonding process within the ingroup without the contact of an outgroup. Within seven to eight days the formation of the two groups emerged and stabilized. As a point of interest, it can be noted that the two groups formed various group beliefs which defined their uniqueness and character. Thus, for example, the first group selected the name 'Tom Hale Rattlers', chose a flat, referred to several places as their territory, and developed a norm of 'toughness' (reflected in cursing and avoidance of reporting injuries). The second group called itself 'Eagles', selected their own song, and selected places in their territory for a campfire and swimming hole.

As Sherif et al. (1961) pointed out, these beliefs were produced from scratch. They were formed as a consequence of the interaction processes found in intragroup relations. They served as unique characteristics of the group and defined the substance of the 'groupness'. The particular group name, the flag, the norm or the territory, in addition to the belief 'We are a group', defined the essence of the group. For group members, these group beliefs served as a cognitive basis for their feeling of 'groupness'. The belief that they are a group, as well as other group beliefs, became part of their reality. It can be said that although the mere division into groups created the fundamental group belief, the addition of group beliefs not only strengthened the group identity, but also provided meaning to the we-ness reality. Group beliefs, thus, are an inseparable part of social identity. They provide the essence to the mere feeling of belonging to a group.

It should be noted though that group beliefs do not have to be formed after the group was founded. Already it has been indicated that certain beliefs may function as antecedents for individuals to form a group and later become group beliefs. Also, individuals formulate beliefs which may serve as a basis for group formation.

Numerous political parties, religious groups and volunteer organizations are based on group beliefs which were formulated before the group was formed. *In this process, the beliefs are first formulated, and then an attempt is made (sometimes it is even unintentional) to form a group in which these beliefs serve as group beliefs.* The following examples illustrate this process.

The Jehovah's Witness group was founded in 1872 by Charles Taze Russell in a suburb of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. Russell, who was brought up as a Presbyterian, was exposed to ideas of Adventism and Second Adventism until he formulated his own beliefs. These beliefs, which were later developed and modified by his successor, Joseph Franklin Rutherford, originally served as a basis for the formulation of a new denomination (Stroup, 1945).

Cannon (1973) described how the Black Panthers formulated their group beliefs:

One afternoon in October, 1966, Huey told Bobby Seale, 'We need a program. We have to have a program for the people. A program that people can understand. A program that the people can read and see, and which expresses their desires and needs at the same time.' That night they sat down in the North Oakland Poverty Center, where they were working, and wrote out the 10-point program which is still the basis for all Panthers' actions. (p. 339)

The programme concerned freedom for the black community, full employment, the end of exploitation, decent housing, true education, the exemption of blacks from military service, the end of police brutality, freedom to black prisoners, establishment of black courts and self-determination (Cannon, 1973).

In the present conception, an important question should be asked: *Which common beliefs (that is, shared beliefs by group members) become group beliefs?* In principle, many beliefs can become group beliefs in the group members' repertoire. In reality, however, relatively few beliefs achieve this status. Three conditions are suggested as an explanation as to which shared beliefs become group beliefs. One condition refers to the functionality of group beliefs. *Beliefs which are functional for group formation and maintenance become group beliefs, since it is assumed that the need to belong and the need to form social identity are important needs which underlie human beings' cognitions and behaviours.* In this context, of special importance are beliefs which differentiate between the ingroup and outgroups, since they allow demarcation of the group boundary and provide significant information about the group.

The differentiating beliefs indicate the similarity of group members which overrides the differences between them. That is, through the psychological process of categorization, group beliefs simultaneously make the group members uniquely similar, yet distinctively different from other groups. They provide the individuals with a system of orientation towards their own group and other groups. This system leads to the perception and judgement of individuals of the same category as more similar to one another than they really are and enhances the perceptual and judgemental contrast between individuals not belonging to this category (Tajfel, 1978d, 1981). An experiment by Allen and Wilder (1979) demonstrated this phenomenon. They created two groups, ostensibly on the basis of artistic preferences (which served as group beliefs), and then had group members complete an opinion survey in the manner they thought another member of their own (or the other) group would respond to the items. They found that individuals assumed that another member of their group would express beliefs more similar to their own (previously assessed) opinions than would an outgroup member. This difference occurred even for belief items irrelevant to art.

In addition, those beliefs which provide information about the group become group beliefs. It is no accident that group beliefs consist of contents which contain such elements as group history, group goals and common characteristics of the group. These contents provide information for group

members about themselves and their commonalities. They provide the raison d'être for group formation and, later, for group maintenance. Also, a fulfilment of additional functions by a belief may especially strengthen its status as a group belief. Thus, for example, beliefs that help to achieve group goals, raise the self esteem of the group members or strengthen feelings of security are likely to become group beliefs.

Another condition pertains to the saliencey of the beliefs which become group beliefs. Beliefs' saliency refers to those beliefs which draw special attention of group members because of their prominence and distinctiveness. In combination with the first condition, these beliefs are efficiently and swiftly absorbed and demarcate the boundary between the ingroup and the outgroups. In some groups the salient group beliefs may pertain to physical appearance, the most perceivable cues. Special clothing, ornamentation or even skin colour may serve as a salient basis for defining one's own group. In other groups, salient beliefs may refer to individual's needs (Toch, 1965), group goals or common experiences.

Finally, in order for beliefs to become group beliefs, epistemic authorities of group members have to consider them as such, and support them. Epistemic authorities are those knowledge sources who exert determinative influence on the formation of knowledge (Bar-Tal, Raviv & Brosch, 1991; Kruglanski, 1989). Group members attribute high confidence to beliefs coming from epistemic authority, consider these beliefs as truth, and adopt them as part of their own repertoires. In our case, the concept applies mostly to leaders who perpetuate beliefs to become group beliefs. Political, intellectual, religious, social and cultural leaders determine to a considerable extent which beliefs become group beliefs and influence group members to accept them as such. They frequently select the group's goals which may serve as group beliefs, formulate ideologies or religious doctrines, decide what events in the past should be remembered as group beliefs for the future, select the symbols for the group, and decide on the attributes that characterize group members (for example, Y. Bar-Tal, 1989).

It is usually in the formative phase of group development that group beliefs are established. This is a period of malleability during which group beliefs are formulated and reformulated. With time, group beliefs emerge in a relatively stable formulation, although always with a possibility of change. In any event, as long as the group exists, it will always be faced with the talk of disseminating group beliefs and maintaining them among group members.

These processes are necessary, since group beliefs serve as a foundation for group existence. The contents of group beliefs provide the raison d'être for a group's existence and delineate its uniqueness vis-à-vis other groups. The fundamental group belief indicates that the group exists. In addition, group members may add other group beliefs of a wide scope of contents. Group members share group beliefs, are aware of this sharing and believe that group beliefs define their 'groupness', that is, social identity.

Implications

The proposed conception implies that group beliefs, as all beliefs, exist in the individual's mind. It does not suggest a view of group beliefs as a special entity of the 'group mind' category. Beliefs are related to individuals. Groups, organizations, societies or any other collectivity do not hold beliefs on the collective level – only individual members in the aggregate groups do. But the present conception describes a widely recognized phenomenon that group members share beliefs and these beliefs may be viewed as providing the basis for group members' social identity and as defining the essence of that group. Moreover, the presented approach suggests that group beliefs are more than a mere sum of group members' personal beliefs (see also Bar-Tal, in press). Sharing of a belief by group members and a recognition that it characterizes them provide group beliefs with distinguished properties.

First of all, group beliefs serve as a basis for group existence. They provide a common basis with which individuals can identify and through which they can define their membership in the group. All groups have to have group beliefs, and a necessary condition for a formation of any group is formulation of group beliefs. This is in order that individuals should feel that they have something in common which distinguishes them from outgroups. They need at least one group belief – fundamental group belief. Tajfel's minimal group paradigm has demonstrated this effect. Using the minimal group paradigm, numerous studies have shown that the mere categorization of persons as ingroup or outgroup – that is, formation of a fundamental group belief – is sufficient to establish group identity and to influence group members' behaviour in the direction of triggering ingroup favouritism and outgroup bias (for example, Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel et al., 1971). But in a real life situation group beliefs are needed in order to provide individuals with reasons for their group membership. Group beliefs supply the basis for cementing social identity.

Second, group beliefs tend to arouse high confidence in their content. The perception of group members that a group belief is shared and characterizes them causes them to ascribe it high validity. The recognition that a belief is shared by group members reduces the subjective feelings of uncertainty and increases the perceived validity of this belief (see Festinger, 1954; Jones & Gerard, 1967). Therefore, group beliefs are usually considered by group members as facts, truths or verities. Another factor which contributes to this view is the perception that group beliefs define the essence of the group. Beliefs of this type cannot be held with low confidence, since low confidence may shatter the basic foundation of group existence. Therefore, shared beliefs which define the essence of the grouping are held with high confidence.

One consequence of holding group beliefs with high confidence is their relative freezing in the group members' repertoire. Group beliefs do not change easily, since freezing implies closure. That is, group members do

not easily entertain alternative hypotheses to group beliefs, but tend to collect information which validates them. The change of group beliefs is of special difficulty when they are central. The centrality of group beliefs indicates their importance for the group's life. Central group beliefs may become part of the group's culture and tradition, and then they are especially enduring. Group members pass them from generation to generation and rarely change them.

Third, since group beliefs define the essence of the group, group members tend to organize their personal beliefs in accordance with them. Group beliefs provide the frame of reference for other beliefs. This process takes place especially in cases when group beliefs are central in group members' repertoire. Then, group members draw implications from group beliefs and add new personal beliefs consistent with them. In extreme cases of an orthodox group, group beliefs serve as anchors around which other beliefs are organized.

Fourth, group beliefs provide the group members with special powers. The mere perception that group members share group beliefs indicates strength. Converse (1964) suggested in his classic analysis of beliefs that the number of people associated with a particular belief system is an important factor in political system:

> claims to numbers are of some modest continuing importance in democratic systems for the legitimacy they confer upon demands; and much more sporadically, claims to numbers become important in nondemocratic systems as threats of potential coercion. (p. 207)

In addition, the power of group beliefs is derived from the perception of unity and commonality that may characterize group members who are aware of sharing beliefs. Knowledge that group members share a given belief expresses a unity of the group and indicates common fate. Group members derive strength out of this knowledge. They feel united, belonging and integrated within the group. One consequence of these feelings of strength is that group beliefs may serve as a basis for demands, desires or goals of group members. Leaders of the group usually take into consideration the group's beliefs when they make decisions that affect the group's life. Being aware that group members share a belief, and are influenced by the belief in their group behaviour, leaders pay special attention to group beliefs. Group beliefs reflect the direction that group members desire to take in their behaviour. Therefore, leaders frequently make decisions regarding group behaviour that correspond to group beliefs.

Fifth, group beliefs may determine the attitudes and behaviours of an outgroup towards the group. Group beliefs are important information for outgroups about any given group. They characterize the group and may imply even the behaviour that the group may take. Group beliefs may indicate possible goals, ideology, values, history, norms or characteristics of the group. This information enables acquaintanceship with the group and in turn influences the type of intergroup relations that may develop.

Finally, if one believes that group members act according to their beliefs, then group beliefs should be considered as an important source of understanding group behaviour. As Krech, Crutchfield and Ballachey (1962) suggested:

> Man acts upon his ideas. His irrational act no less than his rational acts are guided by what he thinks, what he believes, what he anticipates. However bizarre to the behavior of men, tribes or nations may appear to an outsider, to the men, to the tribes, to the nations, their behavior makes sense in terms of their own world view. (p. 17)

Group beliefs provide the cognitive basis to many group behaviours. They may serve as reasons, goals, explanations or justifications for group behaviour. In other words, group beliefs may function as guiding forces for a group, and, therefore may determine the direction, intensity and persistence of group behaviour. This is one of the most important implications of group beliefs.

Conclusion

Group belief conception provides cognitive and social perspectives to the study of a group. The existence of a group is a social reality for group members. Group beliefs provide the basis which allows group members to view the group as a social reality. The group, then, is a product not only of structural characteristics, environment, situational conditions, motivational tendencies or social influence, but also of personal cognitive processes. These processes determine the essence of the group, since group beliefs provide the contents which serves as a basis for group formation and group maintenance.

This conception carries the notion of social identity one step beyond the Tajfel and Turner theories. It suggests that social identity is not based merely on the categorization process, but also on beliefs which provide the rationale for the group existence. The fundamental group belief indicating 'We are a group' and additional group beliefs of different contents which define the nature of the groupness allow individuals to feel, think and act as group members. These beliefs underlie the uniqueness of the group and differentiate it from outgroups.

It is important that behavioural scientists study the contents of group beliefs and the process through which group members acquire them, become aware of sharing them, and are affected by them in their behaviour. This line of interest will, on the one hand, add a cognitive aspect to the study of a group and, on the other hand, liberate beliefs from their individual closet to extent their social meaning. In this respect, the present approach provides the bridge between the individual's level of analysis and group level. Group members, as individuals, are the ones that acquire beliefs which shape their reality. But when group members become aware of the fact that their beliefs are shared by other group members, these beliefs acquire special quality.

That is, they may have important cognitive, affective and even behavioural implications for the group members as individuals and for the group as a whole.

Note

1. Most of the examples provided in the following review are drawn from formal statements prepared by the groups. Although it is possible that they reflect group beliefs, group members were not examined to indicate their responses. Therefore, the presented 'group beliefs' should be treated with caution. They only serve as illustrations for presenting the conception. Further research among group members may determine the actual status of these beliefs.

8

Social Identity and National Identity

José Miguel Salazar

Of all the variants of social identity, national identity is perhaps the one that has had the most dramatic impact on historical events, with both positive and negative consequences for humankind.

The great romantic-nationalist movements of the nineteenth century, as well as the movements of national liberation in the first half of the twentieth century and the most recent break-up of multinational European states, are clear examples of the past and present role played by this type of identity. Identity with national or ethnic categories is evidently also a reference point used by Tajfel in the development of his theory, as inferred from the character of some of his early work (Tajfel, 1969b, 1970a).

Even though the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries have been called the era of nationalism (Kohn, 1962), this designation could also apply to the present century, as there is ample evidence of creative manifestations and excesses of the national idea in our time. In the aftermath of the Second World War, nationalism and independence were bywords of the movements to reaffirm identities in countries which were colonies in the previous century, particularly in Asia and Africa. Yet not only in the so-called third world is evidence found of the ascent of this type of identity; it is increasingly noticeable in the awakening of subdued nationalisms in European countries, and in the breaking-up of previously functioning multinational states. Also in the Americas there are clear manifestations of its increasing importance from Canada, to Mexico, to Peru; and even in the Pacific area with the awakening of the aboriginal populations of Australia, silent for centuries.

Whoever suggests that the era of nationalism is finished and that we are in a new era of universal humanity must be disconnected from his or her surrounding reality. The allegations of 'proletarian internationalism' which proposes that the proletariat has no country, as well as of 'cosmopolitanism', which indicates that as a consequence of transnationalization now it is the bourgeoisie that has no country, are both questionable. On the contrary, the so-called process of globalization and the development of the 'global village', based on technological improvements, constitutes a good example of the dialectics of the historical-cultural process, since it has had the curious effect of reinforcing ethnicity and national identities.

It has been claimed that nations and nationalism only acquire reality in relation to the state and that historically these are intimately connected with

the ascent of the bourgeoisie, and should be considered transient phenomena only referred to as a stage of historical development (that is, Kedourie, 1960; Kohn, 1944; Seton-Watson, 1965). Yet it is possible to differentiate between nationalism, or more precisely 'modern nationalism', clearly associated with the state, and 'national sentiment', which is more ancient and of a more general and less political character (Hertz, 1944).

The emphasis on the nation-state is important from the perspective of elaborating a political history, but in the study of national phenomena from a socio-psychological perspective it is impossible to ignore this other facet. Hence in this chapter we shall begin by considering the affective background of national phenomena. After that, in order to gain a better understanding of national identity as such, some developments within the social identity approach will be examined in order to answer some questions about the problem in hand.

Considerations about national sentiments

The definitions of what a 'nation' is have been very varied. The term appears in a fifteenth-century Bible translating a Hebrew word that means at the same time 'ascendance' and 'posterity'. It is also used to refer to a natural quality, a native quality. In the medieval universities a 'nation' referred to a group of students from a common region. And the idea of belonging to a group based on descendance, differentiable from others, was present and important in history long before the appearance of modern nationalism (Smith, 1991; Chap. 2).

Even in the case of empires as ancient as Egypt and China, national sentiment was important, at least for members of some strata. Evidence of this is found in some hieroglyphs about a Theban prince who expelled the hyksos from Egypt around 1580 BC; they say: 'I will grapple with them, and cut open their belly! I will save Egypt and overthrow the Asiatics' (cited by Smith, 1991, p. 46). Even in Greece, being an Athenian or a Spartan had emotional and behavioural implications; the feeling of being an alien, dramatized in Euripides's *Medea*, must surely reflect a reality understood by the audience of the drama.

On the other hand, the biological basis of national sentiment, and more concretely of ethnocentrism, has been considered by social scientists interested in socio-biology. Campbell (1965) in his provocative essay 'Ethnocentric and Other Altruistic Motives', elucidates the thesis that ethnocentric motivation and behaviour is directed to the protection and survival of the members of the ingroup, leading to sacrifices and even death. This act by definition is an altruistic type of behaviour, going against personally selfish interests. More recently Reynolds, Falger and Vine (1987) have published an interesting book, *The Sociobiology of Ethnocentrism*, that gathers more up-to-date contributions from this same perspective.

There has been great insistence that 'nationalism' is a phenomena of modernity, and that it is incorrect to consider it something more trans-cendental. This is a way of dodging considerations derived from the biological condition of humankind and the fragmentary but unquestionable evidence of the antiquity of 'national sentiments'. There is no doubt that feelings of attachment to the nation-state are a relatively recent phenom-enon since the objects of attachment ('modern' nations and the 'nation-state') are also recent, but to deny the attachment to what is perceived as one's own (be this a city-state, as in Greece, or a tribe in the Amazonian forest) seems exceedingly restrictive. To do this does not take into account some basic considerations about the human condition.

In speaking of a 'nation', reference to the fact of 'birth' is important. (Although in some languages this relationship has been lost or never existed, it is very clear in Spanish [*nacer* = to be born; *nación* = nation] and in other Romance languages.) There is a determination given by belonging to a group in which one was born, an ascribed role that confers an important anchor to the individual. So although the term 'nationalism' in effect appears in common usage around the period of the French Revolution, the term 'nation' is much older. The concept of nationalism is endowed with clear political references to the nation-state, which is not necessarily the case for the concept of nation.

There are groups that in the accepted sense constitute nation-states, but there are other conglomerates, based on the same principle of birth, that may generate loyalties and attachments as strong as, or sometimes even stronger than, the nation-state. The following three cases may be mentioned:

(a) the positive affect towards a regional group within an existing state ('regionalism');
(b) the attachment to a grouping that ignores existing geographical borders, as in the case of the Kurds of the Middle East or the Waiyú in the Goajiro Peninsula that Venezuela and Colombia share ('stateless nationalism');
(c) the positive feeling towards supra-national groupings, as in the case of Latin America ('supra-nationalism').

We consider that there are certain commonalties in the psychological contents of the sentiments expressed in these cases, as well as in the case of state nationalism. And it is this broadly defined national referent which is in our mind when we examine the question of 'national sentiment' in this chapter.

So what is the basis of this national sentiment? If we take a close look, we find that it is based on four elements: (a) territoriality, (b) shared culture, (c) historical memory of genealogical communality and (d) the existence of a nation-state.

Territoriality

Ardrey (1967) extensively develops the point of the importance of territory in human behaviour, going back to the biological base of animal territoriality and making use of the concept of territorial imprinting. He defines what he calls the 'biological nation' as 'a social group containing at least two mature males which holds as an exclusive possession a continuous area of space, which isolates itself from others of its kind through outwards antagonism, and which through joint defense of its social territory achieves leadership, cooperation, and capacity for concerted action' (p. 191). His argument is centred on an evolutionary position and observations of phylogenetic ancestors, which from his point of view give evidence of the antiquity of the phenomenon 'nation'. Of course, like many other animal analogies, this may be questioned, especially if it is sustained that language and culture introduce a qualitative break with evolutionary continuity. Yet the observations continue to have interesting implications.

The excesses of the approaches centred on geographical determinism, in vogue in the nineteenth century, and its later rejection, have made us lose sight of the importance of the geographical environment in relation to behaviour. Even though the geographical referent is more tangible and objectifiable than other referents of nation, there are few authors who give it the relevance it deserves, one exception being Doob (1964), who bases his studies about patriotism in Tyrol on the attachment to the '*Heimat*'. Also there has been some recent rethinking about the theme amongst environmental psychologists (Altman & Low, 1992; Proshansky, Fabian & Kaminoff, 1983).

There are multiple cases in history of the fight to hold on to territories by people who were born in an area, which may not be the best from the point of view of economic rationality; and there are many well-known examples of the feeling of ostracism of migrants or displaced peoples who must live in a territory which is not their own.

But while it is very concrete, the territorial referent is more evident in the regionalism variant of national loyalty. Given geographical variability within countries, it is logical that the role of territory and all that is connected to it should be more marked in more restricted loyalties.

Altogether there is no doubt that territoriality plays an important role in the development of national sentiments,

Culture

Sharing a culture involves collective ways of solving the problems confronted in interacting with the surrounding world, developed and transmitted from generation to generation. This level of shared experience is also important in the development of national sentiments.

Language is the supreme creation of culture, so much so that for many anthropologists it is considered its defining trait. In any case it permits the transmission of collective solutions and their preservation. Language is also

a very early acquisition in human ontogenesis, and so it becomes a basic point or matrix for the development of feelings of attachment.

There are other elements of culture that become obvious referents of attachment: music, different elements of the so-called 'material culture', customs, shared values. They may all be very powerful in awakening positive feelings and loyalties towards the national ingroup.

Ethnicity

Given the conceptual weaknesses and dangerous political use of the term 'race', the concept of ethnicity has become a partial substitute. Smith (1984a, 1984b) develops the idea of 'myths of descent' as the basis of ethnic feeling and ethnic nationalisms. Through these myths, the members of a community perceive they have a common origin, usually connected to a glorious past. An *ethnie* is structured around these mythological socio-cultural elements, the association with a common land, elements of common culture, and something of great relevance: a 'collective proper name' (Smith, 1991, p. 21). It must be clear that in talking about myths no attempt is made to disprove the importance of the phenomena, since myths are not to be ignored. As Mariátegui (1925), a very important Peruvian thinker, said: 'Myths move mankind through history. Without a myth, the existence of mankind has no historical sense' (p. 22). Hence considerations about ethnicity cannot just be discarded, and obviously are connected to the development and maintenance of national sentiments.

State

It is indisputable that the existence of a national state stimulates an important type of national sentiment through the systematic use of ideology producing institutions partially in the hands of the state like the school system and the mass media. This is so pervasive that for some the only *really* important national sentiments are those related to the state. But this is too restrictive, as regional, ethnic and more recently supra-national identities may have as much reality, from a psychological perspective.

There is an additional problem in restricting the study of national sentiment to what occurs at the level of the nation-state, and it is that the idea that a nation equals a state is not a viable equation in our present world. It constitutes, at most, an ideal type, but the great majority of states are really multinational. Some contemplate it explicitly, as Canada or Spain, where there is recognition of the existence of diverse nationalities within the state. However, in states such as Venezuela the fiction of a culturally homogeneous state is disturbed with news of massacres of indigenous tribes, such as the Yanomami. Some states that are explicitly multinational apparently function well, although surprises occur when the latent centripetal forces gain ascendance over the forces of integration, as in the painful case of Yugoslavia.

In defining a nation, there is implicit the existence of one or several non-nations and the existence of limits separating them. When a nation is defined in terms of a state, it is usually clear what the limits are. But the same doesn't happen when you base your definition on any of the other elements: the territorial, the cultural or the ethnic. Hence it becomes necessary to look for theorizings capable of suggesting ways of solving this problem.

Social identity theory frames the problem of 'borders' in socio-psychological terms. Consequently this theoretical approach is essential in any attempt to understand national phenomena. Hence we shall consider very briefly some elements of this approach which may help us to understand better the question in hand.

The social identity approach and its relevance to understanding national phenomena.

The identity theory approach is relevant to the problem of defining group borders since it places it at the irrefutable level of human subjectivity. This theoretical approach, which in its beginnings Tajfel sometimes referred to as CIC theory (categorization–identity–comparison) (Tajfel, 1981) has stimulated multiple theoretical and empirical developments, examples of which can be found in the other chapters of this book.

The three original basic elements, the existence of a category accepted internally and externally, the identification with it, and the process of social comparison, are still very fruitful concepts. The first element becomes concrete in the form of a label; the second element implies the acceptance of the category for oneself with all the affective, cognitive and behavioural consequences. Regarding the third element, the process of social comparison, it is frequently a positive evaluation of the assumed category, but this is not always the case. Tajfel (1981, Chap. 13) himself presents evidence of studies with children in which there is evidence of devaluation of their own ethnic group. Several studies have produced evidence of devaluation of the ingroup (Salazar, 1983a). The postulation of the need to maintain a positive group evaluation seems to have been taken from Sumner's (1906) ethnocentrism theory, considered by many as constituting a very basic means of understanding intergroup relations (Le Vine & Campbell, 1972).

Many developments have occurred on the basis of the original elements of social identity theory, among these accounts regarding the basis of categorizations (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), meta-contrast ratios (Turner et al., 1987), the acquisition of categories, the hierarchy of identities; the process of depersonalization, the salience of categories, and so on, are very relevant to understanding national identity.

Making use of some of these developments, we have attempted answers to some questions related to the understanding of national identities.

Questions about national identity

1. *What is the motivation that underlies the acquisition of national identities?*

Kelman (1969) considers that it is based on both perceived instrumentality and a need for transcendence; the latter would give a particular force to the social identities related to the national. With a bit of poetic licence, it may be said that the existence of national communities is based on the desire for eternity. So the idea of some to conceive of nationalism as a form of religion (Hayes, 1926) is not far-fetched; nationalism may be conceived as a lay religion that offers, like the others, the promise of eternity.

The nation as a community links people not only with a present inhabited by other people they do not and could not possible know, but also with a past and a future. This is possible through *depersonalization*, derived from the process of self-categorization. In reality that which transcends, that which is eternal, is the group, but when this happens this 'eternity' gets transferred to the depersonalized individuals that are part of it.

This may be seen as an attempt to postulate a basic religious motivation in human beings. But whether religiosity is something intrinsic to human-kind or is a historical phenomenon is not important. What is argued here is that national identity is based on an aspect of such religiosity, basically the need to transcend.

In more mundane terms, the 'transcendence' of a nation may be conceived of as attainable by the power it exerts or has been able to exert within the international context. Hence national identities have their more powerful manifestations related to political states, which are by definition conceived of in power terms.

2. *On what basis do the perceptions of similarities and differences arise in the case of national identities?*

It is known that a dialectical relationship exists between categorizations, expressed in a label and the perception of similarities. The mere existence of a label is not enough, for a base must exist to give justification or backing to assuming the category. It is also evident that the dimensions around which the comparisons take place vary in terms of the identities considered.

Humans' capacity for interaction is limited. Dunbar (1992), making a projection on the basis of the size of grouping in higher primates, suggests that 150 is the limit of a viable human group, something like the natural size of a human group. Nevertheless, humankind lives in communities much larger than that, hence necessarily we live in 'imagined communities' (Anderson, 1983). An ethnic community or a nation, is hence one of these 'imagined communities', but even these must be construed around certain elements or dimensions.

When the question of the basis of national sentiments is analysed, four elements come to the fore: territory, culture, ethnicity and state. These elements may be considered as dimensions along which *meta-contrast ratios* of similitude–difference may be established. Particularly in the cases of culture and ethnicity, and in a lesser degree in the case of territory, it is

possible to conceive of continuums in which the meta-contrast ratios gradually change. In the case of the state the categories are discrete and variations in meta-contrast ratios are less applicable.

3. *Could we conceive of levels or hierarchies in the case of nation-related identities?*

In order to encompass the similitudes between state nationalism, region-alism and supra-nationalism, we may speak of 'nation-related identities'. These identities tend to occur in concentric circles. The idea of concentricity of 'national-related' identities could be considered as a particular case of hierarchies within the intermediate level, taking as the higher one that of the individual as member of humanity, and the lowest that of the individual self.

We suggest that there exists a common psychological substratum to identities centred on a region or a specific regional group, and the one centred on a specific nation-state or the emergent supra-national identities. We see this as a *matryoshka* of identities, one inside the other.

The relative importance of these identities is not permanent and situational factors play an important role in determining their role or effect on behaviour.

4. *How does the process of social comparison function in the case of national identity?*

In the case of national identities the question of social comparisons is particularly important. Social comparisons will affect both the salience of the category as well as its evaluation, and influence the development of a positive social identity. The social comparisons that are established involve other nations or ethnic groups. These comparisons may take place along different dimensions: size of the countries, political systems, state of the economy, 'well-being' or 'happiness' of the inhabitants, and so on. In different cases the activated meta-contrasts will vary.

But in the activation of 'nation-related' concentric identities, a basic element to be considered is the degree of transcendence that identity may guarantee without losing the essence of the identity. It may be argued that the more extensive the reference group, the more positively valued will be the identity, since the possibility of transcendence is greater. But it is also true that the smaller the unit, the greater the homogeneity, and hence the more solid the meta-contrasts. There must exist an equilibrium point between both elements, possibly of transcendence and solidity of identity, which constitutes an interesting empirical problem.

There is evidence that when Latin Americans and Venezuelans (or Peruvians or Colombians) are evaluated, the social identity is more positive in the first case (Salazar, 1983b), and it may be that this is due to an underlying perception of greater possibility of transcendence at that level than at the more restricted ones. Something similar seems to be occurring in Europe.

But as has been frequently pointed out, positive social identities may be connected to negative manifestations of aggressive ethnocentrism. The

development of an identity within a wider context redefines the outgroup, and here the European case is illustrative. The strengthening of the sense of being European, a psychosocial correlate to the development of the European community is evident (Echebarría, Elejabarrieta, Valencía & Villareal, 1992; Fells & Niznik, 1992). This has led to the channelling towards non-Europeans of feelings of rejection that in previous periods had been directed to other groups within Europe. The racist manifestations against Turks in Germany, against North Africans in France, are cases in point. In Spain the development of the feeling of being a part of Europe has been accompanied by a rejection of Dominicans and other 'South Americans' that in another definition of the situation, that is, in terms of a Hispanic community, were considered less objectionable.

The varying processes of social comparison point to the importance of exploring the consequences that may be derived from placing the same individual in varying referential frames, be these regional, national or supra-national.

5. *In what conditions do different 'nation-related' identities become salient?*

To begin with, it must be accepted that nation-related identities become activated by field factors, situational factors that affect the salience of a particular category. In the case of the European community, economic and political developments activated a supra-national identity that has been latent, and submerged under a history of conflicts. Obviously identities are politically manageable. However, for this to occur they must exist in a latent form.

In defining the ingroup, there exists an implicit definition of outgroups. Yet these definitions are not static. In emphasizing one level of the nation-related identities, a group that shares the same identity at another concentric level could be defined as an external group. An example makes this clear. The identities of a *Caraqueño* (from Caracas), a Venezuelan and a Latin American are nation-related and subsist in concentric circles. When my *Caraqueño* identity comes to the fore, I consider people from other regions of my country as external groups, with possible behavioural consequences. This ceases to be so when my Venezuelan identity gets activated, in which case a Colombian, or another national group, gets defined as the external group. This externality would disappear when Latin American identity is invoked, since it encompasses both groups at a higher level of abstraction.

For a Latin American living in Europe, the Latin American identity is easily activated; in a Latin American country different from ours the Venezuelan identity becomes frequently activated; in a gathering taking place in a small provincial town, the regional identity of coming from the capital city may come to the fore. It is here that the questions of *accessibility* and *adjustment* come into play.

But there are qualifications that must be made in relation to the thesis of concentricity. It is erroneous to think that there exists perfect balance or concordance within the concentric circles. On the contrary, it must be

recognized that sometimes these may appear as contradictory and in effect enter into conflict. In this sense the Basque case is particularly significant, where for many this identity is independent of the Spanish one, and hence does not function in concentric circles. According to Linz (1986), a high percentage of the inhabitants of the Basque provinces do not consider themselves Spaniards. Nevertheless the idea of concentric circles probably functions with regard to the European identity (Torregrosa & Ramírez, 1991).

Another problematic situation concerns the conflict between national identity and other types of identity, such as those related to partisan political loyalties. Here these may take precedence and lead to dramatic situations as those of a civil war, as has happened so many times in history.

National identity may also come into conflict with human identity, as would be the case with a soldier who refused to comply with the order to kill someone on the basis of their national label.

This brings to the fore the question of 'globalization'. The interrelation between the different countries in the world has always existed; what is new is the development of technologies that bring us close enough to find out what is happening in other places in the world with a speed non-existent in previous times. But while it may be true that this facilitates the imitation and copying of foreign models, usually from more developed countries, it also has created consciousness of similitudes and differences, and does not necessarily lead to homogenizations. A more probable outcome, it seems to me, would be the development of wider communities, on the basis of common elements, in which the sense of national identity is not eliminated, but transferred to a higher level.

In my view, homogenization is not a desirable goal. Rather, I would argue that the recognition and acceptance of differences is preferable to the universal assimilation of all to a single pattern.

PART III
IDENTITY AND GROUP/ INTERGROUP PROCESS

9

Social Identity and Intragroup Differentiation as Subjective Social Control

José M. Marques, Darío Páez and Dominic Abrams

In analysing collective behaviour associated with religious movements in sixteenth-century Europe, the historian J.J. Delumeau (1993) wrote:

> The Protestant uprising naturally provoked an increasing aversion to heresy, which was considered as the ultimate evil . . . : the traitor inside is worse than the enemy outside. He must be made to leave his hide-out, he must be eliminated as a priority and no other punishment is severe enough for him. (pp. 514–515)

This statement illustrates the fact that the deviate members of a large community may be more harshly treated than outsiders, because, while both depart from the community's values, the former threaten these values more severely than the latter. Deviates' behaviour and beliefs endanger the collective value standards more to the extent that these deviates cannot simply be expelled to the outgroup.

Punishment of deviates and traitors appears to be an important component of a community's social regulation system. Another historical illustration of this phenomenon is witch-hunting in the Middle Ages (for example, Hamilton & Rauma, 1995; Yamagishi, 1995). Witch-hunting, as well as more recent instances of collective persecution – like the Inquisition in the fourteenth- to sixteenth-century Iberian countries, McCarthyism in the United States in the 1950s, or political purges in the Stalinist period in Soviet Union, to mention but a few – often find support from the general population, or, at least, from those who identify with the value-system that legitimates the persecution, even when the persecuted do not represent an immediate or material danger. This support is sometimes tangible but, most

often, emerges in the form of derogatory attitudes and judgements. It likely stands for the individuals' commitment to the community's standards and self-definition in light of these standards (cf. Doise, Chapter 2, this volume).

Concomitant with this social self-definition is the effort to ensure and to legitimize beliefs on the distinctiveness and relative superiority of the community's standards as compared to the outgroup. This process may also be viewed as a reaction against social change and as an immediate psychological response against threatening minorities cf. Pérez and Mugny, Chapter 10, this volume). It may be a major factor in the maintenance of a clear-cut and secure social identity as well as a guarantee of the individual's psychological well-being as a group member. As sociologist Georg Simmel (1955) put it, in groups structured around their members' attitudes.

> the opposition of a member to an associate is no purely negative social factor, if only because such opposition is often the only means for making life with actually unbearable people at least possible. . . . It allows us to prove our strength consciously and only thus gives vitality and reciprocity to conditions from which, without such corrective, we would withdraw at any cost. Opposition achieves this aim even where it has no noticeable success, where it does not become manifest but remains purely covert. Yet while it has hardly any practical effect, it may yet achieve an inner balance . . . , may exert a quieting influence, produces a feeling of virtual power, and thus save relationships whose continuation often puzzles the observer. (p. 19)

In the present chapter, we argue that identification with ingroup norms and values may lead individuals to subjectively engage in processes analogous to social influence upon actual or represented ingroup instances. These subjective social influence processes may allow individuals to restore their confidence in the group and, hence, to re-establish a positive social identity.

The social psychological analysis of small groups and large social categories

Social psychological research has focused on different factors involved in the explanation of group processes. Traditionally, this research evolved along two separate lines which, for simplicity, we may designate as the 'small-group approach' and the 'social identity framework' (including self-categorization theory). The former has focused mainly on processes like productivity, decision-making, role and status differentiation, cohesiveness or socialization (cf. Brown, 1988; Cartwright & Zander, 1968; Levine & Moreland, 1994). Most of this work has been conducted in the realm of face-to-face groups. The latter has emphasized the effects of social categorization in the psychological dynamics involved with individuals' sense of group membership. This work has often been conducted with large social categories and their representations (for example, Tajfel, 1978d). Only recently have these two lines been subject to integrative efforts (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Marques & Páez, 1994).

Group affiliation, social influence and intragroup differentiation

Research in small groups was strongly influenced by the work of Festinger
and colleagues. Festinger (1950) proposed that affiliation in groups fulfils a
social reality function, that is, uncertainty reduction through selective
affiliation with those who share similar beliefs, and a *locomotion* function,
that is, facilitation of goal achievement through the association with those
people whose goals are similar to the individual's. Indeed, people in small
groups generate consensual opinions (Festinger, Schachter & Back, 1950)
and reject deviates who resist group pressures to comply with the group's
position on a relevant matter of opinion (Schachter, 1951), or who inten-
tionally fail to contribute to the group's goal achievement (Jones &
DeCharms, 1967; cf. Levine, 1980). Most importantly, evidence shows that
increases in external pressures upon the group, in group uniformity and in
the discrepancy between majority and deviate positions increase the
majority's pressures towards uniformity (Cartwright, 1968; Janis, 1968;
Levine, 1980; Moreland & Levine, 1982; Shaw, 1976). Evidence also suggests
that social reality and group locomotion are ensured within the group
through two forms of social control, traditionally known as *informational*, or
private, and *normative*, or public, influence (Jones & Gerard, 1967). How-
ever, research in small-group processes has rarely addressed itself – at least
conceptually – to the role played by intergroup relations in processes
occurring within groups (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Marques &
Páez, 1994).

**Social categorization, social identification and intergroup
differentiation**

In turn, research on large-scale categories has emphasized intergroup more
than intragroup processes. This may be due to the influential work of Tajfel
and colleagues (for example, Tajfel, 1978d; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner,
1975a). This work started from the assumption that social behaviour may
be conceived of as occurring along *one* continuum, whose poles are inter-
group and interpersonal behaviour:

> What is meant by 'purely' interpersonal is any social encounter between two or
> more people in which all the interaction that takes place is determined by the
> personal relationships between the individuals and by their respective individual
> characteristics. The 'intergroup' extreme is that in which all behaviour of two or
> more individuals towards each other is determined by their membership in
> different social groups or categories. (Tajfel, 1978a, p. 41)

Whereas interpersonal behaviour involves the perception of features
specific to the individuals involved, intergroup behaviour implies self- and
other-stereotyping. In categorizing themselves as members in a social
category, people focus on those features that they share with all category

members. Brown and Turner (1981) advanced this idea under the heading of *the self-stereotyping hypothesis.*

In brief, the social identity framework proposes that group representations correspond to prototype-like representations, because intergroup similarities and intragroup differences are irrelevant in intergroup situations. Clearly, this assumption restrains a view of intergroup and intragroup processes as simultaneously occurring in social life. Although this is not entirely true (Hogg, 1992; Turner, 1991), it nevertheless remains that the social identity framework (including self-categorization theory) has difficulties in dealing with the simultaneous emergence of intergroup and intragroup behaviour.

Group prototypes as denotative norms

Among other well-known assumptions, the social identity framework states that, in social life, people attempt to achieve cognitive clarity by exaggerating intergroup differences and intragroup similarities (Hogg, 1992; Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Tajfel, 1969a, 1978d; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Basic to this process is *comparative fit* (Oakes, Haslam & Turner, 1994, and Chapter 6 this volume; Oakes & Turner, 1990). Comparative fit stands for the actual differences and similarities between the stimuli present in the judgement setting that allow the establishment of correlations between continuous stimulus properties and discrete categories (cf. also Tajfel, 1969a).

According to Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell (1987; cf. also Hogg, 1992; Hogg & McGarty, 1990), comparative fit generates the cognitive construction of group prototypes. This process has been formalized in terms of a *meta-contrast principle* (Turner et al. 1987; cf. also Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hogg & McGarty, 1990). Given a distribution of group member positions on a relevant intergroup dimension (for instance, a personality attribute or an attitude dimension), the meta-contrast principle allows perceivers to ascertain whether intergroup differences are, on the average, higher than intragroup differences. Formally, a ratio can be computed for each group member, so that the group's most prototypical member is the one who shows the highest ratio and thus occupies that position which simultaneously maximizes intergroup differences and minimizes intragroup differences. This position corresponds to the group prototype. From this point, ingroup and outgroup members are subjectively assessed in terms of their respective prototypes. As a result intergroup differences are emphasized to the detriment of interpersonal differences among the members of the same group and interpersonal similarities among ingroup and outgroup.

In addition, according to self-categorization theory, individuals expect group members to match their respective groups' prototypes. Once social categories become salient, perceivers may judge the 'normative fit' (Turner

et al., 1987), that is, the correspondence between the activated categories and the content properties of stimuli, in the situation. Lack of normative fit would lead perceivers to switch to more adequate categorization criteria (Oakes et al., 1994), that is, to alternative intergroup dimensions which best allow the generation of clear-cut intergroup boundaries, and more effectively account for the judgemental situation. Different criteria of categorization will be used to the extent that, depending on the stimulus properties of the judgemental setting, they succeed or fail in cognitively maximizing intergroup differences and intragroup similarities (Haslam & Turner, 1992; Turner et al., 1987; cf. also Bruner, 1957). To give an example, in a political rally, comparative fit could entail a 'liberal versus conservative' categorization. But if in that rally one noticed that, regardless of their political affiliation, female speakers supported women's rights whereas men addressed themselves to other issues, one would likely switch from the initial 'liberal/ conservative' dimension to an alternative 'female/male' categorization.

In brief, for self-categorization theory, group prototypes fulfil structuring functions. The meta-contrast generates cognitive clarity in that it allows individuals to perceive the social world in terms of meaningful, differentiated units. Concomitantly, individuals deal with emerging intragroup differences by changing the criteria of categorization to alternative dimensions which hinder such differences in order to steadily maximize intergroup distinctiveness. They are strongly motivated to maximize intergroup distinctiveness, and this requires that social situations be cognitively construed so that intragroup differences are minimized.

But, according to self-categorization theory, group prototypes also fulfil emotional functions (Hogg, 1992). Following the above-mentioned self-stereotyping hypothesis, self-categorization theory states that individuals identify with groups to the extent that they perceive a match between the self and the ingroup prototype. When self-stereotyping occurs, the ingroup becomes fully representative of the self, and the self becomes perceptually interchangeable with other ingroup members (Turner, 1981). According to Hogg (1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988), a major implication of this fact is that social identification must be logically conceived of not as an outcome of interpersonal attitudes or similarity among group members, but, rather, as the result of a positive orientation towards the group prototype. As he put it,

> when a specific social identity is the salient basis for self-conception, self-perception and conduct become ingroup stereotypical and normative, perceptions of relevant outgroup members become outgroup stereotypical, and intergroup behaviour acquires – to varying degrees, depending on the history of relations between the groups – competitive and discriminatory properties. (Hogg, 1992, pp. 90–91)

In short, when the ingroup is cognitively salient, a positive orientation towards the self becomes intrinsically equivalent to a positive orientation towards the group. Therefore, we may see social identification as a positive orientation towards the ingroup prototype, as it materializes in the

stereotyped self (Hogg, 1992; Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Furthermore, as individuals assimilate themselves to an ingroup prototype, their thoughts and behaviour conform to this prototype. The prototype is thus internalized as a norm defining the appropriate features and behaviour standards of the social self (Turner, 1991).

Denotative versus prescriptive group norms in inter- an intragroup judgements

The above idea is important to our present concerns. From it, we may accept a definition of 'group norm' as a descriptive principle of intergroup differentiation, or cognitive clarity concomitant with social categorization. But norms may also be viewed as prescriptive standards, which are closer to overt or cognitively exerted social influence (Kenny & La Voie, 1985). In this case, norms may be viewed as standards on which ingroup members anchor their judgements (Forsyth, 1995) about other ingroup members in order to ascertain, not intergroup distinctiveness, but rather the legitimacy of the ingroup's superiority (Marques & Páez, 1994). In this vein, we shall speak of *denotative norms* to refer to the former, and *prescriptive norms* to refer to the latter kind of process. Notice, however, that prescriptive norms should function as a prerequisite for intergroup differentiation. Accepting this point, the major question is through what kinds of mechanisms do individuals step from a descriptive norm, which generates intergroup differentiation and identification with the ingroup, to a prescriptive norm, according to which such identification is regulated and reinforced? We now elaborate on this question.

The 'black sheep effect'

Our main empirical argument for the distinction between denotative and prescriptive group norms comes from evidence on the so-called 'black sheep effect' (Marques, 1990; Marques, Yzerbyt & Leyens, 1988). This evidence (Marques, 1990; Marques & Páez, 1994, for reviews), shows that people differentiate more strongly between likeable and unlikeable ingroup members than between likeable and unlikeable outgroup members. For instance, Marques et al. (1988) asked their Belgian subjects to judge attractive and unattractive Belgian and North African students on a series of traits. The results showed that attractive Belgian students were judged more favourably than attractive North African students, whereas unattractive Belgian students were judged more unfavourably than unattractive North African students. Similar results were found by Marques and Yzerbyt (1988). These results showed that law students evaluated a good performance of another law student more favourably than a similar performance by a philosophy student, and evaluated a poor performance by a law student more unfavourably than a similar performance by a philosophy student. Also, Marques,

Robalo and Rocha (1992) found that high-school pupils evaluated more extremely, both negatively and positively, likeable and unlikeable pupils of their own school than similar pupils of a rival high school.

Taken at face-value, these findings might suggest an interpretation based on normative fit. That is, when faced with likeable and unlikeable ingroup and outgroup members, subjects would switch from the initial ingroup–outgroup categorization to one which proved more informative given the stimulus-material they were provided with (that is, likeable and unlikeable characteristics or good and poor performance). However, other findings raise difficulties with this explanation. For instance, Marques et al. (1988, Experiment 2) showed that subjects over-rated likeable ingroup members and derogated unlikeable ingroup members, relative to their outgroup counterparts, only on dimensions relevant to the definition of the ingroup as a whole. On other equally socially desirable or undesirable dimensions, but which did not contribute to the distinctiveness of ingroup and outgroup, subjects were equally extreme in their evaluations of ingroup and outgroup members. In another study, Marques (1990) showed that subjects differentiated more strongly between normative and counter-normative ingroup than outgroup members, but only when they considered the normative dimensions as directly relevant to the ingroup's image. Moreover, contrary to an interpretation based on a switch from the original ingroup–outgroup dimension to another one (distinguishing, for example, between likeable and unlikeable persons), Marques and colleagues found that ingroup bias (that is, positive differentiation of ingroup from outgroup as a whole) generally co-occurs with higher differentiation between likeable and unlikeable ingroup rather than outgroup members.

In discussing evidence on the black sheep effect, Marques and Páez (1994) drew from the general assumptions of the social identity framework. However, they raised a problem with this framework as regards the explanation of the entire set of results. Research on intergroup relations has long shown that ingroup members are expected to be more likeable than outgroup members (for example, Brewer, 1979). Therefore, it is true that an explanation based on a search for intergroup differentiation and clarity of group boundaries may partly account for more negative judgements of undesirable (that is, outgroup typical) than of desirable (that is, ingroup typical) ingroup members. A simple reading of the social identity framework would lead one to state that socially undesirable (that is, non-prototypical) ingroup members are disliked because they contribute negatively to the clearness of group boundaries. In turn, socially desirable (that is, prototypical) ingroup members would be liked, since they bolster such clearness (Hogg, 1992). However, this reasoning would fall short of explaining why unlikeable (that is, outgroup typical) outgroup members are not preferred to likeable (that is, ingroup typical) outgroup members. Indeed, in assuming that the subjects' basic motivation is to enhance intergroup differentiation, one should expect them to express more unfavourable feelings towards undesirable ingroup and desirable outgroup members.

These feelings would ensue from a negative reaction to those who threaten the intergroup boundaries. By the same token, subjects would express more favourable feelings towards desirable ingroup and undesirable outgroup members, who, by definition, bolster such boundaries. But, clearly, this was not the case. To Marques and Páez (1994), the social identity framework could account for the black sheep effect if it encompassed the idea that people derogate socially undesirable ingroup members as part of a cognitive-motivational strategy to purge from the group those ingroup members who negatively contribute to positive intergroup distinctiveness. In other words, derogation of unattractive, or deviate, ingroup members, and upgrading of attractive, or normative, ingroup members relative to outgroup members supports, or at least is concomitant with, intergroup differentiation. Based on this idea, they proposed an explanation based on what we can designate as 'subjective group dynamics'.

The notion of 'subjective group dynamics'

The notion of 'subjective group dynamics' was inspired by an articulation between self-categorization theory and theory and research on small-group processes (Marques & Páez, 1994). In brief, following self-categorization theory, self-stereotyping generates full interchangeability between ingroup members (including the self) as regards ingroup-defining standards. In other words, self-stereotyping would generate 'promotional interdependence' (Deutsch, 1968; Lott & Lott, 1965), or subjective interdependence between the self and other ingroup members. As a result, the value assigned to the social self concept depends on the value assigned to the salient ingroup members in the judgemental context. In this vein, the self should become fully interdependent from other ingroup members.

The above idea states a cognitive parallel between rejection of deviates in small groups and negative evaluations of unlikeable ingroup members in social categories which people conceptualize in terms of subjective belonging-ingness (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Hogg, 1992; Tajfel, 1978d). Moreover, the effects occurring in this latter case should be strengthened relative to those observed in face-to-face groups. In face-to-face groups, deviates are downgraded because they endanger the subjective validity of social reality and the likelihood of group goal achievement. In groups characterized by subjective membership, social reality exclusively amounts to self-definition. The only relevant social reality is the positive value assigned to the social self. Any potential jeopardy of this special aspect of social reality would, most likely, be experienced as more threatening than contingencies arising from other aspects of social reality.

The subjective full interdependence between ingroup members allied with the fact that self-definition engulfs the social reality of the cognitive group would have logical consequences at the judgemental level. Ingroup members who are perceived in line with expectations supporting the ingroup's relative

superiority should generate a state of subjective validity (Turner, 1991) of the positive social self. This would explain praise of likeable ingroup members as occurs in the black sheep effect. But other ingroup members whose perceived characteristics or behaviour hinders positive intergroup distinctiveness would spur strong hostility. This would explain derogation of ingroup deviates.

'Subjective group dynamics' and the cognitive construction of deviance

Recent research on perceptions of group variability indirectly supports the idea that derogation of ingroup deviates emerges as a way to subjectively secure perceived group cohesiveness and hence to validate the superiority of the ingroup relative to the outgroup as a whole. First, there is evidence that when social identity is threatened or dominated, individuals tend to perceive the ingroup as more homogeneous than the outgroup. Lorenzi-Cioldi and colleagues (for example, Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1988, 1993; Lorenzi-Cioldi, Eagly & Stewart, 1995), for instance, have shown that members of dominated groups tend more to see themselves as similar to an ingroup prototype (they see their group as an 'aggregate'), and focus more on the abstract features that characterize the ingroup. In turn, members of dominant groups tend to see themselves more as individualized instances of the category (they see their group as a 'collection') and focus more on interpersonal differences between ingroup members (Doise & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1990). Consistently with this phenomenon, evidence collected by Simon and colleagues (Simon & Brown, 1987; Simon & Hamilton, 1994) shows that members of minority or dominated groups consider themselves to be more similar to other ingroup members and judge the ingroup to be more homogeneous than do members of majorities or dominant groups. In the same vein, Doosje, Ellemers and Spears (1996) have found that members of low-status groups perceive the ingroup to be more homogeneous than the outgroup when their social identification is strong. In turn, members of high-status groups, or members of low-status groups whose identification is low, perceive the ingroup to be more heterogeneous.

Derogation of ingroup deviates as a function of lack of perceived ingroup cohesiveness

Clearly, the above-mentioned research allows us to parallel findings in small-group settings and evidence found using larger social categories. In both cases, threats to the group generate a striving on the part of group members to increase group cohesiveness, probably as a means to reinforce the positive aspects of their social identity (Marques & Páez, 1994). In small groups, derogation of group deviates allows undesirable members to be

purged from the group. One may thus logically reason that a similar process would occur when the basis for judgements is membership of cognitive categories.

Marques, Brito, Correia and Serôdio (1996, Experiment 2) have recently explored this idea. They divided their subjects in minimal groups according to a bogus test of imagination, and asked them to fill in an attitude questionnaire. The questionnaire was composed of several statements ordered from highly socially desirable to highly socially undesirable, and subjects were asked to choose, among those statements, the one with which they agreed the most. One week later, subjects were informed of their group membership (imagination type), and examined responses given by five ingroup or outgroup members to the attitude questionnaire. Figure 9.1 outlines the information provided to subjects about ingroup or outgroup members in the homogeneous and heterogeneous group conditions. As can be seen, in the homogeneous ingroup condition, all group members but one (the socially undesirable member) gave exactly the same response as the subject (item 6). When the ingroup was heterogeneous, two ingroup members gave the same response as the subject, two other members gave neighbouring responses, and one gave a socially undesirable response (item 2). This was reversed in the outgroup condition.

The subjects were then asked to judge one socially desirable member and one socially undesirable member (respectively, members X and Y, in Figure 9.1). Marques and colleagues (1996) predicted that subjects would derogate the unlikeable ingroup member more strongly in the heterogeneous ingroup than in the homogeneous ingroup condition, because, in the former condition, the socially undesirable ingroup member would be more threatening to the validation of the group's identity. In turn, no differences would emerge from evaluations of outgroup members. The data supported this idea. As can be seen in Figure 9.2, subjects derogated the undesirable ingroup member more than the undesirable outgroup member in the heterogeneous condition, and derogated the former member more strongly in this condition than in the homogeneous ingroup condition.

These results indicate that rejection of ingroup deviates may be a direct function of lack of ingroup cohesiveness around valued ingroup standards. When the ingroup is cohesive – that is, majority members uniformly adopt a valued position so that the group's norms are secured – group members seem to feel the presence of deviates as less threatening to the group than when the majority is more heterogeneous, and hence the group's normative system is more easily impaired by this presence.

**Derogation of ingroup deviates and upgrading of outgroup deviates
as a prescriptive means to legitimize ingroup norms.**

In more general theoretical terms, the above-summarized study suggests that intragroup differentiation is concomitant with intergroup differentiation

	Homogeneous group		Heterogeneous group	
Social desirability continuum of statements	Ingroup	Outgroup	Ingroup	Outgroup
1. 'Homosexuals should be exiled to appropriate facilities from which they should never be released so as not to endanger normal people'				A
2. 'Homosexuals should be housed in institutions and allowed to leave only on certain special occasions, as long as they do not endanger other people'	Y	A B C X	Y	B X
3. 'Homosexuality is an illness and homosexuals should be forced to undergo medical treatment'				C
4. 'Homosexuality is shameful and gays should at least try to disguise their tendency'				
5. 'Although they are normal, gays should be helped to find a better way'			C	
6. 'Gays, as everyone else, have the right to choose their own sexual life'	X A B C	Y	X B	Y
7. 'Homosexuality is adapted to modern society and, therefore, gays should be appointed to decision-making positions'			A	

Notes:
1. Statement '6' = subject's stand on the issue.
2. Distance of ingroup deviate member and outgroup deviate member (D) from their groups' modal positions = |4.00|.

Figure 9.1   *Manipulation of group uniformity and group members' status: distribution of ingroup and outgroup members' responses*

rather than just the outcome of a switch from one categorization level (for instance, 'type of imagination') to another (for instance, 'tolerance towards sexual minorities'). Obviously, the notion of 'norm' used in this context is akin to that proposed by Turner and colleagues to designate group proto-types, since it would correspond to the definition of the acceptable ingroup position on a social comparison dimension. However, we also propose that such norms encompass a prescriptive component: individuals would be normative not only as regards the 'denotative' prototypical definition of their group (a cognitive parallel, for instance, to Jones and Gerard's [1967] notion of 'informational influence'), but also in terms of a 'prescriptive' demand for compliance with this prototype (a cognitive parallel to Jones and Gerard's [1967] notion of 'normative influence').

Figure 9.2 *Evaluations of attractive and unattractive ingroup and outgroup members as a function of group uniformity (Marques, Brito, Correia & Serôdio, 1996, Experiment 2)*

The legitimizing role of outgroup 'converts'

In another set of studies, the present authors attempted to show that this process is indeed the outcome of an interplay between denotative and prescriptive norms, as defined above. Specifically, whereas denotative norms serve intergroup differentiation purposes, prescriptive norms serve ingroup legitimization purposes. As a result of prescriptive ingroup norm salience, subjects would not only downgrade ingroup members who fail to attune to these norms, but also upgrade outgroup members who attune to them.

In one study, Marques, Abrams and Páez (1996, Experiment 3) asked their subjects to examine a case of murder, purportedly as part of a study on jury decision-making. Subjects were informed that two opposed patterns of decision-making existed (patterns X and Y) and that their membership of one pattern would be detected on the basis of their criteria in judging the crime. Subjects were also to rank the six characters involved, from most to least responsible. One week later, subjects were informed that, according to their reasoning about the murder (but not according to their ranking), they belonged to one pattern. In one condition (norm condition), subjects were told that a norm existed according to which those who belonged to their pattern should rank the characters exactly as they had done, and that the opposed pattern should show the reverse ranking. In another condition (no norm condition), subjects did not receive this information. In both conditions, it was made explicit that the ranking did not indicate to which pattern individuals belonged. The only valid criterion was the way the rankings were justified by them. Subjects were then presented with the responses of five ingroup or five outgroup members. In the ingroup condition, these responses were constructed such that: (a) each subject's

		Modal member		Deviate member	
Rank	Subject's	Ingroup	Outgroup	Ingroup	Outgroup
1	A	A	B	D	C
2	C	C	D	B	A
3	F	F	E	E	F
4	E	E	F	F	E
5	D	D	C	A	B
6	B	B	A	C	D

Figure 9.3 *Example of ranking of characters A–F used to build modal and deviate members*

response fully matched the ingroup norm; (b) four ingroup members displayed exactly the same response; and (c) one ingroup member (deviate member) displayed a response similar but not identical to the outgroup. In the outgroup condition, the pattern of information was reversed. To clarify, Figure 9.3 exemplifies the way information was constructed to manipulate ingroup and outgroup members' modal or deviate status relative to the group norm.

Among other results, judgements of ingroup and outgroup as a whole were not affected by the norm information. In line with the classical ingroup bias, subjects evaluated the ingroup more favourably than the outgroup. That is, the categorization according to the X and Y pattern entailed intergroup differentiation. However, evaluations of modal and deviate group members varied according to whether subjects were or were not aware of the ranking norm. In the no norm condition, modal and deviate ingroup members were always judged more favourably than outgroup members. But, in the norm condition, modal ingroup members and deviate outgroup members were judged more favourably than deviate ingroup members and modal outgroup members. In other words, when no prescriptive norm existed, subjects behaved according to the same intergroup differentiation principle, in judgements of the whole groups, in judgements of modal members and in judgements of deviate members. However, when they were provided with information about such norms, their judgements diverged in the direction of the legitimization of the ingroup prescriptive norm (see Figure 9.4).

These results suggest that denotative and prescriptive norms simultaneously operate in judgements of groups and their members. They could not be accounted for simply in terms of the denotative character of the meta-contrast principle. Indeed, this principle would state that subjects would prefer normative ingroup members and normative outgroup members to counter-normative ingroup or outgroup members, because the former reinforce intergroup differentiation whereas the latter hinder such differentiation. If, however, another quality of norms (that is, prescriptive norms) served to legitimate the values underlying social identity, then subjects

Figure 9.4 *Effects of norm awareness on judgements of modal and deviate ingroup and outgroup members*

would prefer outgroup members, who, by subscribing to ingroup norms, would hinder intergroup differentiation, to outgroup members, who, by subscribing to outgroup norms would reinforce such differentiation. Whereas denotative norms serve to differentiate between ingroup and outgroup as a whole, prescriptive norms serve to legitimate such differentiation. In support of this interpretation, we found that, in the norm condition, identification with the group was associated with the derogation of the deviate ingroup member ($r = 0.32$) and to the upgrading of the deviate outgroup member ($r = 0.18$; meta-analytical average r regardless of correlation valence $= 0.26$). Instead, in the no norm conditions, identification with the ingroup was associated with a more favourable evaluation of the modal outgroup member ($r = 0.68$, $p < .02$). This result suggests that, in a minimal group situation, subjects' judgements follow the meta-contrast principle. They judge group members depending on their membership rather than on their contribution to the legitimization of ingroup norms, and value ingroup distinctiveness to the detriment of prescriptive aspects of normative ingroup conformity. However, when prescriptive norms enter the picture, subjects appear to simultaneously value intergroup distinctiveness and group members' normativity.

In another study (Marques, Abrams & Páez, 1996, Experiment 2), instead of manipulating subjects' awareness of a prescriptive norm, we manipulated the normative components of the judgemental setting: whereas some subjects were informed that their judgements of modal and deviate members would be scrutinized by typical ingroup members (ingroup accountability condition), others were informed that these judgements would be scrutinized by typical outgroup members (outgroup accountability condition). We reasoned that, if judgements uniquely depended on the meta-contrast principle, outgroup accountability would make intergroup comparison more salient. As a result, subjects would upgrade ingroup members relative to

Favourability

Figure 9.5   *Effects of ingroup and outgroup accountability on judgements of modal and deviate ingroup and outgroup members*

outgroup members, regardless of their normative status, *and* would show a stronger ingroup bias in judgements of the entire ingroup and outgroup. However, if judgements were guided by a prescriptive principle, ingroup accountability would enhance the prescriptive status of the judgements. As a result, subjects would derogate deviate ingroup members and upgrade deviate outgroup members more in this condition, while simultaneously showing a stronger ingroup bias in judgements of ingroup and outgroup as a whole. The results supported this idea. Subjects upgraded the ingroup as whole relative to the outgroup more in the ingroup accountability condition than in the outgroup accountability condition. At the same time, they derogated the deviate ingroup member and upgraded the deviate outgroup member more than when they were accountable to the outgroup (see Figure 9.5).

Again, correlational data showed that, in the ingroup accountability condition, the less subjects identified with the ingroup, the less they upgraded the deviate outgroup member. In the outgroup accountability condition, the correlation was also negative but non-significant ($r = -0.11$, n.s.). Together with the whole set of results, these data indicate that, in a strongly normative context (ingroup accountability or high normative awareness), subjects appear more motivated to legitimate ingroup norms by upgrading outgroup members who endorse, and by downgrading ingroup members who oppose, ingroup norms.

A model of intergroup and intragroup differentiation

The results of the studies summarized above suggest that, as predicted by self-categorization theory, and, specifically, the meta-contrast principle (e.g.

Hogg & McGarty, 1990), social categorization motivates individuals to engage in intergroup differentiation. But these results also suggest that the prescriptive context in which intragroup judgements arise strongly affects the subjects' responses. Ingroup members were downgraded when the ingroup lacked cohesiveness, as well as when prescriptive norms were made salient or the situation explicitly evoked the anticipated evaluation of relevant others (that is, ingroup members). It thus seems reasonable to suppose that derogation of ingroup members is a part of a more general process of 'subjective group dynamics'.

'Subjective group dynamics' and 'referent informational influence'

The relationship between the observed patterns of judgement and the constructs of social identity as a group's social reality as well as of absolute interdependence among ingroup members seems straightforward. Social categorization entails a sense of interdependence between the self and the representation of other ingroup members as a means to maintain a positive social identity. In turn, this social identity is built around cognitively represented group characteristics and behaviour standards whose maintenance is pivotal to positive intergroup differentiation. As a result, group members should be motivated to exert subjective control over ingroup members in order to sustain a sense of legitimacy of the ingroup's superior position relative to other groups. A threat to such legitimacy, and hence to the self, would arise with any perceived lack of conformity within the ingroup in light of the relevant ingroup standards. Subjectively control would be exerted especially over those ingroup members who threaten the overall positiveness of the group and its relative superiority over the outgroup.

In brief, we propose that group judgements may, in circumstances more complex than strictly minimal intergroup situations, arise from an 'implicit theory' of group processes in the individual's mind. With Figure 9.6, we have attempted to sketch the proposed process.

The basic idea underlying the process depicted in the figure is that derogation of some ingroup members occurs when, following social categorization individuals know the normatively appropriate behaviour to be adopted by ingroup members in order to protect a positive intergroup differentiation (Abrams, 1990). This corresponds to *referent informational influence* (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Turner, 1991; cf. also Hogg & Abrams, 1988). Ingroup members who are perceived as not observing these behaviour requirements will trigger 'subjective group dynamics'. They will enhance subjective social control in order to secure the positive ingroup differentiation. In the absence of perceived norm violation, the activated contrasting category labels will suffice to generate intergroup differentiation. This phenomenon can be explained in terms of a 'denotative' meta-contrast, and corresponds to the intergroup level, which represents the classical process of intergroup differentiation and social discrimination.

Figure 9.6   *A two-step process of inter- and intragroup judgement*

But when an intragroup distinction becomes salient and threatens inter-group differentiation, subjects will derogate ingroup members who do not comply with the ingroup standards. This corresponds to the intragroup level. In this vein, the intragroup level would correspond to a subjective effort intended to legitimize the intergroup differentiation, and to warrant

the ingroup's uniformity with regard to the prescribed standards that sustain ingroup's superiority.

Conclusion

We propose that in most circumstances normative intragroup differentiation may function as a foundation for intergroup differentiation and a positive social identity. This process can be viewed as the psychological equivalent of public actions of norm enforcement, like those we mentioned at the outset of this chapter. In this sense, norm violation is functional to group life, to the extent that the social control mechanisms it evokes help to define relevant criteria of group membership. Because the prescriptive norm only appears as such once it has been violated (Forsyth, 1995), deviance plays a basic role in defining the group's objectives and interests by generating (subjective or objective) social control (cf. Hamilton & Rauma, 1995). Moreover, active participation in the punishment of deviance may reinforce the individual's commitment to the norm, thus reinforcing social identification. In purely psychological terms, this process might function more or less as predicted by Bem's (1967) self-perception theory: when they lack a definite attitudinal position about an object, individuals may infer their attitude from their behaviours ('if I have punished a deviate person I infer that I have a clear attitude in favour of the norm'). Moreover, punishment rituals towards deviates may be viewed as part of an initiation process, to reinforce the positive evaluation of the group (cf. Zimbardo & Leippe, 1991).

It is obvious that the presently proposed process is still in need of theoretical and empirical scrutiny. But we hope that the ideas outlined in this chapter may serve as a valuable contribution to the study of the processes occurring in small and large groups alike, and a starting point for researching into the cognitive processes underlying the social construction of norms and deviance in daily life.

10

Categorization and Social Influence

Juan Antonio Pérez and Gabriel Mugny

A relevant dimension in studies of social influence is whether or not the targets of influences see themselves as sharing the same social category as the influence source. The most commonly advanced hypothesis is that the effects of categorization (whether at the cognitive level of accentuating intragroup similarities and intergroup differences, or at a more motivational level of ingroup favouritism and/or outgroup discrimination) should facilitate the influence of an ingroup source and diminish that of an outgroup source. However, it appears to be difficult to draw any general conclusion given that in practice experimental effects have not all consistently been in a single direction, especially if manifest and latent influences are distinguished (Moscovici, 1980). The first objective of this chapter is to review those studies which have varied the degree of identity between source and target, and the second is to present the principal conceptualizations of the links between categorization and influence.

The effects of categorization on influence

There is first of all a series of studies which have manipulated the categorization (ingroup or outgroup) of sources having a majority status (Doise, Gachoud & Mugny, 1986; Pérez, Mugny & Moscovici, 1986; Volpato, Maass, Mucchi-Faina & Vitti, 1990). Ingroup majorities have more (direct and immediate) influence than outgroup majorities. In those studies which have also considered indirect dimensions of influence, this ingroup majority advantage disappears in interaction with other factors.

Studies in which subjects are simultaneously exposed to minority and majority positions do not contradict and indeed confirm these findings. Thus, in the study by Pérez and Mugny (1987), the ingroup majority achieved greater direct influence than the outgroup majority, but at the indirect level this simple effect disappeared in interaction with the categorization of the minority. In the Clark and Maass (1988b) study, categorization of the majority was not varied – it was an ingroup – but it could be seen that it had more influence at the public level than either an ingroup or an outgroup minority. At the private level an interaction could again be observed with the categorization of the minority as either ingroup or outgroup.

In studies where the categorization involved is based on arbitrary criteria (such as whether one over- or underestimates the number of pupils attending secondary school, whether one is in the same classroom, and so on) the ingroup has more influence at the public level than the outgroup. This 'simple categorization' effect can even be observed when the source has a minority status (cf. two studies by Martin, 1988b, 1988c, and one by Papastamou et al., cited in Mugny & Pérez, 1991a, pp. 24–27), as well as when the minority or majority character of the source is not made salient (Wilder, 1990, study 1).

In two studies on attitudes towards abortion, in which gender was used as the basis for categorization, it was found that a male minority group had more influence than a female minority group. In the Maass, Clark and Haberkorn (1982) study they constituted an ingroup source (although when the variance was decomposed the effect did not reach significance), while in the Pérez and Mugny (1985b) study they represented an outgroup. This gender effect may be specific to the theme of abortion because in a task involving estimation of increases in study grants, Martin (1988b) found that a female minority group produced more public influence among other women than did a male minority group, while men were more influenced by a male source.

If one turns to consideration of another variable, the distance between the attitude of the target and that of the source, one finds similarly variable results. In the Clark and Maass (1988a) studies on homosexual rights, an outgroup (homosexuals) produced more influence than an ingroup source (heterosexuals) among those subjects most favourable to homosexual rights; the ingroup source, however, produced more influence than the outgroup source among subjects who had the least favourable attitudes. Mackie, Worth and Asuncion (1990) observed that the ingroup had a stronger influence than the outgroup but only among subjects who were most opposed and when the message contained a 'strong' argument. Using the theme of xenophobic attitudes, Mugny, Kaiser and Papastamou (1983) found the opposite interaction: the outgroup (a group of foreigners) had more influence than the ingroup (a group of fellow compatriots) on the most xenophobic subjects; an ingroup minority had more influence than an outgroup minority on those subjects whose own position was already closest to the anti-xenophobic message.

In four studies in which perception of the source was 'individualized' or 'personalized', ingroup and outgroup achieved the same degree of influence (Doise et al., 1986; Martin 1988a; Papastamou et al., cited in Mugny & Pérez, 1991a; Wilder, 1990).

Negotiating style (cf. Mugny, 1982) tends to interact with the identity of the source. In one study on 'green' attitudes, Mugny and Papastamou (1982) found that when influence targets are led to see themselves as similar in identity to the source of influence, the latter has more influence when the argument is made in a rigid style than when it is made in a more flexible style, when subjects are led to see themselves as dissimilar, it is the source

with the flexible style that is more influential. In a study on attitudes towards foreigners, Mugny and Pérez (1985) observed the same interaction effect. In the same vein, Mugny, Kaiser, Papastamou and Pérez (1984) discovered that a source sharing the same nationality arguing in favour of rights for foreigners had more influence if the argument was based on radical socio-political principles, while a source consisting of foreigners had more influence when the same case was argued from humanitarian principles.

Another problem concerns the effects of categorization in different influence conditions. In studies in which the school to which the source belongs is varied (same school as the subjects or a rival school), results when they have been significant have shown that the ingroup has more impact at the public level than the outgroup (Mackie et al., 1990; Martin, 1988a; Wilder, 1990). Martin observed that at the private level the outgroup had as much influence as the ingroup, both kinds of source producing more change than that of a control condition without a persuasive message.

In some studies measures of influence at both a direct and an indirect level have been available. Thus, in a paradigm based on musical preferences, Aebischer, Hewstone and Henderson (1984) found that an outgroup majority (from a different and devalued education establishment) had more indirect influence than a valued ingroup majority source, while there was no difference in direct influence. In a study of environmentalist attitudes (Pérez & Mugny, 1985a), it was found that when the persuasive message was seen to have derived from a single individual selected at random and not representative of the group, direct influence was greater than when the source was seen to represent the opinion of the entire group. However, at an indirect level the effects were reversed: the message representative of the group had more impact than the unrepresentative message. In a study involving attitudes on abortion and contraception (Pérez & Mugny, 1986a), the connotation of a source was manipulated (the source was characterized in terms of entirely positive attributes or entirely negative attributes), while the source was also an ingroup minority (same age-group as the subjects: young people) or an outgroup minority (different category: adults between 30 and 50 years old). The minority outgroup with positive connotations was more influential at the direct level than the outgroup with negative connotations, and more influential also than the ingroup with a positive image. At the level of indirect influence the most significant effect was that of the negative-image ingroup, as compared to the positive-image ingroup.

In two studies Volpato et al. (1990) measured the effects of categorization on creativity. They led subjects to believe that a committee either in their own town (ingroup) or in another town (outgroup) had produced two communiqués, one by the majority and the other by a minority, respectively opposing or favouring the establishment of a final exam at the completion of baccalaureat studies. They were exposed only to the argument in favour of this proposal. The results showed that a smaller number of subjects indicated they were in favour of the source's proposition when this was

presented as originating from an ingroup minority. The proposition was more widely accepted when it was attributed to an ingroup majority or indeed an outgroup minority. Although the direct influence of an ingroup minority was shown to be less than in these other two conditions, in these two studies this same condition produced a higher proportion of subjects who invented new solutions to solve the problem.

Finally, on the matter of differentiated influence, Mugny et al. (1983) reported that under certain conditions an outgroup arguing on humanitarian grounds had greater delayed influence than the same outgroup using a socio-political argument.

These, in summary, are the effects which have been observed of categorization on social influence. It must be acknowledged that their diversity and complexity is such that the most prudent conclusion would be to admit that there is no systematic effect associated with categorization as such, nor any straightforward relation between categorization and type of influence. The hypothesis that there is an ingroup bias in influence has therefore to be regarded as inadequate; the variables moderating the effects of categorization appear to be as numerous as the paradigms. Perhaps this disparity of manipulations reflects a belief that 'simple categorization' (cf. Tajfel, Flament, Billig & Bundy, 1971) is sufficient to produce intergroup effects, and, by analogy, differences in social influence. This leads us to consider what are currently the most elaborate explanations in this field, and to ask to what extent they can account for this diversity.

Independence and heterogeneity of the source

Wilder invoked independence and heterogeneity of the source (1977, 1978, 1990; cf. also Harkins & Petty, 1981, 1983, 1987) to account for conformity in restricted groups, and more recently to explain why one should expect an ingroup to have more influence than an outgroup. The idea is that the individuals who comprise a group have more influence if they are perceived as independent entities than if they are perceived as a collective entity. The reasons advanced for this are, on the one hand, that information provided by a group is treated with less care (for example, in a less personalized and less specific manner), and, on the other, that members perceived as a group are considered less credible because they are attributed less independence. Recently, Wilder (1990) has used this argument to predict that an ingroup will have more influence than an outgroup. His reasoning is that the target starts from the presupposition of a greater homogeneity among outgroup members than among the members of his or her own group. The target would recognize finer distinctions within the ingroup which would lead to a perception of members of the ingroup as more independent of one another. The same author argued that his is not a motivational explanation of ingroup superiority (it does not appeal to a motive of ingroup favouritism or of discrimination against the outgroup), but rather a cognitive explanation,

based on perception of the homogeneity or heterogeneity of members of the influence source. A series of four experiments illustrates this model (Wilder, 1990), and to these may be added two studies by Mackie et al. (1990) which show that the message attributed to an ingroup is given greater attention than one attributed to an 'other' group.

One difficulty posed by this analysis is the implication that an ingroup is nothing but an aggregation of separate individuals. Thus the comparison made is between an aggregate of individuals and an outgroup rather than between an ingroup and an outgroup. This does not take into account recent developments in the theory of levels of self-categorization (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987), according to which three such levels may be distinguished: a superordinate level at which individuals see themselves as identical to all other human beings; an intermediate level at which the social identity of the individual is defined by the assertion of differences between groups or categories of membership and non-membership; and finally a subordinate level which defines personal identity in terms of categorization of the self as a unique being, distinct from all others including members of one's own group. From this perspective, 'personalized' perception is not synonymous with ingroup categorization. If this argument is conceded, it would appear that Wilder's model, rather than explaining the ingroup–outgroup difference, is more suited to accounting for the superior influence of a personalized source (whether belonging to an ingroup or an outgroup) as compared to that of a source perceived in more 'depersonalized' or homogeneous terms.

The results of a study (Pérez, Mugny & Navarro, 1991) justify our stress on the importance of these distinctions. In this study subjects were required to react to a message either in personal terms (subordinate level of self-categorization), or in 'social terms', which is to say at the intermediate level, in one of two ways: either to react as a representative of their membership group (in this case young people) or as a member of the outgroup (adults). The results show that direct influence is greater when the message is treated in either personal or ingroup terms. These findings are consistent with the predictions of Wilder's model. However, at the indirect level, while influence remains strong in the personalized condition, it disappears in the ingroup condition, an effect which confirms the importance of not confounding the personalized level with the intergroup level. Additionally, indirect influence was found in reaction to the message in intergroup terms. This set of results is interpretable in terms of the notion of ingroup paralysis: under the conditions provided subjects conform to positions prototypical of the ingroup, which has the effect of paralysing examination of other positions from a personal point of view or from any other point of view which is not that of the ingroup. In this case the ingroup introduces a resistance to change and innovation. In a series of studies Sánchez-Mazas, Pérez, Navarro, Mugny and Jovanovic (1993) have confirmed that when subjects are led to the self-perception that in terms of their attitudes they are identical to their own group, this paralyses any change in their attitudes.

Influence according to self-categorization theory

Self-categorization theory treats influence as an intergroup phenomenon (cf. Turner, 1981a, 1991). The fundamental factors are the level of self-categorization and the ways in which individuals seem to operate to determine the validity of their opinions and behaviour. In the first place individuals begin by anticipating that their judgements and actions in a given task will coincide with those of other members perceived as similar to the self and who are regarded as a comparison group appropriate to the situation. Individuals will be confident that their own judgements are valid to the degree that similar others are observed to express the same opinions or behave in the same way in the situation.

Uncertainty and loss of confidence in their judgements and behaviours increase when individuals find themselves in disagreement with other group members whom they perceive, despite the disagreement, as similar to themselves, which is to say as an ingroup. Insofar as this disagreement cannot be attributed to differences between the self and the group this theory predicts a change in judgements or behaviours in the direction of those of the group or of those which best represent the ingroup consensus; those which are most prototypical.

No such expectation exists when the others are perceived as different, which is to say as an outgroup. Disagreement in this case can be attributed to differences in group membership, according to the principle of categorial differentiation (Doise, 1976). Consequently, disagreement with the outgroup produces little uncertainty, and it is not anticipated that individuals in these circumstances would change their judgements or their behaviour.

In the application of his theory to minority influence, Turner (1991) claims in addition that for a minority to exert influence it must present itself, or be perceived, as forming part of the ingroup (and not an outgroup), which is to say a subgroup that defends a pro-normative position within the ingroup. He predicts a reduction in direct influence if the disagreement the minority introduces in the group is polarized to the point of turning it into an intergroup, and not simply an intragroup, conflict.

This theory tends also to account for differences between direct and indirect influence in terms of the level of self-categorization which obtains at any particular moment. Thus a minority categorized as an outgroup will have less influence, whether direct or indirect. In order for minorities to produce direct influence they must be perceived as part of the ingroup. On the other hand, if a minority produces a conversion effect (indirect influence), this will be because the comparison is made within a broader context in which the minority is perceived as an integral part of the ingroup, and because at this superordinate level of categorization, its alternative norm is congruent with the norms and values of the ingroup.

This theory offers one of the most complete explanations for the tendency of an outgroup to have less influence than an ingroup. An initial problem, however, is that the theory tends to predict both a direct and an indirect

influence of an ingroup majority and does not take account of the latent paralysis effect which appears to be precisely the effect of overt conformity (Sánchez-Mazas et al., 1993). A further difficulty is that it does not allow for the fact that an ingroup minority produces less direct influence than an outgroup minority or one which is not explicitly categorized as an ingroup. Additionally, the explanation it offers for conversion does not seem to be entirely convincing. In particular, in several studies, it has been found that in the same situation the same source which does not produce a direct influence does produce indirect influence. Is one supposed to believe that in this situation the influence source is perceived simultaneously at two levels of categorization and that, for example, when faced with an item reflecting direct influence subjects see the source as an outgroup, but when they encounter an indirect item they perceive the same source as part of the ingroup? There is a similar difficulty in seeing how it is possible that at a public level the influence source could be categorized as an outgroup but at a private level as an ingroup, or how a public context could prime an intergroup context while in a private context priming a superordinate intragroup context. These possibilities certainly cannot be excluded but no research has yet supported such dynamics.

Dissociation theory

The need to relate different levels of influence to one another is taken into consideration by dissociation theory, which we will now present. Briefly, this theory makes a general distinction between two levels of influence: first, manifest influence, which includes public, immediate and direct influence; and, second, latent influence, which covers influence at the private, delayed and indirect levels. It provides a basis for relating processes that account for manifest influence (and which the subject can control) to the processes underlying latent influence (which the subject is less able to control consciously).

Manifest influence and positive social identity

Manifest influence is a function of normative and informational dependence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). The importance of normative dependence relates to the individual's motivation to acquire, to present or to preserve a positive self-image or self-concept. Given that one function of manifest influence is protection of a positive social identity, one is influenced at this level by sources able to exercise the strongest normative pressures or in situations in which modifications in judgements allow one to avoid costs or gain more credit than if one maintained one's independence. Susceptibility to manifest influence also flows from the uncertainties felt by the subject, such that the more the source is able to engender uncertainty in the subject (by virtue of the former's credibility, ingroup identity or majority status), the greater the source's influence.

Latent influence and social constructivism

By latent influence we do not have in mind only private influence but all influence reflecting constructivist activity. Thus, for example, it includes the case in which subjects change on dimensions which can be inferred through the operation of a given mental activity. This concerns the attention the target pays to what the source says (to its message, its judgement, its attitude, and so on), the deployment of an innovative form of thought which allows the target to derive or discover new functions and ramifications on the basis of the information provided, to establish new connections between the content given and other contents, as well as the elaboration of a new representation of the question. Some authors have discussed these kinds of activity under the heading of validation processes (Butera, Legrenzi, Mugny & Pérez, 1990–1991; Moscovici, 1980), others under the heading of divergent thinking (Nemeth, 1986). Huguet, Mugny and Pérez (1990–1991) also use the concept of decentration. Within the set of paradigms dealing with attitudes and opinions, these activities have been described as inferences about the organizing principle underlying a position (Pérez & Mugny, 1986b). In all these cases, however, the same basic hypothesis underlies these various designations: mental activity is required if a latent mode of influence is to arise out of social interaction, and it will occur only in the context of certain kinds of social relationship and not others.

Postulates of dissociation theory

To the degree that manifest influence is directly observable by others or is, ultimately, something of which subjects themselves are conscious, then subjects' identity is at stake whenever they are influenced by any source, and dissociation theory recognizes that identification is more probable in the face of an ingroup source. This hypothesis indicates that a message emanating from an ingroup is more likely to be accepted, even if it is not read or processed, than a message originating with an outgroup source.

This more positive attitude towards whatever originates in the ingroup can, especially when the subject is highly involved or motivated, give rise to a higher degree of attention to a message attributed to an ingroup and thus a more elaborated processing of the message as compared to one from an outgroup. Faced with an ingroup, because identification is more intense the message can then be accepted with a less defensive attitude and the subject can feel more motivated to pay attention to it. One may therefore predict that in certain conditions there will be direct but also indirect influence. This will only happen, however, if the situation does not induce a paralysis and if identification with the ingroup is positively valued and poses no conflict of identification.

In order for the ingroup to have indirect influence, one basic condition must be satisfied: subjects must perceive a divergence between their own position and that of their group. One risk for an ingroup is that if

individuals perceive the group to be in agreement with their own position, and this accords with an anticipated homogeneity of attitudes, they will develop a socio-cognitive paralysis, the consequence of which is to inhibit the activity necessary for the emergence of indirect influence. The attitudinal proximity which individuals often establish through their manifest conformity to the ingroup can therefore by this same process limit the latter's impact to a pattern of influences similar to compliance (positive manifest influence combined with zero latent influence), as has been observed in a number of studies (cf. Pérez et al., 1991; Sánchez-Mazas et al., 1993). One way of motivating subjects to process the ingroup message is therefore to lead them to perceive a normative conflict between their own position and that of their group, which flows not from a simple self-categorization but from an intragroup conflict.

Another difficulty for the ingroup arises in the case of identification conflict (cf. Mugny et al., 1983; Mugny & Pérez, 1991b), in which individuals are aware of belonging to a group which has little positive value and may even be negatively valued, or in which they risk being identified with such a group. In these cases, identity with or similarity to this ingroup threatens the maintenance or construction of a positive social and personal identity. Would individuals let themselves be publicly and manifestly influenced by a socially discredited group posing such a conflict of identification? In fact it is not enough to respond that in all probability they would not let themselves be influenced; it is also important to recognize what would happen at a latent level in such a situation. A basic postulate of dissociation theory is that the more that socio-cognitive activities and attention are occupied in creating a disidentification or social differentiation from a source of influence, the less these are concerned with the influence message. In the event that individuals come to give any attention to the message and to analyse it, this is undertaken on the basis of a motivation to construct a differentiation so that a negative processing of the message tends to predominate.

Let us imagine a situation in which the target of influence does not wish to be identified with the source of influence and that in one case this involves an ingroup source and in another an outgroup source.

In the situation where the influence source is perceived to be an ingroup with which the influence target does not wish to be seen to be identified (for example, the case of a discredited minority), the available data suggest that ingroup favouritism is indeed not the dominant strategy. Studies by Marques (1990) on what he has described as the black sheep phenomenon provide a direct illustration of the way in which a negatively valued ingroup can be the object of more discrimination than an equally negatively valued outgroup. The reason for this is that the more intense the identification is (for example, by virtue of a strong identity or similarity between individual and group), the more effort and activity will be required, should the occasion arise, to try to disidentify. This is the reason why ingroup influence may be zero at the latent as well as at the manifest level.

It can thus prove to be more positive for social identity to discriminate against an ingroup rather than an outgroup, or to favour the outgroup to the detriment of the ingroup. Indeed, an outgroup source can paradoxically have a net advantage, particularly at the latent level, over an ingroup source. Given that the ties of identification are less close with an outgroup, it seems reasonable to predict that disidentification with such a group requires less activity and effort, because in this case a ready-made differentiation is provided; it is founded on differences of group membership. The mental activity generating latent effects will no longer be confounded with the activity of differentiation, the two being immediately dissociated.

A major hypothesis of dissociation theory is that even in situations involving intense conflict a source categorized as an outgroup will be more likely to produce dissociation, to the degree that social differentiation is assured by the existence of a pre-established categorization, or that the differences are so great that to shift in the direction of the source's responses carries no risk of a 'categorial confusion' (Lemaine, 1974). This dynamic is also involved when the space for comparison of subject with source is multidimensional, such that there is no negative interdependence between source and target of influence (Pérez & Mugny, 1990). But this does not imply that an outgroup source will have direct influence. In reality, at the direct level it is the categorization processes that operate, as it were quite naturally. However, to the degree that this social differentiation is dissociated from message reception, conversion effects towards outgroup positions can appear. If for one reason or another the subject does not come to dissociate reception of the message from construction of this differentiation, the outgroup will no longer have any significant indirect effect (Butera, Huguet, Mugny & Pérez, 1994).

Conversion dynamics and the nature of the task

Let us acknowledge that at the psychological level the influence situation produces a dissociation of the relation with the source from the processing of the message. One question remains then unanswered, namely: what can motivate the subject, particularly when faced with an outgroup, to process the content of the message?

A first possibility is that epistemic expectations intervene which are specific to the nature of task to which the outgroup's divergent judgement relates. For example, in objective, non-ambiguous tasks (of the type used by Asch, 1956) for which only one correct response, whatever its provenance, is assumed to be possible, the influence mechanism of an outgroup generally rests upon the motivation of the subject to re-establish uniformity of judgements. In such a situation and given the impossibility of changing the source, it is the subject who ends up changing, always at the latent level, in order to reconcile social differentiation and epistemological beliefs concerning the necessity of consensus (Butera et al., 1994).

When tests of ability are involved (for example, estimating distances) and subjects presuppose that there do exist objectively correct answers but do not know what they are and so feel uncertain of their ability, outgroups can achieve an influence by the triangulation effect already described: outgroups' judgements can be perceived as valid by virtue of their socially independent origins (cf. Goethals, 1972).

When the tasks involve opinions, differentiation from the outgroup at the level of attitudes itself constitutes an epistemological requirement (Pérez, Mugny, Llavata & Fierres, 1993) which accounts for manifest discrimination. The indirect effects of an outgroup (in particular when this is a minority) arise from the fact that dissociation allows a centration on the contents and initiates a debate about ideas (Billig, 1985). Examination of a contrary argument, even if this is in order to resist it, implies in particular that one increases one's exposure to information from the other. Here then, as in the case of denial (Falomir, Mugny & Pérez, 1996), a process of social cryptoamnesia may be engaged through which, paradoxically, ideas may be internalized whose social origins may be forgotten as a result of dissociation (cf. Mugny & Pérez, 1991b).

Certain social minorities (for example, black people) may also constitute outgroups protected by the Zeitgeist in such a way that discrimination towards them is socially censured, at least for a significant proportion of society. In this case, a double effect can be produced. At a manifest level there may be on the one hand, a greater influence (reflecting social desirability) which does not, however, generalize to the latent level, and, on the other, an effect close to socio-cognitive paralysis. Paradoxically it is when subjects discriminate against minorities that they experience a conflict the resolution of which can provoke a change in latent attitudes (cf. Pérez, Mugny, Llavata & Fierres, 1993). The occurrence of racist, xenophobic or sexist acts can therefore be in conflict with norms and values of justice and social equality accepted more generally by subjects. The self-reproach arising from this discrimination can thus act as a mechanism for change in latent attitudes.

Conclusion

It is clear that intergroup dynamics, at least with respect to social influence, are not confined to the habitually recognized effects of social categorization (accentuation of intragroup similarities and intergroup differences). They also involve strategies for constructing or maintaining a positive social identity, and can additionally disfavour the ingroup or favour the outgroup, in particular as a function of whether or not the social context threatens the targets' personal and social identities in their relations with salient entities in the categorial field.

Of the two factors that are fundamental to understanding social influence in an intergroup context, one certainly is the dynamic of identification or

differentiation, but the other is the conflict created by the divergent position of a source of influence. Simply categorizing a source as ingroup to produce identification is insufficient to guarantee influence, whether at the manifest or the latent level. It is the divergence and conflict which determine matters in one direction or the other and these alone are able to account for latent processes of constructivism.

In all cases, divergence creates a conflict by reason of epistemological presuppositions about the task, in particular expectations about consensus or dissensus. Categorization therefore is not alone in playing an active role, processes of influence have their own autonomy by virtue of the relational but also socio-cognitive conflicts which they introduce. From this point of view, dissociation theory seems to provide a tool which allows us, to a greater degree than models offering a single-process view of intergroup effects, to organize the multiple dynamics which can arise from the interaction between categorization and social influences.

Note

11

Social Identity and Interpersonal Relationships

Miguel Moya

Attraction and interpersonal relationships

The emotional-sexual relationships established between men and women resulting from attraction (from here on referred to as 'relationships between couples') can, at first, be considered as being situated close to the interpersonal end of the interpersonal–intergroup continuum, already mentioned in previous chapters of this book. This can be deduced both from the classical research carried out in social psychology and the formulations of some authors classified as social identity theorists.

The traditional approach towards studying attraction and interpersonal relationships has always placed special emphasis on considering them from the perspective of the individual, without bearing in mind the social or intergroup dimension. This is reflected not only in the most commonly used phrase to define this study area – 'interpersonal attraction' – but also in the approaches and theories used to explain these phenomena.

The main theoretical focal points used to explain attraction are the theories of cognitive consistence, exchange and interdependence (Kelley & Thibaut, 1978) and those based on the principles of association and reinforcement (Byrne, 1971). All these, as well as the factors used to measure attraction (proximity, similarity, reciprocity, among others), refer fundamentally to peculiar characteristics of individuals involved in the interaction.

Some authors working within the social identity theory framework have also argued that this particular type of male–female relationships can be placed close to the interpersonal end of the continuum (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Huici, 1984). There is a tendency to consider male–female relationships as intergroup when the treatment shown towards people belonging to another sex group is undifferentiated, which implies minimal or almost non-existent knowledge of them. In this case it is likely that stereotyped perception of the outgroup will appear, in addition to intergroup conflict and ingroup favouritism. On the other hand, interpersonal male–female relationships tend to be characterized by a one-to-one relationship, a married or heterosexual couple.

Relationships between couples as intergroup relationships

This heading could also be termed: 'Interpersonal relationships as intergroup relationships', which would be no mere play on words. Our intention here is to show that despite the fact that relationships between couples have been traditionally referred to as 'interpersonal relationships', and have thus had to be placed close to the interpersonal end of the continuum, there in fact exist a number of powerful intergroup aspects within them. Indeed, these have been acknowledged by the above-mentioned authors.

For example, Huici (1984) argues that the existence of power and status differences between women and men in society, the consensual agreement on differential perceptions of each sex and the virtual universality of the discrimination based on sex tend to locate interactions between members of gender categories close to the intergroup end of the continuum. Hogg and Abrams (1988) or Williams and Giles (1978) come to similar conclusions. Here we would like to emphasize that the consideration of these power differences between sexes or the existence of outgroup discrimination (features closely related to the intergroup extreme) does not necessarily need to appear associated with anonymous or collective interactions or those which occur in the professional or public spheres. An interaction between two people, although charged with positive affection, with completely idiosyncratic characteristics and situated within the sphere of intimacy, may still reveal powerful intergroup features.

The definitions of intergroup behaviour given by both Sherif (1967) and Tajfel (1978a), clearly show that what distinguishes interpersonal from group or intergroup behaviour is not the number of people implied. Take, for example, the hypothetical case of the businessman X who turns down the woman Y's application to work in his office because he considers that women are less intelligent and capable than men. If this case involved only a man and a woman, it would appear to be clearly based on an intergroup relationship, given that the businessman's behaviour (male) with regards to the candidate (female) was exclusively concerned with her belonging to the above group and not with her personal qualities. As Brown (1988) shows, in order to establish at what point of the interpersonal–intergroup continuum is situated an interaction between two people from different social categories (such as male and female), we need to study in close detail the nature of that very interaction. If the behaviour and attitude of the man towards the woman (or vice versa) is that stereotypically associated with each gender, we can then begin to talk of intergroup behaviour. If this turns out to be impossible, the interaction's idiosyncratic features will emerge in a more interpersonal relationship.

In most societies (although our data refer only to the Western world), boyfriends and girlfriends, wives and husbands and fathers and mothers behave differently, although coinciding to a great extent with the stereotypes and roles that society associates with men and women (Peplau, 1983). A good example of this is that commonly heard saying: 'I can't do that,

because I'm a married man (woman).' In this way, we can safely say that couples, even those characterized by high intimacy levels, also reveal important intergroup aspects. We will now go on to discuss our approach in more detail, referring to two areas in which uniformities can be seen in both male and female behaviour in a relationship between couples.

(1) *Conception of a couple.* The majority of studies, carried out with middle-class American college students, reveal great similarities in the expectations and conceptions that boys and girls have of couples and heterosexual relationships in general, although some differences have been found. While women from all cultural and economic backgrounds generally grant a great value to affection and companionship in their relationships, only male college students – but not those from a working-class background – coincided with these feelings (Peplau & Gordon, 1985). Likewise, women grant a great importance to intimate communication in their relationships with men (Parelman, 1983). In general, men tend to have more traditional beliefs with regard to their relationships with women, in keeping with male roles and stereotypes (Peplau & Gordon, 1985). This result is as expected given that the traditional concept of a couple would appear to benefit men as opposed to women.

(2) *Professional development and economic responsibility.* In accordance with traditional gender stereotypes, economic responsibility for both the couple's and family's welfare falls on the shoulders of the male. Greater priority is therefore given to his professional career. This is clearly reflected, along with other signs, in the proportion of men and women who work outside the home.

Kotkin (1983) found that 70% of married women at university had, in his study, sacrificed something (for example, economic support, change of address, renunciation of own career) to aid their partner's university studies or professional life, while only 10% of men had made the same sacrifice for their female partners. It will, therefore, come as no surprise that women intending to study at university or work hard at a professional career are often less committed to their couple (Rubin, Peplau & Hill, 1981). However, aside from the priority given to men's professional aspirations over women's, we are also concerned with the fact that simply getting married and having a family can act as an obstacle for women's professional success. For example, when Harrison, Moore and Rucker (1985) studied the biographies of more than two thousand eminent men and women who had appeared in various editions of *Who's Who*, they found that it was less likely for successful women to marry and have children, and more likely that they would get divorced. In the same way, Etaugh and Riley (1983) have shown that single women have higher income levels, from both employment and education, than their married counterparts, while the reverse model is true in the case of men.

Another research area which would appear to reinforce the notion that women retreat from professional life within a couple deals with the image men have of successful women (in keeping with the traditional gender stereotypes), especially those working in typically male fields. In general, these studies portray a negative image, meaning that, to male eyes, these women would appear to be less attractive as partners (Pfost & Fiore, 1990).

Thus, it would seem that although couples can be categorized as inter-personal (as they involve two people, possess strong levels of intimacy and affection and can vary greatly in nature), they also possess strong intergroup elements: they emphasize the similarities of male attitudes and behaviours, on the one hand, and the similarities of female attitudes and behaviours, on the other, and in doing so they follow the traditional gender stereotypes. The fact that stereotyped concepts of gender are used in couples to evaluate and establish their behaviour (more so than other concepts) is hardly surprising, given that a great many of these stereotypes refer to male–female rela-tionships. Thus, it would seem perfectly acceptable for a traditionally minded male to ask his wife to 'take the initiative' with regard to domestic problems and their children's education, or even in the realm of her work outside the home, but not in her direct dealings with him.

Relationships between interpersonal and intergroup aspects

There exist three fundamental ways of connecting the interpersonal and the intergroup: (1) as orthogonally related; (2) as qualitatively different aspects of reality; and (3) as parts of a continuous flow. We shall examine each in turn.

1. Orthogonality of both dimensions

Stephenson (1984) was one of the first researchers who, from within social identity theory, established the possibility that the interpersonal and inter-group need not be placed at opposite ends of a single dimension but rather act as two independent dimensions. In this way, a relationship could be placed at a given point in a bi-dimensional space, resulting from the intersection of both dimensions, as shown in Figure 11.1.

It is possible that there exist certain emotional-sexual relationships between men and women in which neither interpersonal nor intergroup aspects are of great importance. This would be the case in an incipient relationship in which contact between the two members of the couple is rather low – the fact that both interpersonal and intergroup requirements are low does not imply that they are of equal importance. In this case, it is likely that the intergroup aspect would predominate over the interpersonal. Other relationships can reflect a high intergroup requirement and a low interpersonal one: marriages of convenience provide a good example, or

INTERGROUP DEMANDS

High

'Compromise'   'Conflict'

High ————————————————————+———————————————— Low

INTERPERSONAL   INTERPERSONAL
DEMANDS   DEMANDS

'Collusion'   'Apathy'

Low

INTERGROUP DEMANDS

Figure 11.1   *Interpersonal and intergroup demands according to Stephenson (1984)*

those marriages typically found in the Victorian age, in which intimacy was
virtually non-existent and almost the entire relationship and the behaviour
of the couple had been already established by social criteria. Relationships
with a high interpersonal and a low intergroup component would be those
in which the couple challenges established social criteria concerning behav-
iour and attitudes expected from men and women involved in a love affair
and create a complete different and unique relationship. Finally, it should
also be possible to find relationships in which both the interpersonal and
intergroup aspects are present. A graphic example of this could be the
relationship portrayed in Liliana Cavanni's film *The Night Porter*. This
story concerns an ex-Nazi official and a former female prisoner who main-
tain a passionate relationship that reflects (to a great extent) intergroup
requirements since a great part of their behaviour is stereotypical (domi-
nance, aggression, and so on, in the male and submission, passivity, and so
on, in the female). However, at the same time, interpersonal aspects are
equally important: the relationship is deeply idiosyncratic and strange,
considering they belong to entirely separate groups, their romance thus
being distinguished from the millions of male–female relationships estab-
lished during the Second World War.

    An example of the simultaneity of interpersonal and intergroup aspects
appears in our study (Moya, 1987) on social episodes. Following Forgas's

approach (1979) a number of subjects (60 female and 36 male psychology students, 9 male and 13 female student nurses and 23 housewives) were asked to indicate the perceived similarity among a set of situations representing usual interactions with members of the opposite sex and rate these same situations on 15 bipolar scales. Both the situations and the scales had been obtained in a previous session and were all representative of the heterosexual interactions of each group. Examples of these interactions include 'talking on the telephone with a boyfriend/girlfriend', 'having sexual contact', or 'studying with colleagues'. Here, our interest lies in those episodes in which the member of the opposite sex is a partner. For example, in the case of the housewives, these episodes included: 'speaking with my husband', 'having a drink with my husband', 'making love with my husband', and in the case of the student nurses, 'eating with my partner', 'having arguments with my partner', 'making love with my partner' and 'waking up next to my partner'.

The results show that the subjects perceive these episodes as intergroup interactions, in the sense that they consider their behaviour here as being very similar to that of members of the same sex (remember that uniformity is one of the fundamental characteristics of intergroup behaviour). Thus, on the scale of 0 to 9 points whose extremes were 'I behave differently to how a member of my sex would' and 'I behave in a similar way . . .', the scores obtained in those episodes involving a couple were the following: 7.3 in male psychology students and 7.7 in female; 4.15 in male student nurses and 6.3 in female; and 6.92 in housewives. At the same time, however, these interactions were perceived as being highly interpersonal, since the subjects saw themselves as expressing great intimacy, emotional involvement and dignity. They also believed that they expressed themselves spontaneously in the relationship and felt treated as persons. This is confirmed by the results of a multidimensional scale analysis (INDSCAL by Carroll & Chang, 1970) of the ratings of the interaction episodes on the 15 bipolar scales. See, for example, the episodic space obtained by the housewives, where two dimensions proved sufficient to represent the space.

The first dimension was defined by the scales 'passive–active' (–.86), 'intimate–non-intimate' (–.79), 'boring–interesting' (–.71), 'intense–superficial' (–.58) and 'frustrating–rewarding' (–.51). To our way of thinking, this dimension clearly refers to the emotional aspect of the episodes – which could be termed intimacy – and is related with the person's degree of emotional involvement in the situation. The episodes 'chatting with our child', 'making love with my husband', 'playing with our child' and 'interactions with friends' were situated at one extreme, while 'speaking with the children's teacher' and 'going to the doctor' were placed at a midway point on the dimension. Finally, at the other extreme were positioned the shortest interactions with virtual strangers (shopkeeper, baker, gas man). The second dimension was defined by aspects of dignity, equality and control perceived by the person in the episode, the scales defining this dimension being: 'relaxed–tense' (–.89), 'pleasant–unpleasant' (–.8), 'cooperative–

competitive' (−.8), 'free-coerced' (−.79), 'I feel treated as a person–I don't feel treated as a person' (−.77), 'I know how to behave–I don't know how to behave' (−.75), 'I express myself as I am–I don't express myself as I am' (−.74) and 'reciprocated–not reciprocated' (−.71). At one extreme of this dimension were located the following episodes: 'a man is pursuing her', 'quarreling with our child', 'going to the doctor', 'speaking to the children's teacher' and 'speaking to an office worker'. At the midway point more superficial episodes were placed ('going to the hairdressers', 'chatting with a neighbour') and at the other extreme were situated 'making love with my husband' and the relationships with children and neighbours.

As can be seen, there is no interpersonal–intergroup dimension along which the interactions of these housewives with men can be placed subjectively so that interpersonal episodes could be placed at one extreme – relationship with partner or with child – and the intergroup ones at the other – a man is pursuing her, going to the hairdresser. An interpersonal relationship (for example, with their child) is perceived in an entirely different way depending on whether the housewife is playing or arguing with him/her.

2. The interpersonal and intergroup as qualitatively different aspects of identity

Kay Deaux (1992, 1993) has recently established that social and personal identities, rather than being clearly distinguishable, are in fact deeply inter-related. According to Deaux, social identities can be defined as those roles or categories within which a person feels represented. Personal identity would refer to those features or forms of behaviour which a person feels adequately describe him/herself; these characteristics are often intimately associated with one or more social identities. In this way, a male X can regard himself as being very much a typical man, similar to the majority of men in his social surroundings (social identity), and at the same time consider himself as 'affectionate' (personal identity). This latter characteristic is probably more associated with his belonging to the category of father, grandfather or spouse than to that of a military officer (imagine that this male belongs to all these categories or plays all these social roles). In this way, personal identity is defined, at least in part, by our membership of a group, at the same time as these group memberships will, in themselves, be charged with personal meaning.

It should also be borne in mind that identity can be perceived as a hierarchical structure in which groups of identities are related to categories of characteristics or attributes. For example, the identity of a female Y would be exemplified as shown in Figure 11.2. The upper part of the figure shows social identities and the lower – as if it were a mirror – the components of a personal identity.

One of Deaux's primary concerns surrounds this hierarchical structure of social identity. The higher a determined identity, the more behavioural

Figure 11.2 *Example of a hypothetical identity taken from Deaux's formulation and Moya's data (Moya, 1989; Moya & Peplau, in preparation)*

Table 11.1   *Meta-contrast ratios in self-perception and the four stimuli used by Moya and Peplau*

	UCLA	Granada
Person involved in a couple	1.09	1.25
University student	1.22	1.13
Professional	1.03	0.88
Committed to their family	0.95	1.04

repercussions this will have for an individual. Although it is likely that certain exceptional identities occupy high positions in almost all individuals in a society (such as being male or female), it is also possible that there exist great individual or subcultural differences. Maintaining her position in a couple may, for a certain woman be thought of as belonging to an entirely secondary category included in, or subordinate to, her membership of another group, such as that of a high social status. On the other hand, for another woman, being part of a couple could be considered as the most general category, into which all other memberships or social roles fall. It is worth remembering that any characteristics associated with one social identity can be associated with others and that this association between social identities and personal characteristics can vary from one individual to the next or from one social group to another.

Some of these points were verified in recent research (Moya & Peplau, in preparation). A total of 204 subjects (95 men and 109 women) took part in the first test, all students of an introductory course in psychology at the University of California at Los Angeles (UCLA). In the second test, 45 men and 125 women participated, all third-year psychology students at the University of Granada. All subjects were asked to rate themselves on 22 bipolar scales (9 represented instrumental attributes, 9 expressive and 4 neutral). They were then asked to rate four different types of people of the same sex on the same 22 scales (university student, person involved in a lasting relationship, a committed family man/woman and a professional). With these scores, 4 meta-contrast ratios were calculated, one for each stimulus, following Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell's proposal (1987). If the meta-contrast ratio is lower than 1, the stimulus in question is perceived as being a member of the outgroup. The higher above 1, the greater the stimulus is perceived as a member of the ingroup. The meta-contrast ratios obtained by the American and Spanish students appear in Table 11.1.

UCLA students only considered persons committed to their family as outgroup members (RMC lower than 1), while for those from Granada, only the professional was considered as such. Likewise, both sets of students perceived themselves as being closer to the person involved in a relationship. An analysis of variance was performed using as the dependent variable the meta-contrast ratio. The independent variable was subjects' current involvement in a relationship and had two values: involvement versus non-

involvement. For UCLA students involved in a relationship, the meta-contrast ratio with the person committed to the family was .89. For those not involved, the corresponding figure was 1.01 $F(1, 155) = 7.26$ was significant at $p < .01$. No similar differences appeared in the Granada sample.

The importance of taking into account the specific contents that individuals associate with each social identity has also been shown in other results of this research. According to our hypothesis, those involved in an emotional relationship with a member of the opposite sex rated themselves as higher in the expressive items than those not involved. On the other hand, and contrary to expectations, this was also the case with instrumental items (although here the differences did not reach statistical significance). These tendencies were found in both the American and the Spanish sample. In our judgement, these results reveal the existence of different social identity configurations in two distinct social mediums (the American and the Spanish) since being a university student or a committed family member seems to occupy different positions in identity structure, while the relationship between these identities in each sample also presents certain differences (as in the opposition present in the American sample between those involved in a relationship or not).

3. The continuous flow of identities

Turner and colleagues (1987) conceive of the existence of different levels of abstraction in the categorization of 'I', separated from each other and discretely formed, in such a way that the individual passes from one to another according to how the situation varies. It is therefore the dynamic character of identity which is emphasized here, an aspect that has been present in social identity theory but which is rarely reflected in practical research carried out under its inspiration (Condor, 1989). Tajfel (1982a) emphasized how social identifications could be subject to temporal fluctuations: 'the psychological existence of a group for its members consists of a complex sequence of appearances and disappearances, of factors emerging and blurring into thin air' (p. 485). Turner considered his model of identity as neither static, fixed, global or corrected, but totally the reverse: 'the categories of "Self" are not absolute, but rather "Self" is dynamic, relational, comparative, fluid, context-specific and variable' (Turner, 1988, p. 114).

Thus, it is possible that the interactions maintained by members of a couple change continuously from some category memberships to others (as conceived by self-categorization theory) or fluctuate incessantly along the interpersonal–intergroup continuum. For example, deciding what to do one Sunday afternoon, it might occur to a boy to invite to the cinema the girl he has just started seeing, to then pay for her ticket and attempt some physical or sensual contact (following certain stereotypical criteria). He suddenly finds out that the girl cannot stand going to the cinema and would much

rather have an afternoon chat in a quiet café, he thus rapidly changes his plans. In this way, a form of behaviour which commenced with certain intergroup components has quickly found itself being affected by the particular characteristics of the people involved.

Final comments

This chapter's purpose has been two-fold. On the one hand, it has attempted to show that the study of intergroup relations and the processes and structures related to identity can be particularly enhanced if the interpersonal relationships, in which the individuals are involved, are taken into account at the same time (for example, relationships between couples). On the other, it has indicated how the study of interpersonal relationships can be enhanced if we simultaneously bear in mind identity and intergroup aspects. We believe that an articulation of intergroup and interpersonal processes could be more useful in the understanding of certain phenomena than considering these two aspects as antagonistic or contrary.

However, this articulation between interpersonal and intergroup aspects seems relatively complex. We have made reference to some approximations that contain interesting suggestions regarding how these two components should be articulated. Yet, rather than coming up with definitive answers, these approximations only suggest paths down which one can advance, thus granting an important role to empirical research.

Focusing now on the case of couples, the arguments we have put forward show that a greater understanding of them could be attained if, in addition to considering the specific dynamics of the relationship, other factors were also taken into account. These could include the social identity structure of those involved in a couple, as well as the content of their different social identities. Nevertheless, the study of these identities demands approximations which consider their relational character (Rosenberg & Gara, 1985). So, although identities of a general character exist (such as 'being a man' or 'being a woman') and guide the behaviour of individuals without involving other people (for example, they serve the individual when deciding how to dress or what hobbies to take up), there are others (such as 'being in a couple' or 'being a father') which cannot be understood without taking into account a relationship with other people (for example, his/her partner or the specific composition of the family as in the mentioned examples). Consider, for example, the different conception of self felt by a 'woman in a relationship' before and after her partner had been paralysed in an accident.

In conclusion, this approach merely connects up with an old tradition of social psychology (Morales, 1989) which has included: the battle over structural and process aspects of identity (for example, Manford Kuhn and Ralph Turner versus Blumer and Goffman within symbolic interactionism); the extraordinarily discerning analysis of social and personal identity carried

out by, for example, Goffman (1968); and establishing the impossibility of understanding 'self' or the identity, disregarding the specific social interactions maintained by individuals.

Note

1. The content of Figure 11.2 has an illustrative purpose. The structure of the identity within has been taken from Deaux (1993) and the content of the different identities has been elaborated from the results of research carried out by Moya (1989) and Moya and Peplau (in preparation).

12

Social Identity and Aspects of Social Creativity: Shifting to New Dimensions of Intergroup Comparison

Steve Hinkle, Laurie A. Taylor, Lee Fox-Cardamone and Pamela G. Ely

Most accounts of social identity theory (SIT) outline three response patterns which groups and group members can make to unfavourable social identities: individual mobility, social competition and social creativity (see Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Perhaps the earliest discussion of social creativity can be found in two of Tajfel's 1978 publications concerning group differentiation (1978d) and the social psychology of minorities (1978e). In these works, Tajfel discussed low status or minority groups' response to their unsatisfactory social identities. When social circumstances supported leaving the ingroup, social mobility or moving on to another, presumably high-status, ingroup was proposed. When mobility was not sociologically or psychologically likely, Tajfel proposed three possibilities.

(a) to become, through action and reinterpretation of group characteristics, more like the superior group;
(b) to reinterpret the existing inferior characteristics of the group, so that they do not appear as inferior but acquire a positively valued distinctiveness from the superior group;
(c) to create, through social action and or diffusion of new 'ideologies' new group characteristics which have a positively valued distinctiveness from the superior group (Tajfel, 1978c, pp. 93–94).

Later, this list was elaborated to include a fourth possibility:

(d) group members may also seek positive distinctiveness by 'changing the out-group (or selecting the out-group) with which the in-group is compared – in particular, ceasing or avoiding to use the high-status out-group as a comparative frame of reference' (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 43).

In more recent discussions of SIT, the first of these is typically referred to as 'social competition', while the latter three are, generally, considered as

aspects of 'social creativity' (see Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1986).[1]

The purpose of this chapter is to take a detailed look at one of these aspects of social creativity: the establishment of new group characteristics or dimensions of intergroup comparison as a means to institute positive distinctiveness for the ingroup. First, theoretical issues pertinent to this aspect of social creativity will be summarized. The chapter will then review past research pertinent to establishing positive ingroup distinctiveness through the use of new dimensions for intergroup comparison. New, as yet unpublished, research we have conducted with several other colleagues will then be presented. The chapter will conclude with some evaluative comments on this aspect of SIT and SIT research along with discussion of applications and issues for future research.

Some theoretical issues

Legitimacy and stability

At the core of many SIT predictions are the notions of status legitimacy and stability. The relationships between groups can be perceived as legitimate or illegitimate, stable or instable (Tajfel 1978a). In general, Tajfel saw legitimacy and stability as covarying. That is, according to SIT, legitimate and stable intergroup relations tend to co-occur as do illegitimate and instable intergroup relations (Tajfel, 1978a; for contrasting perspective, see Turner & Brown, 1978, who treat legitimacy and stability as independent aspects of the intergroup situation). SIT goes on to associate social competition with illegitimate/instable intergroup relations. Hence, the social creativity strategies, including establishing positive ingroup distinctiveness on new dimensions of intergroup comparison, are postulated by SIT as being most relevant to legitimate and stable intergroup contexts (Tajfel, 1978b). Here, where groups with threatened or negative social identities see the status quo as justified and/or not likely to change, direct social competition to alter the status quo on prevailing comparison dimensions is not apt to be viewed as likely to succeed or justifiable. Hence, the creation of new comparison dimensions as a path to positive social identity is a strategy of obvious motivational significance.

Group status

Another theoretical issue posited as relevant to the use of new intergroup comparison dimensions is group status. While SIT is not as clear as it could be, it appears as though Tajfel believed that the use of new comparison dimensions was most likely for low-status groups in legitimate/stable status circumstances, but most likely for high status groups when they perceive their advantaged position as illegitimate and/or instable (Tajfel, 1978c). However, not all of the early SIT theorizing is consistent on this. For

example, Caddick (1982) sees illegitimacy and instability as instigating the search for new dimensions of distinctiveness for *both* high- and low-status groups. It also appears that, irrespective of illegitimacy and instability, early SIT research viewed the use of new comparison dimensions as being more characteristic of low- than of high-status groups (Brown & Ross, 1982).

Selection of new comparison dimensions

Perhaps one of the most useful and detailed early theoretical discussions in SIT of the use of new dimensions for intergroup comparison is that of van Knippenberg (1978). In particular, he offers some valuable ideas regarding the selection of new comparison dimensions. Assuming legitimacy and stability, existing status differences will continue and be difficult to deny. As a result, van Knippenberg proposed that new comparison dimensions must be capable of enhancing a group's social identity, but without affecting already existing status dimensions. That is, in selecting new comparison dimensions to effect a more favourable social identity, the new dimensions will afford the ingroup positive distinctiveness while being uncorrelated with the existing status dimension where the ingroup does not compare favourably.

   Lemaine, Kastersztein and Personnaz's (1978) position is somewhat different from those of Tajfel (1978c) and van Knippenberg (1978). The latter two authors take no position regarding the relative importance of new versus old dimensions of comparison. In contrast, Lemaine et al. clearly hold that groups will strive to make new bases for intergroup comparisons dominant. For Lemaine et al., groups will not be content to simply acknowledge their own inferiority on existing status dimensions while claiming superiority on a new status dimension. Rather, the ingroup will go further and strive to make the new basis for comparison of greater importance and, thus, the dominant basis for status comparisons. In a later paper, van Knippenberg (1984) modifies his earlier stance in a manner consistent with the views of Lemaine et al., at least with respect to the classic conflictual intergroup situations emphasized by SIT. He also proposes socially cooperative intergroup relations where groups coexist in a climate of mutual appreciation. Here, van Knippenberg (1984) proposes that groups can and will acknowledge both their own superiority and inferiority relative to other groups on various comparison dimensions and that *all* such dimensions can be valued by *all* groups. He does, however, note that ingroups and outgroups may weight the relative importance of the sundry dimensions differently.

New comparison dimensions versus other responses to unfavourable identities

Another important theoretical issue concerns the prepotency of turning to new bases for intergroup comparison relative to other responses to unfavourable identities such as mobility, social competition and other social

creativity strategies, including shifting the locus of comparison to new outgroups and re-evaluating the valence of existing, unfavourable comparisons. Tajfel (1978c) clearly sees mobility as the strategy of choice in circumstances where mobility is viewed as possible and desirable (that is, with a social mobility ideology; Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). However, there is little in his writings to clearly order social competition and social creativity into a hierarchy of strategic choice. Certainly, he says virtually nothing concerning the relative strength of the various forms of social creativity. In contrast, Ball, Giles and Hewstone (1984) propose that mobility attempts will precede social creativity strategies, which, in turn, will take place prior to social competition. However, Ball et al. say nothing about the ordering of the various forms of social creativity. In general, the lack of theory regarding use of the various social creativity strategies is an unfortunate omission in SIT.

Process issues

Finally, what does SIT say relevant to the process of creating new bases for positive intergroup distinctiveness? First, group members must somehow develop a shared perspective on the attributes serving as new bases for intergroup comparisons and the ingroup's standings on these new attributes must, in fact, be positive (Tajfel, 1978c). The next step involves persuading the outgroup to accept the new bases for intergroup comparison and the ingroup's positive standing on these attributes. That is, consensual acceptance by both the in- and outgroup is necessary for the new dimensions of intergroup comparison to fully validate the ingroup's positive social identity (Tajfel, 1978c). Lemaine et al. (1978) add to SIT theorizing about such processes. They hold that the initial intragroup aspect of this process will, ideally, take place without the knowledge of the outgroup. Such seclusion shields the ingroup seeking new bases for intergroup comparisons from criticism and helps reduce uncertainty regarding the new comparisons.

Past empirical research: a selected review of the literature[2]

In spite of the complex SIT theorizing concerning the use of new comparison dimensions as a response to negative social identities, most of the relevant empirical literature has yet to address the theoretical postulates outlined above. As we shall see, the dominant characterization of this literature is simply the demonstration that groups with threatened social identities will, at times, turn to new bases for making intergroup comparisons.

In all likelihood the most frequently cited empirical work is that of Lemaine and his colleagues (Lemaine et al., 1978). In one study, children at summer camps participated in a building competition where some groups were relatively disadvantaged by being given inadequate materials. While

unable to build as large or elaborate huts as other groups, disadvantaged groups began developing gardens, thereby establishing a new basis for intergroup comparisons more favourable to their ingroups.

In a review, Hinkle and Brown (1990) cited 12 papers, using both laboratory and field contexts with subject populations from nurses to university lecturers; all demonstrated that the same group when making intergroup comparisons on multiple dimensions will evince ingroup favouritism on some of the dimensions, outgroup favouritism on others, and no favouritism at all on still other dimensions. The simultaneous occurrence of ingroup and outgroup favouritism on differing dimensions is consistent with the notion of using new bases for intergroup comparisons to establish positive social identities when comparisons on other dimensions do not favour the ingroup. In addition to the studies reviewed by Hinkle and Brown, other similar results are reported in Capozza, Bonaldo and DiMaggio (1982). The diversity of subject populations and paradigms across these various researches points to the robustness of this form of social creativity.

Perhaps one of the most interesting early SIT studies bearing on the use of new dimensions for making intergroup comparisons is Brown and Ross (1982). The study's primary emphases are on both social competition and social creativity. In particular, Brown and Ross's consideration of creativity emphasizes the re-evalution of the importance of various comparison dimensions rather than the topic of the present chapter, the use of new comparison dimensions. Nonetheless, while the latter issue is not focal to Brown and Ross, they do present some important relevant data. Before discussing their findings, some background regarding the paper's hypotheses and design is necessary.

Brown and Ross discuss illegitimacy and instability as inducing a 'threat to identity' or insecure social identity which, in response, produces either social competition or social creativity ('the strategies . . . were not thought to be mutually exclusive', p. 162). Their study's primary manipulation was presented in terms of high, moderate or low threats to identity, though careful examination of their procedures indicates that the study's primary independent variable can just as easily be termed 'status illegitimacy'. A second important independent variable in this research was a manipulation of ingroup status as being either superior or inferior. One of the experiment's primary predictions was 'that increases in differentiation along . . . alternative dimensions would . . . vary in proportion to the threat to identity experienced, and that these changes would be most prominent in the lower status groups' (p. 162).

When ingroup bias on alternative dimensions of intergroup comparison is compared before and after implementation of the status illegitimacy manipulation, the data clearly show that inferior status groups in the high and moderate illegitimacy (that is, threat to identity) conditions manifested substantially more ingroup favouritism on the alternative comparison dimensions. This shift towards greater ingroup bias on the alternative

dimensions did not occur for inferior status groups in the low illegitimacy condition, nor did it occur for superior status groups in any of the three conditions of status legitimacy.[3]

These results are partially supportive of early SIT theorizing in that the use of new comparison dimensions to attain positive group distinctiveness is more characteristic of low- rather than high-status groups. On the other hand, Brown and Ross's results contradict Tajfel's (1978c) view that this and other forms of social creativity would be most prominent for low-status groups when there are legitimate/stable status relations. Similarly, their findings are also inconsistent with Caddick's (1982) prediction that the various social creativity strategies would occur for *both* high- and low-status groups when the intergroup status structure was both illegitimate and instable. It appears from Brown and Ross's data that the most empirically tenable theoretical position for SIT is that social creativity, at least in the form of using new dimensions for making ingroup-favouring intergroup comparisons, is most likely to be observed in low-status groups under conditions of status illegitimacy and/or instability (though the specific effects of illegitimacy and instability as distinct variables remain to be tested).

Other interesting data from Brown and Ross bear on the issue of the valuing of new dimensions of intergroup comparison. Recall Lemaine et al.'s (1987) and van Knippenberg's (1984) hypotheses that groups shifting to new dimensions of intergroup comparison to attain positive distinctiveness would also see these new dimensions as of greater importance than previous bases for intergroup comparison. In general, Brown and Ross found that while inferior status groups were, with status illegitimacy, quick to use alternative comparison dimensions to evince ingroup favouritism, there was little evidence to support the notions that these new dimensions' importance increased or that they were viewed as being of greater importance than the original intergroup comparison dimensions. This result is consistent with similar findings reviewed by Hinkle and Brown (1990). Indeed, the existing evidence seems, if anything, more consistent with the view that low-status groups are willing to salvage damaged or unfavourable social identities by shifting to or emphasizing new ingroup-favouring dimensions of comparison even while acknowledging that the latter are of lesser importance. An example of this might be the losing sports team that emphasizes its own superiority in terms of better sportsmanship (see Lalonde, 1992) or more enjoyment of the game, even while willingly owning that it *is* more important to win.

Caddick (1982) presents similar findings with respect to illegitimate status differences and the occurrence of ingroup favouritism on new dimensions of intergroup comparison. An illegitimate status difference led to increased expression of ingroup favouritism on several comparison dimensions other than the original basis for intergroup comparison. Interestingly, and in contrast to Brown and Ross, ingroup favouritism on the new comparison dimensions occurred for members of both low- *and high*-status groups.

Caddick develops a thought-provoking analysis of this result based on the fact that in his experimental procedure the high-status group is clearly responsible for the illegitimacy of the initial comparison between the groups. Caddick suggests that this may have compromised the high-status group's social identity through guilt feelings induced by violation of values such as fairness or justice. To compensate for their compromised favourable social identities, the high-status groups adopted new bases for making ingroup-favouring intergroup comparisons.

Some new empirical findings

Our own investigation of social creativity issues began rather unexpectedly through an effort to replicate findings from a study by Condor, Brown and Williams (1987). One component of Condor et al.'s experiment involved groups of unacquainted subjects working on a laboratory task to generate ideas for recruiting students to their university under an instructional set emphasizing task issues such as efficiency and productivity. Following this exercise, subjects watched a short video of another group engaged in the same endeavour and then made in- and outgroup ratings on task-oriented dimensions such as the group's competence and energy and socio-emotional dimensions such as the groups' friendliness and warmth. Condor et al. found much greater ingroup favouritism on the task-oriented dimensions of intergroup comparison than on the socio-emotional dimensions. This was expected since the task-oriented dimensions are more closely associated with the experimental instructional set than the socio-emotional dimensions.

Hinkle and Crook (1987) attempted to replicate Condor et al. as closely as possible and found a complete reversal of their findings. That is, significantly greater levels of ingroup favouritism occurred on the socioemotional dimensions than on the task-oriented dimensions. Why? There were only two important differences between the procedures of Condor et al. and Hinkle and Crook. First, the subject populations differed, with the latter study using American university students while the former's subjects were students from a British university. While it is virtually impossible to rule out differences in the populations as an account for the reversal of findings, one of the results from Hinkle and Crook points to the comparability of the two subjects populations. Their subjects saw the task-oriented dimensions as of greater importance than the socio-emotional dimensions. Thus, Hinkle and Crook's findings appear to be a social creativity effect in that their subjects are manifesting the most ingroup favouritism on a secondary, less important dimension of intergroup comparison.

There was a second difference in the procedures of Condor et al. and Hinkle and Crook. Rather than presenting the outgroup via a video, the latter simply asked subjects to think of an average group of university students working on the same task and rate this 'imagined' outgroup.

Figure 12.1 *Ingroup favouritism on different comparison dimensions as a function of outgroup status (Hinkle, Fox-Cardamone, Taylor & Crook, 1988)*

Assuming a rather high level of achievement motivation amongst these university student subjects, it may be that their vision of an 'average' group is of one whose performance does indeed threaten that of their own group. This interpretation corroborates the view that Hinkle and Crook's subjects are engaging in a social creativity process. If the outgroup's task performance is imagined to be quite good relative to ingroup performance, subjects' shift to the less important socio-emotional dimensions to manifest ingroup favouritism may be seen as an effort to offset the unfavourable intergroup comparison on the task-oriented dimensions.

Experimental demonstrations of social creativity effects

To follow up on the interpretation outlined above, Hinkle, Fox-Cardamone, Taylor and Crook (1988) replicated Hinkle and Crook's experiment and extended it by adding two additional experimental conditions. While some groups of subjects were asked to think of an average group of university students as the outgroup stimulus, others were asked to think of below average or well-above average groups. It was predicted that below average outgroups would not threaten the distinctiveness of the ingroup on the important, task-oriented dimensions. Hence, subjects in this condition were expected to manifest greater ingroup favouritism on the task-oriented dimensions than the socio-emotional dimensions. In contrast, the prediction for the average and well-above average outgroup conditions was that such outgroups would threaten the ingroup's distinctiveness on the important task-oriented dimensions. As a result, social creativity would lead to greater ingroup favouritism on the secondary dimensions of intergroup comparison, that is, the socio-emotional dimensions. As can be seen in Figure 12.1, this is exactly what was found.

Interestingly, Hinkle et al. collected data on the perceived importance of the task and socio-emotional comparison dimension *after* subjects had made their ingroup and outgroup ratings. There was no evidence for any change in the importance of the dimensions. The task-oriented dimensions were still seen as being significantly more important than the socio-emotional dimensions in all three experimental conditions. Thus, the social creativity seen in the average and well-above average outgroup conditions does not appear to actually compensate for unfavourable comparisons on the task-oriented dimensions. In these conditions subjects are not saying, 'Your group is better at the task, but it is more important to get along well and we are better at that.' Rather, they appear to be saying, 'While your group is better than ours at the task, *at least* we get along better.' The social creativity seen in this study does not appear to compensate for an unfavourable social identity, but simply to take a step towards *salvaging* the ingroup's social identity. As with earlier research reviewed above, this result is inconsistent with Lemain et al.'s (1978) and van Knippenberg's (1984) views that the shift to new, ingroup-favouring dimensions of intergroup comparison would necessarily be accompanied by perceiving the new dimensions as of greater value or importance than those upon which the ingroup did not compare favourably.

The Hinkle et al. research can be criticized for the use of an imagined manipulation of outgroup status. Recently, two of us (Laurie Taylor and Steve Hinkle) conducted an experiment similar to those reported above, but incorporating a more concrete manipulation of outgroup status. Again, groups worked under a task-emphasis instructional set to generate ideas for the recruitment of students to their university, and the ingroup and out-group were rated on both task-oriented and socio-emotional dimensions of intergroup comparison. However, rather than asking students to imagine outgroups of varying status levels, outgroup status was manipulated by providing subjects with a list of some of the recruitment ideas generated by the other group. These lists were prepared in light of pilot test data such that they contained only the lowest (below average outgroup status) or highest (above average outgroup status) rated ideas from the pilot study. In the below average outgroup condition, ingroup favouritism was greater on the task-oriented dimensions than on the socio-emotional dimensions. In the above average outgroup condition, a social creativity effect was again observed: greater ingroup favouritism on the socio-emotional comparison dimensions than on the task-oriented dimensions (see Figure 12.2).

Conclusions, applications and directions for future theory and research

General conclusions

The strongest and most consistent finding across numerous studies using various populations and paradigms is that social creativity in the form of

Figure 12.2 *Ingroup favouritism on different comparison dimensions as a function of outgroup status (unpublished data from Taylor & Hinkle)*

responding to a negative social identity with ingroup favouritism on new comparison dimensions is a reliable and robust phenomenon. Furthermore, the experimental investigations of Hinkle et al. and Taylor and Hinkle demonstrate that low ingroup status *causes* greater ingroup favouritism on new comparison dimensions than on the original dimensions upon which the ingroup does not fare well.

Status, legitimacy and stability

Past this broad conclusion, the existing research findings bearing on the theoretical issues raised at the outset of this chapter are limited. The issue of group status in conjunction with its legitimacy and stability has received the most attention and the early SIT theoretical formulations have received mixed support. The evidence from studies such as Brown and Ross (1982) and Caddick (1982) supports the notion that low-status groups are more apt to manifest group favouritism on alternative dimensions of intergroup comparison than high-status groups. How legitimacy and stability enter the theoretical equation has been far less clear. Caddick's results indicate that illegitimacy increases ingroup-favouring comparisons on new dimensions for both high- and low-status groups. Brown and Ross found this to be the case for low-status groups only. Clearly, other variables must be moderating the relationship between illegitimacy, group status and the occurrence of ingroup favouritism on new comparison dimensions. Relevant theory and, more importantly, research are needed. Caddick's speculation concerning the responsibility of a high-status group for the existence of an illegitimate intergroup status structure appears to be a potential moderator worthy of further empirical attention.

At present, there appears to be no support for Tajfel's (1978c) early proposal that low-status groups would be particularly likely to use new

dimensions of intergroup comparison when status relations are legitimate and stable. Perhaps with a legitimate/stable status structure it is very unlikely for low-status group members to perceive *any* change in the status quo relative to superior groups, including the use of new comparison dimensions. It seems plausible that another social creativity strategy, a shift to different comparison outgroups, may be the more likely response to an unfavourable social identity under a legitimate/stable status structure. A superordinate issue to any SIT discussion regarding legitimacy and stability is the need for more thoroughly elaborated theorizing and research on the relationships between legitimacy and stability.

Importance of comparison dimensions

The other theoretical issue which has received some empirical attention has to do with the importance or value placed on new intergroup comparison dimensions. Recall that both Lemaine et al. (1978) and van Knippenberg (1984) hypothesized that a shift to ingroup favouritism on new intergroup comparison dimensions would be accompanied by the new bases of comparison acquiring greater value or importance than the original comparison dimensions. The intuitive strength of this postulate makes it quite difficult to abandon. However, there is substantial evidence to the contrary. Groups appear to frequently evince ingroup favouritism on new, less valued comparison dimensions while acknowledging that they do not measure up to the outgroup in other, apparently more important, comparisons. This is an intriguing result calling out for more research to further illuminate this finding and perhaps identify moderator variables specifying when new comparison dimensions will or will not be seen as being of greater importance than the initial comparison dimensions.

Van Knippenberg's (1984) discussion of socially cooperative intergroup relations in contrast to SIT's traditionally competitive intergroup relations seems to offer a good deal of theoretical promise with respect to this as it seems plausible that the psychological importance of placing greater value on new intergroup comparison dimensions may only be relevant to competitively oriented intergroup relations.

Similarly, Hinkle and Brown's (1990) distinction between autonomous and relational processes of social identity construction may also be theoretically relevant (see also Brown, Hinkle, Ely, Fox-Cardamone, Maras & Taylor, 1992; Hinkle, Brown & Ely, 1992). Groups with autonomous identity construction orientations may establish entirely satisfactory social identities through seeing themselves favourably on relevant comparison dimensions independent of whether other groups rank below *or above* them. As a result, the relative value or importance of various comparison dimensions may not be psychologically relevant with the autonomous orientation.

Another potentially useful approach to developing more research and theory on the importance of different comparison dimensions takes a temporal perspective. It seems plausible that the immediate response to an

unfavourable intergroup comparison is, to use a term introduced earlier, to *salvage* a positive social identity. If our research group fares disastrously in the latest government league tables of research quantity and quality, the first step is to establish a toehold towards re-establishing a favourable social identity. One way to do this is by claiming high status for the ingroup on any dimension, even an inferior one. 'Yes, the quality and quantity of our group's research is not on par with others, but we are doing some limited, innovative work and our teaching is very good. And, yes, we recognize that research innovation and teaching quality really are not the *sine qua non* for research groups.' This salvages the group's esteem in the short term and provides the foundation for subsequent developments such as actually improving the group's research productivity or convincing relevant entities in the social structure that research innovation and teaching quality ought to be the more important bases for intergroup comparison.

The processes of social creativity

There is, to our knowledge, no research on Tajfel's (1978c) and Lemaine et al.'s (1978) proposals that selection of new comparison dimensions proceeds first as an intragroup process and, according to Lemaine et al., surreptitiously and, then, as an intergroup process where the ingroup attempts to persuade the outgroup regarding the importance of the new comparison dimension and the ingroup's superior status. The comments in the previous section on temporal aspects of social identity processes again seems relevant. It may be that groups with unfavourable identities must first take steps to salvage positive distinctiveness, then work within the group to develop genuinely favourable intergroup comparisons, and, finally, shift to the issue of persuading other groups as to the validity and importance of the new bases of comparison. Research paradigms without a longitudinal component are unlikely to detect or shed light on such processes. Unfortunately, longitudinally oriented studies are virtually non-existent in the SIT tradition.

Hinkle and Brown's (1990) notion of autonomous orientations may also be pertinent. For autonomous groups, since they are interested in the ingroup in comparison to abstract standards rather than in comparison to other groups, the need to persuade external audiences of the validity of new intergroup comparisons is apt to be irrelevant.

An interesting and closely related issue is raised by van Knippenberg (1984), who argues that responses to unfavourable social identities are not always directed towards immediate enhancement of the group's social identity. Specifically, van Knippenberg discusses the role of self-presentational processes in the expression of ingroup or outgroup favouritism. Self-presentational issues seem equally relevant to social creativity processes including the selection of new bases for making intergroup comparisons. Abrams and Hogg (1988; also Hogg & Abrams, 1990) have outlined similar

ideas which go well beyond social identity and self-presentation as motivational issues relevant to the expression of ingroup or outgroup favouritism.

Strategy choice in response to unfavourable social identities

While there are a few studies on mobility versus either social competition or social creativity (or both, for example, Ellemers, Wilke & van Knippenberg, 1993; Jackson, 1993; Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990), there is no research and virtually no relevant theory on selection of the various social creativity strategies. These are important theoretical issues. SIT's inability to predict the specific form of response to an unfavourable social identity is a significant omission and diminution of its utility. While there may be good historical reasons for why these issues were not well addressed in the early years of SIT's development, the contemporary status of SIT would be enhanced by progress on this front.

Potential applications

We are unaware of any genuinely applied literature on the use of new intergroup comparison dimensions. However, existing studies and theoretical discussions are rife with possibility. Perhaps the richest potential for application resides in issues of group morale, cohesion and motivation. How might poorly performing sports teams, business organizations and other similar entities deal with attendance problems of low group morale and motivation? The generation of new, favourable dimensions of intergroup comparison offers one strategy. While the existing research indicates that a losing team's development of the view that they enjoy what they are doing more than their competitors does not fully psychologically compensate for its poor won–lost record, which such a team is still apt to see of premier importance, it still may serve as a starting point for rebuilding team spirit and motivation. While the theoretical basis for this has not yet been tested, the hypothesis that social creativity results in enhanced cohesiveness and, subsequently, better group performance is an intriguing one. Were notions such as this begun to be examined in applied contexts, other interesting issues would certainly come quickly to the fore. For example, in all previous research of this area, the creation or ingroup-favouring use of new comparison dimensions has always arisen spontaneously from the studies' inherent intragroup dynamics. In contemplating applications, it is quite likely that the instigation to the use of new dimensions of intergroup comparison would result from the intervention of a group's leadership such as managers, administrators, coaches, and so on, or outside sources such as consultants. There is little if any helpful existing research or theory. Links to work in organizational psychology and the leadership literature would likely be beneficial in determining whether or not leadership efforts to stimulate social creativity would be effective or how such endeavours could be best implemented.

Final comments

In conclusion, research on social creativity in the form of selecting new comparison dimensions for making ingroup-favouring evaluations has played a small, but important, role in SIT research, a role which appears to be increasing in its significance and potential applications. The robustness of this form of social creativity is well documented and some important complexities have begun to be addressed. The existing empirical findings provide support for certain SIT precepts, but not others. Our own view on this is that in instances where the literature has not supported SIT it has served the valuable function of precipitating modifications of the theory that have enhanced its power and viability. However, as should be clear form earlier discussion in this chapter, there are many interesting issues still in need of both conceptual and empirical attention. SIT can only be enriched as these issues stimulate further work in the study of intergroup processes.

Notes

1. Note that other authors label or group responses to unfavourable social identities somewhat differently (for example, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1987). In preparing the present chapter, the authors have endeavoured to follow as closely as possible the conceptual organization offered in Tajfel's early statements of SIT.

2. Turner and Brown (1978) is a frequently cited paper on legitimacy and stability and their relationship to social competition and social creativity. However, in the present context, their measures are of limited relevance. The creativity indices concern the number of new possible comparison dimensions generated by the subjects. However, subjects did not actually make any ingroup or outgroup ratings on these new dimensions. Hence, the study's results do not bear directly on the use of new bases of comparison to establish favourable social identities.

3. Note that Brown and Ross themselves do not emphasize this pattern in their results. In fact, they do not discuss it at all. However, the described pattern is very clear from examination of the data in their Tables 2 (p. 168) and 5 (p. 171).

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Mere Categorization and Competition: A Closer Look at Social Identity Theory and the Discontinuity Effect

Stephen M. Drigotas, Chester Insko and John Schopler

The word 'group' can have many meanings. It can be used to represent anything from face-to-face interaction to aggregates of unacquainted people. Its imprecision is further enhanced by the fact that one may be assigned to many groups (based on sex, race, nationality, family, and so on) without any feelings of belonging or particular affinity for any one of them. Because of this apparent amorphousness, researchers through the years have attempted to delineate when an aggregate of individuals becomes a group. Horwitz and Rabbie (1989) credit Lewin (1948) for early theoretical interest in perceived collectivity as the defining nature of groupness. Lewin maintained that interdependence of fate is the determinant of who belongs to which group, not simply degree of similarity–dissimilarity of features. Campbell (1958) called the shift from perceived aggregate to perceived collectivity 'entitativity' and suggested various Gestalt mechanisms for the perception of many as one. At this point we feel that it would be premature to settle on what precisely is meant by the term 'group'.

The behaviour of individuals within groups can be as diverse as the considerations of what constitutes a group. Historically some social scientists have focused on the supposedly animalistic nature of crowd behaviour as providing possible evidence for a group mind unfettered by moral constraints (cf. Allport, 1924; Durkheim, 1898; LeBon, 1896; McDougall, 1920). On the other hand, after extensive observation McPhail (1991) argues that the notion of 'madding' crowd is a 'myth'. Still within contemporary social psychology there is evidence that under some circumstances individuals within groups behave in a manner that is less than praiseworthy. For example, individuals within groups are more likely socially to loaf (Latané, Williams & Harkins, 1979), give more shocks to a 'learner' (Zimbardo, 1969), and not help in an emergency situation (Latané & Darley, 1970).

Our approach to the general problem of group behaviour has been specifically to compare interindividual behaviour with intergroup behaviour. Consistent with Roger Brown's (1954) suggestion of a discontinuity between individual and group behaviour, we have adopted the term 'discontinuity'

for the tendency of intergroup behaviour to be more competitive, or less cooperative, than interindividual behaviour. Within the context of certain matrix games there is now an abundance of evidence for a descriptively large discontinuity effect (for a review see Schopler & Insko, 1992). What is less clear is the reason for the discontinuity effect.[1] While different theorists have suggested divergent causes for the competitiveness of groups, the purpose of the present chapter is to compare and contrast two of the major approaches to understanding the phenomenon: social identity theory (Tajfel, 1970b, 1978a, 1978b, 1982c; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1981b) and the research tradition which has specifically investigated the discontinuity effect (Insko & Schopler, 1987; Insko, Pinkley, Harring, et al., 1987; Insko, Pinkley, Hoyle, et al., 1987; Insko, Schopler, Hoyle, Dardis & Graetz, 1990; Insko et al., 1988; Insko et al., 1992, 1993; McCallum et al., 1985; Schopler & Insko, 1992; Schopler, Insko, Graetz, Drigotas & Smith, 1991; Schopler et al., 1993).

Social identity theory

An overview

Tajfel's social identity theory (SIT) is based upon the assumption that we all have a need for favourable self-identity, and that the status of the groups to which we belong helps us achieve such positive self-identity. Moreover, Tajfel and his associates claim that such positive evaluations are made on a comparative basis – we nourish our positive self-identities when our group does better than another group (Tajfel, 1978b, 1981, 1982c; Tajfel & Turner, 1979, 1986; Turner, 1981b). Thus, intergroup competitiveness is directly linked to the maintenance of self-identity. The SIT theorists also claim that mere categorization of subjects into 'groups' results in the orientation towards own-category favouritism. An abundance of research (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Tajfel & Billig, 1974; see Brewer, 1979 and Diehl, 1990, for reviews) has demonstrated that when subjects are categorized into one of two mutually exclusive groups and respond to a non-correspondent allocation task, they typically make choices favouring an own-group member over an outgroup member – ostensibly in the pursuit of bolstering self-identity through the relative advantage for own group.

A discontinuity perspective on social identity theory

A serious problem inherent in social identity theory is its inability theoretically to account for the differences between intergroup interaction and interindividual interaction. Research involving the discontinuity effect has long demonstrated that group interactions can in many circumstances be more competitive than individual interactions. However, as noted elsewhere (Insko & Schopler, 1987; Schopler & Insko, 1992), individuals should also receive positive bolstering of self-esteem from doing better than

another individual. But if this is true, why from a social identity theory perspective should individuals not be just as competitive as groups? It is true that social identity theory was developed to address intergroup relations. The point is, however, that there is nothing in social identity theory itself that indicates why the processes inherent in two-on-two relations should not also be present in one-on-one relations. If besting another group should bolster one's self-esteem and one's self-definition, the same should also be true of besting another individual. Why then, from a social identity perspective, are not interindividual relations just as competitive as intergroup relations? Furthermore, if it is true that individuals receive a self-definitional boost from besting another individual, by implication social identity theory does not adequately account for between-group competitiveness. Social identity theory's self-definitional premise is plausible, but does not by itself account for between-group competitiveness. The theory is not so much implausible as incomplete.

The minimal group paradigm

Investigations of social identity theory's prediction that mere categorization is sufficient to evoke relativistic social comparisons have used a minimal group paradigm in which subjects are categorized and then asked to allocate outcomes to own- and other-category members. The most common technique for categorization involves dividing subjects into sets, or groups, on the basis of their fabricated preferences for the paintings of Klee versus those of Kandinksy. Subjects are asked to rate pairs of Klee-Kandinsky slides and are then assigned to different rooms based upon their supposed preferences. Once in the separate rooms subjects are asked individually to select one column of payoff points from a matrix, and thus assign a payoff amount to an own-group member and an other-group member. While Tajfel and his associates use a somewhat complicated 'pull' procedure for scoring (see Turner, 1978a, for a complete description of the assessment procedure), only the four resultant orientations are discussed here. They include (a) maximum ingroup profit (MIP), (b) maximum difference in favour of the ingroup (MD), (c) fairness (F) and (d) maximum joint profit (MJP). It is the maximum difference choice that represents the greatest relative advantage and best exemplifies the need for ingroup favouritism. Their research has generally concluded that MD is the most powerful predictor of choice, although evidence for the other four choices does exist. In fact, Turner, Brown and Tajfel (1979) summarized their results as indicating that the MD choice is only non-significantly more influential than MIP and MJP. Nevertheless, the SIT theorists hold strong to their contention that between-group competitiveness is the result of the need for positive social identity through the relative advantage of ingroup performance.

As indicated below, there is a question whether or not mere categorization is sufficient to produce relativistic social comparison. Beyond that there is a definitional matter as to whether aggregates of individuals should be

defined as groups to the extent that they engage in relativistic social comparisons. One could interpret Tajfel and his associates as believing, first, that entitativity is created (on the independent variable side) by categorization, and, second, that entitativity is indexed (on the dependent variable side) by relativistic social comparisons. While Tajfel and his associates do not use the term 'entitativity', they do believe that mere categorization does induce 'genuine awareness of membership in separate and distinct groups' (Tajfel, 1978a, p. 35).

The alternative allocation task experiments

A series of experiments using the Multiple Alternative Matrices (MAMs) were conducted during the early eighties to assess directly the maximizing difference orientation exhibited within the minimal group paradigm. Bornstein et al. (1983a) developed the procedure which enables the measurement of seven different social orientations. The labels for the orientations, taken from the analyses of Kelley and Thibaut (1978), are differentiated based upon whether the orientations favour own group, other group or neither group. The orientations favouring own group include maximizing own gain (max. own), maximizing relative own gain (max. rel. own), and maximizing joint gain favouring own group (max. joint own). The orientations favouring the other group include maximizing other's gain (max. other), maximizing other's relative gain (max. rel. other), and maximizing joint gain favouring other (max. joint other). Finally, the orientation favouring neither group minimizes the difference between group outcomes (min. diff.).

The obvious advantage of this approach is its delineation of interpersonal motives. Each orientation represents a mutually exclusive motivation for interaction. Thus, the overlapping orientations problem inherent in the minimal group paradigm is easily resolved through use of the MAMs and a better test of SIT is possible. The max. rel. own choice best represents SIT's maximum difference (MD), max. own is similar to maximum ingroup profit (MIP), min. diff. is similar to fairness (F), and max. joint best represents maximum joint profit (MJP).

Point values for own versus other group can be assigned to represent the seven orientations without motivational overlap. In other words, the representations of the seven orientations are mutually exclusive as to the motivation for choosing them. Therefore, the specific predictions of SIT concerning categorization and self-esteem gained through maximizing relative advantage could be tested in an unconfounded manner through the use of the Multiple Alternative Matrices.

A series of studies using the MAMs was conducted to test the viability of SIT in predicting actual motivational behaviour in the minimal group paradigm. Because the details of these studies have been presented in previous articles and a chapter (Insko & Schopler, 1987), only the highlights are presented here.

Bornstein et al. (1983a) conducted a series of three experiments using the MAMs that represented a substantial challenge to social identity theory. In the first two studies, college students were given a cover story concerning their participation in an experiment as part of a larger investigation of artistic preferences. The rest of the experiment followed the Tajfelian procedure exactly except that subjects made monetary choices for one own-group and outgroup member using the multiple alternative matrices. The results indicated that the subjects were not choosing max. rel. own more than would be expected by chance (across the seven orientations and 10 trials), and they actually chose it significantly less than would be expected by chance. Recall that max. rel. own is analogous to MD, the main strategy believed to be evoked by mere categorization. Instead, subjects significantly tended to choose both max. joint own and min. diff. (with significantly more min. diff. for females than males).

In the second experiment subjects were also asked to go back through the matrices and indicate a second preference on each matrix, and then a third preference. Subjects did not select max. rel. above chance for either the second or third preferences. Furthermore, the second experiment also included a condition in which subjects responded using the Tajfel matrices instead of the MAMs. Results using these matrices indicated support for the MD choice, as in previous studies using the less differentiated matrices.

The third experiment was conducted using junior high students (9th and 10th grade) from a middle-class US suburb. No cover story was used. Results again indicated no significant deviation from chance for max. rel. own. As in the first two experiments, min. diff. was selected significantly more than chance. However, unlike in the first two experiments, max. own was also selected significantly more than chance.

Given the slightly different results for junior high students, Wittenbraker (1983) conducted an experiment using 5th, 9th and 12th grade students from the same school system used in the previously mentioned third study. He used the same mere categorization procedure except that coloured bar graphs were used to represent outcomes for Klee versus Kandinsky members. Once again, results indicated a significant effect for min. diff. There was also a replication of the max. own effect for 9th grade males. Finally, there was a significant effect for max. joint own for both 5th and 12th graders.[2]

Social identity theory's response

In response to the Bornstein et al. series of experiments, Turner (1983a, 1983b) raised three objections. The first two were procedural in nature while the third constituted a major theoretical challenge. The two procedural objections were that the cover story distorted the results and that in the MAMs format subjects allocated money to just one own group and one outgroup. Two different studies (Bornstein et al., 1983b) were conducted in response to these objections. The first compared the old cover story with a

new cover story and a condition with no cover story at all. The results indicated no effect for the three-level manipulation of cover story. The second experiment contrasted a procedure using allocation to one own group and one other group to one using allocation to different own group and outgroup members. The results indicated non-significant effects for constancy of recipient. Furthermore, both studies again found significant effects for both min. diff. and max. joint own and a non-significant effect for max. rel.

The major theoretical objection to the use of the MAMs concerned what Turner called the maximizing assumption. Turner maintained that the MAMs differentiate between social orientations only to the degree that individuals wish to maximize a value reflected by a particular orientation. Instead, subjects may make a specific choice not because of its social orientation as reflected by the maximizing assumption, but because of a different orientation altogether. For example, a subject may choose max. own not out of a desire to maximize own profits but instead out of a desire to win to a lesser extent than is possible through max. rel. own. Thus, the MAMs would reflect social values only to the degree that subjects adhere to the maximizing assumption.

If one is able to cast doubt on whether subjects actually adhere to the maximizing assumption, reinterpretation of previous results using the MAMs allows for possible support for social identity theory. Recall that research with adult subjects found an abundance of evidence for max. joint own but no evidence for max. rel. own or max. own. Obviously, max. rel. own and max. own both involve advantaging of own group. But what about max. joint own? If the choice is interpreted to reflect a concern with both own-group and outgroup outcomes, the evidence of desire for superiority is ambiguous at best. However, Turner argues that subjects may choose max. joint own not out of concern for maximizing both own and other outcomes but out of a desire to win to a lesser extent than is possible in max. rel. own. Thus, if the maximizing assumption is rejected, both the max. rel. own and max. joint own choices support the social comparison prediction of social identity theory.

Insko, Pinkley, Harring, et al. (1987) conducted a study designed to determine whether subjects actually invoked the maximizing assumption when choosing either max. own or max. joint own. An identical format was used to test the subjects except that the MAMs were presented one at a time. If and when a max. own or max. joint own was selected the subject was given a questionnaire containing an open-ended item and a closed-ended item. The open-ended item simply asked subjects to state their reason for their immediately prior choice. The closed-ended item forced subjects to choose between the maximizing assumption and the Turner rationale. For max. own these items were 'to gain the most amount of money possible' and 'to win by less than the biggest margin'. For max. joint own these items were 'to gain the highest combined amount of money for everyone, with my group receiving slightly more', and 'to win by less than the biggest margin'.

The results for both the open-ended and closed-ended items indicated overwhelming support for the maximizing assumption. For example, 18 of the 21 subjects who chose max. joint own had open-ended responses consistent with the maximizing assumption ($p < .0006$ by binomial test).

The MAMs versus the Tajfelian pull procedure

If subjects do accept the maximizing assumption of the MAMs, why do the MAMs yield different results from the pull procedure? Currently, we do not have a definitive answer to this question. We can, however, point to two obvious differences in the assessment procedures. First, because the array of alternatives on the MAMs are unconfounded, it should be relatively clear to the subject that he or she is selecting among distinctive choices.

Second, unlike the pull procedure, the MAMs simultaneously present subjects with the full array of possible preferences to be assessed. Thus a subject is able to make a choice with complete knowledge of all of the possibilities that are available. We find it plausible that in such a situation the subject's ability to indicate his or her clear preference will be optimized, that is, that the choice will be an informed choice.

Consider, for example, a subject who selects max. rel. own on the MAMs. It should be apparent to the subject that the choice is clearly different from max. own, max. joint own, max. other, and so on. The subject should clearly understand that a max. rel. own choice is not a choice to maximize own category outcomes, not a choice to maximize joint outcomes, not a choice to maximize other category outcomes, but rather a choice to maximize the relative difference between own- and other-category outcomes. If it is advantageous to use an assessment procedure which maximizes the subject's understanding of what is being chosen, why should investigators continue to rely on the pull procedure?

SIT summary

Taken together, this series of experiments using the MAMs provides a very dissatisfying picture of the contention that mere categorization is enough to instil relativistic competition through social comparison mechanisms. First, five different studies using a variety of populations, including adults, found that mere categorization does not lead to maximizing relative choices when differentiated social orientation matrices are used instead of the traditional, motivationally confounded, Tajfelian matrices. Instead, subjects tend to choose max. joint own. Furthermore, research has shown that subjects do appear to use the maximizing assumption inherent in the interpretation of the MAMs. In other words, with closer inspection of social motives, mere categorization does not produce the relative advantage competition that Tajfel believed to characterize real groups. Given this revelation, the question then becomes: what exactly is needed beyond mere categorization to produce intergroup competition?

The discontinuity effect

*The possibility of schema-related beliefs concerning the
appropriateness of competitive behaviour*

As mentioned earlier, the discontinuity effect refers to the tendency for intergroup interactions to be more competitive than interindividual inter-actions. Within the domain of investigated matrices, the effect appears to be robust and reliable. Moreover, research concerning the discontinuity effect has helped identify what is needed beyond mere categorization to produce intergroup competition. We specifically hypothesize that all of the evidence triangulates on the suggestion that competition flows from circumstances implying the believed appropriateness of competition. We, furthermore, speculate that a set of such beliefs in the appropriateness of competition constitute a schema. By a schema we mean a set of beliefs serving to organize and guide memory for past events and expectations regarding future events. In postulating such a schema we are clearly going beyond the evidence. More definitive evidence for a schema would be provided by data indicating that perceived effects are magnified or altered in memory. We have no such data; rather, we have data which suggest that experienced competitiveness can produce further competitiveness – even when the further competitiveness involves a different opponent.

*Competitive experience with one opponent and subsequent
competitive relations with another opponent*

Insko, Pinkley, Harring, et al. (1987) conducted an experiment comparing intergroup interactions versus interindividual interactions in a Prisoner's Dilemma Game (PDG; see Figure 13.1) followed by the usual mere cat-egorization procedure. Previous research using the PDG had indicated that groups behaved competitively while individuals behaved cooperatively in the identical setting (McCallum et al., 1985). Thus, the behaviour of subjects who experienced competition (in group-on-group interaction) or did not experience competition (in one-on-one interaction) on a previous task could be compared in the mere categorization task. It was hypothesized that the prior experience would carry over to the categorization task, resulting in increased levels of competitiveness (max. rel. own or max. own). The results indicated that there was more competition between groups than between individuals with the PDG and that this behaviour carried over to the mere categorization procedure in the form of increased max. own (but not max. rel.) on the MAMs.

Reciprocation of competitive responses, or escalation of conflict with the same opponent, has been documented by others (for example, Kelley & Stahelski, 1970). It is important to realize, however, that the Insko, Pinkley, Harring, et al. result occurred despite the fact that the subjects were led to believe that the subject composition of the Klee and Kandinsky categories in the mere categorization situation was not necessarily the same as the

Figure 13.1   *A Prisoner's Dilemma Game matrix (PDG)*

subject composition of the groups in the PDG situation, and thus that the obtained results were not a simple result of reciprocation. Why, then, did competitive behaviour carry over from one situation to the other? One possibility is that there was a perseveration of competitive behaviour. We believe, however, that such an explanation is at best an oversimplification. Rather we interpret the results as suggesting that subjects shifted their beliefs regarding what was appropriate or normative. As a result of prior competitive group-on-group interaction, subjects believed that when subsequently categorized in a different group it was appropriate to behave competitively towards another category or group.

To some readers it may appear that in postulating that competitive experience results in a change in beliefs regarding the appropriateness of competition we are going beyond the evidence, and indeed we are. Why do we need to postulate anything other than simple perseveration of competitive behaviour? There are two answers to this question. First, the reader should note that there is a wealth of published research indicating that behaviour change can result in attitude and belief change (for a review of this literature see Chapter 11 in Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). In addition the evidence for this linkage is particularly strong in those situations in which the choice to engage in the behaviour is 'free' or apparently unconstrained, and that appears to be the case in the above-described research. Second, the readers should note that competitive experience also involves competitiveness in the opponent, and a series of studies by Insko et al. (1992) relating to max. rel. indicates that it is an opponent's competitiveness which is particularly important in producing subsequent competitive behaviour.

The design of the Insko et al. (1992) studies used a three-choice matrix (labelled a PDR matrix; see Figure 13.2) which reflected three different social orientations: max. joint, max. own and max. rel. The max. own choice on this matrix is suggested by Campbell's (1965) realistic conflict theory, which implies that the dominant social motive in intergroup conflict is maximizing 'real' outcomes. The max. rel. choice obviously reflects the

Note: The third choice in the PDR matrix is max. rel. The third choice in the PDC matrix is confounded max. rel., which is max. rel. that is confounded with max. own.

Figure 13.2 *A Prisoner's Dilemma max. rel. matrix (PDR) and a Prisoner's Dilemma confounded matrix (PDC)*

Tajfelian notion of maximizing relative advantage to bolster social identity. The results of the first study supported both Campbell and Tajfel's theory concerning group behaviour: relative to individuals, groups made both more max. own and max. rel. choices. There was some hint, however, that the max. rel. behaviour only occurred after the completion of the practice trials, which were played for points instead of money against the other group (or individual).

One possible reason for this initial reluctance to choose max. rel. might relate to tactical considerations. Some groups may try tactically to 'set up' the other group by not choosing max. rel. until the later trials. Therefore, in experiment 2 we eliminated this confound by having subjects play their practice trials against an experimenter, and invoked a procedure whereby each group (or individual) played one trial with each of three other groups (or individuals). This procedure was designed to eliminate possible tactical considerations because subjects knew they would only interact once with each other group (or individual). The procedure had the added benefit of

Table 13.1   *Max. rel. as a function of matrix type (PDR versus PDC), trials and groups versus individuals, experiment 2*

	Trial 1		Trial 2		Trial 3	
	Groups	Individuals	Groups	Individuals	Groups	Individuals
PDR	0.08	0.08	0.17	0.18	0.50	0.00
PDC	0.12	0.63	1.38	0.28	1.06	0.27

Note: Because four groups (or individuals) interacted on any given trial, max. rel. scores have a potential range from 0 to 4.

eliminating a possible interpretation of the results as being due to reciprocation of competition, or the escalation of conflict with an opponent.

It is likely that the max. rel. that occurred after the practice trials reflects the fact that a number of interactions are needed to instil the belief that competition is appropriate within the context of the PDR matrix. A further complication is that subjects may have been initially unwilling to choose max. rel. out of a reluctance to reduce own outcomes. The max. own choice produced higher own outcomes than the max. rel. choice (see the PDR matrix in Figure 13.2). Experiment 2 addressed this problem by using, in addition to the PDR matrix, a new matrix, the PDC matrix. On the PDC matrix own outcomes are identical (or confounded) for the max. own and max. rel. choices (see Figure 13.2). Thus, for this matrix the selection of max. rel. imposed no penalty on own outcomes.

The results, once again, supported both Campbell and Tajfel: groups selected max. own and max. rel. more often than individuals. However, there were significant max. rel. sequence effects for both the PDR and PDC matrices (see Table 13.1). On the PDC matrix, the tendency for groups to choose max. rel. more than individuals was non-existent on the first trial, increased on the second trial, and then levelled off on the third trial. On the PDR matrix, the max. rel. effect was non-existent on the first and second trials, but was there on the third trial. There were no sequence effects for max. own on either matrix. There was a cooperation effect inverse of that for max. rel. for both matrices, but this effect can be regarded as a consequence of the shifts in max. rel.

The findings for both studies are consistent. Max. rel. selections did not commence until some experience with the matrices had occurred. We should note here that, at least in study 2, this could not have been the result of tactical considerations that arise when repeatedly facing another group. These effects occurred even when subjects knew they would face each other group only once.

It is also important to recognize that the increased competitiveness cannot be the result of simple reciprocation of conflict. Again, subjects knew they would face each other group only once. Therefore, there was no chance for retaliation against a group that competed. Reciprocation and escalation of conflict seem unlikely explanations of the competition sequence effects.

A further analysis of the trial-by-trial patterns in the data indicated that the tendency to chose max. rel. (confounded with max. own) on the PDC matrix on the second trial occurred most obviously for those groups whose opponents on the first trial had chosen max. own. Having been hit with a competitive choice from the first opponent, groups, but not individuals, hit their second opponent with a more competitive (but not own outcome reducing) max. rel. choice. On the other hand, the tendency to chose pure max. rel. on the PDR matrix on the third trial occurred for those groups who had engaged in mutual max. own responses with their second trial opponents. Having exchanged mutual max. own choices with their second opponent, groups, not individuals, hit their third opponent with pure max. rel. (max. rel. that did reduce own outcomes and was thus unconfounded with max. own). Such findings are consistent with the general supposition that prior competitive experience can activate a schema regarding the believed appropriateness of a highly competitive, max. rel. response. The evidence suggests that after groups engage in mutual max. own responses they 'reach for a bigger gun' (pure max, rel.) to use against their next opponent. At that point groups are willing to reduce their own outcomes just to increase the likelihood of doing relatively better than their new opponent.

Recall the above-described Insko, Pinkley, Harring, et al. (1987) experiment in which participants interacted first in the context of the PDG and second in the mere categorization situation. In that experiment there was the possibility that the max. own choices in the mere categorization situation were a simple result of response perseveration. Note, however, that in the present experiments (Insko et al., 1992) the response-perseveration possibility can be ruled out for the simple reason that the max. rel. choice did not follow prior own max. rel. choice. For the PDC matrix the max. rel. response occurred following the max. own choice by the opponent., and for the PDR matrix the max. rel. response occurred following mutual max. own responses. The key thus appears to be the experience of competitiveness *by the opponent.*

The discontinuity research paradigm

Studies investigating the discontinuity effect are typically laboratory experiments that observe interaction using a Prisoner's Dilemma outcome matrix (or some variation thereof). The research is usually conducted in a laboratory suite in which same-sex individuals or groups are located in different rooms connected to a central room. After extensive training concerning the interdependent nature of the PDG, a trial or series of trials is conducted. Subjects are given time to examine a version of the PDG, then have some time to discuss possible action with the other group (often face to face with representatives but sometimes over a communication system), and then return to own-group discussion and actual decision-making. In group conditions the decision is typically made by the group as a whole or based

upon a majority vote. The decisions are then collected and the subjects paid accordingly. The discontinuity effect has been shown across a large number of studies regardless of: number of trials; size of payoff; gender; intergroup contact using representatives or all group members; whether the low values in the matrices are positive or negative; the type of matrices used (PDG, PDG-Alt., Mutual Fate Control); and whether there is equal or non-equal power.

Groups are not always more competitive than individuals

A further issue that merits comment relates to whether groups are 'always' more competitive than individuals. Clearly in many instances groups are cooperative and individuals are competitive and it would be foolish to maintain otherwise. Even though the above point has been repeatedly made (for example, Insko et al., 1993; Schopler & Insko, 1992), it is sometimes asserted that we believe otherwise. For example, Rabbie and Lodewijkx (1994) claim that 'Schopler and Insko (1992) have concluded, based on their research with the PDG, that groups are invariably more competitive and less cooperative than individuals' (p. 158). Actually, Schopler and Insko (1992) and Insko et al. (1993) argued that Kelley and Thibaut's (1978) index of correspondence provides a basis for predicting when groups will be more competitive than individuals. Kelley and Thibaut's index of correspondence, in a situation in which the range of outcomes for the two players are the same, is the correlation between the outcomes across the cells. With the PDG and with other matrices that we have investigated, this correlation is moderately negative. Clearly, one would not expect discontinuity with matrices involving totally correspondent outcomes (+1 correlation). With such matrices both groups and individuals should coordinate their responses and there thus would be no discontinuity effect. Likewise in a zero-sum situation with totally non-correspondent outcomes (–1 correlation) both individuals and groups have no alternative to competing, and there would again be no basis for a discontinuity effect. Given this theoretical argument, the empirical challenge is to determine whether the circumstances in which groups are more competitive than individuals are, indeed, situations with somewhat, but not totally, non-correspondent outcomes. This is an issue that is currently being investigated.

   A further consideration that is relevant to the issue as to whether groups are always more competitive than individuals is the fact that our investigations of the discontinuity effect have almost always been in situations in which individuals and groups communicate with each other prior to making simultaneous and irrevocable choices. Typically the communication has been face-to-face communication, but sometimes the communication has been via an intercom. Furthermore, Insko et al. (1993) obtained evidence indicating that in one-trial situations the absence of communication via an intercom produced a larger decrease in cooperation between individuals than between groups. Further evidence indicated that the presence of

communication produced a greater decrease in *expected* competition between individuals than between groups. Such evidence is consistent with the possibility, as discussed below, that there is an outgroup schema leading groups not to trust each other and thus for communication between groups to be of relatively low credibility. All of which is to suggest that without some form of communication the discontinuity effect should be markedly smaller and may, under some circumstances, be non-existent. Typically, of course, relations between individuals and relations between groups do occur in the context of some form of communication.

The theoretical basis for discontinuity: ingroup (greed) and outgroup (fear) schemata

As mentioned earlier, research investigating the discontinuity effect allows for careful consideration of the roots and nature of competition between groups. Previously mentioned research has provided evidence for the link between the belief in the appropriateness of competition (group schema) and competitive behaviour. Actually there is reason to believe that the schema concerning the believed appropriateness of competition can be subdivided into two schemata, the ingroup, or greed, schema and the outgroup, or fear, schema. At this point we would like to ruminate more extensively on these two theoretical bases for the discontinuity effect,

The ingroup (greed) schema If a set of beliefs regarding the appropriateness of competition exist, it is reasonable to suppose that some of those beliefs relate to what is appropriate and expected within the ingroup. But what might those beliefs be? One possibility relates to the beliefs that are postulated by the *altruistic rationalization* hypothesis. According to this hypothesis, group members assume that they are able to rationalize their competitiveness in intergroup interactions by believing that such behaviour is for the benefit of ingroup members. Thus, such competition is altruistic in regards to other members of the ingroup. The hypothesis bears some resemblance to Snyder's concept of attributional ambiguity (Snyder, Kleck, Strenta & Mentzer, 1979; Snyder & Wicklund, 1981). Snyder maintains that self-interested behaviour is more likely to occur when there is attributional ambiguity as to whether the behaviour is self-interested in nature. Unfortunately, there is evidence that when subjects are explicitly given the opportunity to share outcomes, and thus make altruistic rationalizations, they do not become more competitive. Insko, Pinkley, Hoyle, et al. (1987) conducted two studies employing a condition in which individuals were bound together by outcome interdependence. Within this condition, there were three simultaneous dyad interactions, with all subjects having a separate room, three on each side of the centre hall. However, subjects were told that, while they would interact alone with an individual on the other side of the hall, their money would be divided equally with the other two people on the same side of the hall. According to the altruistic rationalization

hypothesis, this outcome interdependence condition should have created more competition than the individual interaction condition. However, the means for the two conditions were virtually identical, thus making the altruistic rationalization hypothesis implausible.

A more compelling argument for the creation of a competition-allowing ingroup schema revolves around the *social support for shared self-interest* that is available for groups but not for individuals. A belief in the availability of within-group support is quite likely based on a wealth of within-group experience. We thus postulate that a history of mutual support for short-term self-interest has produced an ingroup schema that supports greedy behaviour. Individuals, by definition, are not afforded this support and therefore, apart from fantasised social support, are less likely to develop this schema. In characterizing social support for shared self-interest as a schema we are explicitly postulating that individuals in groups expect that they will be supported when they suggest a course of action consistent with the group's self-interest. Beyond this, however, we also postulate that greed-based competitiveness is most likely in a situation in which the other group is expected to be cooperative and is therefore vulnerable. (Combativeness that occurs in a context in which the other group is expected to be competitive and is therefore dangerous is more reasonably attributed to fear than to greed.) Schopler et al.'s (1993) study 2 was designed to demonstrate the resultant competitive behaviour when there is social support for self-interest, and an expectation that the other group will be cooperative. Confederates were placed in each group and told to give a single suggestion as to what the group should choose in a standard PDG. The confederates were told to suggest to the other two subjects either that they should choose X (the cooperative choice) or Z (the competitive choice). The use of confederates also allowed for manipulation of the feedback concerning what the other group actually chose. By selecting the confederates as representatives it was possible to give the subjects false feedback that the other group was either choosing all X, all Z, or a 50–50 mixture of the two. The feedback manipulation was conceived as a manipulation of the other group's expected behaviour. The prediction was of an interaction between the feedback and suggestion factors such that only with cooperative feedback would the cooperative suggestion succeed in reducing intergroup competitiveness. Within the context of the repeated cooperative feedback where the other group is perceived as vulnerable, the cooperative suggestion theoretically should have reduced the within-group social support for combativeness, and thus reduced competitiveness in this condition relative to all the other conditions. The predicted pattern of results occurred.

The outgroup (fear) schema   While social support may foster greed through the bolstering of a competition-allowing ingroup schema, belief that the other group will be competitive is also expected to create competition within the PDG paradigm. Competition as the result of a competitive outgroup schema has been termed the 'fear' hypothesis.

	Cooperation	Withdrawal	Competition
Cooperation	$0.57 / $0.57	$0.48 / $0.48	$0.66 / $0.33
Withdrawal	$0.48 / $0.48	$0.48 / $0.48	$0.48 / $0.48
Competition	$0.33 / $0.66	$0.48 / $0.48	$0.39 / $0.39

Figure 13.3 *A Prisoner's Dilemma Game alternative matrix (PDG-Alt.)*

There is some evidence that individuals do maintain beliefs describing other groups as competitive, aggressive and dishonest in nature. Doise (1969) reported that before any interaction subjects attribute fewer cooperative motives to the opposing group than to themselves or their own group members. Hoyle, Pinkley and Insko (1989) found that the source of this negative expectancy was not whether one was alone or in a group, but whether the opponent was a group or an individual. The expectations for the outgroup were significantly more competitive and aggressive regardless of whether one was alone or in a group. We do not have definitive evidence that such expectations, or beliefs, constitute a schema, but we are explicitly postulating that they do.

There is evidence relating the postulated outgroup schema to the discontinuity effect itself. This evidence comes from research using a new three-choice matrix referred to as a Dilemma Game (PDG-Alt.) matrix (see Figure 13.3). The PDG-Alt. matrix includes a third choice in addition to the cooperative and competitive choices of the PDG matrix. This new choice guarantees intermediate outcomes regardless of the opponent's choice. This new choice, labelled 'withdrawal', is thus a safe choice that should be rationally preferred when there is fear of the opponent's competitive intent. Insko et al.'s (1990) second study used the PDG-Alt. matrix. The results indicated a discontinuity effect for both competition and withdrawal. Not only did groups compete and withdraw more than individuals, they competed and withdrew to approximately the same extent. Thus, the discontinuity effect cannot be explained by greed alone. The negativity of the outgroup schema (that is, the expectation that another group is more dangerous than another individual) also affects group behaviour.

What is not clear, however, is the basis for this negative outgroup schema. One could suggest a number of hypotheses regarding its development. The first could simply be experience. We may develop general negative outgroup schemata based upon negative experiences with specific outgroups. Such experiences may cloud interactions with any group, just as the competitive PDG experience made competition more likely in the mere categorization paradigm, and just as max. rel. did not emerge until after a few trials using the PDR and PDC matrices. Consistent with this speculation, Pemberton, Insko and Schopler (1997) obtained evidence indicating that intergroup relations are recalled as more competitive than interindividual relations, and also that intergroup relations are experienced as more competitive than interindividual relations. The experiential data were obtained from 'diaries' that subjects carried with them for seven days (Reis & Wheeler, 1991).

A second hypothesis concerns the role of false consensus. This negative view of outgroups in general may stem from our knowledge of our own competitive tendencies within groups. Thus, we may only need to look at ourselves and by projection develop a prediction of how the other group may behave. Further research should expand our understanding of these matters.

Regardless of how the negative outgroup schema develops, its effects on behaviour are predictable. When the only choice is between cooperation and competition, as in the standard PDG, groups lash out in fear. It may be that the root of many group behaviours that are intensely competitive in nature are simply the result of fear of the other group and not a reflection of ingroup greed. This is certainly apparent when there is the chance to withdraw from the situation with certainty of outcomes, as in the PDG-Alt. In such situations groups tend to withdraw as often as they attack.

Reducing discontinuity through recategorization: preliminary results

There is an 'older' literature and a 'newer' literature on the overcoming of ingroup ethnocentrism. The 'older' literature tended to specify remedial interventions in terms of interactive behaviour between two groups. There were such global recommendations as joint interactions to attain super-ordinate goals (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961), and there were the specific behavioural rules contained in Osgood's (1962) Graduated and Reciprocated Initiatives in Tension-reduction (GRIT). The 'newer' literature focuses on the cognitive mechanisms presumed to be antecedents to intergroup bias, and seems to vary with respect to the directness with which the intervention affects relevant cognitions. The most direct methods are those that degrade the categorized representation by such methods as recategorization (Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman & Rust, 1993; Gaertner, Mann, Murrell & Dovidio, 1989) or criss-crossing category membership (Brewer, Ho, Lee & Miller, 1987). With the exception of modelling GRIT (Lindskold, 1983), both traditions tested for a reduction in ethnocentrism with measures of individual perceptions of ingroup and

outgroup members. To our knowledge no one has attempted to assess whether the intervention was successful in increasing such behaviours as intergroup cooperation. We believe the ultimate effectiveness of any technique resides in its ability to create intergroup cooperation between intact groups.

We have pilot tested some recategorization procedures that, in terms of reduced intergroup conflict, were spectacular failures. The pilot studies began with the formation of four three-person groups, who were subsequently combined into two rivalrous six-person groups or, in a different version, two, independent, six-person groups each working cooperatively on a task. The recategorization worked well, in the sense of increasing liking for former outgroup members and creating satisfactory working relations with them. But, when we regrouped participants into their initial three-person groups and asked them to interact with previous group members on a PDG, their rate of competition was just as large as the rate for groups whose members were never recategorized. All of which makes us suspect that if at the end of camp Sherif and his associates (Sherif et al., 1961) had put the Eagles and Rattlers into a mixed-motive situation, they would have been just as competitive as they were in the tournament. Quite possibly Sherif and others have underestimated the power of the social setting.

Conclusions

That individuals gain self-definition and bolster self-esteem by belonging to groups is certainly a reasonable working hypothesis. Furthermore, we find it plausible that the need to support high self-esteem through the demonstrated superiority of one's own group may be at least a partial explanation for between-group competitiveness. This main tenet of social identity theory has not been questioned. However, the belief that mere categorization into groups produces such intergroup competitiveness, a second tenet of the theory, has been questioned. An abundance of research has demonstrated that when more differentiated social orientations are used, mere categorization does not produce the relative competitiveness predicted by social identity theory.

Instead, research detailing the discontinuity effect has suggested that what is need to produce the intergroup competitiveness beyond mere categorization is a belief that competition is appropriate. There is evidence that competitive behaviour increases following competitive experience. This is true even when the opponent is a group other than the one with whom the prior competitive experience occurred. Such evidence is consistent with the possibility that beliefs in the appropriateness of competition can produce competition between categories. We have speculated that such beliefs flow both from an ingroup schema relating to expected social support for self-interested, or greedy, behaviour, and from an outgroup schema relating to the expected competitiveness, and dangerousness, of an outgroup.

Notes

1. Given the existence of difference in the interaction of two groups and the interaction of two individuals, we are inclined to define aggregates of people as groups whenever behaviour between these aggregates is different from behaviour between individuals. However, in order to avoid circularity it is necessary to use the term 'group' in two different senses. Groups in the sense of aggregates, or sets of individuals, is assumed in the definition of discontinuity. The existence of discontinuity, however, provides evidence for the existence of groups in the more psychological meaning of the term.

2. In seeming conflict with the above results, Platow, McClintock and Liebrand (1990) found that categorized subjects would select max. rel. on the Bornstein et al. (1983a, 1983b) matrices. Two differences between this experiment and all, or much, of the above research are that Platow et al. used points and not money for outcomes, and did not have a cover story. The *combination* of points and the lack of a non-game cover story may have led some subjects to interpret the situation as game-like, and thus to attribute relative value to the points. We believe that researchers should be careful not to create a game-like atmosphere and should use outcomes that have value outside of the experimental context.

PART IV

THE IMPACT OF CULTURE ON IDENTITY AND CATEGORIZATION

14

Discrimination and Beliefs on Discrimination in Individualists and Collectivists

J. Francisco Morales, Mercedes López-Sáez and Laura Vega

The concept of individualism

Individualism refers not to the individual as an empirical subject or 'individual specimen of the human species', but rather to the individual as a 'moral, independent, autonomous being, . . . bearer of our supreme values'. In this second sense, individualism is the prevailing contemporaneous ideology of person and society (see Dumont, 1987, pp. 37ff.).

As opposed to individualism, which ascribes to the individual the main value in society, for holism the supreme value lies in society as a whole. Historically, individualism appears in holistic societies as a source of opposition to them and as a sort of supplement. Here, the Indian 'renouncer' is an important landmark. In order to achieve the utmost truth, the renouncer relinquishes social life and its limitations and devotes himself to his own destiny. Similarly, in the Hellenistic period, against the self-sufficient *polis* of Plato and Aristotle, the idea was postulated that in order to become a wise person it was necessary to renounce the world. At that time, non-learned people were considered as victims of the worldly life.

From the beginning of the modern era, society is usually conceived as an 'association', which suggests that the individuals who belong to it have associated with each other 'voluntarily', and thus they are prior to the groups and/or the relations they establish among themselves. This conception entails

two characteristic features: equality and freedom. There is a belief that one's own selfish interest is the best guarantee of social order and of general satisfaction for all members of society.

Nevertheless, quite often, the way many people have used freedom has prevented others from achieving their own. Here is the central 'paradox' of individualism, according to Camps. Ethics must necessarily be individualistic, because it has to preserve the individual. But it must be achieved in such a way that it protects everyone at the same time, not some at the expense of others. When this is not achieved, individualism is equivalent to 'anti-ideology', insolidarity, insensitivity to unequalities, lack of interest in public affairs. And that is what happens to most developed societies, 'whose only expectation is the perpetuation of group' (see Camps, 1993, pp. 14f.).

Cultural aspects of individualism

Hofstede (1980) reports the results of the HERMES project, which involved the study of employees from 40 different countries, all of them belonging to the same multinational business corporation. From the responses given by this sample of subjects to 14 work goals, this author identified a factor representing a dimension of individualism–collectivism.

The individualism–collectivism factor loaded positively on the following goals, from highest to lowest loading: (a) enough free time for oneself and one's family; (b) freedom to follow one's own way at work; (c) having a job which provides a personal sense of performance; and (d) living in a place desirable to oneself and one's family. The goals with negative loadings, also in a decreasing order, were: (a) opportunities to learn new skills; (b) good physical working conditions for work; (c) use of skills and abilities at work; and (d) good marginal profits. According to Hofstede, goals with positive loadings have in common that they emphasize personal independence vis-à-vis the organization. On the other hand, goals with negative loadings refer to things the organization can do for the individual.

The factor analysis conducted by Hofstede has been called 'ecological', because the loading of each goal is the correlation coefficient between each country's factor score and its mean score in that goal. This correlation is calculated across all 40 countries. From factor scores an Individualism Index is calculated for each country, ranging from 0 to 100 due to a mathematical transformation.

Psychological aspects of individualism

Hui (1988) postulates that individualism is also an individual tendency or predisposition, since there is, within any culture, subcultural variation among individuals regarding this dimension. This author's work has two main characteristics. First, the development of a scale to measure the

individualism–collectivism construct, named INDCOL, consisting of eight subscales. Thus, the construct is considered as multifaceted and is measured in relation to eight specific targets: spouse or partner, relatives, parents, neighbours, close friends, co-workers, acquaintances and siblings.

Second, INDCOL measures beliefs, attitudes, behavioural intentions and behaviours. As Hui himself notes, this has both theoretical and methodological consequences. From a methodological standpoint, generality of measurement increases, although it is at the expense of a part of the scale's internal consistency. From a theoretical point of view, individualism–collectivism is not considered as a unitary disposition, but rather as a syndrome. In fact, by adding up the scores of the eight subscales, the General Index of Collectivism is obtained. Hui defines this index as the degree to which the person believes the group, and not the individual, is the basic unit of survival.

Based on INDCOL and other scales developed by himself, Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai and Lucca (1988) produced the Three Factor Questionnaire. They applied this questionnaire to samples from the United States and found, as did Hui, that individualism is a multifaceted construct, since it appears characterized by the following features: (a) priority given to one's own goals over those of the ingroup; (b) less attention paid to the views of the ingroup; (c) self-reliance with competition; (d) distance from ingroup; (e) making decisions on one's own before asking others' point of view; (f) less concern for ingroup. Therefore, in the event of a conflict between ingroup and individual, individualism will lead the person to do what he or she, and not the ingroup, considers appropriate.

Correlates of individualism: self, relationship with ingroup and outgroup, emotional experience

Besides the above-mentioned work by Hui (1988) and Triandis et al. (1988), many others have studied the differences in social behaviour between individualists and collectivists. Among the best known the following can be cited: Hui and Triandis (1986), Markus and Kitayama (1991a), Triandis (1993), Triandis, Leung, Villareal and Clack (1985), Triandis et al. (1986) and Triandis, McCusker and Hui (1990). Table 14.1 summarizes the main differences regarding self and relationship with ingroups and outgroups.

In order to better understand the content of this table, two points must be noted. First, not all ingroups are equally important for collectivists. On the contrary, there is usually a preference or priority ranking among them. According to Triandis (1993), in many societies the order is (a) family, (b) nation, (c) religious group and (d) work group. However, in Japan the religious group does not exist, and the work group ranks higher. Together with the priority order of ingroups, we must take into account the existence of vertical collectivism and horizontal collectivism. The former implies

Table 14.1   *Summary of some differences between individualists and collectivists*

Difference target	Individualists	Collectivists
Content of self	Individual differences	Social categories
Way of achieving self-actualization	'I can do whatever I want'	'I am not a burden to my group'
Basic unit of survival (belief)	Individual	Group
Regulation of behaviour	Personal attitudes and cost–benefit analysis	Ingroup norms
Personal goals vs ingroup goals	Personal > ingroup	Ingroup > personal
Difference between ingroup and outgroup	Weak	Strong
Ingroup and outgroup homogeneity	Outgroup more homogeneous	Ingroup more homogeneous
Kind of relations	Horizontal	Vertical

submission to ingroup authority. The latter means a fusion with ingroup identity. Both kinds of collectivism may coexist, but the prevalence of one or the other depends on the type of society concerned.

Markus and Kitayama (1991a) designate individualist cultures as 'independent self' cultures, and collectivist ones as 'interdependent self' cultures. According to these authors, there are important differences between both types of culture as far as emotional experience is concerned, since the fundamental emotions, their sustaining basis and the functions they fulfil do not coincide. Thus, in 'independent self' cultures, the most important emotions are ego-focused, specifically anger, frustration, pride, guilt and haughtiness, their basis consists on the subject's internal attributes, and their function is the expression of inner feelings. On the other hand, emotions in 'interdependent self' cultures are focused on others. Among them shame and sympathy stand out, the basis of these being a special sensitivity to others, an ability to take the perspective of the other and an active search for interdependence. Their function is to express the outcome of interpersonal relationships.

Individualism and social identity: Hinkle and Brown's proposal

As the various chapters in this book have shown, social identity theory (SIT) deals with processes of group comparison and identification, relationships between groups, the formation of psychological group, and the relative weight of personal and social identity, among many other processes. Results obtained by those who have studied the repercussions of the individualism–collectivism orientation, summarized in Table 14.2, lead us to expect a convergence between studies on individualism and those carried out within the framework of SIT.

Table 14.2 *Relation between identification with the group and intergroup differentiation as a function of individualism/collectivism and autonomous/relational orientation*

	Orientation	
Orientation	Autonomous	Relational
Individualist	.03	.33*
	$n = 17$	$n = 24$
Collectivist	.47**	.79***
	$n = 25$	$n = 18$

* $p < .10$; ** $p < .05$; *** $p < .01$

Hinkle and Brown (1990) were the first to pay attention to this convergence. From a theoretical point of view, they state that processes of social identity studied by SIT will take place mainly in 'collectivist kind of groups' (p. 66), since it seems reasonable to expect only collectivist groups or individuals to worry about the outcome of comparisons between ingroup and outgroups. The general underlying idea is that a collectivist orientation seems important for the manifestation of social identity processes (Hinkle & Brown, p. 67).

From an empirical point of view, Hinkle, Brown and Ely (1992) found that the relation between identification with the group and intergroup differentiation is significantly greater in collectivists than in individualists. This is a proof, they argue, that only collectivists are really concerned with the outcome of comparisons between ingroup and outgroups (See Table 14.2).

Individualism and identity theory: other perspectives

SIT is also a theory of the formation of a psychological group. Since the earlier experiments using the minimal group paradigm, both Tajfel and Turner interpreted the discrimination taking place in that situation as evidence of group formation. Insko and Schopler (1987, p. 215) note that Tajfel considers the effect of mere categorization as a proof of entitativity, meaning the feeling of shared group membership. As early as 1981, Brown and Turner proposed using an interpersonal–group continuum instead of the famous interpersonal–intergroup continuum. The reason was, according to these authors, that 'the same processes may tend to distinguish both intragroup and intergroup processes of interpersonal relationships' (Brown & Turner, 1981, p. 40). In other words, intergroup differentiation implies group formation and vice versa.

Nevertheless, research by Triandis and his co-workers suggests that one of the main differences between individualists and collectivists is the

relationship they maintain with their own groups. In principle, the idea must be rejected that individualists find it difficult to join a group. Even accepting the schematic picture of Table 14.1, the very fact of having an ingroup and an outgroup implies group identification, as minimal as this may be. Even more, it would not be incorrect to predict a greater ease for individualists to form a group, having in mind that their differentiation vis-à-vis outgroup people is weaker. For the same reason, it seems difficult for collectivists to be able to form a group with people not belonging formerly to any of their few ingroups.

At this point we must mention an interesting result reported by Hinkle, Brown and Ely (1992, p. 107–108). For subjects showing an autonomous as well as individualist orientation, the correlation between identification and differentiation was .03, as can be seen in Table 14.2. However, these subjects did show positive discrimination in favour of their group. Therefore, we tried to find out: (a) whether individualists show discrimination in the minimal group paradigm situation; (b) whether there are differences between them and collectivists in their showing intergroup discrimination.

First experiment

Subjects were 52 students from adult education courses, aged between 20 and 60, and being of a low socio-economic level. All of them had previously completed the Spanish version of Triandis et al.'s (1988) Three Factor Questionnaire, validated in this country. Two groups of 26 subjects were formed, each consisting of 13 subjects above and 13 subjects below the median of the questionnaire. Thus, both groups were homogeneous in this variable. One of the groups was put to the standard categorization procedure. This was the experimental or categorized group. The other one, not categorized, was the control group. Therefore, there were two variables – categorization and individualism – each having two values. Subjects answered only once to the six Tajfel matrices and to the 10 Insko matrices.

The MANOVA carried out on Tajfel's strategies showed that the experimental group (categorized) was more discriminatory than the control group (not categorized). Thus the experimental group was significantly higher in maximum ingroup profit (MIP) over maximum joint profit (MJP): 6.17 vs 1, $F(1, 39) = 12.93$, $p < .01$. It was also higher in maximum (ingroup) difference (MD): 5.29 vs –.58, $F(1, 39) = 18.61$, $p < .01$ and in MIP over fairness (F): 5.96 vs –.26, $F(1, 39) = 16.96$, $p < .01$. On the other hand, the control group was higher in fairness or equity: 7.84 vs 2.38, $F(1, 39) = 7.78$, $p < .01$.

The MANOVA carried out on Insko's strategies yielded similar results. The experimental group was higher in max. rel. own: .86 vs –1.01, $F(1, 39) = 10.83$, $p = .06$. The control group was higher in max. joint other: .25 vs –.93, $F(1, 39) = 9.15$, $p < .06$, and also in min. diff.: 1.83 vs .61, $F(1, 39) = 3.76$, $p < .06$.

No effects of individualism were found, nor interaction between categorization and individualism. This means that the classic effect of ingroup favouritism, first found by Tajfel and afterwards by many other researchers, appears again in our study, both for individualists and for collectivists in the two types of matrices.

In order to find out whether there were any differences in the kind of discrimination showed by individualists and collectivists, within-cell analysis of the preferences in the use of different strategies were carried out, both in experimental and in control group. No significant differences appeared either.

Second experiment

Within-cell comparisons in the first experiment were based on a small number of subjects (13). We carried out a second experiment to increase that number. We decided not to include the control group, since the effect of categorization seemed beyond doubt, and focused only on the individualism variable. Ninety-two subjects participated, of whom 47 were individualists and 45 were collectivists.

The procedure was similar: subjects completed the six Tajfel matrices and the 10 Insko ones, which provided the first measure of the dependent variable, named first choice. However, a change was introduced. After the booklet where they had marked their preferences had been taken away, subjects were given a second one where they were asked: (a) to complete the 16 matrices again, recording their previous choice in each, but explaining why they had made it – since there were 16 different matrices, subjects had to provide 16 reasons; this second measure was called justified choice; (b) to record the choice they thought people of their group had made, ingroup choice; and (c) to record the choice they thought people of the other group had made, outgroup choice.

Next, we will present the results obtained for each of these measures. But before we do so, we must stress that the effect of categorization, in the absence of a control group, is evident for every measure in the prevalence of discriminating over non-discriminating strategies. Thus, in the first choice only the fairness/equity strategy in Tajfel's matrices is higher than discriminating ones: 6.87. But both MIP over MJP (3.89), and MD (3.47), as well as MIP over fairness (3.01) are higher than MJP (.30) and MJP + MIP (.47). Similar results are found in the other three measures of the dependent variable. Insko's matrices show a similar pattern, with the exception of, only, the strategy max. joint own, which is as high as the discriminating strategies max. own and max. rel. own.

Results regarding first choice

The MANOVA carried out on Tajfel's matrices yielded significant values. The univariate Fs show that individualists are lower than collectivists in

MIP over fairness, 1.60 vs 4.44, $F(1, 89) = 6.98$, $p < .01$, which is evidence of their lesser degree of discrimination. At the same time, they are higher in fairness, 7.69 vs 6.04, F (1, 89) = 2.00, $p < .16$. MANOVA was not significant for Insko's matrices.

However, in these latter matrices differences do appear when relative preferences of individualists and collectivists are compared by means of the Wilcoxon test. Thus, we find that individualists are different from collectivists in that they prefer the strategy of fairness (min. diff.) over max. rel. own and max. joint own; also in their preference for max. joint own over max. own. Collectivists, on the other hand, choose max. rel. own more often than max. joint own. All this converges in a description of individualists as more prone than collectivists to fairness and to joint and non-discriminating strategies, bearing in mind that this differential tendency is found within a discrimination framework shared by both kinds of subjects, which explains the lack of differences in the MANOVA.

Results regarding justified choice

The MANOVA did not yield any significant differences, either in Tajfel's matrices or in Insko's ones.

As we have mentioned, after subjects had completed the matrices, they were asked a number of questions. The first one was about the reason why they had chosen a particular strategy in allocating points between two persons. More specifically, the question was: 'Why did you choose that cell?' Each subject had to record the reason corresponding to each cell. Since these amounted to 16, each subject provided 16 reasons to explain his/her choice-allocating strategies.

After analysing the reasons given by all subjects, we found they could be grouped into 10 main categories:

1	Fairness or equality	34%
2	Equality to balance	4.2%
3	Equality when it is the only choice not detrimental to one's group	0.58%
4	Maximum ingroup profit	24.8%
5	Maximum ingroup difference	8.53%
6	Maximum ingroup joint profit or maximum joint own	15.31%
7	Maximum joint other	3.2%
8	Maximum outgroup difference	0.77%
9	Others	0.84%
10	Chance	7%

Six of these reasons correspond exactly to the strategies of matrices. These are *fairness or equality* (F) (min. diff.), *maximum ingroup profit* (MIP) (max. own), *maximum ingroup difference* (MD) (max. rel. own), *maximum ingroup joint profit* (MJP) (max. joint own), *maximum joint other* (max. joint other) and *maximum outgroup difference* (max. rel. other).

These six strategies tend to be the most often used by subjects. In fact, a high percentage of them repeat the reason given for the first cell in the remaining 15, that is, does not show 'alternation' in its reasons. In these cases, which we have called 'Use of Single Strategy', or USS, subjects tend to use, almost always, some of these six reasons.

On the other hand, reasons 2, 3 and 9, respectively categorized as 'equality to balance', 'equality when it is the only choice not detrimental to one's group' and 'others', are subsidiary to the former ones. This means that they are used only in cases of 'alternation' of strategies, or SA, where subjects do not want to limit themselves to only one reason and resort to other complementary ones.

Let us see an example. Subject 34 uses a perfect alternation of reasons. On eight occasions he employs reason 4 (MIP) (max. own), which is discriminatory. In the remaining eight, he uses reason 2 (equality to balance), which is egalitarian. This subject's words are worth being cited. When he chooses reason 4, he justifies his choice as follows: 'To give points to the people having the same code as myself'. When he chooses reason 2, he states: 'In order not to increase too much the difference in favour of my group.'

In the case of this subject, as well as in other similar ones, reason 2 is clearly subsidiary to reason 4. The subject wants to benefit his/her group *more*, but does not want to do so in an extreme or radical way. Therefore, this justice or equality pursued arises from a wish to compensate a previous discrimination.

Reason 3 is even more subsidiary than reason 2. It is usually employed by subjects with a discriminatory orientation when they meet a Tajfel matrix in which they cannot benefit their group more than the opposite group. This is the case of subject 39, who shows a discriminatory pattern of reasons, choosing 15 times reason 4 (MIP) (max. own), and only once reason 3. In justifying his discriminating strategy, this subject states: 'To give more points to my group.' However, when choosing the equality strategy in Tajfel's last matrix, he says: 'To give as few points as possible to the other group.' Effectively, in this latter matrix it is not possible to discriminate in favour of one's own group.

It is clear, then, that reason 3 justifies equality in a subsidiary way, as a sort of lesser evil to prevent one's own group from getting less points than the other.

The last subsidiary reason is 9, which we have called 'others'. Sometimes, subjects look for justice allocating one group more points in one cell and less in the next one, since they think that a strict equality strategy will be detrimental to both groups in rendering their whole absolute profit lower. Thus, subject 18 states: 'I have tried to balance the two groups. Since compensation is sometimes difficult, it is rather a random criterion.'

Reason 10, 'chance', embodies those reasons not related to the strategy chosen. Five subjects used only this reason and were removed from the analyses, as was another who chose it most of the times.

Nevertheless, the great majority of reasons (82.64%) were distributed among the four main categories, which closely coincided with the main allocating strategies. These four reasons are fairness (34%), maximum ingroup profit (24.8%), maximum difference (8.53%) and maximum joint profit (15.3%).

Although each subject had to justify 16 different choices, a thorough analysis of the pattern of justifications showed that most subjects used only one reason for all 16 occasions or alternated between two. There were no differences between individualists and collectivists in the regularity of use of justification patterns: 74.4% of the former and 73.3% of the latter used one or two reasons to justify their respective choices.

When only the justifications of these 'regular' subjects are considered, the four above-mentioned categories explained 96.5% of the reasons used (instead of 82.64% which appeared when all subjects were computed). Discriminatory strategies, on the one hand (maximum ingroup profit and maximum difference), and non-discriminatory ones, on the other (fairness and maximum joint profit), were added up. This calculation led to the discovery that in individualists the use of discriminatory reasons (28.1%) is less than the use of non-discriminatory reasons (69.2%), a difference which is significant. However, in collectivists, though the use of discriminatory reasons is also less (42% and 54%, respectively), the difference is far from being significant.

Ingroup choice

By means of the Wilcoxon test we tried to find out whether there were differences between individualists and collectivists in their preferences for any strategy in the various choices. In other words, when individualists proceed from first choice and justified choice to ingroup choice, do they change their preferences as compared with collectivists? If this is true, the conclusion would be that individualists see ingroup members in a different way from how collectivists see members of their own ingroup.

Accepting $p < .05$ as a criterion of statistical significance, we found that, in effect, there were strong differences between collectivists and individualists. They certainly coincide in thinking that members of their own group use the fairness/equity strategy of Tajfel's matrices less often than themselves, which means they consider themselves as fairer than their ingroup's members. But individualists, as opposed to collectivists, think that ingroup mates are higher than themselves in the three Tajfel discriminatory strategies, namely MIP over MJP, MD, and MIP over fairness.

In Insko's matrices something similar happens. Collectivists consider themselves as more just than ingroup members. And so do individualists. Moreover, collectivists see themselves as less discriminatory than ingroup members in max. rel. own. And so do individualists. But these think they are less discriminatory than ingroup members in max. own, and here they are opposed to collectivists.

Outgroup choice

As in the previous choice, the Wilcoxon test was employed to look for differences between individualists and collectivists in the use of strategies in this choice as compared to the two former ones.

In Tajfel's matrices, results are exactly the same as in the previous choice. Collectivists consider themselves as more prone to fairness (F) than outgroup members. But collectivists do not think outgroup members to be more discriminatory than themselves. Individualists, however, do think so in the following strategies: MIP over MJP, MD, and MIP over F.

Results are also very similar in Insko's matrices. Both collectivists and individualists consider themselves as more fair than outgroup members and less discriminatory in max. rel. own. But individualists, as opposed to collectivists, think they are less discriminatory than outgroup members in max. own.

First choice–justified choice and ingroup choice–outgroup choice comparisons

Considering the six Tajfel strategies and the seven Insko ones, as well as the two groups, individualists and collectivists, a total of 26 first choice–justified choice comparisons and 26 ingroup choice–outgroup choice comparisons were carried out. None of them yielded significant differences, which, in view of the previous results, suggests that subjects are very homogeneous when answering for themselves (whether having to justify their answer or not) and when they answer in the place of others (be these from ingroup or from outgroup).

Conclusion

Two conclusions can be drawn from the results of our two experiments. First, both individualists and collectivists discriminate in favour of their own group in a minimal group situation. As we have seen, there is a slight tendency for individualists to be less discriminatory. However, on the whole, both kinds of subjects provide evidence of group formation, along the lines suggested by Insko and Schopler (1987).

Second, as far as beliefs on discrimination are concerned, it seems clear that individualists consider their point allocation to be less discriminatory than that of collectivists. The reasons they provide to justify their second choice seem to imply that individualists interpret their allocating behaviour as a search for justice and a wish to share with the other group. On a much lower number of occasions they admit to being motivated by a wish to dominate the opposite group.

Moreover, the divergence between individualists and collectivists appears again in the clear-cut distinction the former establish between themselves

and people of ingroup and outgroup. Collectivists tend to consider them-
selves as more just in their comparisons to ingroup and outgroup, but this
result can be easily explained as due to social desirability. Individualists also
see themselves as more fair and, at the same time, as less discriminatory.
This explicit and public acceptance of their non-following ingroup norm
seems to speak for a claim of independence vis-à-vis the group, of a certain
critical positioning against it, despite the fact that actual allocating
behaviour is discriminatory and, as such, is a proof that the person feels as
a member of the group to all purposes.

All the aforementioned leads us to the conclusion already outlined in
previous pages. It is not a matter of individualists experiencing insurmount-
able difficulties to form groups or identify themselves with them. Rather,
what happens is that they do so while trying to preserve their individual
initiative, in this particular case restricted to beliefs. Of course, other inter-
pretations of our data are possible, this allowing and, at the same time,
encouraging future research on a subject which is of interest to understand
processes mediating behaviour of people in groups and in society as a
whole.

Note

This chapter was translated from the Spanish by Elena Gaviria Stewart.

15

Constructing Social Identity: The Role of Status, Collective Values, Collective Self-Esteem, Perception and Social Behaviour

Darío Páez, Cristina Martínez-Taboada, Juan José Arróspide, Patricia Insúa and Sabino Ayestarán

Social identity theory (SIT) and Turner's self-categorization theory (SCT), a more cognitive version of the former, have stimulated research on group processes and are currently some of the most heuristic theories in this domain. Nevertheless, some psychological aspects of SIT have not received systematic empirical support. The most important ones are the following: (a) the belief in the relationship between salience of the categorization and intergroup discrimination; (b) the relationship between strong identification and perceptual and behavioural biases which favour the ingroup; (c) the relationship between discrimination and an increase in self-esteem (Messick & Mackie, 1989). These results suggest that the relationship put forward by SIT, and also partly by SCT, between salience and favourable behaviour towards the ingroup, coupled with an increase in self-esteem, is not so general as was once thought. However, we must state that these criticisms are valid only for a more individualistic approach to SIT and SCT. Following Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher and Wetherell (1987), psycho-logical processes of identification, self-esteem, discrimination, and so on, are only one aspect of intergroup behaviour. *Socio-structural position* and *socially shared beliefs* on the legitimization of power/status differences and individual/collective strategies to cope with these social differences are two main explanatory processes of intergroup behaviour. From this perspective it is a mistake to focus only on the intrapsychological relationships of identification, self-esteem and discrimination.

This chapter will analyse certain themes of debate which have arisen with respect to the concept of social identity: When does it regulate a person's behaviour and perception? When does it produce a favourable perception of the ingroup and discriminatory behaviour towards the outgroup? Hinkle, Brown and Ely's (1992) revision of the literature has shown that there is not always an association between group identification and ingroup favouritism, and that there is no consistent association between discrimination in favour of one's group and increasing one's self-esteem. Hinkle et al. confirmed that

subjects who share collectivistic values are those who show more association between identification and ingroup favouritism. Crocker and Luhtanen (1990) have found that the variable linked to intergroup discrimination is collective and not personal self-esteem: it is those subjects with a high collective self-esteem who show a discriminatory bias in situations which threaten one's social identity. Abrams (1990, 1994) has shown the moderating role of private self-consciousness and strong identification: those subjects with a strong group identification and high private self-consciousness are those who show a stronger behaviour regulation on the basis of one's social identity. We will present Spanish data which confirm and specify the role of these moderating variables in the relationship between social identity, perception and social behaviour. Finally low-status groups' socio-cognitive functioning does not always respond to the logic derived from SIT's statement of the need to defend one's identity: instead of showing ethnocentrism subjects present centrism or outgroup favouritism. Turner's perspective emphasizes the role of *socially shared beliefs* and *socio-structural position* in order to explain these results. In our case we will focus on the role played by individualistic versus *collectivistic values* and in the role of *collective self-esteem*. This is why we will analyse *social status* and the predominance of the collectivistic cultural values as factors which will moderate the regulation of one's behaviour by social identity.

We believe it is specially important to contrast the macrosocial and transcultural validity of the above-mentioned theories. This is one of the reasons why first of all we will devote special attention to the studies conducted in Spanish and Latin American contexts on the issues of collective identity, stereotypes and discrimination (Morales & Páez, 1996).

Individualism–collectivism, status and the importance of personal and social identity

SIT states that there is a personal–intergroup continuum. On the intergroup pole, subjects see themselves as interchangeable members of the category or group. On the personal pole, subjects will be defined by their singularity and individual specificity. It is thought that the coping strategies which the members of low- or high-status groups rely on will be located as opposites in this dimension: on one extreme we will find individual mobility, on the other side social competition. Nevertheless, research carried out in Latin America has shown that Chilean workers simultaneously agreed with social conflict strategies and using strategies aimed towards individual improvement of their siblings' position by means of education (Quevedo, 1972). This study did not analyse the correlation between the agreement with both strategies. Even though this correlation could be negative, and so confirm the hypothesis which states the opposite nature of both these strategies, the fact that the average agreement with both strategies was high confirms that they may coexist on a group level. The opposition between the salience of

identification levels which have different inclusiveness (that is, regional and supra-national) has not been confirmed as a general phenomenon. We must state that some subjects show strong regional identification and a low identification on a higher level. But other subjects simultaneously show a strong identification with different levels of inclusiveness (as was the case of a simultaneously strong identification with the Polish and European national identities, Mlicki & Ellemers, 1996). Finally it is possible that in collectivistic cultures the difference between social and personal identity is much less than in individualistic cultures. SIT posits that an important dimension of identity is the social dimension. Nevertheless, the identity or individual self-concept may be more or less shaped by social identity. There is both a trait and situational variability with regard to the integration of social identity in personal identity or the former's relevance. The importance of social identity and its integration within personal identity will be mediated by the subjects and the historical context which contextualizes them. The importance of social identity is stronger in collectivistic and sociocentric cultures in comparison to individualistic and egocentric ones.

Individualism is a set of beliefs, values and cultural practices in which people manifest an emotional independence from groups and organizations. On the other hand, collectivism as a cultural syndrome is associated with an emotional dependence towards a group. A collectivistic culture is that in which there is a stable relationship between the individual and certain informal groups to which one belongs, a subordination of individual objectives to those of the collective, and an adjustment between the person's and the group's objectives. There is a tendency towards not leaving the group even though the requirements may be high. An individualistic culture is that in which a person has negotiable relationships with various groups. S/he may abandon these groups when they are very demanding (or potentially may be so), and the individual's goals are more important than the group's goals (Morales, López & Vega, 1992; Triandis, 1992, 1994; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai & Lucca, 1988). Cooperation with the group, sharing resources and spaces with members of certain stable ingroups, collective achievements and a strong affective link all characterize collectivistic subjects. Interpersonal competition, having important private spaces and resources, individual achievements and distancing oneself from the group are all characteristics of an individualistic subject (Hinkle et al., 1992).

From the point of view of the importance of social or collective identity for one's self-image or for the social representation of the individual (see Doise, Chapter 2 in this volume), individualistic cultures stress a concept of the individual as a separate, autonomous, self-contained and independent being. Collectivistic cultures emphasize a representation of the person as an entity centred in his or her relationships with others, connected to, and dependent on, the social context (Markus & Kitayama, 1991b).

The group's social status also affects the degree to which individuals define themselves in terms of their social or personal identity. High-status

groups perceive themselves as a set of individuals. Low-status groups define themselves as an aggregate of subjects who share a series of similar characteristics (as Lorenzi-Cioldi et al.'s studies have shown). Members of dominant groups will define their identity mainly on the basis of personal factors, while members of dominated groups will define their self-concept on the basis of mainly social factors (Lorenzi-Cioldi & Doise, 1994). As a summary we may state that dominated groups and collectivistic cultures will reinforce the relevance of social identity over personal identity. On the other hand, individualistic cultures and dominant groups will pay more attention to, and have a better evaluation of, an individual who possesses resources while also stressing the relevance of personal identity over social identity.

Low status, salience of the intergroup comparison, outgroup favouritism and group perception

Culture and status have an influence not only on the importance of the social categories in the representation of one's self, but also in assessing the representation of group perception. Collectivistic cultures, which positively value the group, reinforce the perception of intragroup homogeneity, while individualistic cultures, which positively value an autonomous subject, reinforce the perception of ingroup variability (Devos, Comby & Deschamps, 1995).

From the point of view of intra- and intergroup social perception, we must remember that there is a tendency towards perceiving the ingroup as better in certain attributes. For instance Rodríguez (1992) found that subjects from Venezuela evaluated themselves better than subjects from Colombia in four out of six positive attributes, whilst the Colombians did the same in five out of six attributes.

In general, subjects differ positively in those dimensions which define the ingroup, although they may accept outgroup superiority in another set of dimensions. This social perception which favours the ingroup is modelled by social status: high-status groups tend towards a stronger perceptive differentiation in favour of the ingroup than those subjects who hold a lower status, as Mullen, Brown and Smith's (1992) meta-analytic review showed.

In relation to the variability of stereotypical attributes, the ingroup is seen as more complex, variable and heterogeneous than the outgroup. There is a tendency towards perceiving the outgroup as more homogeneous and the ingroup as more heterogeneous. As Mullen and Hu's (1989) meta-analytic review has confirmed, this effect is further stressed in the case of natural groups. Status also has an influence in the perception of variability: minority or threatened groups will perceive their group as less variable. This is a way of reinforcing its distinctiveness and cohesion. Results have also shown that groups perceive themselves as more homogeneous on those attributes or dimensions which define them (Leyens, Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1994).

'Cold' socio-cognitive theory (Leyens et al., 1994) suggests that having had a direct experience with the group will lead to a more variable, heterogeneous or individualized representation of the ingroup.

From an SIT perspective, cognitive categorization as a member of a group, or the identification with this group, will stress intergroup differences and intragroup similarities. Individualization or aggregation would be a function of the defence of one's social identity, on the basis of the existing power and status relationships. Social comparison will influence not only the perception of differences but also homogeneity. It will not always be the outgroup who will be perceived as less variable, simple or homogeneous. The ingroup will be perceived as more homogeneous in those attributes which define their social identity and in situations in which this identity is under threat (Leyens et al., 1994; Marques & Páez, 1994).

In a study conducted by us we confirmed the predominance of this normative logic of identity defence, instead of a cognitive logic of experience (see Marques, Páez and Abrams, Chapter 9, this volume). We asked psychology students ($N = 109$) to evaluate the ingroup's (psychologists) and outgroup's (engineers) variability in stereotypical attributes (Table 15.1). These attributes had been generated in previous studies and suggested that being friendly and sociable are typical traits awarded to psychologists, whilst being competitive, intellectual and having a strong leadership capacity are typical of engineers. On the basis of these answers we calculated the Pd (perceived difference) and Var (variability). The estimated variabilities are significantly different, although not regularly higher in the ingroup. Variability was higher in the outgroup on those attributes stereotypical of the ingroup and vice versa. In other words, psychologists perceived themselves as more homogeneously friendly and sociable in comparison to engineers, while this last group was seen as more homogeneously competitive and intellectual, although in this last attribute differences were smaller and other studies have found that it is associated with the psychologists' stereotype. In those variables in which we did not find significant differences, means were in the hypothesized direction. Variability was smaller for engineers in leadership and in being normative.

The tendency towards accentuating ingroup favouritism on important or consensual dimensions seems an increase in competition or salience of the comparison conditions, as Doise and Sinclair's study (reanalysed by van Knippenberg & Wilke, mentioned in Morales & Huici, 1994, p. 737) has shown. Nevertheless in a study conducted in Brazil by Nascimento-Schulze (1993) on bank clerks, a social comparison situation led to a worse image of the group than a situation in which there was no social comparison, and the same happened when the context made group membership more salient. As we can see, this is contrary to the fact that group salience should activate a process of favouritism or defence of the group's image. The author interprets these results as showing that these groups of bank clerks in social comparison and salient conditions are aware of their problematic work conditions and of their unstable status, which is reflected in a diminution of

Table 15.1   *Perceived ingroup and outgroup heterogeneity*

Attributes	Engineers		Psychologists		
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	t (113)
Friendly	0.88	0.56	0.68	0.54	3.86***
Competitive	0.60	0.61	0.82	0.63	−3.17**
Sociable	0.81	0.72	0.56	0.52	4.03**
Intellectual	0.64	0.56	0.76	0.53	−2.72**

** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$

their self-image. This socio-cognitive functioning of groups with unstable and relatively insecure status does not seem to follow an ethnocentric logic.

In a conceptual replication of this research, we have confirmed that in conditions of salience of the comparison subjects increase the superiority of the outgroup in consensual or stereotypical attributes. In order to manipulate the salience of the comparison, we asked subjects enrolled in a group dynamics course ($N = 118$) to perform a cognitive creativity task: to list the attributes which characterize a good leadership. Subjects were randomly assigned to a condition of activation of the comparison with the engineer outgroup, or of ingroup comparison. All the subjects had to read a first set of attributes. Depending on the condition, subjects were told that this list had been written by psychologists (ingroup) or engineers (outgroup). Apart from performing the task, subjects also had to estimate ingroup and outgroup variability on a series of six attributes: leadership, friendly, competitive, normative or followers of the norm, sociable and intellectual. On a five-point scale subjects had to decide, for instance, what percentage of engineers and psychologists had no, some, regular, a high or an extremely high intellectual capacity. This cognitive task allowed us to obtain variability indices such as the Pd and the Var, whilst also allowing us to infer the group's mean on that attribute. All the subjects evaluated both psychologists and engineers. The F of the between-group interaction with regard to the group that was being evaluated (ingroup or outgroup) and the salience manipulation was significant ($F(1, 113) = 4.89$; $p < .05$). Specifically psychologists were attributed a much lower leadership average when the social comparison was made salient. This reflects the realistic perception of the inferior nature, in terms of status, of the psychologists compared to engineers (see Table 15.2).

In order to confirm that previous results (psychologists perceived themselves as more homogeneously friendly and sociable in comparison to engineers; the engineers group was seen as more homogeneously competitive in comparison to psychologists) followed a normative or social desirability logic, we asked a sample of psychology students ($N = 9$), psychologists and mental health workers ($N = 9$), and qualified workers, including physicians and engineers, and non-qualified workers ($N = 12$) to

Table 15.2 *Perception of ingroup and outgroup by salience versus non-salience of social comparison*

Attributes	Salience of social comparison ('between' variable)		Non-salience ('between' variable)	
	Engineers	Psychologists	Engineers	Psychologists
	('within' variable)		('within' variable)	
	Inferred mean	Inferred mean	Inferred mean	Inferred mean
Leaders	3.31	2.71	3.47	3.34

'evaluate to which degree the following characteristics are desirable or positive in each jobs' performance'. As we can see in Table 15.3 both the engineers' higher status and the normative nature for psychologists on those attributes in which there was a smaller variability (friendly, sociable) was confirmed. Exactly the opposite took place for the attribute 'competitive' (less variability and it was attributed more to engineers). The only exception was found in the attribute 'intellectual', in which psychologists have a higher score and that in the first study showed more variability, although the difference in variability means was the smallest of all. In order to confirm that the attribution of the traits followed both a professional social desirability logic as well as a group identification logic, we correlated the subjects' level of identification with psychologists ('we ask you to indicate your identification with the professional category termed "psychologists"') with a composite rating of attributes (friendly, sociable, intellectual) of the group. This composite score showed a satisfactory reliability (alpha = .67) and a significant correlation of 0.35; $p < .05$ with one's identification with the group of psychologists. This identification was individually associated with believing that it was desirable that the psychologists should be friendly ($r = .36$; $p < .05$), with sociable ($r = .27$; $p < .10$) and, although of marginal significance, with intellectual ($r = .15$; $p < .10$).

On the other hand, identification with psychologists was not associated with the agreement that psychologists were competitive and normative ($r = < .09$). However, those features were typical of the engineers. Identification with psychologists was associated with the leadership attribute ($r = .42$; $p < .05$). Bearing in mind one's professional experience, in comparison to students, psychologists and mental health experts stated that it was more socially desirable for a psychologist to have leadership capacity (mean = 5.11), and both these groups believed in this fact more than did qualified and non-qualified workers (mean = 3.75; $F(2, 27) = 4.07$; $p < .03$). Group identification was linked with a stronger attribution to this group of the positive attributes, especially when these define their professional identity. Moreover, even when the task was a comparison with a group of engineers, those psychologists and mental health experts more professionally involved attributed positive traits (e.g. leadership) to the ingroup, though it has been shown that these traits tend to be associated with high status groups. In

Table 15.3   *Perceived social desirability of attributes for engineers and psychologists*

| Attributes | Means of social desirability for | | | | |
| | Engineers | | Psychologists | | |
	Mean	SD	Mean	SD	t (29)
Friendly	3.70	1.61	5.90	1.26	−7.05***
Competitive	5.70	0.95	4.17	1.58	4.63***
Sociable	4.67	1.40	5.97	1.22	−4.33***
Intellectual	5.00	1.19	5.87	0.90	−3.98**
Leadership	5.80	1.31	4.30	1.31	3.84**
Normative	5.50	1.07	4.70	1.58	2.68**
	Means of group status for				
	Engineers		Psychologists		
Status	6.27	0.69	4.00	1.08	11.84***

1 = not at all; 7 = very much
* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $= p < .001$

summary we may state that the lower variability traits associated with the psychologists are in general those which are seen as socially desirable for the job of being a psychologist. These traits are also associated with the identification with this group and involvement in one's professional activity (see Table 15.3).

We may conclude that a certain relative ingroup bias is present in social perception and that it follows a normative logic – of defence of a positive social identity by means of stressing the positive aspects of the ingroup in those attributes used to define the group. Moreover, in subordinated groups this tendency is not shown in social comparison situations. But this does not imply that subordinated groups do not show in general outgroup favouritism. Bourhis, Gagnon and Moïse (1994) have shown how members of dominated groups choose and evaluate more positively dominant outgroup symbols. In studies conducted in Latin America, different authors have found that the Venezuelan ingroup was evaluated worse than the European (Italian) and North American outgroups (Montero, 1987, 1990). Even though the subjects identified themselves with the ingroup (Venezuela), subjects had a better evaluation of the European groups (England and Spain) and of certain American nations such as Argentina, although they had a bad image of other American countries such as Colombia. Due to the results obtained from similar psychosocial, anthropological and historical studies, which show that in Latin America, Asia and Africa there is a devaluation of the national ingroup and favouritism towards First World outgroups, the concept of Altercentrism has been coined. Altercentrism is an important theoretical concept as it allows us to pay attention to a basic problematic found in SIT: how do we explain the socio-cognitive func-

tioning of the dominated groups who do not mobilize themselves, or cannot be individually included in higher status groups?

Various explanatory processes put forward by SIT suggest how dominated groups manage their ambivalent image, showing at the same time favouritism towards dominant groups.

Intragroup social comparison with more disadvantaged subsectors, or, alternatively, an advantaged social comparison with a group of similar and pertinent attributes, would be another mechanism which would allow the showing of favouritism towards the dominant outgroups while at the same time retaining a partly positive image of the ingroup. Members of subordinated ingroups (that is, Venezuelans) accept the superiority of dominant outgroups (that is, North Americans), although at the same time they stress their superiority over other groups who hold a similar position to theirs and whom they undervalue (that is, Colombians) (Montero, 1987; Salazar, 1989).

Another phenomenon that characterizes dominated groups is a type of *symbolic individual mobility* – of which Bovarism and the cosmopolitanism of the dominant classes of Latin America is a good example. Bovarism (permanently believing one is living in Paris, London or New York, although one is really living in Puerto Hundido) is a form of symbolic and ideal identification with the dominant outgroup. Latin Americans, especially, although not only, those from dominant classes, view themselves as second-class or 'transplanted' Europeans or North Americans. The use of surnames (for instance, the large amount of people called Johnny, William or Peter González), adopting customs and identifying with the values of the dominant cultures constitute a coping strategy of the accepted negative national identity. Studies carried out in developed countries have shown that this symbolic individual mobility strategy takes place even though there are no real possibilities of integrating oneself into the dominant group (Wright, Taylor & Moghaddam, 1990, mentioned in Bourhis et al., 1994).

Finally, low-status or dominated groups use *cognitive creativity*, redefining as important a series of new dimensions in which the ingroup is superior (see Smith & Bond, 1993). Research conducted by Salazar et al. on national stereotypes in Latin America has confirmed the existence of a status/competence dimension, a sociability dimension and a third, less important, education/instruction factor. There is evidence to suggest that the instrumental or status/power dimensions and the expressiveness or sociability ones are transculturally valid dimensions of social perception (Zebrowitz, 1990). Various studies have shown that subordinated groups accept the superiority of dominant groups on the competence/ability dimensions, or on status, power and resources, but they view themselves as superior in the expressive or sociability dimensions. For instance, nurses with a high status viewed themselves as superior in technical knowledge, while lower status nurses perceived themselves as being more friendly (Smith & Bond, 1993, p. 62). Studies conducted in Latin America confirm that the self-stereotypes reaffirm a positive evaluation of sociability attributes: attributes stereo-

Table 15.4 *Attributes for engineers and psychologists*

Attributes	Engineers		Psychologists		
	Inferred mean	*SD*	Inferred mean	*SD*	*t*
Leadership	3.40	0.83	3.07	0.80	3.13*
Friendly	2.98	0.66	3.83	0.77	−9.08**
Competitive	4.11	0.70	2.78	0.80	14.40**
Normative	3.56	0.90	2.69	0.84	7.57**
Sociable	3.00	0.66	3.96	0.56	−11.75**
Intellectual	3.42	0.83	3.27	0.67	6.49**

* = $p < .01$; ** = $p < .001$

typically favourable to the Latin American national groups were of the sociable type (that is, happy), while the stereotypical positive attributes towards European and North American groups were of a more instrumental nature (that is, practical, workers and so on) (Rodríguez, 1992).

Our own research conducted in Spain on psychologists and engineers confirmed that the perceptive superiority of a lower status ingroup (psychologists) was found on the expressive dimension (they viewed themselves as more friendly and sociable), whilst they also accepted the superiority of the higher status outgroup on more instrumental attributes. They perceived the engineers as more competitive, intellectual, and so on (see Table 15.4).

The above-mentioned results may be interpreted as the effect of a normative process, in the sense that subjects try to defend their group by perceiving it as an entity which adjusts itself to the norms and values which relevantly define its subculture more than the outgroup does (Marques & Páez, 1994; also see Devos et al., 1995). Nevertheless, although low-status group members may use symbolic individual mobility, comparison with disadvantaged groups and cognitive creativeness in order to explain one's ambivalent social image, according to the psychological version of SIT, low status must have an influence on one's self-esteem.

Status, self-esteem, collectivistic values and social identity

Status is an important variable for SIT due to the fact that it is associated with the prestige and self-esteem one may infer from one's group membership. According to SIT, belonging to a social category or group is a source of self-esteem. Belonging to low-status groups, which possess negative attributes, would motivate a search for individual mobility, cognitive creativity and social competition. What is implicit in this approach is the idea that subjects from disadvantaged classes and groups should suffer a deficit in self-esteem. This idea is included within the hypothesis stating that a deficit or threat to self-esteem would be an antecedent or cause of the ingroup's favourable social perception, of ethnocentric attitudinal prejudice and behavioural discrimination. Personal self-esteem as an evaluative

component of personal identity may be differentiated from self-esteem referring to group belonging or being a part of a certain social category, in other words collective self-esteem.

One answer to the fact that the salience of the categorization does not directly lead to differentiation, or that it leads to an increase in self-esteem, is methodological. The relationship between discrimination or intergroup differentiation and self-esteem should take place and be proven not on the basis of personal self-esteem, but on the basis of collective self-esteem, in other words on the basis of the favourable evaluation of the category or social group to which one belongs. Nascimento-Schulze's (1993) results with Brazilian workers confirm that there is no relationship between intergroup discrimination and an increase in general personal self-esteem. Intergroup discrimination produced an increase in the group's evaluation or collective self-esteem. In this sense, the development of collective self-esteem scales is a step forward in order to better understand the relationship between social identity and social behaviour. Crocker and Luhtanen, 1990; Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992) have developed a scale which measures stable individual differences in the level of a person's positive social identity (high collective self-esteem) and also a positive personal identity. These authors developed a scale with a private collective self-esteem dimension, a public collective self-esteem dimension, the feeling of being a member of the group, and the importance of this identity. These scales had structural validity and alpha coefficients which scored higher than .73 (in fact the public self-esteem scale reached a score of .80). The private collective self-esteem scale and the one referring to the importance of being a member of the group, which measures the most individual aspects of social identity, also correlated significantly with personal self-esteem scales. The collective self-esteem scores were positively and coherently associated with the agreement with collective values – measured using Hui's individualism–collectivism scale (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992).

Our results with the Spanish translation of this scale also show satisfactory results in relation to internal consistency. Alpha coefficients were satisfactory for the private and public collective self-esteem scales, identification with the ingroup and belonging to this same group (Cronbach alphas of .83, .78, .66 and .71, respectively). Moreover, they also showed convergent validity with Hui's collectivistic values scale (see below).

Experimental research found that, using the above-mentioned scale, subjects high in collective self-esteem, contrary to those with low collective self-esteem, showed more positive biases in relation to their group in situations in which there was a threat to their group identity. In situations of failure, subjects with a high collective identity changed their scores in such a way that they mitigated the threat to the group's worth. Personal self-esteem did not play a regulating role in the answers (Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990).

These results show that we have to differentiate between the need for individual and collective esteem. Moreover, they also suggest that the SIT statement referring to the tendency for discriminatory biases which favour

the ingroup with the aim of obtaining a positive social identity is valid only for those subjects with a stable tendency towards positively evaluating social identity or socially sharing a positive definition of collective self.

Studies conducted on relative deprivation and political participation reinforce the idea that it is the threat to collective self-esteem, and not the lack of personal self-esteem, which is associated with the regulation of perception and social conduct by social identity. Let us remember that deprivation or personal dissatisfaction is not associated with socio-political participation behaviours, which we may view as examples of social conflict, but that in fact it is associated with anomie and individual affective alterations. It is sociocentric or fraternal relative deprivation (in relation to the group) which is linked to political participation (Guimond & Tougas, 1994). On the other hand, research on political participation shows that it is those subjects who are socially integrated, with a perception of political self-efficiency, but who are also dissidents or critical of the social system which they view as the cause of the group's disadvantaged position, who mobilize themselves – and not those subjects who are most isolated, deprived or disadvantaged (Kinder & Sears, 1985). This is why Crocker, Luhtanen, Blaine and Broadnax (1994) have found that it is those subjects with high collective (socially shared beliefs or collective affective evaluation with regard to the group and not the person) self-esteem (those who are integrated and efficient) who show more ingroup bias in threatening conditions (in other words, of relative deprivation in which the group does not receive what it expected). As we can see, those subjects who regulate their perception and behaviour on the basis of their social identity and those who show ingroup favouritism and outgroup discrimination are the ones who have high collective self-esteem in threatening situations.

The differentiation between social and personal identity as well as the relative independence of public, private and personal collective self-esteem are two mechanisms which may explain why members of dominated and stigmatized classes do not show a deficit in personal self-esteem (Phinney, 1990).

An explanatory process for the lack of deficit in personal and collective self-esteem in a dominated group included in an individualistic culture is the frequently found phenomenon of the acceptance of the disadvantaged nature of the group, while at the same time rejecting its individual disadvantage (Crosby, Cordova & Jaskar, 1994). For instance, Puerto Rican subjects accepted that Puerto Ricans are dependent, but they themselves are not like that. Personal self-valuation was mainly positive, while collective self-valuation was mainly negative (Rivera, 1991). As Rivera (1991) stated:

> The results of this first study were the pronounced and consistent divergence between the collective and personal valuation; the latter was invariably higher than the collective valuation. These results suggest that participants may have internalized, to some degree, the Puerto Ricans' negative stereotype, depersonalizing these categories in order to show that the rest of the Puerto Ricans are that way, but not themselves, who are attributed positive personal valuations. (pp. 101–102)

Another explanatory process for the lack of low personal self-esteem in members of dominated groups is that subjects will not link other people's opinions about their group with their own personal self-esteem. Crocker et al. (1994) have found that the relationship between public (how the subject believes that other people evaluate his/her group) and private collective self-esteem (how the subject evaluates his/her own group) is medium in individualistic cultures (Anglo-Americans), positive and strong in collectivistic cultures (Asian-Americans) and null in dominated groups (African-Americans). Let us add that private collective self-esteem is strongly linked in general with personal self-esteem. Nevertheless, in the sample of black subjects there was no relationship between public and private collective self-esteem. These black subjects strongly differentiate how they believe other people value their group and how they themselves do so – and probably how they value themselves as individuals. In this way it is possible to cope with discrimination and prejudice separating collective negative judgements from one's image of oneself. On the other hand, for Asian subjects the vision the other person has is strongly associated with one's own view of the ingroup. This suggests that the relationship between personal self-esteem and group self-esteem is more underlined in collectivistic cultures.

Self-consciousness, individualistic–collectivistic cultural values, social identity and behaviour regulation

As Abrams (1990) has stated, sometimes behaviour is not regulated by social identity. Categorization in a group and salience of group membership will not be sufficient conditions for ingroup discrimination and its function of augmenting self-esteem. Moreover, a person must strongly identify with the group. Abrams (1990, 1994) has shown in different studies that group identification and self-consciousness or focalizing attention on the private and public aspects of one's self converge in order to regulate behaviour. Subjects with strong identification and high private self-consciousness regulated behaviour by means of social identity.

There is correlational evidence which confirms that high identification with a group is associated with a good evaluation of this same group. Garza and Herringer (1986) developed an instrument which measured important dimensions in group identity, the evaluation of the group, its emotional valuation and the stability of group identity. In a replication of this study, we applied the Spanish version of this scale (Páez, Arróspide, Martínez-Taboada & Ayestarán, 1992). Our sample was composed of 120 subjects, 46% were men and 54% women with a mean age of 24.7 years. Forty-seven subjects were students who were starting their participation in a group dynamics course, and the rest of the sample were relatives of fifth-year psychology students enrolled in the Psychology Faculty of the Basque Country University. Students answered the questionnaires in class while the relatives were interviewed at home by the students as part of their class curricula.

Table 15.5   *Factorial analysis of the 'most important social identity scale'* (*Garza & Herringer, 1986*)

Factor		1	2	3
EV	Good–bad	.88		
EV	Likes–dislikes	.86		
EV	Positive–negative	.87		
EM	Pleasant–unpleasant	.83		
EM	Comfortable–uncomfortable	.80		
IM	Important–unimportant	.67		
IM	Valid–invalid	.80		
ST	Permanent–impermanent	.69		
ST	Stable–unstable	.75		
ST	Secure–insecure	.81		
ST	Cooperative–competitive		.64	
ST	Dominant–dominated		.81	
ST	With power–without power		.84	
EM	Amusing–boring		.70	
ST	Abstract–concrete			.77
ST	Private–public			.67

EV = Evaluative dimension; EM = Emotional dimension; IM = Importance; ST = Stability

We found three clearly differentiated factors in this scale (see Table 15.5). The first factor explaining 47% of the variance was saturated by the four dimensions mentioned by Garza and Herringer (1986): emotion, evaluation, importance and stability, and also by item number 13, which refers to competition–cooperation. The second factor was composed of items related to power and dominance, and they explained 9.4% of the variance. The third factor included those items referring to the abstract versus the concrete and the private versus the public. This final factor explained 8% of the variance.

These results reaffirm that the evaluation of the group, the emotional response to the group, the importance of the group for identity and the stability of the identification with a group are congruently associated. With regard to the relationship between identification and stereotypes, we have found that in Latin America those subjects who strongly identified with their national groups (samples from Venezuela, Chile and Colombia) rejected sloth, while stressing happiness as a description of a Latin American person when answering closed items. With regard to open answers, these samples underlined characteristics associated with the Latin American's positive sociability: happy, hospitable. Moreover, they mentioned history and socio-political processes such as oppression and dependency as identity elements. Those subjects who shared a low identification mentioned more frequently deficitary instrumental attributes, such as sloth and irresponsibility, and they also made more mention of underdevelopment, poverty and language as identity factors (Salazar, 1989). In other words, those people with a strong identification show perceptive favouritism stressing the stereotype's positive attributes, relativizing the negative ones, while those

subjects who did not identify share the stereotypical negative attributes of their social category.

As a summary, we may state that group identification and focalizing attention will interact in order to regulate behaviour. It is easy to believe that it will be those individuals with a high private self-consciousness and collective identity who will be more stable in their beliefs and behaviours linked to obtaining group goals. They will also be more emotionally reactive to stimuli such as group threats.

Of course not only situational factors or internal tendencies of group identity salience and attention directed towards aspects of collective identity influence behaviour regulation. Macrosocial phenomena such as collectivistic orientation cultures reinforce the importance of collective or social identity, while individualistic cultures reinforce personal or individual identity, as we have already seen (Gudykunst, 1988; Smith & Bond, 1993).

Collectivistic cultures emphasize an intensive relationship with ingroup members, while in individualistic cultures people behave in a more extensive than intensive fashion – even with the ingroup members. Consequently, the difference between behaviour towards the outgroup and behaviour towards the ingroup is not so important (Triandis, 1994). There is partial evidence which confirms that individuals from collectivistic cultures are more sensible to outgroup and ingroup membership in the regulation of their behaviour (Triandis, 1994). People from collectivistic countries show a stronger tendency towards cooperation, and people from individualistic-type countries tend more towards competition. Nevertheless, when they must interact with outgroup members, collectivistic persons become more competitive. For example, Argentinean and Indian children who had to share game rewards with subjects who did not belong to their group were more competitive than children from the United States (who in general are competitive) (Smith & Bond, 1993).

In the following experiment we empirically confirmed the importance of collectivistic values in behaviour and perception regulation. We asked students ($N = 48$) enrolled in a group dynamics class to perform a cognitive creativeness task: to list the attributes which characterize good leadership. All the subjects had to read a first set of attributes supposedly previously generated by a group. Depending on the condition, subjects were told that this list had been generated by psychologists (ingroup) or engineers (outgroup). This first list and the one they created after 10 minutes of individual reflection and another 10 minutes of group discussion were evaluated as: good–bad, complete–incomplete, unreal–realistic, and typical–not at all typical. The response scale ranged from 1 = the first attribute of the pair to 7 = the second attribute of the set. For instance 1 = good, 7 = bad.

Differences in scores between their own list and the previous one were taken as an index of favouritism. The difference was established between the first score (the score given to the supposedly other group) and the second score (given to one's own group). The subtraction was performed in such a

way that a positive difference meant a better evaluation of one's own group. We subtracted from the scale with highest negative scores (bad = 7; incomplete = 7; not at all typical = 7) the score given to the first set (other group) from the score given to the second list (one's own group). For example, if the first list (other group) is considered bad = 7 and the second list (own group) is good = 1, the positive difference of +6 was a sign of this favouritism. When the scale had a higher score and also a positive evaluation (realistic = 7), the second score was subtracted (own group list) from the first list. If the ingroup list was awarded a 7 (very realistic) and the first list (other group) was awarded a 1 (not at all realistic), the subtraction (7 − 1) would yield a positive score which would reflect ingroup favouritism. In other words, a positive score always meant ingroup favouritism.

The scores in Crocker and Luhtanen's collective self-esteem scale, Hui's collectivistic values and Carver, Antoni and Scheier's (1985) self-consciousness scale were used as covariables and their influence was controlled. The variance and covariance multivariate analysis showed a significant effect if the first comparison group was that of engineers or psychologists. On a univariate level the comparison with an ingroup or outgroup had a significant effect for the positive evaluation of the list ($F(5, 46) = 13.1$; $p < .001$) and near significance for the complete list ($F(5, 46) = 2.74$; $p < .10$). The other group's list was evaluated as better and more complete when it was attributed to psychologists (ingroup), and was evaluated as worse and less complete when it was attributed to the engineers (outgroup).

The private and public self-consciousness variables, as well as the group identification variables, did not interact with the experimental manipulation. Nevertheless the individualistic/collectivistic values did. Subjects with a high score in collectivism behaved in a different way depending on whether the first list was attributed to the outgroup or to the ingroup. The multivariate interaction effect was significant ($F(11, 38) = 2.33$; $p < .026$). The univariate contrasts indicate that those subjects who share more collectivistic values view the first list as more believable ($F(1, 48) = 4.88$; $p < .03$), realistic ($F(1, 48) = 6.66$; $p < .02$), complete ($F(1, 48) = 5.75$; $p < .02$), and less typical ($F(1, 48) = 11.04$; $p < .002$) when this list was attributed to psychologists. In other words, when the stimulus was associated with the general ingroup and subjects were collectivistic (with regard to their values) it was evaluated more positively and as more original. Exactly the opposite happened with subjects low on collectivism; these subjects viewed the list that was attributed to the outgroup (engineers) as less typical, more believable, realistic and complete (see Table 15.6).

The lack of self-consciousness and identity effects may be explained in the first case because the scale measures the tendency to focus attention on the public and private aspects of the self − and not necessarily on the collective dimension of the self. In the second case, the scale measures the general tendency to identify with groups in general − and not with the group which was used in the manipulation (psychologists). Finally the low number of

Table 15.6 *Differences between engineers and psychologists as a function of their degree of collectivism*

First list	Engineers		Psychologists	
Differences in evaluation	Low collectivism	High collectivism	Low collectivism	High collectivism
Believable	−1.30	−0.12	−0.17	−1.00
Incomplete	1.50	0.25	−0.80	0.73
Realistic	−1.50	−0.63	−0.18	−1.80
Not typical	−1.30	0.60	0.08	−1.10

subjects does not allow us to perform a contrast simultaneously choosing subjects with high group identification and high private self-consciousness.

The above-mentioned research suggests that those subjects who show more ingroup bias in conditions in which the intergroup comparison is salient are those who share more the collectivistic values. Moreover, an index of collectivistic values is associated with social identification, collective self-esteem and public and private collective self-consciousness, confirming the relationship between these processes.

Applying the private and public self-consciousness items to the attention on social identity's external and internal aspects, we have developed a collective self-consciousness scale which we validated by comparing it to Garza and Herringer's scale (Páez et al., 1992). This scale was developed on the basis of the items extracted from the original private and public self-consciousness scale – referring to the most important group a person belongs to. The items and instructions were as follows: Think of the most relevant group to which you belong (family, friends, and so on). (1) I always try to analyse myself in relation to my group's objectives; (2) I am interested in how I do things when I do them in my group's name; (3) I reflect a lot upon myself in relation to my group's values and beliefs; (4) In relation to my group's objectives I am very careful with the image I give to other people; (5) I am well aware of the image I give in relation to my group; (6) I constantly think of the reasons for my behaviour in relation to my group's objectives; (7) I normally think of myself as a representative of my group; (8) I am worried about the image my group gives; (9) When my group gets what it wants I am happy; (10) I dream about myself many times in relation to my group; (11) I do not feel responsible or guilty if a member of my closest group (family) fails; (12) I do not feel responsible or guilty if a friend fails; (13) When my group does not achieve what it wants I get very annoyed; (14) When a member of my group achieves what s/he wants I feel well. Questions number 11 and 12 are to be inversely scored. The scale was passed with a score of 1 = totally disagree to 7 = total agreement. In our sample the reliability of our collective self-consciousness scale was .73. This collective self-consciousness scale had a satisfactory convergent validity – a correlation of .39, $p < .01$ with Hui's individualism–collectivism scale; .22,

p < .05 with Garza and Herringer's scale of group identification; and .21, *p* < .05 with a scale of importance of group membership for one's self (Páez et al., 1992).

These results suggest that the chronic accessibility of the collective dimension of the self, or, in other words, the stable focalization of internal and external attention on the collective or group dimensions of identity, is coherently associated with a positive evaluation of collectivism, with a positive identification with the groups and with a structure of one's self based on one's group membership.

Conclusions

This chapter has examined the conditions and processes by which social identity regulates social perception and behaviour. We have emphasized the role of socio-structural variables and of socially shared beliefs in order to explain this process. This is why we underlined the importance of social status and the predominance of collectivistic cultural values as factors which will moderate the regulation of one's behaviour by social identity.

We stressed the *stronger influence which social identity has in collectivistic* and sociocentric *cultures* in comparison to individualistic or egocentric cultures. We also showed the same pattern of results for dominated or low-status groups. On the other hand, dominant classes and individualistic cultures reflect more the attention and valuation of a subject who possesses resources, augmenting the salience of personal over social identity.

High-status groups will *stress* the personal aspects of identity, the perception of ingroup *individuation and differentiation. Dominated groups* will have a self-concept which will place more emphasis on group membership, stressing the perception of *intragroup homogeneity* – the same as subjects from collectivistic cultures.

Groups in general view themselves as superior in comparison to other groups on those attributes which define them or which are typical of them, and tend to perceive outgroups as less variable or more homogeneous. Nevertheless, in threatening situations and in relation to defining or typical attributes of one's collective identity, exactly the opposite takes place: they are perceived as more homogeneous.

Social status was another variable which moderated the relationship between social identity and ingroup favouritism. Subjects perceive their ingroup as superior to the outgroup on those attributes which define it, although they do not necessarily show general favouritism. This favouritism will be most clearly found among high-status groups. Although in general subjects represent their ingroup as more heterogeneous than the outgroup, at the same time they state that it is more homogeneous, or less variable, on those attributes which define it. *Low-status* or -prestige groups show *outgroup favouritism* or altercentrism, while at the same time they view themselves as superior on specific dimensions, especially sociability and

expressiveness. Our own study on psychologists and engineers in Spain confirmed that the perceptive *superiority of a lower status* ingroup (psychologists) was found in an *expressive dimension* (they viewed themselves as more friendly and sociable), accepting the fact that the *high-status outgroup* (engineers) was *superior* to them in more *instrumental* attributes.

SIT states that group membership is a source of self-esteem, and that belonging to a disadvantaged group will motivate favourable social comparison and social competition. In a sense, dominated or low-status groups do not show a deficit in self-esteem. The differentiation between personal and social identity, as well as the relative independence of private, public and personal collective self-esteem, are two mechanisms which explain why the members of dominated and stigmatized classes do not show a deficit in personal self-esteem.

Also, as we have already stated, the relationship between discrimination and the increase in self-esteem is not consistent. The difference between individual and collective self-esteem partly explains the lack of association between identification, discrimination and self-esteem. Studies conducted on collective self-esteem and on fraternalistic relative deprivation and political participation suggest that a threatened high collective self-esteem is one of the antecedents of a biased social perception and of discriminatory behaviour.

Tendencies towards ingroup favouritism are clearer among those individuals who share a strong group identification, high collective self-esteem and collectivistic values. Those individuals who value belongingness to collectivities also think that their group membership is important and they positively value this membership for their identity. These are the people who have stronger reactions when their social identity is under threat; they increase intergroup differentiation, positively compare their ingroup to other groups, and increase the identification and attraction of their group. Our correlational studies confirmed that individuals with a strong group identification show high private and public group self-consciousness, more stability, a better valuation, a positive emotional reaction, and attach more importance to belonging to a group for their identity.

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